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Fix integer overflow in STRALGO LCS (CVE-2021-32625) (#9011)
An integer overflow bug in Redis version 6.0 or newer can be exploited using the STRALGO LCS command to corrupt the heap and potentially result with remote code execution. This is a result of an incomplete fix by CVE-2021-29477.
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@ -800,6 +800,12 @@ void stralgoLCS(client *c) {
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goto cleanup;
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}
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/* Detect string truncation or later overflows. */
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if (sdslen(a) >= UINT32_MAX-1 || sdslen(b) >= UINT32_MAX-1) {
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addReplyError(c, "String too long for LCS");
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goto cleanup;
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}
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/* Compute the LCS using the vanilla dynamic programming technique of
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* building a table of LCS(x,y) substrings. */
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uint32_t alen = sdslen(a);
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@ -808,9 +814,19 @@ void stralgoLCS(client *c) {
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/* Setup an uint32_t array to store at LCS[i,j] the length of the
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* LCS A0..i-1, B0..j-1. Note that we have a linear array here, so
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* we index it as LCS[j+(blen+1)*j] */
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uint32_t *lcs = zmalloc((size_t)(alen+1)*(blen+1)*sizeof(uint32_t));
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#define LCS(A,B) lcs[(B)+((A)*(blen+1))]
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/* Try to allocate the LCS table, and abort on overflow or insufficient memory. */
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unsigned long long lcssize = (unsigned long long)(alen+1)*(blen+1); /* Can't overflow due to the size limits above. */
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unsigned long long lcsalloc = lcssize * sizeof(uint32_t);
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uint32_t *lcs = NULL;
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if (lcsalloc < SIZE_MAX && lcsalloc / lcssize == sizeof(uint32_t))
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lcs = ztrymalloc(lcsalloc);
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if (!lcs) {
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addReplyError(c, "Insufficient memory");
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goto cleanup;
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}
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/* Start building the LCS table. */
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i <= alen; i++) {
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for (uint32_t j = 0; j <= blen; j++) {
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