mirror of https://gitee.com/openkylin/libvirt.git
qemu: hotplug: Don't try to infer secret object alias/presence
Now that we remember the alias we've used to attach the secret objects we should reuse them rather than trying to infer them from the disk configuration. Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
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@ -3900,16 +3900,17 @@ qemuDomainRemoveDiskDevice(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
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virDomainObjPtr vm,
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virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
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{
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qemuDomainStorageSourcePrivatePtr diskPriv = QEMU_DOMAIN_STORAGE_SOURCE_PRIVATE(disk->src);
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virDomainDeviceDef dev;
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virObjectEventPtr event;
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size_t i;
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const char *src = virDomainDiskGetSource(disk);
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qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
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char *drivestr;
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char *objAlias = NULL;
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char *encAlias = NULL;
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bool prManaged = priv->prDaemonRunning;
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bool prUsed = false;
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const char *authAlias = NULL;
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const char *encAlias = NULL;
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VIR_DEBUG("Removing disk %s from domain %p %s",
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disk->info.alias, vm, vm->def->name);
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@ -3919,32 +3920,14 @@ qemuDomainRemoveDiskDevice(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
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if (!(drivestr = qemuAliasFromDisk(disk)))
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return -1;
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/* Let's look for some markers for a secret object and create an alias
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* object to be used to attempt to delete the object that was created.
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* We cannot just use the disk private secret info since it would have
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* been removed during cleanup of qemuProcessLaunch. Likewise, libvirtd
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* restart wouldn't have them, so no assumption can be made. */
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if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_OBJECT_SECRET) &&
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qemuDomainStorageSourceHasAuth(disk->src)) {
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if (diskPriv) {
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if (diskPriv->secinfo &&
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diskPriv->secinfo->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECRET_INFO_TYPE_AES)
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authAlias = diskPriv->secinfo->s.aes.alias;
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if (!(objAlias =
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qemuDomainGetSecretAESAlias(disk->info.alias, false))) {
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VIR_FREE(drivestr);
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return -1;
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}
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}
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/* Similarly, if this is possible a device using LUKS encryption, we
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* can remove the luks object password too
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*/
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if (qemuDomainDiskHasEncryptionSecret(disk->src)) {
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if (!(encAlias =
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qemuDomainGetSecretAESAlias(disk->info.alias, true))) {
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VIR_FREE(objAlias);
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VIR_FREE(drivestr);
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return -1;
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}
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if (diskPriv->encinfo &&
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diskPriv->encinfo->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECRET_INFO_TYPE_AES)
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encAlias = diskPriv->encinfo->s.aes.alias;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < vm->def->ndisks; i++) {
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@ -3963,14 +3946,12 @@ qemuDomainRemoveDiskDevice(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
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VIR_FREE(drivestr);
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/* If it fails, then so be it - it was a best shot */
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if (objAlias)
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ignore_value(qemuMonitorDelObject(priv->mon, objAlias));
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VIR_FREE(objAlias);
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if (authAlias)
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ignore_value(qemuMonitorDelObject(priv->mon, authAlias));
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/* If it fails, then so be it - it was a best shot */
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if (encAlias)
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ignore_value(qemuMonitorDelObject(priv->mon, encAlias));
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VIR_FREE(encAlias);
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/* If it fails, then so be it - it was a best shot */
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if (disk->src->pr &&
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