/* * virt-host-validate-common.c: Sanity check helper APIs * * Copyright (C) 2012, 2014 Red Hat, Inc. * * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. * * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU * Lesser General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public * License along with this library. If not, see * . * */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "viralloc.h" #include "vircgroup.h" #include "virfile.h" #include "virt-host-validate-common.h" #include "virstring.h" #include "virarch.h" #include "virutil.h" #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_NONE VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virHostValidateCPUFlag, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_LAST, "vmx", "svm", "sie", "158", "sev"); static bool quiet; void virHostMsgSetQuiet(bool quietFlag) { quiet = quietFlag; } void virHostMsgCheck(const char *prefix, const char *format, ...) { va_list args; char *msg; if (quiet) return; va_start(args, format); msg = g_strdup_vprintf(format, args); va_end(args); fprintf(stdout, _("%6s: Checking %-60s: "), prefix, msg); VIR_FREE(msg); } static bool virHostMsgWantEscape(void) { static bool detectTty = true; static bool wantEscape; if (detectTty) { if (isatty(STDOUT_FILENO)) wantEscape = true; detectTty = false; } return wantEscape; } void virHostMsgPass(void) { if (quiet) return; if (virHostMsgWantEscape()) fprintf(stdout, "\033[32m%s\033[0m\n", _("PASS")); else fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", _("PASS")); } static const char * failMessages[] = { N_("FAIL"), N_("WARN"), N_("NOTE"), }; G_STATIC_ASSERT(G_N_ELEMENTS(failMessages) == VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_LAST); static const char *failEscapeCodes[] = { "\033[31m", "\033[33m", "\033[34m", }; G_STATIC_ASSERT(G_N_ELEMENTS(failEscapeCodes) == VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_LAST); void virHostMsgFail(virHostValidateLevel level, const char *format, ...) { va_list args; char *msg; if (quiet) return; va_start(args, format); msg = g_strdup_vprintf(format, args); va_end(args); if (virHostMsgWantEscape()) fprintf(stdout, "%s%s\033[0m (%s)\n", failEscapeCodes[level], _(failMessages[level]), msg); else fprintf(stdout, "%s (%s)\n", _(failMessages[level]), msg); VIR_FREE(msg); } int virHostValidateDeviceExists(const char *hvname, const char *dev_name, virHostValidateLevel level, const char *hint) { virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "if device %s exists", dev_name); if (access(dev_name, F_OK) < 0) { virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint); return -1; } virHostMsgPass(); return 0; } int virHostValidateDeviceAccessible(const char *hvname, const char *dev_name, virHostValidateLevel level, const char *hint) { virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "if device %s is accessible", dev_name); if (access(dev_name, R_OK|W_OK) < 0) { virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint); return -1; } virHostMsgPass(); return 0; } int virHostValidateNamespace(const char *hvname, const char *ns_name, virHostValidateLevel level, const char *hint) { char nspath[100]; virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "for namespace %s", ns_name); g_snprintf(nspath, sizeof(nspath), "/proc/self/ns/%s", ns_name); if (access(nspath, F_OK) < 0) { virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint); return -1; } virHostMsgPass(); return 0; } virBitmapPtr virHostValidateGetCPUFlags(void) { FILE *fp; virBitmapPtr flags = NULL; if (!(fp = fopen("/proc/cpuinfo", "r"))) return NULL; flags = virBitmapNew(VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_LAST); do { char line[1024]; char *start; char **tokens; size_t ntokens; size_t i; if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp)) break; /* The line we're interested in is marked differently depending * on the architecture, so check possible prefixes */ if (!STRPREFIX(line, "flags") && !STRPREFIX(line, "Features") && !STRPREFIX(line, "features") && !STRPREFIX(line, "facilities")) continue; /* fgets() includes the trailing newline in the output buffer, * so we need to clean that up ourselves. We can safely access * line[strlen(line) - 1] because the checks above would cause * us to skip empty strings */ line[strlen(line) - 1] = '\0'; /* Skip to the separator */ if (!(start = strchr(line, ':'))) continue; /* Split the line using " " as a delimiter. The first token * will always be ":", but that's okay */ if (!(tokens = virStringSplitCount(start, " ", 0, &ntokens))) continue; /* Go through all flags and check whether one of those we * might want to check for later on is present; if that's * the case, set the relevant bit in the bitmap */ for (i = 0; i < ntokens; i++) { int value; if ((value = virHostValidateCPUFlagTypeFromString(tokens[i])) >= 0) ignore_value(virBitmapSetBit(flags, value)); } virStringListFreeCount(tokens, ntokens); } while (1); VIR_FORCE_FCLOSE(fp); return flags; } int virHostValidateLinuxKernel(const char *hvname, int version, virHostValidateLevel level, const char *hint) { struct utsname uts; unsigned long thisversion; uname(&uts); virHostMsgCheck(hvname, _("for Linux >= %d.%d.%d"), ((version >> 16) & 0xff), ((version >> 8) & 0xff), (version & 0xff)); if (STRNEQ(uts.sysname, "Linux")) { virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint); return -1; } if (virParseVersionString(uts.release, &thisversion, true) < 0) { virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint); return -1; } if (thisversion < version) { virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint); return -1; } else { virHostMsgPass(); return 0; } } #ifdef __linux__ int virHostValidateCGroupControllers(const char *hvname, int controllers, virHostValidateLevel level) { g_autoptr(virCgroup) group = NULL; int ret = 0; size_t i; if (virCgroupNewSelf(&group) < 0) return -1; for (i = 0; i < VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_LAST; i++) { int flag = 1 << i; const char *cg_name = virCgroupControllerTypeToString(i); if (!(controllers & flag)) continue; virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "for cgroup '%s' controller support", cg_name); if (!virCgroupHasController(group, i)) { ret = -1; virHostMsgFail(level, "Enable '%s' in kernel Kconfig file or " "mount/enable cgroup controller in your system", cg_name); } else { virHostMsgPass(); } } return ret; } #else /* !__linux__ */ int virHostValidateCGroupControllers(const char *hvname G_GNUC_UNUSED, int controllers G_GNUC_UNUSED, virHostValidateLevel level) { virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", "This platform does not support cgroups"); return -1; } #endif /* !__linux__ */ int virHostValidateIOMMU(const char *hvname, virHostValidateLevel level) { virBitmapPtr flags; struct stat sb; const char *bootarg = NULL; bool isAMD = false, isIntel = false; virArch arch = virArchFromHost(); struct dirent *dent; int rc; flags = virHostValidateGetCPUFlags(); if (flags && virBitmapIsBitSet(flags, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_VMX)) isIntel = true; else if (flags && virBitmapIsBitSet(flags, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_SVM)) isAMD = true; virBitmapFree(flags); if (isIntel) { virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "%s", _("for device assignment IOMMU support")); if (access("/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/DMAR", F_OK) == 0) { virHostMsgPass(); bootarg = "intel_iommu=on"; } else { virHostMsgFail(level, "No ACPI DMAR table found, IOMMU either " "disabled in BIOS or not supported by this " "hardware platform"); return -1; } } else if (isAMD) { virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "%s", _("for device assignment IOMMU support")); if (access("/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/IVRS", F_OK) == 0) { virHostMsgPass(); bootarg = "iommu=pt iommu=1"; } else { virHostMsgFail(level, "No ACPI IVRS table found, IOMMU either " "disabled in BIOS or not supported by this " "hardware platform"); return -1; } } else if (ARCH_IS_PPC64(arch)) { /* Empty Block */ } else if (ARCH_IS_S390(arch)) { DIR *dir; /* On s390x, we skip the IOMMU check if there are no PCI * devices (which is quite usual on s390x). If there are * no PCI devices the directory is still there but is * empty. */ if (!virDirOpen(&dir, "/sys/bus/pci/devices")) return 0; rc = virDirRead(dir, &dent, NULL); VIR_DIR_CLOSE(dir); if (rc <= 0) return 0; } else { virHostMsgFail(level, "Unknown if this platform has IOMMU support"); return -1; } /* We can only check on newer kernels with iommu groups & vfio */ if (stat("/sys/kernel/iommu_groups", &sb) < 0) return 0; if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) return 0; virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "%s", _("if IOMMU is enabled by kernel")); if (sb.st_nlink <= 2) { if (bootarg) virHostMsgFail(level, "IOMMU appears to be disabled in kernel. " "Add %s to kernel cmdline arguments", bootarg); else virHostMsgFail(level, "IOMMU capability not compiled into kernel."); return -1; } virHostMsgPass(); return 0; } bool virHostKernelModuleIsLoaded(const char *module) { FILE *fp; bool ret = false; if (!(fp = fopen("/proc/modules", "r"))) return false; do { char line[1024]; if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp)) break; if (STRPREFIX(line, module)) { ret = true; break; } } while (1); VIR_FORCE_FCLOSE(fp); return ret; } int virHostValidateSecureGuests(const char *hvname, virHostValidateLevel level) { virBitmapPtr flags; bool hasFac158 = false; bool hasAMDSev = false; virArch arch = virArchFromHost(); g_autofree char *cmdline = NULL; static const char *kIBMValues[] = {"y", "Y", "on", "ON", "oN", "On", "1"}; g_autofree char *mod_value = NULL; flags = virHostValidateGetCPUFlags(); if (flags && virBitmapIsBitSet(flags, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_FACILITY_158)) hasFac158 = true; else if (flags && virBitmapIsBitSet(flags, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_SEV)) hasAMDSev = true; virBitmapFree(flags); virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "%s", _("for secure guest support")); if (ARCH_IS_S390(arch)) { if (hasFac158) { if (!virFileIsDir("/sys/firmware/uv")) { virHostMsgFail(level, "IBM Secure Execution not supported by " "the currently used kernel"); return 0; } if (virFileReadValueString(&cmdline, "/proc/cmdline") < 0) return -1; /* we're prefix matching rather than equality matching here, because * kernel would treat even something like prot_virt='yFOO' as * enabled */ if (virKernelCmdlineMatchParam(cmdline, "prot_virt", kIBMValues, G_N_ELEMENTS(kIBMValues), VIR_KERNEL_CMDLINE_FLAGS_SEARCH_FIRST | VIR_KERNEL_CMDLINE_FLAGS_CMP_PREFIX)) { virHostMsgPass(); return 1; } else { virHostMsgFail(level, "IBM Secure Execution appears to be disabled " "in kernel. Add prot_virt=1 to kernel cmdline " "arguments"); } } else { virHostMsgFail(level, "Hardware or firmware does not provide " "support for IBM Secure Execution"); } } else if (hasAMDSev) { if (virFileReadValueString(&mod_value, "/sys/module/kvm_amd/parameters/sev") < 0) { virHostMsgFail(level, "AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization not " "supported by the currently used kernel"); return 0; } if (mod_value[0] != '1') { virHostMsgFail(level, "AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization appears to be " "disabled in kernel. Add kvm_amd.sev=1 " "to the kernel cmdline arguments"); return 0; } if (virFileExists("/dev/sev")) { virHostMsgPass(); return 1; } else { virHostMsgFail(level, "AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization appears to be " "disabled in firemare."); } } else { virHostMsgFail(level, "Unknown if this platform has Secure Guest support"); return -1; } return 0; }