libvirt/tools/virt-host-validate-common.c

530 lines
15 KiB
C

/*
* virt-host-validate-common.c: Sanity check helper APIs
*
* Copyright (C) 2012, 2014 Red Hat, Inc.
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this library. If not, see
* <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/utsname.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include "viralloc.h"
#include "vircgroup.h"
#include "virfile.h"
#include "virt-host-validate-common.h"
#include "virstring.h"
#include "virarch.h"
#include "virutil.h"
#define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_NONE
VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virHostValidateCPUFlag,
VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_LAST,
"vmx",
"svm",
"sie",
"158",
"sev");
static bool quiet;
void virHostMsgSetQuiet(bool quietFlag)
{
quiet = quietFlag;
}
void virHostMsgCheck(const char *prefix,
const char *format,
...)
{
va_list args;
char *msg;
if (quiet)
return;
va_start(args, format);
msg = g_strdup_vprintf(format, args);
va_end(args);
fprintf(stdout, _("%6s: Checking %-60s: "), prefix, msg);
VIR_FREE(msg);
}
static bool virHostMsgWantEscape(void)
{
static bool detectTty = true;
static bool wantEscape;
if (detectTty) {
if (isatty(STDOUT_FILENO))
wantEscape = true;
detectTty = false;
}
return wantEscape;
}
void virHostMsgPass(void)
{
if (quiet)
return;
if (virHostMsgWantEscape())
fprintf(stdout, "\033[32m%s\033[0m\n", _("PASS"));
else
fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", _("PASS"));
}
static const char * failMessages[] = {
N_("FAIL"),
N_("WARN"),
N_("NOTE"),
};
G_STATIC_ASSERT(G_N_ELEMENTS(failMessages) == VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_LAST);
static const char *failEscapeCodes[] = {
"\033[31m",
"\033[33m",
"\033[34m",
};
G_STATIC_ASSERT(G_N_ELEMENTS(failEscapeCodes) == VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_LAST);
void virHostMsgFail(virHostValidateLevel level,
const char *format,
...)
{
va_list args;
char *msg;
if (quiet)
return;
va_start(args, format);
msg = g_strdup_vprintf(format, args);
va_end(args);
if (virHostMsgWantEscape())
fprintf(stdout, "%s%s\033[0m (%s)\n",
failEscapeCodes[level], _(failMessages[level]), msg);
else
fprintf(stdout, "%s (%s)\n",
_(failMessages[level]), msg);
VIR_FREE(msg);
}
int virHostValidateDeviceExists(const char *hvname,
const char *dev_name,
virHostValidateLevel level,
const char *hint)
{
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "if device %s exists", dev_name);
if (access(dev_name, F_OK) < 0) {
virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
return -1;
}
virHostMsgPass();
return 0;
}
int virHostValidateDeviceAccessible(const char *hvname,
const char *dev_name,
virHostValidateLevel level,
const char *hint)
{
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "if device %s is accessible", dev_name);
if (access(dev_name, R_OK|W_OK) < 0) {
virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
return -1;
}
virHostMsgPass();
return 0;
}
int virHostValidateNamespace(const char *hvname,
const char *ns_name,
virHostValidateLevel level,
const char *hint)
{
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "for namespace %s", ns_name);
char nspath[100];
g_snprintf(nspath, sizeof(nspath), "/proc/self/ns/%s", ns_name);
if (access(nspath, F_OK) < 0) {
virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
return -1;
}
virHostMsgPass();
return 0;
}
virBitmapPtr virHostValidateGetCPUFlags(void)
{
FILE *fp;
virBitmapPtr flags = NULL;
if (!(fp = fopen("/proc/cpuinfo", "r")))
return NULL;
if (!(flags = virBitmapNewQuiet(VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_LAST)))
goto cleanup;
do {
char line[1024];
char *start;
char **tokens;
size_t ntokens;
size_t i;
if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp))
break;
/* The line we're interested in is marked differently depending
* on the architecture, so check possible prefixes */
if (!STRPREFIX(line, "flags") &&
!STRPREFIX(line, "Features") &&
!STRPREFIX(line, "features") &&
!STRPREFIX(line, "facilities"))
continue;
/* fgets() includes the trailing newline in the output buffer,
* so we need to clean that up ourselves. We can safely access
* line[strlen(line) - 1] because the checks above would cause
* us to skip empty strings */
line[strlen(line) - 1] = '\0';
/* Skip to the separator */
if (!(start = strchr(line, ':')))
continue;
/* Split the line using " " as a delimiter. The first token
* will always be ":", but that's okay */
if (!(tokens = virStringSplitCount(start, " ", 0, &ntokens)))
continue;
/* Go through all flags and check whether one of those we
* might want to check for later on is present; if that's
* the case, set the relevant bit in the bitmap */
for (i = 0; i < ntokens; i++) {
int value;
if ((value = virHostValidateCPUFlagTypeFromString(tokens[i])) >= 0)
ignore_value(virBitmapSetBit(flags, value));
}
virStringListFreeCount(tokens, ntokens);
} while (1);
cleanup:
VIR_FORCE_FCLOSE(fp);
return flags;
}
int virHostValidateLinuxKernel(const char *hvname,
int version,
virHostValidateLevel level,
const char *hint)
{
struct utsname uts;
unsigned long thisversion;
uname(&uts);
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, _("for Linux >= %d.%d.%d"),
((version >> 16) & 0xff),
((version >> 8) & 0xff),
(version & 0xff));
if (STRNEQ(uts.sysname, "Linux")) {
virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
return -1;
}
if (virParseVersionString(uts.release, &thisversion, true) < 0) {
virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
return -1;
}
if (thisversion < version) {
virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
return -1;
} else {
virHostMsgPass();
return 0;
}
}
#ifdef __linux__
int virHostValidateCGroupControllers(const char *hvname,
int controllers,
virHostValidateLevel level)
{
virCgroupPtr group = NULL;
int ret = 0;
size_t i;
if (virCgroupNewSelf(&group) < 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_LAST; i++) {
int flag = 1 << i;
const char *cg_name = virCgroupControllerTypeToString(i);
if (!(controllers & flag))
continue;
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "for cgroup '%s' controller support", cg_name);
if (!virCgroupHasController(group, i)) {
ret = -1;
virHostMsgFail(level, "Enable '%s' in kernel Kconfig file or "
"mount/enable cgroup controller in your system",
cg_name);
} else {
virHostMsgPass();
}
}
virCgroupFree(&group);
return ret;
}
#else /* !__linux__ */
int virHostValidateCGroupControllers(const char *hvname G_GNUC_UNUSED,
int controllers G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virHostValidateLevel level)
{
virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", "This platform does not support cgroups");
return -1;
}
#endif /* !__linux__ */
int virHostValidateIOMMU(const char *hvname,
virHostValidateLevel level)
{
virBitmapPtr flags;
struct stat sb;
const char *bootarg = NULL;
bool isAMD = false, isIntel = false;
virArch arch = virArchFromHost();
struct dirent *dent;
DIR *dir;
int rc;
flags = virHostValidateGetCPUFlags();
if (flags && virBitmapIsBitSet(flags, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_VMX))
isIntel = true;
else if (flags && virBitmapIsBitSet(flags, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_SVM))
isAMD = true;
virBitmapFree(flags);
if (isIntel) {
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "%s", _("for device assignment IOMMU support"));
if (access("/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/DMAR", F_OK) == 0) {
virHostMsgPass();
bootarg = "intel_iommu=on";
} else {
virHostMsgFail(level,
"No ACPI DMAR table found, IOMMU either "
"disabled in BIOS or not supported by this "
"hardware platform");
return -1;
}
} else if (isAMD) {
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "%s", _("for device assignment IOMMU support"));
if (access("/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/IVRS", F_OK) == 0) {
virHostMsgPass();
bootarg = "iommu=pt iommu=1";
} else {
virHostMsgFail(level,
"No ACPI IVRS table found, IOMMU either "
"disabled in BIOS or not supported by this "
"hardware platform");
return -1;
}
} else if (ARCH_IS_PPC64(arch)) {
/* Empty Block */
} else if (ARCH_IS_S390(arch)) {
/* On s390x, we skip the IOMMU check if there are no PCI
* devices (which is quite usual on s390x). If there are
* no PCI devices the directory is still there but is
* empty. */
if (!virDirOpen(&dir, "/sys/bus/pci/devices"))
return 0;
rc = virDirRead(dir, &dent, NULL);
VIR_DIR_CLOSE(dir);
if (rc <= 0)
return 0;
} else {
virHostMsgFail(level,
"Unknown if this platform has IOMMU support");
return -1;
}
/* We can only check on newer kernels with iommu groups & vfio */
if (stat("/sys/kernel/iommu_groups", &sb) < 0)
return 0;
if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode))
return 0;
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "%s", _("if IOMMU is enabled by kernel"));
if (sb.st_nlink <= 2) {
if (bootarg)
virHostMsgFail(level,
"IOMMU appears to be disabled in kernel. "
"Add %s to kernel cmdline arguments", bootarg);
else
virHostMsgFail(level, "IOMMU capability not compiled into kernel.");
return -1;
}
virHostMsgPass();
return 0;
}
bool virHostKernelModuleIsLoaded(const char *module)
{
FILE *fp;
bool ret = false;
if (!(fp = fopen("/proc/modules", "r")))
return false;
do {
char line[1024];
if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp))
break;
if (STRPREFIX(line, module)) {
ret = true;
break;
}
} while (1);
VIR_FORCE_FCLOSE(fp);
return ret;
}
int virHostValidateSecureGuests(const char *hvname,
virHostValidateLevel level)
{
virBitmapPtr flags;
bool hasFac158 = false;
bool hasAMDSev = false;
virArch arch = virArchFromHost();
g_autofree char *cmdline = NULL;
static const char *kIBMValues[] = {"y", "Y", "on", "ON", "oN", "On", "1"};
g_autofree char *mod_value = NULL;
flags = virHostValidateGetCPUFlags();
if (flags && virBitmapIsBitSet(flags, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_FACILITY_158))
hasFac158 = true;
else if (flags && virBitmapIsBitSet(flags, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_SEV))
hasAMDSev = true;
virBitmapFree(flags);
virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "%s", _("for secure guest support"));
if (ARCH_IS_S390(arch)) {
if (hasFac158) {
if (!virFileIsDir("/sys/firmware/uv")) {
virHostMsgFail(level, "IBM Secure Execution not supported by "
"the currently used kernel");
return 0;
}
if (virFileReadValueString(&cmdline, "/proc/cmdline") < 0)
return -1;
/* we're prefix matching rather than equality matching here, because
* kernel would treat even something like prot_virt='yFOO' as
* enabled
*/
if (virKernelCmdlineMatchParam(cmdline, "prot_virt", kIBMValues,
G_N_ELEMENTS(kIBMValues),
VIR_KERNEL_CMDLINE_FLAGS_SEARCH_FIRST |
VIR_KERNEL_CMDLINE_FLAGS_CMP_PREFIX)) {
virHostMsgPass();
return 1;
} else {
virHostMsgFail(level,
"IBM Secure Execution appears to be disabled "
"in kernel. Add prot_virt=1 to kernel cmdline "
"arguments");
}
} else {
virHostMsgFail(level, "Hardware or firmware does not provide "
"support for IBM Secure Execution");
}
} else if (hasAMDSev) {
if (virFileReadValueString(&mod_value, "/sys/module/kvm_amd/parameters/sev") < 0) {
virHostMsgFail(level, "AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization not "
"supported by the currently used kernel");
return 0;
}
if (mod_value[0] != '1') {
virHostMsgFail(level,
"AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization appears to be "
"disabled in kernel. Add kvm_amd.sev=1 "
"to the kernel cmdline arguments");
return 0;
}
if (virFileExists("/dev/sev")) {
virHostMsgPass();
return 1;
} else {
virHostMsgFail(level,
"AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization appears to be "
"disabled in firemare.");
}
} else {
virHostMsgFail(level,
"Unknown if this platform has Secure Guest support");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}