License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
|
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
* key management facility for FS encryption support.
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
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|
*
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
* This contains encryption key functions.
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Written by Michael Halcrow, Ildar Muslukhov, and Uday Savagaonkar, 2015.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
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|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <keys/user-type.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <crypto/aes.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <crypto/sha.h>
|
2016-11-27 09:32:46 +08:00
|
|
|
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct crypto_shash *essiv_hash_tfm;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
* derive_key_aes() - Derive a key using AES-128-ECB
|
2016-02-06 11:21:41 +08:00
|
|
|
* @deriving_key: Encryption key used for derivation.
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
* @source_key: Source key to which to apply derivation.
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
* @derived_raw_key: Derived raw key.
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: Zero on success; non-zero otherwise.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
static int derive_key_aes(u8 deriving_key[FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE],
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
const struct fscrypt_key *source_key,
|
|
|
|
u8 derived_raw_key[FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE])
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int res = 0;
|
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
|
|
|
struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
|
2017-10-18 15:00:44 +08:00
|
|
|
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
|
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
|
|
|
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0);
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
|
|
|
|
res = PTR_ERR(tfm);
|
|
|
|
tfm = NULL;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
|
|
|
crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
|
|
|
|
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!req) {
|
|
|
|
res = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
|
|
|
skcipher_request_set_callback(req,
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
|
2017-10-18 15:00:44 +08:00
|
|
|
crypto_req_done, &wait);
|
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
|
|
|
res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, deriving_key,
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE);
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (res < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
sg_init_one(&src_sg, source_key->raw, source_key->size);
|
|
|
|
sg_init_one(&dst_sg, derived_raw_key, source_key->size);
|
|
|
|
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, source_key->size,
|
|
|
|
NULL);
|
2017-10-18 15:00:44 +08:00
|
|
|
res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
|
|
|
skcipher_request_free(req);
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-05 13:05:01 +08:00
|
|
|
static int validate_user_key(struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info,
|
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_context *ctx, u8 *raw_key,
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
const char *prefix, int min_keysize)
|
2016-05-05 13:05:01 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-01-06 05:51:18 +08:00
|
|
|
char *description;
|
2016-05-05 13:05:01 +08:00
|
|
|
struct key *keyring_key;
|
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_key *master_key;
|
|
|
|
const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
|
|
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-06 05:51:18 +08:00
|
|
|
description = kasprintf(GFP_NOFS, "%s%*phN", prefix,
|
|
|
|
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
ctx->master_key_descriptor);
|
|
|
|
if (!description)
|
2016-05-05 13:05:01 +08:00
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-06 05:51:18 +08:00
|
|
|
keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_logon, description, NULL);
|
|
|
|
kfree(description);
|
2016-05-05 13:05:01 +08:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(keyring_key))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(keyring_key);
|
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
2017-02-22 07:07:11 +08:00
|
|
|
down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
|
2016-05-05 13:05:01 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) {
|
|
|
|
printk_once(KERN_WARNING
|
|
|
|
"%s: key type must be logon\n", __func__);
|
|
|
|
res = -ENOKEY;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-03-01 23:11:23 +08:00
|
|
|
ukp = user_key_payload_locked(keyring_key);
|
2017-10-10 03:46:18 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ukp) {
|
|
|
|
/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
|
|
|
|
res = -EKEYREVOKED;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-05-05 13:05:01 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct fscrypt_key)) {
|
|
|
|
res = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
master_key = (struct fscrypt_key *)ukp->data;
|
|
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE != FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
if (master_key->size < min_keysize || master_key->size > FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE
|
|
|
|
|| master_key->size % AES_BLOCK_SIZE != 0) {
|
2016-05-05 13:05:01 +08:00
|
|
|
printk_once(KERN_WARNING
|
|
|
|
"%s: key size incorrect: %d\n",
|
|
|
|
__func__, master_key->size);
|
|
|
|
res = -ENOKEY;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
res = derive_key_aes(ctx->nonce, master_key, raw_key);
|
2016-05-05 13:05:01 +08:00
|
|
|
out:
|
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
2017-02-22 07:07:11 +08:00
|
|
|
up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
|
2016-05-05 13:05:01 +08:00
|
|
|
key_put(keyring_key);
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
static const struct {
|
|
|
|
const char *cipher_str;
|
|
|
|
int keysize;
|
|
|
|
} available_modes[] = {
|
|
|
|
[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS] = { "xts(aes)",
|
|
|
|
FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE },
|
|
|
|
[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS] = { "cts(cbc(aes))",
|
|
|
|
FS_AES_256_CTS_KEY_SIZE },
|
|
|
|
[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC] = { "cbc(aes)",
|
|
|
|
FS_AES_128_CBC_KEY_SIZE },
|
|
|
|
[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CTS] = { "cts(cbc(aes))",
|
|
|
|
FS_AES_128_CTS_KEY_SIZE },
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-09-16 01:32:11 +08:00
|
|
|
static int determine_cipher_type(struct fscrypt_info *ci, struct inode *inode,
|
|
|
|
const char **cipher_str_ret, int *keysize_ret)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
u32 mode;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(ci->ci_data_mode, ci->ci_filename_mode)) {
|
|
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("fscrypt: inode %lu uses unsupported encryption modes (contents mode %d, filenames mode %d)\n",
|
|
|
|
inode->i_ino,
|
|
|
|
ci->ci_data_mode, ci->ci_filename_mode);
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2016-09-16 01:32:11 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
|
|
|
|
mode = ci->ci_data_mode;
|
|
|
|
} else if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
|
|
|
|
mode = ci->ci_filename_mode;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ONCE(1, "fscrypt: filesystem tried to load encryption info for inode %lu, which is not encryptable (file type %d)\n",
|
|
|
|
inode->i_ino, (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT));
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2016-09-16 01:32:11 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
*cipher_str_ret = available_modes[mode].cipher_str;
|
|
|
|
*keysize_ret = available_modes[mode].keysize;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2016-09-16 01:32:11 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!ci)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
|
|
|
crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
crypto_free_cipher(ci->ci_essiv_tfm);
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci);
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
static int derive_essiv_salt(const u8 *key, int keysize, u8 *salt)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_shash *tfm = READ_ONCE(essiv_hash_tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* init hash transform on demand */
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!tfm)) {
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_shash *prev_tfm;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
|
|
|
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("fscrypt: error allocating SHA-256 transform: %ld\n",
|
|
|
|
PTR_ERR(tfm));
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
prev_tfm = cmpxchg(&essiv_hash_tfm, NULL, tfm);
|
|
|
|
if (prev_tfm) {
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
|
|
|
|
tfm = prev_tfm;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
|
|
|
|
desc->tfm = tfm;
|
|
|
|
desc->flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return crypto_shash_digest(desc, key, keysize, salt);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int init_essiv_generator(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key,
|
|
|
|
int keysize)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
|
|
|
|
u8 salt[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ci->ci_essiv_tfm = essiv_tfm;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = derive_essiv_salt(raw_key, keysize, salt);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Using SHA256 to derive the salt/key will result in AES-256 being
|
|
|
|
* used for IV generation. File contents encryption will still use the
|
|
|
|
* configured keysize (AES-128) nevertheless.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, sizeof(salt));
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
memzero_explicit(salt, sizeof(salt));
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_shash(essiv_hash_tfm);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
2017-02-22 07:07:11 +08:00
|
|
|
int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info;
|
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_context ctx;
|
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
|
|
|
struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm;
|
2015-05-20 13:26:54 +08:00
|
|
|
const char *cipher_str;
|
2016-09-16 01:32:11 +08:00
|
|
|
int keysize;
|
2016-11-14 09:41:09 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 *raw_key = NULL;
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
|
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
2017-02-22 07:07:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (inode->i_crypt_info)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-07 06:53:57 +08:00
|
|
|
res = fscrypt_initialize(inode->i_sb->s_cop->flags);
|
2015-05-16 06:37:24 +08:00
|
|
|
if (res)
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
|
|
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
2017-01-03 04:12:17 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled(inode) ||
|
2017-10-10 03:15:36 +08:00
|
|
|
IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
return res;
|
2017-01-03 04:12:17 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Fake up a context for an unencrypted directory */
|
|
|
|
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
|
2016-09-16 01:32:11 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx.contents_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
|
|
|
|
ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS;
|
2017-01-03 04:12:17 +08:00
|
|
|
memset(ctx.master_key_descriptor, 0x42, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
} else if (res != sizeof(ctx)) {
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-09-16 01:32:11 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx.format != FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx.flags & ~FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
crypt_info = kmem_cache_alloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!crypt_info)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_flags = ctx.flags;
|
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
|
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
|
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL;
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_essiv_tfm = NULL;
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key));
|
2015-05-13 04:33:00 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-09-16 01:32:11 +08:00
|
|
|
res = determine_cipher_type(crypt_info, inode, &cipher_str, &keysize);
|
|
|
|
if (res)
|
2015-05-20 13:26:54 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2016-09-16 01:32:11 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-11-14 09:41:09 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This cannot be a stack buffer because it is passed to the scatterlist
|
|
|
|
* crypto API as part of key derivation.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
res = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
raw_key = kmalloc(FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE, GFP_NOFS);
|
|
|
|
if (!raw_key)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
res = validate_user_key(crypt_info, &ctx, raw_key, FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX,
|
|
|
|
keysize);
|
2016-05-05 13:05:01 +08:00
|
|
|
if (res && inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix) {
|
2017-01-06 05:51:18 +08:00
|
|
|
int res2 = validate_user_key(crypt_info, &ctx, raw_key,
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix,
|
|
|
|
keysize);
|
2016-05-05 13:05:01 +08:00
|
|
|
if (res2) {
|
|
|
|
if (res2 == -ENOKEY)
|
|
|
|
res = -ENOKEY;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (res) {
|
2016-02-06 11:19:01 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
|
|
|
ctfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(cipher_str, 0, 0);
|
2015-05-20 13:26:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ctfm || IS_ERR(ctfm)) {
|
|
|
|
res = ctfm ? PTR_ERR(ctfm) : -ENOMEM;
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
pr_debug("%s: error %d (inode %lu) allocating crypto tfm\n",
|
|
|
|
__func__, res, inode->i_ino);
|
2015-05-20 13:26:54 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-05-20 13:26:54 +08:00
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_ctfm = ctfm;
|
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
|
|
|
crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(ctfm, ~0);
|
|
|
|
crypto_skcipher_set_flags(ctfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* if the provided key is longer than keysize, we use the first
|
|
|
|
* keysize bytes of the derived key only
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-09-16 01:32:11 +08:00
|
|
|
res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(ctfm, raw_key, keysize);
|
2015-05-20 13:26:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (res)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-19 15:27:58 +08:00
|
|
|
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
|
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_data_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC) {
|
|
|
|
res = init_essiv_generator(crypt_info, raw_key, keysize);
|
|
|
|
if (res) {
|
|
|
|
pr_debug("%s: error %d (inode %lu) allocating essiv tfm\n",
|
|
|
|
__func__, res, inode->i_ino);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
2017-02-22 07:07:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (cmpxchg(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
crypt_info = NULL;
|
2015-05-20 13:26:54 +08:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (res == -ENOKEY)
|
2015-05-20 13:26:54 +08:00
|
|
|
res = 0;
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
put_crypt_info(crypt_info);
|
2016-11-14 09:41:09 +08:00
|
|
|
kzfree(raw_key);
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
}
|
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
2017-02-22 07:07:11 +08:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_get_encryption_info);
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, struct fscrypt_info *ci)
|
2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_info *prev;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ci == NULL)
|
locking/atomics: COCCINELLE/treewide: Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() patterns to READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE()
Please do not apply this to mainline directly, instead please re-run the
coccinelle script shown below and apply its output.
For several reasons, it is desirable to use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() in
preference to ACCESS_ONCE(), and new code is expected to use one of the
former. So far, there's been no reason to change most existing uses of
ACCESS_ONCE(), as these aren't harmful, and changing them results in
churn.
However, for some features, the read/write distinction is critical to
correct operation. To distinguish these cases, separate read/write
accessors must be used. This patch migrates (most) remaining
ACCESS_ONCE() instances to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(), using the following
coccinelle script:
----
// Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() uses to equivalent READ_ONCE() and
// WRITE_ONCE()
// $ make coccicheck COCCI=/home/mark/once.cocci SPFLAGS="--include-headers" MODE=patch
virtual patch
@ depends on patch @
expression E1, E2;
@@
- ACCESS_ONCE(E1) = E2
+ WRITE_ONCE(E1, E2)
@ depends on patch @
expression E;
@@
- ACCESS_ONCE(E)
+ READ_ONCE(E)
----
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au
Cc: shuah@kernel.org
Cc: snitzer@redhat.com
Cc: thor.thayer@linux.intel.com
Cc: tj@kernel.org
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508792849-3115-19-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-10-24 05:07:29 +08:00
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ci = READ_ONCE(inode->i_crypt_info);
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2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
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if (ci == NULL)
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return;
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2015-04-22 07:23:47 +08:00
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2015-05-16 07:26:10 +08:00
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prev = cmpxchg(&inode->i_crypt_info, ci, NULL);
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if (prev != ci)
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return;
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put_crypt_info(ci);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_put_encryption_info);
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