linux/fs/exec.c

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/*
* linux/fs/exec.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
*/
/*
* #!-checking implemented by tytso.
*/
/*
* Demand-loading implemented 01.12.91 - no need to read anything but
* the header into memory. The inode of the executable is put into
* "current->executable", and page faults do the actual loading. Clean.
*
* Once more I can proudly say that linux stood up to being changed: it
* was less than 2 hours work to get demand-loading completely implemented.
*
* Demand loading changed July 1993 by Eric Youngdale. Use mmap instead,
* current->executable is only used by the procfs. This allows a dispatch
* table to check for several different types of binary formats. We keep
* trying until we recognize the file or we run out of supported binary
* formats.
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fdtable.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/stat.h>
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events! In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging, monitoring, analysis facility. Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem 'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and less appropriate. All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion) The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well. Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and suggested a rename. User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to keep the size down.) This patch has been generated via the following script: FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config') sed -i \ -e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \ -e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \ -e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \ -e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \ -e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \ -e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \ $FILES for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g') mv $N $M done FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*) sed -i \ -e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \ -e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \ -e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \ -e 's/counter/event/g' \ -e 's/Counter/Event/g' \ $FILES ... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches is the smallest: the end of the merge window. Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch. ( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but in case there's something left where 'counter' would be better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. ) Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 18:02:48 +08:00
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/tsacct_kern.h>
#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/kmod.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
exec: allow do_coredump() to wait for user space pipe readers to complete Allow core_pattern pipes to wait for user space to complete One of the things that user space processes like to do is look at metadata for a crashing process in their /proc/<pid> directory. this is racy however, since do_coredump in the kernel doesn't wait for the user space process to complete before it reaps the crashing process. This patch corrects that. Allowing the kernel to wait for the user space process to complete before cleaning up the crashing process. This is a bit tricky to do for a few reasons: 1) The user space process isn't our child, so we can't sys_wait4 on it 2) We need to close the pipe before waiting for the user process to complete, since the user process may rely on an EOF condition I've discussed several solutions with Oleg Nesterov off-list about this, and this is the one we've come up with. We add ourselves as a pipe reader (to prevent premature cleanup of the pipe_inode_info), and remove ourselves as a writer (to provide an EOF condition to the writer in user space), then we iterate until the user space process exits (which we detect by pipe->readers == 1, hence the > 1 check in the loop). When we exit the loop, we restore the proper reader/writer values, then we return and let filp_close in do_coredump clean up the pipe data properly. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Reported-by: Earl Chew <earl_chew@agilent.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-24 06:56:58 +08:00
#include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
#include <linux/oom.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/tlb.h>
tracepoint: add tracepoints for debugging oom_score_adj oom_score_adj is used for guarding processes from OOM-Killer. One of problem is that it's inherited at fork(). When a daemon set oom_score_adj and make children, it's hard to know where the value is set. This patch adds some tracepoints useful for debugging. This patch adds 3 trace points. - creating new task - renaming a task (exec) - set oom_score_adj To debug, users need to enable some trace pointer. Maybe filtering is useful as # EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/task/ # echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_newtask/filter # echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_rename/filter # echo 1 > $EVENT/enable # EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/oom/ # echo 1 > $EVENT/enable output will be like this. # grep oom /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace bash-7699 [007] d..3 5140.744510: oom_score_adj_update: pid=7699 comm=bash oom_score_adj=-1000 bash-7699 [007] ...1 5151.818022: task_newtask: pid=7729 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000 ls-7729 [003] ...2 5151.818504: task_rename: pid=7729 oldcomm=bash newcomm=ls oom_score_adj=-1000 bash-7699 [002] ...1 5175.701468: task_newtask: pid=7730 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000 grep-7730 [007] ...2 5175.701993: task_rename: pid=7730 oldcomm=bash newcomm=grep oom_score_adj=-1000 Signed-off-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-11 07:08:09 +08:00
#include <trace/events/task.h>
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
#include "internal.h"
#include "coredump.h"
#include <trace/events/sched.h>
[PATCH] setuid core dump Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl: This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are 0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped 1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked. 2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or other files. This mode is appropriate when adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment. (akpm: > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable); > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL? No problem to me. > > if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid) > > current->mm->dumpable = 1; > > Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER? Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used as a bool in untouched code) > Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something. Doing that > would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too. Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic diff because it is used all over the place. ) Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 15:09:43 +08:00
int suid_dumpable = 0;
static LIST_HEAD(formats);
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(binfmt_lock);
void __register_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt, int insert)
{
BUG_ON(!fmt);
if (WARN_ON(!fmt->load_binary))
return;
write_lock(&binfmt_lock);
insert ? list_add(&fmt->lh, &formats) :
list_add_tail(&fmt->lh, &formats);
write_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__register_binfmt);
void unregister_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt)
{
write_lock(&binfmt_lock);
list_del(&fmt->lh);
write_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_binfmt);
static inline void put_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt)
{
module_put(fmt->module);
}
/*
* Note that a shared library must be both readable and executable due to
* security reasons.
*
* Also note that we take the address to load from from the file itself.
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library)
{
struct linux_binfmt *fmt;
struct file *file;
struct filename *tmp = getname(library);
int error = PTR_ERR(tmp);
static const struct open_flags uselib_flags = {
.open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
.acc_mode = MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN,
.intent = LOOKUP_OPEN,
.lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW,
};
if (IS_ERR(tmp))
goto out;
file = do_filp_open(AT_FDCWD, tmp, &uselib_flags);
putname(tmp);
error = PTR_ERR(file);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out;
error = -EINVAL;
if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
goto exit;
error = -EACCES;
if (file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
goto exit;
fsnotify_open(file);
error = -ENOEXEC;
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
list_for_each_entry(fmt, &formats, lh) {
if (!fmt->load_shlib)
continue;
if (!try_module_get(fmt->module))
continue;
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
error = fmt->load_shlib(file);
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
put_binfmt(fmt);
if (error != -ENOEXEC)
break;
}
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
exit:
fput(file);
out:
return error;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
/*
* The nascent bprm->mm is not visible until exec_mmap() but it can
* use a lot of memory, account these pages in current->mm temporary
* for oom_badness()->get_mm_rss(). Once exec succeeds or fails, we
* change the counter back via acct_arg_size(0).
*/
static void acct_arg_size(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pages)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
long diff = (long)(pages - bprm->vma_pages);
if (!mm || !diff)
return;
bprm->vma_pages = pages;
add_mm_counter(mm, MM_ANONPAGES, diff);
}
static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
int write)
{
struct page *page;
int ret;
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
if (write) {
ret = expand_downwards(bprm->vma, pos);
if (ret < 0)
return NULL;
}
#endif
ret = get_user_pages(current, bprm->mm, pos,
1, write, 1, &page, NULL);
if (ret <= 0)
return NULL;
if (write) {
unsigned long size = bprm->vma->vm_end - bprm->vma->vm_start;
struct rlimit *rlim;
acct_arg_size(bprm, size / PAGE_SIZE);
/*
* We've historically supported up to 32 pages (ARG_MAX)
* of argument strings even with small stacks
*/
if (size <= ARG_MAX)
return page;
/*
* Limit to 1/4-th the stack size for the argv+env strings.
* This ensures that:
* - the remaining binfmt code will not run out of stack space,
* - the program will have a reasonable amount of stack left
* to work from.
*/
rlim = current->signal->rlim;
if (size > ACCESS_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4) {
put_page(page);
return NULL;
}
}
return page;
}
static void put_arg_page(struct page *page)
{
put_page(page);
}
static void free_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int i)
{
}
static void free_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
}
static void flush_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
struct page *page)
{
flush_cache_page(bprm->vma, pos, page_to_pfn(page));
}
static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int err;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = NULL;
struct mm_struct *mm = bprm->mm;
bprm->vma = vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vma)
return -ENOMEM;
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma->vm_mm = mm;
/*
* Place the stack at the largest stack address the architecture
* supports. Later, we'll move this to an appropriate place. We don't
* use STACK_TOP because that can depend on attributes which aren't
* configured yet.
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(VM_STACK_FLAGS & VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP);
vma->vm_end = STACK_TOP_MAX;
vma->vm_start = vma->vm_end - PAGE_SIZE;
vma->vm_flags = VM_SOFTDIRTY | VM_STACK_FLAGS | VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP;
vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
mm: change anon_vma linking to fix multi-process server scalability issue The old anon_vma code can lead to scalability issues with heavily forking workloads. Specifically, each anon_vma will be shared between the parent process and all its child processes. In a workload with 1000 child processes and a VMA with 1000 anonymous pages per process that get COWed, this leads to a system with a million anonymous pages in the same anon_vma, each of which is mapped in just one of the 1000 processes. However, the current rmap code needs to walk them all, leading to O(N) scanning complexity for each page. This can result in systems where one CPU is walking the page tables of 1000 processes in page_referenced_one, while all other CPUs are stuck on the anon_vma lock. This leads to catastrophic failure for a benchmark like AIM7, where the total number of processes can reach in the tens of thousands. Real workloads are still a factor 10 less process intensive than AIM7, but they are catching up. This patch changes the way anon_vmas and VMAs are linked, which allows us to associate multiple anon_vmas with a VMA. At fork time, each child process gets its own anon_vmas, in which its COWed pages will be instantiated. The parents' anon_vma is also linked to the VMA, because non-COWed pages could be present in any of the children. This reduces rmap scanning complexity to O(1) for the pages of the 1000 child processes, with O(N) complexity for at most 1/N pages in the system. This reduces the average scanning cost in heavily forking workloads from O(N) to 2. The only real complexity in this patch stems from the fact that linking a VMA to anon_vmas now involves memory allocations. This means vma_adjust can fail, if it needs to attach a VMA to anon_vma structures. This in turn means error handling needs to be added to the calling functions. A second source of complexity is that, because there can be multiple anon_vmas, the anon_vma linking in vma_adjust can no longer be done under "the" anon_vma lock. To prevent the rmap code from walking up an incomplete VMA, this patch introduces the VM_LOCK_RMAP VMA flag. This bit flag uses the same slot as the NOMMU VM_MAPPED_COPY, with an ifdef in mm.h to make sure it is impossible to compile a kernel that needs both symbolic values for the same bitflag. Some test results: Without the anon_vma changes, when AIM7 hits around 9.7k users (on a test box with 16GB RAM and not quite enough IO), the system ends up running >99% in system time, with every CPU on the same anon_vma lock in the pageout code. With these changes, AIM7 hits the cross-over point around 29.7k users. This happens with ~99% IO wait time, there never seems to be any spike in system time. The anon_vma lock contention appears to be resolved. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-06 05:42:07 +08:00
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vma->anon_vma_chain);
err = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
if (err)
goto err;
mm->stack_vm = mm->total_vm = 1;
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
bprm->p = vma->vm_end - sizeof(void *);
return 0;
err:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
bprm->vma = NULL;
kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
return err;
}
static bool valid_arg_len(struct linux_binprm *bprm, long len)
{
return len <= MAX_ARG_STRLEN;
}
#else
static inline void acct_arg_size(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pages)
{
}
static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
int write)
{
struct page *page;
page = bprm->page[pos / PAGE_SIZE];
if (!page && write) {
page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER|__GFP_ZERO);
if (!page)
return NULL;
bprm->page[pos / PAGE_SIZE] = page;
}
return page;
}
static void put_arg_page(struct page *page)
{
}
static void free_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int i)
{
if (bprm->page[i]) {
__free_page(bprm->page[i]);
bprm->page[i] = NULL;
}
}
static void free_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES; i++)
free_arg_page(bprm, i);
}
static void flush_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
struct page *page)
{
}
static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
bprm->p = PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *);
return 0;
}
static bool valid_arg_len(struct linux_binprm *bprm, long len)
{
return len <= bprm->p;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
/*
* Create a new mm_struct and populate it with a temporary stack
* vm_area_struct. We don't have enough context at this point to set the stack
* flags, permissions, and offset, so we use temporary values. We'll update
* them later in setup_arg_pages().
*/
static int bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int err;
struct mm_struct *mm = NULL;
bprm->mm = mm = mm_alloc();
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!mm)
goto err;
err = init_new_context(current, mm);
if (err)
goto err;
err = __bprm_mm_init(bprm);
if (err)
goto err;
return 0;
err:
if (mm) {
bprm->mm = NULL;
mmdrop(mm);
}
return err;
}
struct user_arg_ptr {
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
bool is_compat;
#endif
union {
const char __user *const __user *native;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
const compat_uptr_t __user *compat;
#endif
} ptr;
};
static const char __user *get_user_arg_ptr(struct user_arg_ptr argv, int nr)
{
const char __user *native;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (unlikely(argv.is_compat)) {
compat_uptr_t compat;
if (get_user(compat, argv.ptr.compat + nr))
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
return compat_ptr(compat);
}
#endif
if (get_user(native, argv.ptr.native + nr))
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
return native;
}
/*
* count() counts the number of strings in array ARGV.
*/
static int count(struct user_arg_ptr argv, int max)
{
int i = 0;
if (argv.ptr.native != NULL) {
for (;;) {
const char __user *p = get_user_arg_ptr(argv, i);
if (!p)
break;
if (IS_ERR(p))
return -EFAULT;
if (i >= max)
return -E2BIG;
++i;
if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
return -ERESTARTNOHAND;
cond_resched();
}
}
return i;
}
/*
* 'copy_strings()' copies argument/environment strings from the old
* processes's memory to the new process's stack. The call to get_user_pages()
* ensures the destination page is created and not swapped out.
*/
static int copy_strings(int argc, struct user_arg_ptr argv,
struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct page *kmapped_page = NULL;
char *kaddr = NULL;
unsigned long kpos = 0;
int ret;
while (argc-- > 0) {
const char __user *str;
int len;
unsigned long pos;
ret = -EFAULT;
str = get_user_arg_ptr(argv, argc);
if (IS_ERR(str))
goto out;
len = strnlen_user(str, MAX_ARG_STRLEN);
if (!len)
goto out;
ret = -E2BIG;
if (!valid_arg_len(bprm, len))
goto out;
/* We're going to work our way backwords. */
pos = bprm->p;
str += len;
bprm->p -= len;
while (len > 0) {
int offset, bytes_to_copy;
if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
ret = -ERESTARTNOHAND;
goto out;
}
cond_resched();
offset = pos % PAGE_SIZE;
if (offset == 0)
offset = PAGE_SIZE;
bytes_to_copy = offset;
if (bytes_to_copy > len)
bytes_to_copy = len;
offset -= bytes_to_copy;
pos -= bytes_to_copy;
str -= bytes_to_copy;
len -= bytes_to_copy;
if (!kmapped_page || kpos != (pos & PAGE_MASK)) {
struct page *page;
page = get_arg_page(bprm, pos, 1);
if (!page) {
ret = -E2BIG;
goto out;
}
if (kmapped_page) {
flush_kernel_dcache_page(kmapped_page);
kunmap(kmapped_page);
put_arg_page(kmapped_page);
}
kmapped_page = page;
kaddr = kmap(kmapped_page);
kpos = pos & PAGE_MASK;
flush_arg_page(bprm, kpos, kmapped_page);
}
if (copy_from_user(kaddr+offset, str, bytes_to_copy)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
}
}
ret = 0;
out:
if (kmapped_page) {
flush_kernel_dcache_page(kmapped_page);
kunmap(kmapped_page);
put_arg_page(kmapped_page);
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Like copy_strings, but get argv and its values from kernel memory.
*/
int copy_strings_kernel(int argc, const char *const *__argv,
struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int r;
mm_segment_t oldfs = get_fs();
struct user_arg_ptr argv = {
.ptr.native = (const char __user *const __user *)__argv,
};
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
r = copy_strings(argc, argv, bprm);
set_fs(oldfs);
return r;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_strings_kernel);
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
/*
* During bprm_mm_init(), we create a temporary stack at STACK_TOP_MAX. Once
* the binfmt code determines where the new stack should reside, we shift it to
* its final location. The process proceeds as follows:
*
* 1) Use shift to calculate the new vma endpoints.
* 2) Extend vma to cover both the old and new ranges. This ensures the
* arguments passed to subsequent functions are consistent.
* 3) Move vma's page tables to the new range.
* 4) Free up any cleared pgd range.
* 5) Shrink the vma to cover only the new range.
*/
static int shift_arg_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long shift)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
unsigned long old_start = vma->vm_start;
unsigned long old_end = vma->vm_end;
unsigned long length = old_end - old_start;
unsigned long new_start = old_start - shift;
unsigned long new_end = old_end - shift;
mm: mmu_gather rework Rework the existing mmu_gather infrastructure. The direct purpose of these patches was to allow preemptible mmu_gather, but even without that I think these patches provide an improvement to the status quo. The first 9 patches rework the mmu_gather infrastructure. For review purpose I've split them into generic and per-arch patches with the last of those a generic cleanup. The next patch provides generic RCU page-table freeing, and the followup is a patch converting s390 to use this. I've also got 4 patches from DaveM lined up (not included in this series) that uses this to implement gup_fast() for sparc64. Then there is one patch that extends the generic mmu_gather batching. After that follow the mm preemptibility patches, these make part of the mm a lot more preemptible. It converts i_mmap_lock and anon_vma->lock to mutexes which together with the mmu_gather rework makes mmu_gather preemptible as well. Making i_mmap_lock a mutex also enables a clean-up of the truncate code. This also allows for preemptible mmu_notifiers, something that XPMEM I think wants. Furthermore, it removes the new and universially detested unmap_mutex. This patch: Remove the first obstacle towards a fully preemptible mmu_gather. The current scheme assumes mmu_gather is always done with preemption disabled and uses per-cpu storage for the page batches. Change this to try and allocate a page for batching and in case of failure, use a small on-stack array to make some progress. Preemptible mmu_gather is desired in general and usable once i_mmap_lock becomes a mutex. Doing it before the mutex conversion saves us from having to rework the code by moving the mmu_gather bits inside the pte_lock. Also avoid flushing the tlb batches from under the pte lock, this is useful even without the i_mmap_lock conversion as it significantly reduces pte lock hold times. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment tpyo] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-05-25 08:11:45 +08:00
struct mmu_gather tlb;
BUG_ON(new_start > new_end);
/*
* ensure there are no vmas between where we want to go
* and where we are
*/
if (vma != find_vma(mm, new_start))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* cover the whole range: [new_start, old_end)
*/
mm: change anon_vma linking to fix multi-process server scalability issue The old anon_vma code can lead to scalability issues with heavily forking workloads. Specifically, each anon_vma will be shared between the parent process and all its child processes. In a workload with 1000 child processes and a VMA with 1000 anonymous pages per process that get COWed, this leads to a system with a million anonymous pages in the same anon_vma, each of which is mapped in just one of the 1000 processes. However, the current rmap code needs to walk them all, leading to O(N) scanning complexity for each page. This can result in systems where one CPU is walking the page tables of 1000 processes in page_referenced_one, while all other CPUs are stuck on the anon_vma lock. This leads to catastrophic failure for a benchmark like AIM7, where the total number of processes can reach in the tens of thousands. Real workloads are still a factor 10 less process intensive than AIM7, but they are catching up. This patch changes the way anon_vmas and VMAs are linked, which allows us to associate multiple anon_vmas with a VMA. At fork time, each child process gets its own anon_vmas, in which its COWed pages will be instantiated. The parents' anon_vma is also linked to the VMA, because non-COWed pages could be present in any of the children. This reduces rmap scanning complexity to O(1) for the pages of the 1000 child processes, with O(N) complexity for at most 1/N pages in the system. This reduces the average scanning cost in heavily forking workloads from O(N) to 2. The only real complexity in this patch stems from the fact that linking a VMA to anon_vmas now involves memory allocations. This means vma_adjust can fail, if it needs to attach a VMA to anon_vma structures. This in turn means error handling needs to be added to the calling functions. A second source of complexity is that, because there can be multiple anon_vmas, the anon_vma linking in vma_adjust can no longer be done under "the" anon_vma lock. To prevent the rmap code from walking up an incomplete VMA, this patch introduces the VM_LOCK_RMAP VMA flag. This bit flag uses the same slot as the NOMMU VM_MAPPED_COPY, with an ifdef in mm.h to make sure it is impossible to compile a kernel that needs both symbolic values for the same bitflag. Some test results: Without the anon_vma changes, when AIM7 hits around 9.7k users (on a test box with 16GB RAM and not quite enough IO), the system ends up running >99% in system time, with every CPU on the same anon_vma lock in the pageout code. With these changes, AIM7 hits the cross-over point around 29.7k users. This happens with ~99% IO wait time, there never seems to be any spike in system time. The anon_vma lock contention appears to be resolved. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-06 05:42:07 +08:00
if (vma_adjust(vma, new_start, old_end, vma->vm_pgoff, NULL))
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* move the page tables downwards, on failure we rely on
* process cleanup to remove whatever mess we made.
*/
if (length != move_page_tables(vma, old_start,
vma, new_start, length, false))
return -ENOMEM;
lru_add_drain();
Fix TLB gather virtual address range invalidation corner cases Ben Tebulin reported: "Since v3.7.2 on two independent machines a very specific Git repository fails in 9/10 cases on git-fsck due to an SHA1/memory failures. This only occurs on a very specific repository and can be reproduced stably on two independent laptops. Git mailing list ran out of ideas and for me this looks like some very exotic kernel issue" and bisected the failure to the backport of commit 53a59fc67f97 ("mm: limit mmu_gather batching to fix soft lockups on !CONFIG_PREEMPT"). That commit itself is not actually buggy, but what it does is to make it much more likely to hit the partial TLB invalidation case, since it introduces a new case in tlb_next_batch() that previously only ever happened when running out of memory. The real bug is that the TLB gather virtual memory range setup is subtly buggered. It was introduced in commit 597e1c3580b7 ("mm/mmu_gather: enable tlb flush range in generic mmu_gather"), and the range handling was already fixed at least once in commit e6c495a96ce0 ("mm: fix the TLB range flushed when __tlb_remove_page() runs out of slots"), but that fix was not complete. The problem with the TLB gather virtual address range is that it isn't set up by the initial tlb_gather_mmu() initialization (which didn't get the TLB range information), but it is set up ad-hoc later by the functions that actually flush the TLB. And so any such case that forgot to update the TLB range entries would potentially miss TLB invalidates. Rather than try to figure out exactly which particular ad-hoc range setup was missing (I personally suspect it's the hugetlb case in zap_huge_pmd(), which didn't have the same logic as zap_pte_range() did), this patch just gets rid of the problem at the source: make the TLB range information available to tlb_gather_mmu(), and initialize it when initializing all the other tlb gather fields. This makes the patch larger, but conceptually much simpler. And the end result is much more understandable; even if you want to play games with partial ranges when invalidating the TLB contents in chunks, now the range information is always there, and anybody who doesn't want to bother with it won't introduce subtle bugs. Ben verified that this fixes his problem. Reported-bisected-and-tested-by: Ben Tebulin <tebulin@googlemail.com> Build-testing-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Build-testing-by: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-08-16 02:42:25 +08:00
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, old_start, old_end);
if (new_end > old_start) {
/*
* when the old and new regions overlap clear from new_end.
*/
mm: mmu_gather rework Rework the existing mmu_gather infrastructure. The direct purpose of these patches was to allow preemptible mmu_gather, but even without that I think these patches provide an improvement to the status quo. The first 9 patches rework the mmu_gather infrastructure. For review purpose I've split them into generic and per-arch patches with the last of those a generic cleanup. The next patch provides generic RCU page-table freeing, and the followup is a patch converting s390 to use this. I've also got 4 patches from DaveM lined up (not included in this series) that uses this to implement gup_fast() for sparc64. Then there is one patch that extends the generic mmu_gather batching. After that follow the mm preemptibility patches, these make part of the mm a lot more preemptible. It converts i_mmap_lock and anon_vma->lock to mutexes which together with the mmu_gather rework makes mmu_gather preemptible as well. Making i_mmap_lock a mutex also enables a clean-up of the truncate code. This also allows for preemptible mmu_notifiers, something that XPMEM I think wants. Furthermore, it removes the new and universially detested unmap_mutex. This patch: Remove the first obstacle towards a fully preemptible mmu_gather. The current scheme assumes mmu_gather is always done with preemption disabled and uses per-cpu storage for the page batches. Change this to try and allocate a page for batching and in case of failure, use a small on-stack array to make some progress. Preemptible mmu_gather is desired in general and usable once i_mmap_lock becomes a mutex. Doing it before the mutex conversion saves us from having to rework the code by moving the mmu_gather bits inside the pte_lock. Also avoid flushing the tlb batches from under the pte lock, this is useful even without the i_mmap_lock conversion as it significantly reduces pte lock hold times. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment tpyo] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-05-25 08:11:45 +08:00
free_pgd_range(&tlb, new_end, old_end, new_end,
vma->vm_next ? vma->vm_next->vm_start : USER_PGTABLES_CEILING);
} else {
/*
* otherwise, clean from old_start; this is done to not touch
* the address space in [new_end, old_start) some architectures
* have constraints on va-space that make this illegal (IA64) -
* for the others its just a little faster.
*/
mm: mmu_gather rework Rework the existing mmu_gather infrastructure. The direct purpose of these patches was to allow preemptible mmu_gather, but even without that I think these patches provide an improvement to the status quo. The first 9 patches rework the mmu_gather infrastructure. For review purpose I've split them into generic and per-arch patches with the last of those a generic cleanup. The next patch provides generic RCU page-table freeing, and the followup is a patch converting s390 to use this. I've also got 4 patches from DaveM lined up (not included in this series) that uses this to implement gup_fast() for sparc64. Then there is one patch that extends the generic mmu_gather batching. After that follow the mm preemptibility patches, these make part of the mm a lot more preemptible. It converts i_mmap_lock and anon_vma->lock to mutexes which together with the mmu_gather rework makes mmu_gather preemptible as well. Making i_mmap_lock a mutex also enables a clean-up of the truncate code. This also allows for preemptible mmu_notifiers, something that XPMEM I think wants. Furthermore, it removes the new and universially detested unmap_mutex. This patch: Remove the first obstacle towards a fully preemptible mmu_gather. The current scheme assumes mmu_gather is always done with preemption disabled and uses per-cpu storage for the page batches. Change this to try and allocate a page for batching and in case of failure, use a small on-stack array to make some progress. Preemptible mmu_gather is desired in general and usable once i_mmap_lock becomes a mutex. Doing it before the mutex conversion saves us from having to rework the code by moving the mmu_gather bits inside the pte_lock. Also avoid flushing the tlb batches from under the pte lock, this is useful even without the i_mmap_lock conversion as it significantly reduces pte lock hold times. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment tpyo] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-05-25 08:11:45 +08:00
free_pgd_range(&tlb, old_start, old_end, new_end,
vma->vm_next ? vma->vm_next->vm_start : USER_PGTABLES_CEILING);
}
Fix TLB gather virtual address range invalidation corner cases Ben Tebulin reported: "Since v3.7.2 on two independent machines a very specific Git repository fails in 9/10 cases on git-fsck due to an SHA1/memory failures. This only occurs on a very specific repository and can be reproduced stably on two independent laptops. Git mailing list ran out of ideas and for me this looks like some very exotic kernel issue" and bisected the failure to the backport of commit 53a59fc67f97 ("mm: limit mmu_gather batching to fix soft lockups on !CONFIG_PREEMPT"). That commit itself is not actually buggy, but what it does is to make it much more likely to hit the partial TLB invalidation case, since it introduces a new case in tlb_next_batch() that previously only ever happened when running out of memory. The real bug is that the TLB gather virtual memory range setup is subtly buggered. It was introduced in commit 597e1c3580b7 ("mm/mmu_gather: enable tlb flush range in generic mmu_gather"), and the range handling was already fixed at least once in commit e6c495a96ce0 ("mm: fix the TLB range flushed when __tlb_remove_page() runs out of slots"), but that fix was not complete. The problem with the TLB gather virtual address range is that it isn't set up by the initial tlb_gather_mmu() initialization (which didn't get the TLB range information), but it is set up ad-hoc later by the functions that actually flush the TLB. And so any such case that forgot to update the TLB range entries would potentially miss TLB invalidates. Rather than try to figure out exactly which particular ad-hoc range setup was missing (I personally suspect it's the hugetlb case in zap_huge_pmd(), which didn't have the same logic as zap_pte_range() did), this patch just gets rid of the problem at the source: make the TLB range information available to tlb_gather_mmu(), and initialize it when initializing all the other tlb gather fields. This makes the patch larger, but conceptually much simpler. And the end result is much more understandable; even if you want to play games with partial ranges when invalidating the TLB contents in chunks, now the range information is always there, and anybody who doesn't want to bother with it won't introduce subtle bugs. Ben verified that this fixes his problem. Reported-bisected-and-tested-by: Ben Tebulin <tebulin@googlemail.com> Build-testing-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Build-testing-by: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-08-16 02:42:25 +08:00
tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb, old_start, old_end);
/*
mm: change anon_vma linking to fix multi-process server scalability issue The old anon_vma code can lead to scalability issues with heavily forking workloads. Specifically, each anon_vma will be shared between the parent process and all its child processes. In a workload with 1000 child processes and a VMA with 1000 anonymous pages per process that get COWed, this leads to a system with a million anonymous pages in the same anon_vma, each of which is mapped in just one of the 1000 processes. However, the current rmap code needs to walk them all, leading to O(N) scanning complexity for each page. This can result in systems where one CPU is walking the page tables of 1000 processes in page_referenced_one, while all other CPUs are stuck on the anon_vma lock. This leads to catastrophic failure for a benchmark like AIM7, where the total number of processes can reach in the tens of thousands. Real workloads are still a factor 10 less process intensive than AIM7, but they are catching up. This patch changes the way anon_vmas and VMAs are linked, which allows us to associate multiple anon_vmas with a VMA. At fork time, each child process gets its own anon_vmas, in which its COWed pages will be instantiated. The parents' anon_vma is also linked to the VMA, because non-COWed pages could be present in any of the children. This reduces rmap scanning complexity to O(1) for the pages of the 1000 child processes, with O(N) complexity for at most 1/N pages in the system. This reduces the average scanning cost in heavily forking workloads from O(N) to 2. The only real complexity in this patch stems from the fact that linking a VMA to anon_vmas now involves memory allocations. This means vma_adjust can fail, if it needs to attach a VMA to anon_vma structures. This in turn means error handling needs to be added to the calling functions. A second source of complexity is that, because there can be multiple anon_vmas, the anon_vma linking in vma_adjust can no longer be done under "the" anon_vma lock. To prevent the rmap code from walking up an incomplete VMA, this patch introduces the VM_LOCK_RMAP VMA flag. This bit flag uses the same slot as the NOMMU VM_MAPPED_COPY, with an ifdef in mm.h to make sure it is impossible to compile a kernel that needs both symbolic values for the same bitflag. Some test results: Without the anon_vma changes, when AIM7 hits around 9.7k users (on a test box with 16GB RAM and not quite enough IO), the system ends up running >99% in system time, with every CPU on the same anon_vma lock in the pageout code. With these changes, AIM7 hits the cross-over point around 29.7k users. This happens with ~99% IO wait time, there never seems to be any spike in system time. The anon_vma lock contention appears to be resolved. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-06 05:42:07 +08:00
* Shrink the vma to just the new range. Always succeeds.
*/
vma_adjust(vma, new_start, new_end, vma->vm_pgoff, NULL);
return 0;
}
/*
* Finalizes the stack vm_area_struct. The flags and permissions are updated,
* the stack is optionally relocated, and some extra space is added.
*/
int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
unsigned long stack_top,
int executable_stack)
{
unsigned long ret;
unsigned long stack_shift;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = bprm->vma;
struct vm_area_struct *prev = NULL;
unsigned long vm_flags;
unsigned long stack_base;
fs/exec.c: restrict initial stack space expansion to rlimit When reserving stack space for a new process, make sure we're not attempting to expand the stack by more than rlimit allows. This fixes a bug caused by b6a2fea39318e43fee84fa7b0b90d68bed92d2ba ("mm: variable length argument support") and unmasked by fc63cf237078c86214abcb2ee9926d8ad289da9b ("exec: setup_arg_pages() fails to return errors"). This bug means that when limiting the stack to less the 20*PAGE_SIZE (eg. 80K on 4K pages or 'ulimit -s 79') all processes will be killed before they start. This is particularly bad with 64K pages, where a ulimit below 1280K will kill every process. To test, do: 'ulimit -s 15; ls' before and after the patch is applied. Before it's applied, 'ls' should be killed. After the patch is applied, 'ls' should no longer be killed. A stack limit of 15KB since it's small enough to trigger 20*PAGE_SIZE. Also 15KB not a multiple of PAGE_SIZE, which is a trickier case to handle correctly with this code. 4K pages should be fine to test with. [kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: cleanup] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanup cleanup] Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Americo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-02-11 05:56:42 +08:00
unsigned long stack_size;
unsigned long stack_expand;
unsigned long rlim_stack;
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
/* Limit stack size to 1GB */
stack_base = rlimit_max(RLIMIT_STACK);
if (stack_base > (1 << 30))
stack_base = 1 << 30;
/* Make sure we didn't let the argument array grow too large. */
if (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start > stack_base)
return -ENOMEM;
stack_base = PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top - stack_base);
stack_shift = vma->vm_start - stack_base;
mm->arg_start = bprm->p - stack_shift;
bprm->p = vma->vm_end - stack_shift;
#else
stack_top = arch_align_stack(stack_top);
stack_top = PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top);
if (unlikely(stack_top < mmap_min_addr) ||
unlikely(vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start >= stack_top - mmap_min_addr))
return -ENOMEM;
stack_shift = vma->vm_end - stack_top;
bprm->p -= stack_shift;
mm->arg_start = bprm->p;
#endif
if (bprm->loader)
bprm->loader -= stack_shift;
bprm->exec -= stack_shift;
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS;
/*
* Adjust stack execute permissions; explicitly enable for
* EXSTACK_ENABLE_X, disable for EXSTACK_DISABLE_X and leave alone
* (arch default) otherwise.
*/
if (unlikely(executable_stack == EXSTACK_ENABLE_X))
vm_flags |= VM_EXEC;
else if (executable_stack == EXSTACK_DISABLE_X)
vm_flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
vm_flags |= mm->def_flags;
mm: migration: avoid race between shift_arg_pages() and rmap_walk() during migration by not migrating temporary stacks Page migration requires rmap to be able to find all ptes mapping a page at all times, otherwise the migration entry can be instantiated, but it is possible to leave one behind if the second rmap_walk fails to find the page. If this page is later faulted, migration_entry_to_page() will call BUG because the page is locked indicating the page was migrated by the migration PTE not cleaned up. For example kernel BUG at include/linux/swapops.h:105! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff810e951a>] handle_mm_fault+0x3f8/0x76a [<ffffffff8130c7a2>] do_page_fault+0x44a/0x46e [<ffffffff813099b5>] page_fault+0x25/0x30 [<ffffffff8114de33>] load_elf_binary+0x152a/0x192b [<ffffffff8111329b>] search_binary_handler+0x173/0x313 [<ffffffff81114896>] do_execve+0x219/0x30a [<ffffffff8100a5c6>] sys_execve+0x43/0x5e [<ffffffff8100320a>] stub_execve+0x6a/0xc0 RIP [<ffffffff811094ff>] migration_entry_wait+0xc1/0x129 There is a race between shift_arg_pages and migration that triggers this bug. A temporary stack is setup during exec and later moved. If migration moves a page in the temporary stack and the VMA is then removed before migration completes, the migration PTE may not be found leading to a BUG when the stack is faulted. This patch causes pages within the temporary stack during exec to be skipped by migration. It does this by marking the VMA covering the temporary stack with an otherwise impossible combination of VMA flags. These flags are cleared when the temporary stack is moved to its final location. [kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com: idea for having migration skip temporary stacks] Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie> Reviewed-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-25 05:32:24 +08:00
vm_flags |= VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP;
ret = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
vm_flags);
if (ret)
goto out_unlock;
BUG_ON(prev != vma);
/* Move stack pages down in memory. */
if (stack_shift) {
ret = shift_arg_pages(vma, stack_shift);
if (ret)
goto out_unlock;
}
mm: migration: avoid race between shift_arg_pages() and rmap_walk() during migration by not migrating temporary stacks Page migration requires rmap to be able to find all ptes mapping a page at all times, otherwise the migration entry can be instantiated, but it is possible to leave one behind if the second rmap_walk fails to find the page. If this page is later faulted, migration_entry_to_page() will call BUG because the page is locked indicating the page was migrated by the migration PTE not cleaned up. For example kernel BUG at include/linux/swapops.h:105! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff810e951a>] handle_mm_fault+0x3f8/0x76a [<ffffffff8130c7a2>] do_page_fault+0x44a/0x46e [<ffffffff813099b5>] page_fault+0x25/0x30 [<ffffffff8114de33>] load_elf_binary+0x152a/0x192b [<ffffffff8111329b>] search_binary_handler+0x173/0x313 [<ffffffff81114896>] do_execve+0x219/0x30a [<ffffffff8100a5c6>] sys_execve+0x43/0x5e [<ffffffff8100320a>] stub_execve+0x6a/0xc0 RIP [<ffffffff811094ff>] migration_entry_wait+0xc1/0x129 There is a race between shift_arg_pages and migration that triggers this bug. A temporary stack is setup during exec and later moved. If migration moves a page in the temporary stack and the VMA is then removed before migration completes, the migration PTE may not be found leading to a BUG when the stack is faulted. This patch causes pages within the temporary stack during exec to be skipped by migration. It does this by marking the VMA covering the temporary stack with an otherwise impossible combination of VMA flags. These flags are cleared when the temporary stack is moved to its final location. [kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com: idea for having migration skip temporary stacks] Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie> Reviewed-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-25 05:32:24 +08:00
/* mprotect_fixup is overkill to remove the temporary stack flags */
vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP;
stack_expand = 131072UL; /* randomly 32*4k (or 2*64k) pages */
fs/exec.c: restrict initial stack space expansion to rlimit When reserving stack space for a new process, make sure we're not attempting to expand the stack by more than rlimit allows. This fixes a bug caused by b6a2fea39318e43fee84fa7b0b90d68bed92d2ba ("mm: variable length argument support") and unmasked by fc63cf237078c86214abcb2ee9926d8ad289da9b ("exec: setup_arg_pages() fails to return errors"). This bug means that when limiting the stack to less the 20*PAGE_SIZE (eg. 80K on 4K pages or 'ulimit -s 79') all processes will be killed before they start. This is particularly bad with 64K pages, where a ulimit below 1280K will kill every process. To test, do: 'ulimit -s 15; ls' before and after the patch is applied. Before it's applied, 'ls' should be killed. After the patch is applied, 'ls' should no longer be killed. A stack limit of 15KB since it's small enough to trigger 20*PAGE_SIZE. Also 15KB not a multiple of PAGE_SIZE, which is a trickier case to handle correctly with this code. 4K pages should be fine to test with. [kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: cleanup] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanup cleanup] Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Americo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-02-11 05:56:42 +08:00
stack_size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
/*
* Align this down to a page boundary as expand_stack
* will align it up.
*/
rlim_stack = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK) & PAGE_MASK;
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
fs/exec.c: restrict initial stack space expansion to rlimit When reserving stack space for a new process, make sure we're not attempting to expand the stack by more than rlimit allows. This fixes a bug caused by b6a2fea39318e43fee84fa7b0b90d68bed92d2ba ("mm: variable length argument support") and unmasked by fc63cf237078c86214abcb2ee9926d8ad289da9b ("exec: setup_arg_pages() fails to return errors"). This bug means that when limiting the stack to less the 20*PAGE_SIZE (eg. 80K on 4K pages or 'ulimit -s 79') all processes will be killed before they start. This is particularly bad with 64K pages, where a ulimit below 1280K will kill every process. To test, do: 'ulimit -s 15; ls' before and after the patch is applied. Before it's applied, 'ls' should be killed. After the patch is applied, 'ls' should no longer be killed. A stack limit of 15KB since it's small enough to trigger 20*PAGE_SIZE. Also 15KB not a multiple of PAGE_SIZE, which is a trickier case to handle correctly with this code. 4K pages should be fine to test with. [kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: cleanup] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanup cleanup] Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Americo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-02-11 05:56:42 +08:00
if (stack_size + stack_expand > rlim_stack)
stack_base = vma->vm_start + rlim_stack;
else
stack_base = vma->vm_end + stack_expand;
#else
fs/exec.c: restrict initial stack space expansion to rlimit When reserving stack space for a new process, make sure we're not attempting to expand the stack by more than rlimit allows. This fixes a bug caused by b6a2fea39318e43fee84fa7b0b90d68bed92d2ba ("mm: variable length argument support") and unmasked by fc63cf237078c86214abcb2ee9926d8ad289da9b ("exec: setup_arg_pages() fails to return errors"). This bug means that when limiting the stack to less the 20*PAGE_SIZE (eg. 80K on 4K pages or 'ulimit -s 79') all processes will be killed before they start. This is particularly bad with 64K pages, where a ulimit below 1280K will kill every process. To test, do: 'ulimit -s 15; ls' before and after the patch is applied. Before it's applied, 'ls' should be killed. After the patch is applied, 'ls' should no longer be killed. A stack limit of 15KB since it's small enough to trigger 20*PAGE_SIZE. Also 15KB not a multiple of PAGE_SIZE, which is a trickier case to handle correctly with this code. 4K pages should be fine to test with. [kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: cleanup] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanup cleanup] Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Americo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-02-11 05:56:42 +08:00
if (stack_size + stack_expand > rlim_stack)
stack_base = vma->vm_end - rlim_stack;
else
stack_base = vma->vm_start - stack_expand;
#endif
current->mm->start_stack = bprm->p;
ret = expand_stack(vma, stack_base);
if (ret)
ret = -EFAULT;
out_unlock:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_arg_pages);
#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
struct file *open_exec(const char *name)
{
struct file *file;
int err;
struct filename tmp = { .name = name };
static const struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
.open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
.acc_mode = MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN,
.intent = LOOKUP_OPEN,
.lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW,
};
file = do_filp_open(AT_FDCWD, &tmp, &open_exec_flags);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out;
err = -EACCES;
if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
goto exit;
if (file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
goto exit;
fsnotify_open(file);
err = deny_write_access(file);
if (err)
goto exit;
out:
return file;
exit:
fput(file);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(open_exec);
int kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
char *addr, unsigned long count)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs;
loff_t pos = offset;
int result;
old_fs = get_fs();
set_fs(get_ds());
/* The cast to a user pointer is valid due to the set_fs() */
result = vfs_read(file, (void __user *)addr, count, &pos);
set_fs(old_fs);
return result;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_read);
ssize_t read_code(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, loff_t pos, size_t len)
{
ssize_t res = file->f_op->read(file, (void __user *)addr, len, &pos);
if (res > 0)
flush_icache_range(addr, addr + len);
return res;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(read_code);
static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct * old_mm, *active_mm;
/* Notify parent that we're no longer interested in the old VM */
tsk = current;
old_mm = current->mm;
mm_release(tsk, old_mm);
if (old_mm) {
sync_mm_rss(old_mm);
/*
* Make sure that if there is a core dump in progress
* for the old mm, we get out and die instead of going
* through with the exec. We must hold mmap_sem around
* checking core_state and changing tsk->mm.
*/
down_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem);
if (unlikely(old_mm->core_state)) {
up_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem);
return -EINTR;
}
}
task_lock(tsk);
active_mm = tsk->active_mm;
tsk->mm = mm;
tsk->active_mm = mm;
activate_mm(active_mm, mm);
task_unlock(tsk);
arch_pick_mmap_layout(mm);
if (old_mm) {
up_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem);
BUG_ON(active_mm != old_mm);
setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&tsk->signal->maxrss, old_mm);
mm owner: fix race between swapoff and exit There's a race between mm->owner assignment and swapoff, more easily seen when task slab poisoning is turned on. The condition occurs when try_to_unuse() runs in parallel with an exiting task. A similar race can occur with callers of get_task_mm(), such as /proc/<pid>/<mmstats> or ptrace or page migration. CPU0 CPU1 try_to_unuse looks at mm = task0->mm increments mm->mm_users task 0 exits mm->owner needs to be updated, but no new owner is found (mm_users > 1, but no other task has task->mm = task0->mm) mm_update_next_owner() leaves mmput(mm) decrements mm->mm_users task0 freed dereferencing mm->owner fails The fix is to notify the subsystem via mm_owner_changed callback(), if no new owner is found, by specifying the new task as NULL. Jiri Slaby: mm->owner was set to NULL prior to calling cgroup_mm_owner_callbacks(), but must be set after that, so as not to pass NULL as old owner causing oops. Daisuke Nishimura: mm_update_next_owner() may set mm->owner to NULL, but mem_cgroup_from_task() and its callers need to take account of this situation to avoid oops. Hugh Dickins: Lockdep warning and hang below exec_mmap() when testing these patches. exit_mm() up_reads mmap_sem before calling mm_update_next_owner(), so exec_mmap() now needs to do the same. And with that repositioning, there's now no point in mm_need_new_owner() allowing for NULL mm. Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-09-29 06:09:31 +08:00
mm_update_next_owner(old_mm);
mmput(old_mm);
return 0;
}
mmdrop(active_mm);
return 0;
}
/*
* This function makes sure the current process has its own signal table,
* so that flush_signal_handlers can later reset the handlers without
* disturbing other processes. (Other processes might share the signal
* table via the CLONE_SIGHAND option to clone().)
*/
static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal;
struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = tsk->sighand;
spinlock_t *lock = &oldsighand->siglock;
if (thread_group_empty(tsk))
goto no_thread_group;
/*
* Kill all other threads in the thread group.
*/
spin_lock_irq(lock);
if (signal_group_exit(sig)) {
/*
* Another group action in progress, just
* return so that the signal is processed.
*/
spin_unlock_irq(lock);
return -EAGAIN;
}
sig->group_exit_task = tsk;
sig->notify_count = zap_other_threads(tsk);
if (!thread_group_leader(tsk))
sig->notify_count--;
while (sig->notify_count) {
__set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(lock);
schedule();
if (unlikely(__fatal_signal_pending(tsk)))
goto killed;
spin_lock_irq(lock);
}
spin_unlock_irq(lock);
/*
* At this point all other threads have exited, all we have to
* do is to wait for the thread group leader to become inactive,
* and to assume its PID:
*/
if (!thread_group_leader(tsk)) {
struct task_struct *leader = tsk->group_leader;
sig->notify_count = -1; /* for exit_notify() */
for (;;) {
threadgroup_change_begin(tsk);
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
if (likely(leader->exit_state))
break;
__set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
threadgroup_change_end(tsk);
schedule();
if (unlikely(__fatal_signal_pending(tsk)))
goto killed;
}
/*
* The only record we have of the real-time age of a
* process, regardless of execs it's done, is start_time.
* All the past CPU time is accumulated in signal_struct
* from sister threads now dead. But in this non-leader
* exec, nothing survives from the original leader thread,
* whose birth marks the true age of this process now.
* When we take on its identity by switching to its PID, we
* also take its birthdate (always earlier than our own).
*/
tsk->start_time = leader->start_time;
tsk->real_start_time = leader->real_start_time;
BUG_ON(!same_thread_group(leader, tsk));
BUG_ON(has_group_leader_pid(tsk));
/*
* An exec() starts a new thread group with the
* TGID of the previous thread group. Rehash the
* two threads with a switched PID, and release
* the former thread group leader:
*/
[PATCH] pidhash: kill switch_exec_pids switch_exec_pids is only called from de_thread by way of exec, and it is only called when we are exec'ing from a non thread group leader. Currently switch_exec_pids gives the leader the pid of the thread and unhashes and rehashes all of the process groups. The leader is already in the EXIT_DEAD state so no one cares about it's pids. The only concern for the leader is that __unhash_process called from release_task will function correctly. If we don't touch the leader at all we know that __unhash_process will work fine so there is no need to touch the leader. For the task becomming the thread group leader, we just need to give it the pid of the old thread group leader, add it to the task list, and attach it to the session and the process group of the thread group. Currently de_thread is also adding the task to the task list which is just silly. Currently the only leader of __detach_pid besides detach_pid is switch_exec_pids because of the ugly extra work that was being performed. So this patch removes switch_exec_pids because it is doing too much, it is creating an unnecessary special case in pid.c, duing work duplicated in de_thread, and generally obscuring what it is going on. The necessary work is added to de_thread, and it seems to be a little clearer there what is going on. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-29 08:11:03 +08:00
/* Become a process group leader with the old leader's pid.
* The old leader becomes a thread of the this thread group.
* Note: The old leader also uses this pid until release_task
[PATCH] pidhash: kill switch_exec_pids switch_exec_pids is only called from de_thread by way of exec, and it is only called when we are exec'ing from a non thread group leader. Currently switch_exec_pids gives the leader the pid of the thread and unhashes and rehashes all of the process groups. The leader is already in the EXIT_DEAD state so no one cares about it's pids. The only concern for the leader is that __unhash_process called from release_task will function correctly. If we don't touch the leader at all we know that __unhash_process will work fine so there is no need to touch the leader. For the task becomming the thread group leader, we just need to give it the pid of the old thread group leader, add it to the task list, and attach it to the session and the process group of the thread group. Currently de_thread is also adding the task to the task list which is just silly. Currently the only leader of __detach_pid besides detach_pid is switch_exec_pids because of the ugly extra work that was being performed. So this patch removes switch_exec_pids because it is doing too much, it is creating an unnecessary special case in pid.c, duing work duplicated in de_thread, and generally obscuring what it is going on. The necessary work is added to de_thread, and it seems to be a little clearer there what is going on. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-29 08:11:03 +08:00
* is called. Odd but simple and correct.
*/
tsk->pid = leader->pid;
change_pid(tsk, PIDTYPE_PID, task_pid(leader));
transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_PGID);
transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_SID);
list_replace_rcu(&leader->tasks, &tsk->tasks);
list_replace_init(&leader->sibling, &tsk->sibling);
tsk->group_leader = tsk;
leader->group_leader = tsk;
[PATCH] de_thread: Don't confuse users do_each_thread. Oleg Nesterov spotted two interesting bugs with the current de_thread code. The simplest is a long standing double decrement of __get_cpu_var(process_counts) in __unhash_process. Caused by two processes exiting when only one was created. The other is that since we no longer detach from the thread_group list it is possible for do_each_thread when run under the tasklist_lock to see the same task_struct twice. Once on the task list as a thread_group_leader, and once on the thread list of another thread. The double appearance in do_each_thread can cause a double increment of mm_core_waiters in zap_threads resulting in problems later on in coredump_wait. To remedy those two problems this patch takes the simple approach of changing the old thread group leader into a child thread. The only routine in release_task that cares is __unhash_process, and it can be trivially seen that we handle cleaning up a thread group leader properly. Since de_thread doesn't change the pid of the exiting leader process and instead shares it with the new leader process. I change thread_group_leader to recognize group leadership based on the group_leader field and not based on pids. This should also be slightly cheaper then the existing thread_group_leader macro. I performed a quick audit and I couldn't see any user of thread_group_leader that cared about the difference. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-04-11 07:16:49 +08:00
tsk->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
leader->exit_signal = -1;
BUG_ON(leader->exit_state != EXIT_ZOMBIE);
leader->exit_state = EXIT_DEAD;
/*
* We are going to release_task()->ptrace_unlink() silently,
* the tracer can sleep in do_wait(). EXIT_DEAD guarantees
* the tracer wont't block again waiting for this thread.
*/
if (unlikely(leader->ptrace))
__wake_up_parent(leader, leader->parent);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
threadgroup_change_end(tsk);
release_task(leader);
}
sig->group_exit_task = NULL;
sig->notify_count = 0;
no_thread_group:
/* we have changed execution domain */
tsk->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
exit_itimers(sig);
flush_itimer_signals();
if (atomic_read(&oldsighand->count) != 1) {
struct sighand_struct *newsighand;
/*
* This ->sighand is shared with the CLONE_SIGHAND
* but not CLONE_THREAD task, switch to the new one.
*/
newsighand = kmem_cache_alloc(sighand_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!newsighand)
return -ENOMEM;
atomic_set(&newsighand->count, 1);
memcpy(newsighand->action, oldsighand->action,
sizeof(newsighand->action));
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
spin_lock(&oldsighand->siglock);
rcu_assign_pointer(tsk->sighand, newsighand);
spin_unlock(&oldsighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
signal/timer/event: signalfd core This patch series implements the new signalfd() system call. I took part of the original Linus code (and you know how badly it can be broken :), and I added even more breakage ;) Signals are fetched from the same signal queue used by the process, so signalfd will compete with standard kernel delivery in dequeue_signal(). If you want to reliably fetch signals on the signalfd file, you need to block them with sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK). This seems to be working fine on my Dual Opteron machine. I made a quick test program for it: http://www.xmailserver.org/signafd-test.c The signalfd() system call implements signal delivery into a file descriptor receiver. The signalfd file descriptor if created with the following API: int signalfd(int ufd, const sigset_t *mask, size_t masksize); The "ufd" parameter allows to change an existing signalfd sigmask, w/out going to close/create cycle (Linus idea). Use "ufd" == -1 if you want a brand new signalfd file. The "mask" allows to specify the signal mask of signals that we are interested in. The "masksize" parameter is the size of "mask". The signalfd fd supports the poll(2) and read(2) system calls. The poll(2) will return POLLIN when signals are available to be dequeued. As a direct consequence of supporting the Linux poll subsystem, the signalfd fd can use used together with epoll(2) too. The read(2) system call will return a "struct signalfd_siginfo" structure in the userspace supplied buffer. The return value is the number of bytes copied in the supplied buffer, or -1 in case of error. The read(2) call can also return 0, in case the sighand structure to which the signalfd was attached, has been orphaned. The O_NONBLOCK flag is also supported, and read(2) will return -EAGAIN in case no signal is available. If the size of the buffer passed to read(2) is lower than sizeof(struct signalfd_siginfo), -EINVAL is returned. A read from the signalfd can also return -ERESTARTSYS in case a signal hits the process. The format of the struct signalfd_siginfo is, and the valid fields depends of the (->code & __SI_MASK) value, in the same way a struct siginfo would: struct signalfd_siginfo { __u32 signo; /* si_signo */ __s32 err; /* si_errno */ __s32 code; /* si_code */ __u32 pid; /* si_pid */ __u32 uid; /* si_uid */ __s32 fd; /* si_fd */ __u32 tid; /* si_fd */ __u32 band; /* si_band */ __u32 overrun; /* si_overrun */ __u32 trapno; /* si_trapno */ __s32 status; /* si_status */ __s32 svint; /* si_int */ __u64 svptr; /* si_ptr */ __u64 utime; /* si_utime */ __u64 stime; /* si_stime */ __u64 addr; /* si_addr */ }; [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix signalfd_copyinfo() on i386] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-11 13:23:13 +08:00
__cleanup_sighand(oldsighand);
}
BUG_ON(!thread_group_leader(tsk));
return 0;
killed:
/* protects against exit_notify() and __exit_signal() */
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
sig->group_exit_task = NULL;
sig->notify_count = 0;
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
return -EAGAIN;
}
char *get_task_comm(char *buf, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/* buf must be at least sizeof(tsk->comm) in size */
task_lock(tsk);
strncpy(buf, tsk->comm, sizeof(tsk->comm));
task_unlock(tsk);
return buf;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_task_comm);
/*
* These functions flushes out all traces of the currently running executable
* so that a new one can be started
*/
void set_task_comm(struct task_struct *tsk, char *buf)
{
task_lock(tsk);
tracepoint: add tracepoints for debugging oom_score_adj oom_score_adj is used for guarding processes from OOM-Killer. One of problem is that it's inherited at fork(). When a daemon set oom_score_adj and make children, it's hard to know where the value is set. This patch adds some tracepoints useful for debugging. This patch adds 3 trace points. - creating new task - renaming a task (exec) - set oom_score_adj To debug, users need to enable some trace pointer. Maybe filtering is useful as # EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/task/ # echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_newtask/filter # echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_rename/filter # echo 1 > $EVENT/enable # EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/oom/ # echo 1 > $EVENT/enable output will be like this. # grep oom /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace bash-7699 [007] d..3 5140.744510: oom_score_adj_update: pid=7699 comm=bash oom_score_adj=-1000 bash-7699 [007] ...1 5151.818022: task_newtask: pid=7729 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000 ls-7729 [003] ...2 5151.818504: task_rename: pid=7729 oldcomm=bash newcomm=ls oom_score_adj=-1000 bash-7699 [002] ...1 5175.701468: task_newtask: pid=7730 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000 grep-7730 [007] ...2 5175.701993: task_rename: pid=7730 oldcomm=bash newcomm=grep oom_score_adj=-1000 Signed-off-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-11 07:08:09 +08:00
trace_task_rename(tsk, buf);
strlcpy(tsk->comm, buf, sizeof(tsk->comm));
task_unlock(tsk);
perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events! In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging, monitoring, analysis facility. Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem 'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and less appropriate. All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion) The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well. Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and suggested a rename. User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to keep the size down.) This patch has been generated via the following script: FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config') sed -i \ -e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \ -e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \ -e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \ -e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \ -e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \ -e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \ $FILES for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g') mv $N $M done FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*) sed -i \ -e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \ -e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \ -e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \ -e 's/counter/event/g' \ -e 's/Counter/Event/g' \ $FILES ... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches is the smallest: the end of the merge window. Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch. ( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but in case there's something left where 'counter' would be better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. ) Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 18:02:48 +08:00
perf_event_comm(tsk);
}
2012-02-04 17:47:10 +08:00
static void filename_to_taskname(char *tcomm, const char *fn, unsigned int len)
{
int i, ch;
/* Copies the binary name from after last slash */
for (i = 0; (ch = *(fn++)) != '\0';) {
if (ch == '/')
i = 0; /* overwrite what we wrote */
else
if (i < len - 1)
tcomm[i++] = ch;
}
tcomm[i] = '\0';
}
int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
{
int retval;
/*
* Make sure we have a private signal table and that
* we are unassociated from the previous thread group.
*/
retval = de_thread(current);
if (retval)
goto out;
set_mm_exe_file(bprm->mm, bprm->file);
2012-02-04 17:47:10 +08:00
filename_to_taskname(bprm->tcomm, bprm->filename, sizeof(bprm->tcomm));
/*
* Release all of the old mmap stuff
*/
acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
retval = exec_mmap(bprm->mm);
if (retval)
goto out;
bprm->mm = NULL; /* We're using it now */
set_fs(USER_DS);
current->flags &=
~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC | PF_KTHREAD | PF_NOFREEZE);
flush_thread();
current->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear;
return 0;
out:
return retval;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(flush_old_exec);
void would_dump(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
{
if (inode_permission(file_inode(file), MAY_READ) < 0)
bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(would_dump);
void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
{
arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm);
/* This is the point of no return */
current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
if (uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))
set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
[PATCH] setuid core dump Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl: This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are 0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped 1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked. 2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or other files. This mode is appropriate when adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment. (akpm: > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable); > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL? No problem to me. > > if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid) > > current->mm->dumpable = 1; > > Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER? Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used as a bool in untouched code) > Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something. Doing that > would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too. Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic diff because it is used all over the place. ) Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 15:09:43 +08:00
else
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
[PATCH] setuid core dump Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl: This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are 0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped 1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked. 2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or other files. This mode is appropriate when adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment. (akpm: > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable); > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL? No problem to me. > > if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid) > > current->mm->dumpable = 1; > > Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER? Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used as a bool in untouched code) > Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something. Doing that > would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too. Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic diff because it is used all over the place. ) Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 15:09:43 +08:00
2012-02-04 17:47:10 +08:00
set_task_comm(current, bprm->tcomm);
/* Set the new mm task size. We have to do that late because it may
* depend on TIF_32BIT which is only updated in flush_thread() on
* some architectures like powerpc
*/
current->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE;
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
/* install the new credentials */
if (!uid_eq(bprm->cred->uid, current_euid()) ||
!gid_eq(bprm->cred->gid, current_egid())) {
current->pdeath_signal = 0;
} else {
would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP)
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
}
/* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
group */
current->self_exec_id++;
flush_signal_handlers(current, 0);
do_close_on_exec(current->files);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);
2009-09-06 02:17:13 +08:00
/*
* Prepare credentials and lock ->cred_guard_mutex.
* install_exec_creds() commits the new creds and drops the lock.
* Or, if exec fails before, free_bprm() should release ->cred and
* and unlock.
*/
int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
2009-09-06 02:17:13 +08:00
return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
if (likely(bprm->cred))
return 0;
mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
2009-09-06 02:17:13 +08:00
return -ENOMEM;
}
void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
free_arg_pages(bprm);
if (bprm->cred) {
mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
2009-09-06 02:17:13 +08:00
abort_creds(bprm->cred);
}
exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak into the command line. Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively. However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the userspace argv areas. After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As such, we need to protect the changes to interp. This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or binfmt_misc does an allocation take place. For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from: http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/ Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net> Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-21 07:05:16 +08:00
/* If a binfmt changed the interp, free it. */
if (bprm->interp != bprm->filename)
kfree(bprm->interp);
2009-09-06 02:17:13 +08:00
kfree(bprm);
}
exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak into the command line. Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively. However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the userspace argv areas. After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As such, we need to protect the changes to interp. This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or binfmt_misc does an allocation take place. For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from: http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/ Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net> Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-21 07:05:16 +08:00
int bprm_change_interp(char *interp, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
/* If a binfmt changed the interp, free it first. */
if (bprm->interp != bprm->filename)
kfree(bprm->interp);
bprm->interp = kstrdup(interp, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bprm->interp)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bprm_change_interp);
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
/*
* install the new credentials for this executable
*/
void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
security_bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
commit_creds(bprm->cred);
bprm->cred = NULL;
/*
* Disable monitoring for regular users
* when executing setuid binaries. Must
* wait until new credentials are committed
* by commit_creds() above
*/
if (get_dumpable(current->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
perf_event_exit_task(current);
2009-09-06 02:17:13 +08:00
/*
* cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
* ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
2009-09-06 02:17:13 +08:00
* credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
*/
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
/*
* determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program
* - the caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
* PTRACE_ATTACH
*/
static int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
{
CRED: Fix SUID exec regression The patch: commit a6f76f23d297f70e2a6b3ec607f7aeeea9e37e8d CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials moved the place in which the 'safeness' of a SUID/SGID exec was performed to before de_thread() was called. This means that LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE is now calculated incorrectly. This flag is set if any of the usage counts for fs_struct, files_struct and sighand_struct are greater than 1 at the time the determination is made. All of which are true for threads created by the pthread library. However, since we wish to make the security calculation before irrevocably damaging the process so that we can return it an error code in the case where we decide we want to reject the exec request on this basis, we have to make the determination before calling de_thread(). So, instead, we count up the number of threads (CLONE_THREAD) that are sharing our fs_struct (CLONE_FS), files_struct (CLONE_FILES) and sighand_structs (CLONE_SIGHAND/CLONE_THREAD) with us. These will be killed by de_thread() and so can be discounted by check_unsafe_exec(). We do have to be careful because CLONE_THREAD does not imply FS or FILES. We _assume_ that there will be no extra references to these structs held by the threads we're going to kill. This can be tested with the attached pair of programs. Build the two programs using the Makefile supplied, and run ./test1 as a non-root user. If successful, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1 --TEST1-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 exec ./test2 --TEST2-- uid=4043, euid=0 suid=0 SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID and if unsuccessful, something like: [dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1 --TEST1-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 exec ./test2 --TEST2-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID! The non-root user ID you see will depend on the user you run as. [test1.c] #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <pthread.h> static void *thread_func(void *arg) { while (1) {} } int main(int argc, char **argv) { pthread_t tid; uid_t uid, euid, suid; printf("--TEST1--\n"); getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid); printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid); if (pthread_create(&tid, NULL, thread_func, NULL) < 0) { perror("pthread_create"); exit(1); } printf("exec ./test2\n"); execlp("./test2", "test2", NULL); perror("./test2"); _exit(1); } [test2.c] #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> int main(int argc, char **argv) { uid_t uid, euid, suid; getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid); printf("--TEST2--\n"); printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid); if (euid != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID!\n"); exit(1); } printf("SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID\n"); exit(0); } [Makefile] CFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE -Wall -Werror -Wunused all: test1 test2 test1: test1.c gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test1 test1.c -lpthread test2: test2.c gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test2 test2.c sudo chown root.root test2 sudo chmod +s test2 Reported-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-06 19:45:46 +08:00
struct task_struct *p = current, *t;
unsigned n_fs;
int res = 0;
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
if (p->ptrace) {
if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP)
bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP;
else
bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE;
}
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs With this change, calling prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) disables privilege granting operations at execve-time. For example, a process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid or gid if this bit is set. The same is true for file capabilities. Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that LSMs respect the requested behavior. To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0); It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL. (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.) This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch series. By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task. Another potential use is making certain privileged operations unprivileged. For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot affect privileged tasks. Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is set and AppArmor is in use. It is fixed in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> v18: updated change desc v17: using new define values as per 3.4 Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-13 05:47:50 +08:00
/*
* This isn't strictly necessary, but it makes it harder for LSMs to
* mess up.
*/
if (current->no_new_privs)
bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS;
CRED: Fix SUID exec regression The patch: commit a6f76f23d297f70e2a6b3ec607f7aeeea9e37e8d CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials moved the place in which the 'safeness' of a SUID/SGID exec was performed to before de_thread() was called. This means that LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE is now calculated incorrectly. This flag is set if any of the usage counts for fs_struct, files_struct and sighand_struct are greater than 1 at the time the determination is made. All of which are true for threads created by the pthread library. However, since we wish to make the security calculation before irrevocably damaging the process so that we can return it an error code in the case where we decide we want to reject the exec request on this basis, we have to make the determination before calling de_thread(). So, instead, we count up the number of threads (CLONE_THREAD) that are sharing our fs_struct (CLONE_FS), files_struct (CLONE_FILES) and sighand_structs (CLONE_SIGHAND/CLONE_THREAD) with us. These will be killed by de_thread() and so can be discounted by check_unsafe_exec(). We do have to be careful because CLONE_THREAD does not imply FS or FILES. We _assume_ that there will be no extra references to these structs held by the threads we're going to kill. This can be tested with the attached pair of programs. Build the two programs using the Makefile supplied, and run ./test1 as a non-root user. If successful, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1 --TEST1-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 exec ./test2 --TEST2-- uid=4043, euid=0 suid=0 SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID and if unsuccessful, something like: [dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1 --TEST1-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 exec ./test2 --TEST2-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID! The non-root user ID you see will depend on the user you run as. [test1.c] #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <pthread.h> static void *thread_func(void *arg) { while (1) {} } int main(int argc, char **argv) { pthread_t tid; uid_t uid, euid, suid; printf("--TEST1--\n"); getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid); printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid); if (pthread_create(&tid, NULL, thread_func, NULL) < 0) { perror("pthread_create"); exit(1); } printf("exec ./test2\n"); execlp("./test2", "test2", NULL); perror("./test2"); _exit(1); } [test2.c] #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> int main(int argc, char **argv) { uid_t uid, euid, suid; getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid); printf("--TEST2--\n"); printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid); if (euid != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID!\n"); exit(1); } printf("SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID\n"); exit(0); } [Makefile] CFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE -Wall -Werror -Wunused all: test1 test2 test1: test1.c gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test1 test1.c -lpthread test2: test2.c gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test2 test2.c sudo chown root.root test2 sudo chmod +s test2 Reported-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-06 19:45:46 +08:00
n_fs = 1;
spin_lock(&p->fs->lock);
rcu_read_lock();
CRED: Fix SUID exec regression The patch: commit a6f76f23d297f70e2a6b3ec607f7aeeea9e37e8d CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials moved the place in which the 'safeness' of a SUID/SGID exec was performed to before de_thread() was called. This means that LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE is now calculated incorrectly. This flag is set if any of the usage counts for fs_struct, files_struct and sighand_struct are greater than 1 at the time the determination is made. All of which are true for threads created by the pthread library. However, since we wish to make the security calculation before irrevocably damaging the process so that we can return it an error code in the case where we decide we want to reject the exec request on this basis, we have to make the determination before calling de_thread(). So, instead, we count up the number of threads (CLONE_THREAD) that are sharing our fs_struct (CLONE_FS), files_struct (CLONE_FILES) and sighand_structs (CLONE_SIGHAND/CLONE_THREAD) with us. These will be killed by de_thread() and so can be discounted by check_unsafe_exec(). We do have to be careful because CLONE_THREAD does not imply FS or FILES. We _assume_ that there will be no extra references to these structs held by the threads we're going to kill. This can be tested with the attached pair of programs. Build the two programs using the Makefile supplied, and run ./test1 as a non-root user. If successful, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1 --TEST1-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 exec ./test2 --TEST2-- uid=4043, euid=0 suid=0 SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID and if unsuccessful, something like: [dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1 --TEST1-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 exec ./test2 --TEST2-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID! The non-root user ID you see will depend on the user you run as. [test1.c] #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <pthread.h> static void *thread_func(void *arg) { while (1) {} } int main(int argc, char **argv) { pthread_t tid; uid_t uid, euid, suid; printf("--TEST1--\n"); getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid); printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid); if (pthread_create(&tid, NULL, thread_func, NULL) < 0) { perror("pthread_create"); exit(1); } printf("exec ./test2\n"); execlp("./test2", "test2", NULL); perror("./test2"); _exit(1); } [test2.c] #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> int main(int argc, char **argv) { uid_t uid, euid, suid; getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid); printf("--TEST2--\n"); printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid); if (euid != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID!\n"); exit(1); } printf("SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID\n"); exit(0); } [Makefile] CFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE -Wall -Werror -Wunused all: test1 test2 test1: test1.c gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test1 test1.c -lpthread test2: test2.c gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test2 test2.c sudo chown root.root test2 sudo chmod +s test2 Reported-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-06 19:45:46 +08:00
for (t = next_thread(p); t != p; t = next_thread(t)) {
if (t->fs == p->fs)
n_fs++;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
CRED: Fix SUID exec regression The patch: commit a6f76f23d297f70e2a6b3ec607f7aeeea9e37e8d CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials moved the place in which the 'safeness' of a SUID/SGID exec was performed to before de_thread() was called. This means that LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE is now calculated incorrectly. This flag is set if any of the usage counts for fs_struct, files_struct and sighand_struct are greater than 1 at the time the determination is made. All of which are true for threads created by the pthread library. However, since we wish to make the security calculation before irrevocably damaging the process so that we can return it an error code in the case where we decide we want to reject the exec request on this basis, we have to make the determination before calling de_thread(). So, instead, we count up the number of threads (CLONE_THREAD) that are sharing our fs_struct (CLONE_FS), files_struct (CLONE_FILES) and sighand_structs (CLONE_SIGHAND/CLONE_THREAD) with us. These will be killed by de_thread() and so can be discounted by check_unsafe_exec(). We do have to be careful because CLONE_THREAD does not imply FS or FILES. We _assume_ that there will be no extra references to these structs held by the threads we're going to kill. This can be tested with the attached pair of programs. Build the two programs using the Makefile supplied, and run ./test1 as a non-root user. If successful, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1 --TEST1-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 exec ./test2 --TEST2-- uid=4043, euid=0 suid=0 SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID and if unsuccessful, something like: [dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1 --TEST1-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 exec ./test2 --TEST2-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID! The non-root user ID you see will depend on the user you run as. [test1.c] #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <pthread.h> static void *thread_func(void *arg) { while (1) {} } int main(int argc, char **argv) { pthread_t tid; uid_t uid, euid, suid; printf("--TEST1--\n"); getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid); printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid); if (pthread_create(&tid, NULL, thread_func, NULL) < 0) { perror("pthread_create"); exit(1); } printf("exec ./test2\n"); execlp("./test2", "test2", NULL); perror("./test2"); _exit(1); } [test2.c] #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> int main(int argc, char **argv) { uid_t uid, euid, suid; getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid); printf("--TEST2--\n"); printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid); if (euid != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID!\n"); exit(1); } printf("SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID\n"); exit(0); } [Makefile] CFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE -Wall -Werror -Wunused all: test1 test2 test1: test1.c gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test1 test1.c -lpthread test2: test2.c gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test2 test2.c sudo chown root.root test2 sudo chmod +s test2 Reported-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-06 19:45:46 +08:00
if (p->fs->users > n_fs) {
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE;
} else {
res = -EAGAIN;
if (!p->fs->in_exec) {
p->fs->in_exec = 1;
res = 1;
}
}
spin_unlock(&p->fs->lock);
return res;
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
}
/*
* Fill the binprm structure from the inode.
* Check permissions, then read the first 128 (BINPRM_BUF_SIZE) bytes
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
*
* This may be called multiple times for binary chains (scripts for example).
*/
int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
int retval;
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
/* clear any previous set[ug]id data from a previous binary */
bprm->cred->euid = current_euid();
bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs With this change, calling prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) disables privilege granting operations at execve-time. For example, a process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid or gid if this bit is set. The same is true for file capabilities. Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that LSMs respect the requested behavior. To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0); It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL. (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.) This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch series. By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task. Another potential use is making certain privileged operations unprivileged. For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot affect privileged tasks. Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is set and AppArmor is in use. It is fixed in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> v18: updated change desc v17: using new define values as per 3.4 Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-13 05:47:50 +08:00
if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) &&
!current->no_new_privs &&
kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_uid) &&
kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_gid)) {
/* Set-uid? */
if (mode & S_ISUID) {
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->cred->euid = inode->i_uid;
}
/* Set-gid? */
/*
* If setgid is set but no group execute bit then this
* is a candidate for mandatory locking, not a setgid
* executable.
*/
if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->cred->egid = inode->i_gid;
}
}
/* fill in binprm security blob */
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
bprm->cred_prepared = 1;
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
return kernel_read(bprm->file, 0, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_binprm);
/*
* Arguments are '\0' separated strings found at the location bprm->p
* points to; chop off the first by relocating brpm->p to right after
* the first '\0' encountered.
*/
int remove_arg_zero(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned long offset;
char *kaddr;
struct page *page;
if (!bprm->argc)
return 0;
do {
offset = bprm->p & ~PAGE_MASK;
page = get_arg_page(bprm, bprm->p, 0);
if (!page) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
for (; offset < PAGE_SIZE && kaddr[offset];
offset++, bprm->p++)
;
kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
put_arg_page(page);
if (offset == PAGE_SIZE)
free_arg_page(bprm, (bprm->p >> PAGE_SHIFT) - 1);
} while (offset == PAGE_SIZE);
bprm->p++;
bprm->argc--;
ret = 0;
out:
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(remove_arg_zero);
#define printable(c) (((c)=='\t') || ((c)=='\n') || (0x20<=(c) && (c)<=0x7e))
/*
* cycle the list of binary formats handler, until one recognizes the image
*/
int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
bool need_retry = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULES);
struct linux_binfmt *fmt;
int retval;
/* This allows 4 levels of binfmt rewrites before failing hard. */
if (bprm->recursion_depth > 5)
return -ELOOP;
retval = security_bprm_check(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = -ENOENT;
retry:
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
list_for_each_entry(fmt, &formats, lh) {
if (!try_module_get(fmt->module))
continue;
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
bprm->recursion_depth++;
retval = fmt->load_binary(bprm);
bprm->recursion_depth--;
if (retval >= 0 || retval != -ENOEXEC ||
bprm->mm == NULL || bprm->file == NULL) {
put_binfmt(fmt);
return retval;
}
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
put_binfmt(fmt);
}
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
if (need_retry && retval == -ENOEXEC) {
if (printable(bprm->buf[0]) && printable(bprm->buf[1]) &&
printable(bprm->buf[2]) && printable(bprm->buf[3]))
return retval;
if (request_module("binfmt-%04x", *(ushort *)(bprm->buf + 2)) < 0)
return retval;
need_retry = false;
goto retry;
}
return retval;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(search_binary_handler);
static int exec_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
pid_t old_pid, old_vpid;
int ret;
/* Need to fetch pid before load_binary changes it */
old_pid = current->pid;
rcu_read_lock();
old_vpid = task_pid_nr_ns(current, task_active_pid_ns(current->parent));
rcu_read_unlock();
ret = search_binary_handler(bprm);
if (ret >= 0) {
audit_bprm(bprm);
trace_sched_process_exec(current, old_pid, bprm);
ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC, old_vpid);
current->did_exec = 1;
proc_exec_connector(current);
if (bprm->file) {
allow_write_access(bprm->file);
fput(bprm->file);
bprm->file = NULL; /* to catch use-after-free */
}
}
return ret;
}
/*
* sys_execve() executes a new program.
*/
static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
struct user_arg_ptr argv,
struct user_arg_ptr envp)
{
struct linux_binprm *bprm;
struct file *file;
struct files_struct *displaced;
bool clear_in_exec;
int retval;
move RLIMIT_NPROC check from set_user() to do_execve_common() The patch http://lkml.org/lkml/2003/7/13/226 introduced an RLIMIT_NPROC check in set_user() to check for NPROC exceeding via setuid() and similar functions. Before the check there was a possibility to greatly exceed the allowed number of processes by an unprivileged user if the program relied on rlimit only. But the check created new security threat: many poorly written programs simply don't check setuid() return code and believe it cannot fail if executed with root privileges. So, the check is removed in this patch because of too often privilege escalations related to buggy programs. The NPROC can still be enforced in the common code flow of daemons spawning user processes. Most of daemons do fork()+setuid()+execve(). The check introduced in execve() (1) enforces the same limit as in setuid() and (2) doesn't create similar security issues. Neil Brown suggested to track what specific process has exceeded the limit by setting PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED process flag. With the change only this process would fail on execve(), and other processes' execve() behaviour is not changed. Solar Designer suggested to re-check whether NPROC limit is still exceeded at the moment of execve(). If the process was sleeping for days between set*uid() and execve(), and the NPROC counter step down under the limit, the defered execve() failure because NPROC limit was exceeded days ago would be unexpected. If the limit is not exceeded anymore, we clear the flag on successful calls to execve() and fork(). The flag is also cleared on successful calls to set_user() as the limit was exceeded for the previous user, not the current one. Similar check was introduced in -ow patches (without the process flag). v3 - clear PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED on successful calls to set_user(). Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-08-08 23:02:04 +08:00
/*
* We move the actual failure in case of RLIMIT_NPROC excess from
* set*uid() to execve() because too many poorly written programs
* don't check setuid() return code. Here we additionally recheck
* whether NPROC limit is still exceeded.
*/
if ((current->flags & PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED) &&
atomic_read(&current_user()->processes) > rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) {
move RLIMIT_NPROC check from set_user() to do_execve_common() The patch http://lkml.org/lkml/2003/7/13/226 introduced an RLIMIT_NPROC check in set_user() to check for NPROC exceeding via setuid() and similar functions. Before the check there was a possibility to greatly exceed the allowed number of processes by an unprivileged user if the program relied on rlimit only. But the check created new security threat: many poorly written programs simply don't check setuid() return code and believe it cannot fail if executed with root privileges. So, the check is removed in this patch because of too often privilege escalations related to buggy programs. The NPROC can still be enforced in the common code flow of daemons spawning user processes. Most of daemons do fork()+setuid()+execve(). The check introduced in execve() (1) enforces the same limit as in setuid() and (2) doesn't create similar security issues. Neil Brown suggested to track what specific process has exceeded the limit by setting PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED process flag. With the change only this process would fail on execve(), and other processes' execve() behaviour is not changed. Solar Designer suggested to re-check whether NPROC limit is still exceeded at the moment of execve(). If the process was sleeping for days between set*uid() and execve(), and the NPROC counter step down under the limit, the defered execve() failure because NPROC limit was exceeded days ago would be unexpected. If the limit is not exceeded anymore, we clear the flag on successful calls to execve() and fork(). The flag is also cleared on successful calls to set_user() as the limit was exceeded for the previous user, not the current one. Similar check was introduced in -ow patches (without the process flag). v3 - clear PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED on successful calls to set_user(). Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-08-08 23:02:04 +08:00
retval = -EAGAIN;
goto out_ret;
}
/* We're below the limit (still or again), so we don't want to make
* further execve() calls fail. */
current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
retval = unshare_files(&displaced);
if (retval)
goto out_ret;
retval = -ENOMEM;
bprm = kzalloc(sizeof(*bprm), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bprm)
goto out_files;
2009-09-06 02:17:13 +08:00
retval = prepare_bprm_creds(bprm);
if (retval)
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
goto out_free;
retval = check_unsafe_exec(bprm);
if (retval < 0)
2009-09-06 02:17:13 +08:00
goto out_free;
clear_in_exec = retval;
2009-09-06 02:17:13 +08:00
current->in_execve = 1;
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
file = open_exec(filename);
retval = PTR_ERR(file);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out_unmark;
sched_exec();
bprm->file = file;
bprm->filename = filename;
bprm->interp = filename;
retval = bprm_mm_init(bprm);
if (retval)
goto out_file;
bprm->argc = count(argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS);
if ((retval = bprm->argc) < 0)
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
goto out;
bprm->envc = count(envp, MAX_ARG_STRINGS);
if ((retval = bprm->envc) < 0)
goto out;
retval = prepare_binprm(bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm->filename, bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
bprm->exec = bprm->p;
retval = copy_strings(bprm->envc, envp, bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
retval = copy_strings(bprm->argc, argv, bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
retval = exec_binprm(bprm);
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
/* execve succeeded */
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
current->in_execve = 0;
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
acct_update_integrals(current);
task_numa_free(current);
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
free_bprm(bprm);
if (displaced)
put_files_struct(displaced);
return retval;
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
out:
if (bprm->mm) {
acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
mmput(bprm->mm);
}
out_file:
if (bprm->file) {
allow_write_access(bprm->file);
fput(bprm->file);
}
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
out_unmark:
if (clear_in_exec)
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
current->in_execve = 0;
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
out_free:
free_bprm(bprm);
out_files:
if (displaced)
reset_files_struct(displaced);
out_ret:
return retval;
}
int do_execve(const char *filename,
const char __user *const __user *__argv,
const char __user *const __user *__envp)
{
struct user_arg_ptr argv = { .ptr.native = __argv };
struct user_arg_ptr envp = { .ptr.native = __envp };
return do_execve_common(filename, argv, envp);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static int compat_do_execve(const char *filename,
const compat_uptr_t __user *__argv,
const compat_uptr_t __user *__envp)
{
struct user_arg_ptr argv = {
.is_compat = true,
.ptr.compat = __argv,
};
struct user_arg_ptr envp = {
.is_compat = true,
.ptr.compat = __envp,
};
return do_execve_common(filename, argv, envp);
}
#endif
void set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
if (mm->binfmt)
module_put(mm->binfmt->module);
mm->binfmt = new;
if (new)
__module_get(new->module);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_binfmt);
/*
* set_dumpable converts traditional three-value dumpable to two flags and
* stores them into mm->flags. It modifies lower two bits of mm->flags, but
* these bits are not changed atomically. So get_dumpable can observe the
* intermediate state. To avoid doing unexpected behavior, get get_dumpable
* return either old dumpable or new one by paying attention to the order of
* modifying the bits.
*
* dumpable | mm->flags (binary)
* old new | initial interim final
* ---------+-----------------------
* 0 1 | 00 01 01
* 0 2 | 00 10(*) 11
* 1 0 | 01 00 00
* 1 2 | 01 11 11
* 2 0 | 11 10(*) 00
* 2 1 | 11 11 01
*
* (*) get_dumpable regards interim value of 10 as 11.
*/
void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value)
{
switch (value) {
case SUID_DUMP_DISABLE:
clear_bit(MMF_DUMPABLE, &mm->flags);
smp_wmb();
clear_bit(MMF_DUMP_SECURELY, &mm->flags);
break;
case SUID_DUMP_USER:
set_bit(MMF_DUMPABLE, &mm->flags);
smp_wmb();
clear_bit(MMF_DUMP_SECURELY, &mm->flags);
break;
case SUID_DUMP_ROOT:
set_bit(MMF_DUMP_SECURELY, &mm->flags);
smp_wmb();
set_bit(MMF_DUMPABLE, &mm->flags);
break;
}
}
int __get_dumpable(unsigned long mm_flags)
{
int ret;
ret = mm_flags & MMF_DUMPABLE_MASK;
return (ret > SUID_DUMP_USER) ? SUID_DUMP_ROOT : ret;
}
/*
* This returns the actual value of the suid_dumpable flag. For things
* that are using this for checking for privilege transitions, it must
* test against SUID_DUMP_USER rather than treating it as a boolean
* value.
*/
int get_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
return __get_dumpable(mm->flags);
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(execve,
const char __user *, filename,
const char __user *const __user *, argv,
const char __user *const __user *, envp)
{
struct filename *path = getname(filename);
int error = PTR_ERR(path);
if (!IS_ERR(path)) {
error = do_execve(path->name, argv, envp);
putname(path);
}
return error;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
asmlinkage long compat_sys_execve(const char __user * filename,
const compat_uptr_t __user * argv,
const compat_uptr_t __user * envp)
{
struct filename *path = getname(filename);
int error = PTR_ERR(path);
if (!IS_ERR(path)) {
error = compat_do_execve(path->name, argv, envp);
putname(path);
}
return error;
}
#endif