License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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2008-03-26 16:43:29 +08:00
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/* linux/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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*
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* This file contains various random system calls that
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* have a non-standard calling sequence on the Linux/sparc
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* platform.
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*/
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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2017-02-09 01:51:30 +08:00
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#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
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2017-02-09 01:51:31 +08:00
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#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
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2017-02-09 01:51:35 +08:00
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#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/sem.h>
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#include <linux/msg.h>
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#include <linux/shm.h>
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#include <linux/stat.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/utsname.h>
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#include <linux/smp.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <linux/ipc.h>
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#include <linux/personality.h>
|
2006-03-18 09:42:57 +08:00
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#include <linux/random.h>
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2011-07-23 01:18:16 +08:00
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#include <linux/export.h>
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2013-09-14 20:02:11 +08:00
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#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2016-12-25 03:46:01 +08:00
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#include <asm/utrap.h>
|
2006-10-02 17:18:34 +08:00
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#include <asm/unistd.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2008-03-26 16:43:29 +08:00
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#include "entry.h"
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2014-05-17 05:25:54 +08:00
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#include "kernel.h"
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2008-03-26 16:43:29 +08:00
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#include "systbls.h"
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/* #define DEBUG_UNIMP_SYSCALL */
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2018-03-20 11:23:53 +08:00
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SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpagesize)
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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{
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return PAGE_SIZE;
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}
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2006-03-03 10:12:27 +08:00
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/* Does addr --> addr+len fall within 4GB of the VA-space hole or
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* overflow past the end of the 64-bit address space?
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*/
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static inline int invalid_64bit_range(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
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{
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unsigned long va_exclude_start, va_exclude_end;
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va_exclude_start = VA_EXCLUDE_START;
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va_exclude_end = VA_EXCLUDE_END;
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if (unlikely(len >= va_exclude_start))
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return 1;
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if (unlikely((addr + len) < addr))
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return 1;
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if (unlikely((addr >= va_exclude_start && addr < va_exclude_end) ||
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((addr + len) >= va_exclude_start &&
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(addr + len) < va_exclude_end)))
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
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/* These functions differ from the default implementations in
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* mm/mmap.c in two ways:
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*
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* 1) For file backed MAP_SHARED mmap()'s we D-cache color align,
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* for fixed such mappings we just validate what the user gave us.
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* 2) For 64-bit tasks we avoid mapping anything within 4GB of
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* the spitfire/niagara VA-hole.
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*/
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2012-12-12 08:02:29 +08:00
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static inline unsigned long COLOR_ALIGN(unsigned long addr,
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2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
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unsigned long pgoff)
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{
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unsigned long base = (addr+SHMLBA-1)&~(SHMLBA-1);
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unsigned long off = (pgoff<<PAGE_SHIFT) & (SHMLBA-1);
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return base + off;
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}
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
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{
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struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
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struct vm_area_struct * vma;
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unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE;
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int do_color_align;
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2012-12-12 08:02:21 +08:00
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struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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if (flags & MAP_FIXED) {
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/* We do not accept a shared mapping if it would violate
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* cache aliasing constraints.
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*/
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if ((flags & MAP_SHARED) &&
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((addr - (pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT)) & (SHMLBA - 1)))
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return -EINVAL;
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return addr;
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}
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if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
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2006-03-18 09:33:56 +08:00
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task_size = STACK_TOP32;
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2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
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if (unlikely(len > task_size || len >= VA_EXCLUDE_START))
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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return -ENOMEM;
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do_color_align = 0;
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if (filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED))
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do_color_align = 1;
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if (addr) {
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if (do_color_align)
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2012-12-12 08:02:29 +08:00
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addr = COLOR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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else
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addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
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vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
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if (task_size - len >= addr &&
|
mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas
Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.
This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.
Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.
One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).
Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.
Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.
Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-06-19 19:03:24 +08:00
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(!vma || addr + len <= vm_start_gap(vma)))
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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return addr;
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}
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|
2012-12-12 08:02:21 +08:00
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info.flags = 0;
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info.length = len;
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info.low_limit = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
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info.high_limit = min(task_size, VA_EXCLUDE_START);
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info.align_mask = do_color_align ? (PAGE_MASK & (SHMLBA - 1)) : 0;
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info.align_offset = pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
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addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
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if ((addr & ~PAGE_MASK) && task_size > VA_EXCLUDE_END) {
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VM_BUG_ON(addr != -ENOMEM);
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info.low_limit = VA_EXCLUDE_END;
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info.high_limit = task_size;
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addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
|
2005-06-22 08:14:49 +08:00
|
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}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
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|
2012-12-12 08:02:21 +08:00
|
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return addr;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
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}
|
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|
2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
|
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unsigned long
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arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0,
|
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const unsigned long len, const unsigned long pgoff,
|
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const unsigned long flags)
|
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{
|
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struct vm_area_struct *vma;
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struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
2006-03-18 09:33:56 +08:00
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unsigned long task_size = STACK_TOP32;
|
2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
|
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unsigned long addr = addr0;
|
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int do_color_align;
|
2012-12-12 08:02:21 +08:00
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struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
|
2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
|
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/* This should only ever run for 32-bit processes. */
|
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BUG_ON(!test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT));
|
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|
if (flags & MAP_FIXED) {
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/* We do not accept a shared mapping if it would violate
|
|
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|
* cache aliasing constraints.
|
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|
*/
|
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|
if ((flags & MAP_SHARED) &&
|
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((addr - (pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT)) & (SHMLBA - 1)))
|
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return -EINVAL;
|
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|
return addr;
|
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|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
if (unlikely(len > task_size))
|
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return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
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do_color_align = 0;
|
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if (filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED))
|
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do_color_align = 1;
|
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|
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/* requesting a specific address */
|
|
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|
if (addr) {
|
|
|
|
if (do_color_align)
|
2012-12-12 08:02:29 +08:00
|
|
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addr = COLOR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
|
2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
|
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else
|
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addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
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vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
|
|
|
|
if (task_size - len >= addr &&
|
mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas
Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.
This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.
Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.
One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).
Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.
Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.
Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-06-19 19:03:24 +08:00
|
|
|
(!vma || addr + len <= vm_start_gap(vma)))
|
2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
|
|
|
return addr;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-12-12 08:02:21 +08:00
|
|
|
info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN;
|
|
|
|
info.length = len;
|
|
|
|
info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
info.high_limit = mm->mmap_base;
|
|
|
|
info.align_mask = do_color_align ? (PAGE_MASK & (SHMLBA - 1)) : 0;
|
|
|
|
info.align_offset = pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
|
|
|
|
addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
|
2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* A failed mmap() very likely causes application failure,
|
|
|
|
* so fall back to the bottom-up function here. This scenario
|
|
|
|
* can happen with large stack limits and large mmap()
|
|
|
|
* allocations.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-12-12 08:02:21 +08:00
|
|
|
if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK) {
|
|
|
|
VM_BUG_ON(addr != -ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
info.flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
info.low_limit = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
|
|
|
|
info.high_limit = STACK_TOP32;
|
|
|
|
addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return addr;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Try to align mapping such that we align it as much as possible. */
|
|
|
|
unsigned long get_fb_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long orig_addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long align_goal, addr = -ENOMEM;
|
2009-11-30 21:38:43 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long (*get_area)(struct file *, unsigned long,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
get_area = current->mm->get_unmapped_area;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (flags & MAP_FIXED) {
|
|
|
|
/* Ok, don't mess with it. */
|
2009-11-30 21:38:43 +08:00
|
|
|
return get_area(NULL, orig_addr, len, pgoff, flags);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
flags &= ~MAP_SHARED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
align_goal = PAGE_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
if (len >= (4UL * 1024 * 1024))
|
|
|
|
align_goal = (4UL * 1024 * 1024);
|
|
|
|
else if (len >= (512UL * 1024))
|
|
|
|
align_goal = (512UL * 1024);
|
|
|
|
else if (len >= (64UL * 1024))
|
|
|
|
align_goal = (64UL * 1024);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
do {
|
2009-11-30 21:38:43 +08:00
|
|
|
addr = get_area(NULL, orig_addr, len + (align_goal - PAGE_SIZE), pgoff, flags);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!(addr & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
|
|
|
|
addr = (addr + (align_goal - 1UL)) & ~(align_goal - 1UL);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (align_goal == (4UL * 1024 * 1024))
|
|
|
|
align_goal = (512UL * 1024);
|
|
|
|
else if (align_goal == (512UL * 1024))
|
|
|
|
align_goal = (64UL * 1024);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
align_goal = PAGE_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
} while ((addr & ~PAGE_MASK) && align_goal > PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Mapping is smaller than 64K or larger areas could not
|
|
|
|
* be obtained.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
|
2009-11-30 21:38:43 +08:00
|
|
|
addr = get_area(NULL, orig_addr, len, pgoff, flags);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return addr;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-09 08:58:20 +08:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_fb_unmapped_area);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-02-19 06:06:47 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Essentially the same as PowerPC. */
|
|
|
|
static unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
|
2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-02-19 06:06:47 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long rnd = 0UL;
|
2006-03-18 09:42:57 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) {
|
2016-02-27 07:19:37 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long val = get_random_long();
|
2006-03-18 09:42:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
|
2011-10-17 21:05:23 +08:00
|
|
|
rnd = (val % (1UL << (23UL-PAGE_SHIFT)));
|
2006-03-18 09:42:57 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
2011-10-17 21:05:23 +08:00
|
|
|
rnd = (val % (1UL << (30UL-PAGE_SHIFT)));
|
2006-03-18 09:42:57 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-10-17 21:05:23 +08:00
|
|
|
return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
|
2011-02-19 06:06:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-11 07:34:53 +08:00
|
|
|
void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm, struct rlimit *rlim_stack)
|
2011-02-19 06:06:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long random_factor = mmap_rnd();
|
|
|
|
unsigned long gap;
|
2006-03-18 09:42:57 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fall back to the standard layout if the personality
|
|
|
|
* bit is set, or if the expected stack growth is unlimited:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-04-11 07:34:53 +08:00
|
|
|
gap = rlim_stack->rlim_cur;
|
2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ||
|
|
|
|
(current->personality & ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT) ||
|
2010-01-08 16:03:26 +08:00
|
|
|
gap == RLIM_INFINITY ||
|
2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
|
|
|
sysctl_legacy_va_layout) {
|
2006-03-18 09:42:57 +08:00
|
|
|
mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + random_factor;
|
2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
|
|
|
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* We know it's 32-bit */
|
2006-03-18 09:33:56 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long task_size = STACK_TOP32;
|
2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (gap < 128 * 1024 * 1024)
|
|
|
|
gap = 128 * 1024 * 1024;
|
|
|
|
if (gap > (task_size / 6 * 5))
|
|
|
|
gap = (task_size / 6 * 5);
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-18 09:42:57 +08:00
|
|
|
mm->mmap_base = PAGE_ALIGN(task_size - gap - random_factor);
|
2006-03-18 06:41:03 +08:00
|
|
|
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* sys_pipe() is the normal C calling standard for creating
|
|
|
|
* a pipe. It's not the way unix traditionally does this, though.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-03-20 08:48:50 +08:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(sparc_pipe)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int fd[2];
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-07-24 12:29:30 +08:00
|
|
|
error = do_pipe_flags(fd, 0);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2018-03-20 08:48:50 +08:00
|
|
|
current_pt_regs()->u_regs[UREG_I1] = fd[1];
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
error = fd[0];
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* sys_ipc() is the de-multiplexer for the SysV IPC calls..
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This is really horribly ugly.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2010-03-11 07:21:18 +08:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE6(sparc_ipc, unsigned int, call, int, first, unsigned long, second,
|
2009-01-20 13:11:27 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long, third, void __user *, ptr, long, fifth)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-10-10 11:56:31 +08:00
|
|
|
long err;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* No need for backward compatibility. We can start fresh... */
|
2015-03-03 14:16:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (call <= SEMTIMEDOP) {
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
switch (call) {
|
|
|
|
case SEMOP:
|
|
|
|
err = sys_semtimedop(first, ptr,
|
2016-03-11 07:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
(unsigned int)second, NULL);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
case SEMTIMEDOP:
|
2016-03-11 07:21:43 +08:00
|
|
|
err = sys_semtimedop(first, ptr, (unsigned int)second,
|
2008-03-26 16:43:29 +08:00
|
|
|
(const struct timespec __user *)
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long) fifth);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
case SEMGET:
|
|
|
|
err = sys_semget(first, (int)second, (int)third);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
case SEMCTL: {
|
2008-04-25 17:12:05 +08:00
|
|
|
err = sys_semctl(first, second,
|
|
|
|
(int)third | IPC_64,
|
2013-03-06 04:04:55 +08:00
|
|
|
(unsigned long) ptr);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
err = -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2011-06-03 22:45:23 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (call <= MSGCTL) {
|
|
|
|
switch (call) {
|
|
|
|
case MSGSND:
|
|
|
|
err = sys_msgsnd(first, ptr, (size_t)second,
|
|
|
|
(int)third);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
case MSGRCV:
|
|
|
|
err = sys_msgrcv(first, ptr, (size_t)second, fifth,
|
|
|
|
(int)third);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
case MSGGET:
|
|
|
|
err = sys_msgget((key_t)first, (int)second);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
case MSGCTL:
|
|
|
|
err = sys_msgctl(first, (int)second | IPC_64, ptr);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
err = -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2011-06-03 22:45:23 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (call <= SHMCTL) {
|
|
|
|
switch (call) {
|
|
|
|
case SHMAT: {
|
|
|
|
ulong raddr;
|
2012-07-31 05:42:38 +08:00
|
|
|
err = do_shmat(first, ptr, (int)second, &raddr, SHMLBA);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!err) {
|
|
|
|
if (put_user(raddr,
|
|
|
|
(ulong __user *) third))
|
|
|
|
err = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case SHMDT:
|
|
|
|
err = sys_shmdt(ptr);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
case SHMGET:
|
|
|
|
err = sys_shmget(first, (size_t)second, (int)third);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
case SHMCTL:
|
|
|
|
err = sys_shmctl(first, (int)second | IPC_64, ptr);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
err = -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2011-06-03 22:45:23 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
err = -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-20 13:11:27 +08:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sparc64_personality, unsigned long, personality)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-12-27 07:13:27 +08:00
|
|
|
long ret;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2012-08-02 03:10:51 +08:00
|
|
|
if (personality(current->personality) == PER_LINUX32 &&
|
|
|
|
personality(personality) == PER_LINUX)
|
|
|
|
personality |= PER_LINUX32;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = sys_personality(personality);
|
2012-08-02 03:10:51 +08:00
|
|
|
if (personality(ret) == PER_LINUX32)
|
|
|
|
ret &= ~PER_LINUX32;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
sparc: Merge asm-sparc{,64}/mman.h
Renaming the function sparc64_mmap_check() to
sparc_mmap_check() was enough to make the two
header files identical.
:$ diff -u include/asm-sparc/mman.h include/asm-sparc64/mman.h
:-- include/asm-sparc/mman.h 2008-06-13 06:46:39.000000000 +0200
:++ include/asm-sparc64/mman.h 2008-06-13 06:46:39.000000000 +0200
:@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
:-#ifndef __SPARC_MMAN_H__
:-#define __SPARC_MMAN_H__
:+#ifndef __SPARC64_MMAN_H__
:+#define __SPARC64_MMAN_H__
:
: #include <asm-generic/mman.h>
:
:@@ -23,9 +23,9 @@
:
: #ifdef __KERNEL__
: #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
:-#define arch_mmap_check(addr,len,flags) sparc_mmap_check(addr,len)
:-int sparc_mmap_check(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len);
:+#define arch_mmap_check(addr,len,flags) sparc64_mmap_check(addr,len)
:+int sparc64_mmap_check(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len);
: #endif
: #endif
:
:-#endif /* __SPARC_MMAN_H__ */
:+#endif /* __SPARC64_MMAN_H__ */
Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
2008-06-07 02:51:20 +08:00
|
|
|
int sparc_mmap_check(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
|
2006-09-07 18:17:04 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
|
|
|
|
if (len >= STACK_TOP32)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-05-07 17:24:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (addr > STACK_TOP32 - len)
|
2006-09-07 18:17:04 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (len >= VA_EXCLUDE_START)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-05-07 17:24:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (invalid_64bit_range(addr, len))
|
2006-09-07 18:17:04 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Linux version of mmap */
|
2009-01-20 13:11:27 +08:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE6(mmap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, len,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long, prot, unsigned long, flags, unsigned long, fd,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long, off)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-12-01 06:37:04 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long retval = -EINVAL;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2009-12-01 06:37:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((off + PAGE_ALIGN(len)) < off)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
if (off & ~PAGE_MASK)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2018-03-11 18:34:46 +08:00
|
|
|
retval = ksys_mmap_pgoff(addr, len, prot, flags, fd, off >> PAGE_SHIFT);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-20 13:11:27 +08:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(64_munmap, unsigned long, addr, size_t, len)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-03-03 10:12:27 +08:00
|
|
|
if (invalid_64bit_range(addr, len))
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2006-03-03 10:12:27 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2012-04-21 09:57:04 +08:00
|
|
|
return vm_munmap(addr, len);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-20 13:11:27 +08:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(64_mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long, new_len, unsigned long, flags,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long, new_addr)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
|
2012-05-30 14:12:40 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
return sys_mremap(addr, old_len, new_len, flags, new_addr);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-20 22:44:21 +08:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(nis_syscall)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static int count;
|
2018-03-20 22:44:21 +08:00
|
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Don't make the system unusable, if someone goes stuck */
|
|
|
|
if (count++ > 5)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
printk ("Unimplemented SPARC system call %ld\n",regs->u_regs[1]);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_UNIMP_SYSCALL
|
|
|
|
show_regs (regs);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* #define DEBUG_SPARC_BREAKPOINT */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
asmlinkage void sparc_breakpoint(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-09-14 20:02:11 +08:00
|
|
|
enum ctx_state prev_state = exception_enter();
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
|
|
|
|
regs->tpc &= 0xffffffff;
|
|
|
|
regs->tnpc &= 0xffffffff;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_SPARC_BREAKPOINT
|
|
|
|
printk ("TRAP: Entering kernel PC=%lx, nPC=%lx\n", regs->tpc, regs->tnpc);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2018-04-20 05:59:56 +08:00
|
|
|
force_sig_fault(SIGTRAP, TRAP_BRKPT, (void __user *)regs->tpc, 0, current);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_SPARC_BREAKPOINT
|
|
|
|
printk ("TRAP: Returning to space: PC=%lx nPC=%lx\n", regs->tpc, regs->tnpc);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2013-09-14 20:02:11 +08:00
|
|
|
exception_exit(prev_state);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-20 13:11:27 +08:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-07-22 05:12:39 +08:00
|
|
|
int nlen, err;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-09-18 22:11:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
2006-07-22 05:12:39 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
down_read(&uts_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
2006-10-02 17:18:11 +08:00
|
|
|
nlen = strlen(utsname()->domainname) + 1;
|
2006-09-18 22:11:36 +08:00
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (nlen > len)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2006-07-22 05:12:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = -EFAULT;
|
2006-10-02 17:18:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!copy_to_user(name, utsname()->domainname, nlen))
|
2006-07-22 05:12:39 +08:00
|
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-09-18 22:11:36 +08:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
up_read(&uts_sem);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-20 13:11:27 +08:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(utrap_install, utrap_entry_t, type,
|
|
|
|
utrap_handler_t, new_p, utrap_handler_t, new_d,
|
|
|
|
utrap_handler_t __user *, old_p,
|
|
|
|
utrap_handler_t __user *, old_d)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (type < UT_INSTRUCTION_EXCEPTION || type > UT_TRAP_INSTRUCTION_31)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (new_p == (utrap_handler_t)(long)UTH_NOCHANGE) {
|
|
|
|
if (old_p) {
|
|
|
|
if (!current_thread_info()->utraps) {
|
|
|
|
if (put_user(NULL, old_p))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (put_user((utrap_handler_t)(current_thread_info()->utraps[type]), old_p))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (old_d) {
|
|
|
|
if (put_user(NULL, old_d))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!current_thread_info()->utraps) {
|
|
|
|
current_thread_info()->utraps =
|
2006-03-07 05:48:40 +08:00
|
|
|
kzalloc((UT_TRAP_INSTRUCTION_31+1)*sizeof(long), GFP_KERNEL);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!current_thread_info()->utraps)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
current_thread_info()->utraps[0] = 1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if ((utrap_handler_t)current_thread_info()->utraps[type] != new_p &&
|
|
|
|
current_thread_info()->utraps[0] > 1) {
|
2008-03-26 16:43:29 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long *p = current_thread_info()->utraps;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
current_thread_info()->utraps =
|
|
|
|
kmalloc((UT_TRAP_INSTRUCTION_31+1)*sizeof(long),
|
|
|
|
GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!current_thread_info()->utraps) {
|
|
|
|
current_thread_info()->utraps = p;
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p[0]--;
|
|
|
|
current_thread_info()->utraps[0] = 1;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(current_thread_info()->utraps+1, p+1,
|
|
|
|
UT_TRAP_INSTRUCTION_31*sizeof(long));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (old_p) {
|
|
|
|
if (put_user((utrap_handler_t)(current_thread_info()->utraps[type]), old_p))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (old_d) {
|
|
|
|
if (put_user(NULL, old_d))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
current_thread_info()->utraps[type] = (long)new_p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-20 11:26:39 +08:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memory_ordering, unsigned long, model)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-03-20 11:26:39 +08:00
|
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (model >= 3)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
regs->tstate = (regs->tstate & ~TSTATE_MM) | (model << 14);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-20 13:11:27 +08:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(rt_sigaction, int, sig, const struct sigaction __user *, act,
|
|
|
|
struct sigaction __user *, oact, void __user *, restorer,
|
|
|
|
size_t, sigsetsize)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct k_sigaction new_ka, old_ka;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: Don't preclude handling different sized sigset_t's. */
|
|
|
|
if (sigsetsize != sizeof(sigset_t))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (act) {
|
|
|
|
new_ka.ka_restorer = restorer;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&new_ka.sa, act, sizeof(*act)))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = do_sigaction(sig, act ? &new_ka : NULL, oact ? &old_ka : NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ret && oact) {
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(oact, &old_ka.sa, sizeof(*oact)))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-20 11:23:53 +08:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(kern_features)
|
sparc64: Make montmul/montsqr/mpmul usable in 32-bit threads.
The Montgomery Multiply, Montgomery Square, and Multiple-Precision
Multiply instructions work by loading a combination of the floating
point and multiple register windows worth of integer registers
with the inputs.
These values are 64-bit. But for 32-bit userland processes we only
save the low 32-bits of each integer register during a register spill.
This is because the register window save area is in the user stack and
has a fixed layout.
Therefore, the only way to use these instruction in 32-bit mode is to
perform the following sequence:
1) Load the top-32bits of a choosen integer register with a sentinel,
say "-1". This will be in the outer-most register window.
The idea is that we're trying to see if the outer-most register
window gets spilled, and thus the 64-bit values were truncated.
2) Load all the inputs for the montmul/montsqr/mpmul instruction,
down to the inner-most register window.
3) Execute the opcode.
4) Traverse back up to the outer-most register window.
5) Check the sentinel, if it's still "-1" store the results.
Otherwise retry the entire sequence.
This retry is extremely troublesome. If you're just unlucky and an
interrupt or other trap happens, it'll push that outer-most window to
the stack and clear the sentinel when we restore it.
We could retry forever and never make forward progress if interrupts
arrive at a fast enough rate (consider perf events as one example).
So we have do limited retries and fallback to software which is
extremely non-deterministic.
Luckily it's very straightforward to provide a mechanism to let
32-bit applications use a 64-bit stack. Stacks in 64-bit mode are
biased by 2047 bytes, which means that the lowest bit is set in the
actual %sp register value.
So if we see bit zero set in a 32-bit application's stack we treat
it like a 64-bit stack.
Runtime detection of such a facility is tricky, and cumbersome at
best. For example, just trying to use a biased stack and seeing if it
works is hard to recover from (the signal handler will need to use an
alt stack, plus something along the lines of longjmp). Therefore, we
add a system call to report a bitmask of arch specific features like
this in a cheap and less hairy way.
With help from Andy Polyakov.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-10-27 06:18:37 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return KERN_FEATURE_MIXED_MODE_STACK;
|
|
|
|
}
|