linux/security/tomoyo/realpath.c

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Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
/*
* security/tomoyo/realpath.c
*
* Pathname calculation functions for TOMOYO.
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
*
* Copyright (C) 2005-2010 NTT DATA CORPORATION
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
*/
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/mnt_namespace.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
#include "common.h"
/**
* tomoyo_encode: Convert binary string to ascii string.
*
* @str: String in binary format.
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
*
* Returns pointer to @str in ascii format on success, NULL otherwise.
*
* This function uses kzalloc(), so caller must kfree() if this function
* didn't return NULL.
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
*/
char *tomoyo_encode(const char *str)
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
{
int len = 0;
const char *p = str;
char *cp;
char *cp0;
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
if (!p)
return NULL;
while (*p) {
const unsigned char c = *p++;
if (c == '\\')
len += 2;
else if (c > ' ' && c < 127)
len++;
else
len += 4;
}
len++;
/* Reserve space for appending "/". */
cp = kzalloc(len + 10, GFP_NOFS);
if (!cp)
return NULL;
cp0 = cp;
p = str;
while (*p) {
const unsigned char c = *p++;
if (c == '\\') {
*cp++ = '\\';
*cp++ = '\\';
} else if (c > ' ' && c < 127) {
*cp++ = c;
} else {
*cp++ = '\\';
*cp++ = (c >> 6) + '0';
*cp++ = ((c >> 3) & 7) + '0';
*cp++ = (c & 7) + '0';
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
}
}
return cp0;
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
}
/**
* tomoyo_realpath_from_path - Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root.
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
*
* @path: Pointer to "struct path".
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
*
* Returns the realpath of the given @path on success, NULL otherwise.
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
*
* If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended.
* Characters out of 0x20 < c < 0x7F range are converted to
* \ooo style octal string.
* Character \ is converted to \\ string.
*
* These functions use kzalloc(), so the caller must call kfree()
* if these functions didn't return NULL.
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
*/
char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(struct path *path)
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
{
char *buf = NULL;
char *name = NULL;
unsigned int buf_len = PAGE_SIZE / 2;
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
bool is_dir;
if (!dentry)
return NULL;
is_dir = dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
while (1) {
struct path ns_root = { .mnt = NULL, .dentry = NULL };
char *pos;
buf_len <<= 1;
kfree(buf);
buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_NOFS);
if (!buf)
break;
/* Get better name for socket. */
if (dentry->d_sb && dentry->d_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct socket *sock = inode ? SOCKET_I(inode) : NULL;
struct sock *sk = sock ? sock->sk : NULL;
if (sk) {
snprintf(buf, buf_len - 1, "socket:[family=%u:"
"type=%u:protocol=%u]", sk->sk_family,
sk->sk_type, sk->sk_protocol);
} else {
snprintf(buf, buf_len - 1, "socket:[unknown]");
}
name = tomoyo_encode(buf);
break;
}
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
/* For "socket:[\$]" and "pipe:[\$]". */
if (dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_dname) {
pos = dentry->d_op->d_dname(dentry, buf, buf_len - 1);
if (IS_ERR(pos))
continue;
name = tomoyo_encode(pos);
break;
}
/* If we don't have a vfsmount, we can't calculate. */
if (!path->mnt)
break;
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
/* go to whatever namespace root we are under */
pos = __d_path(path, &ns_root, buf, buf_len);
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
/* Prepend "/proc" prefix if using internal proc vfs mount. */
if (!IS_ERR(pos) && (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL) &&
(path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_magic == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC)) {
pos -= 5;
if (pos >= buf)
memcpy(pos, "/proc", 5);
else
pos = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
}
if (IS_ERR(pos))
continue;
name = tomoyo_encode(pos);
break;
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
}
kfree(buf);
if (!name)
tomoyo_warn_oom(__func__);
else if (is_dir && *name) {
/* Append trailing '/' if dentry is a directory. */
char *pos = name + strlen(name) - 1;
if (*pos != '/')
/*
* This is OK because tomoyo_encode() reserves space
* for appending "/".
*/
*++pos = '/';
}
return name;
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
}
/**
* tomoyo_realpath_nofollow - Get realpath of a pathname.
*
* @pathname: The pathname to solve.
*
* Returns the realpath of @pathname on success, NULL otherwise.
*/
char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname)
{
struct path path;
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
if (pathname && kern_path(pathname, 0, &path) == 0) {
char *buf = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&path);
path_put(&path);
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
return buf;
}
return NULL;
}