linux/drivers/net/vxlan.c

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/*
* VXLAN: Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network
*
* Copyright (c) 2012-2013 Vyatta Inc.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
#include <linux/igmp.h>
#include <linux/etherdevice.h>
#include <linux/if_ether.h>
#include <linux/if_vlan.h>
#include <linux/hash.h>
#include <linux/ethtool.h>
#include <net/arp.h>
#include <net/ndisc.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/ip_tunnels.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <net/udp.h>
#include <net/udp_tunnel.h>
#include <net/rtnetlink.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <net/dsfield.h>
#include <net/inet_ecn.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <net/netns/generic.h>
#include <net/vxlan.h>
#include <net/protocol.h>
#include <net/udp_tunnel.h>
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include <net/addrconf.h>
#include <net/ip6_tunnel.h>
#include <net/ip6_checksum.h>
#endif
#define VXLAN_VERSION "0.1"
#define PORT_HASH_BITS 8
#define PORT_HASH_SIZE (1<<PORT_HASH_BITS)
#define VNI_HASH_BITS 10
#define VNI_HASH_SIZE (1<<VNI_HASH_BITS)
#define FDB_HASH_BITS 8
#define FDB_HASH_SIZE (1<<FDB_HASH_BITS)
#define FDB_AGE_DEFAULT 300 /* 5 min */
#define FDB_AGE_INTERVAL (10 * HZ) /* rescan interval */
/* UDP port for VXLAN traffic.
* The IANA assigned port is 4789, but the Linux default is 8472
* for compatibility with early adopters.
*/
static unsigned short vxlan_port __read_mostly = 8472;
module_param_named(udp_port, vxlan_port, ushort, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(udp_port, "Destination UDP port");
static bool log_ecn_error = true;
module_param(log_ecn_error, bool, 0644);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(log_ecn_error, "Log packets received with corrupted ECN");
static int vxlan_net_id;
static const u8 all_zeros_mac[ETH_ALEN];
/* per-network namespace private data for this module */
struct vxlan_net {
struct list_head vxlan_list;
struct hlist_head sock_list[PORT_HASH_SIZE];
spinlock_t sock_lock;
};
union vxlan_addr {
struct sockaddr_in sin;
struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
struct sockaddr sa;
};
struct vxlan_rdst {
union vxlan_addr remote_ip;
__be16 remote_port;
u32 remote_vni;
u32 remote_ifindex;
struct list_head list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
};
/* Forwarding table entry */
struct vxlan_fdb {
struct hlist_node hlist; /* linked list of entries */
struct rcu_head rcu;
unsigned long updated; /* jiffies */
unsigned long used;
struct list_head remotes;
u16 state; /* see ndm_state */
u8 flags; /* see ndm_flags */
u8 eth_addr[ETH_ALEN];
};
/* Pseudo network device */
struct vxlan_dev {
struct hlist_node hlist; /* vni hash table */
struct list_head next; /* vxlan's per namespace list */
struct vxlan_sock *vn_sock; /* listening socket */
struct net_device *dev;
struct net *net; /* netns for packet i/o */
struct vxlan_rdst default_dst; /* default destination */
union vxlan_addr saddr; /* source address */
__be16 dst_port;
__u16 port_min; /* source port range */
__u16 port_max;
__u8 tos; /* TOS override */
__u8 ttl;
u32 flags; /* VXLAN_F_* in vxlan.h */
struct work_struct sock_work;
struct work_struct igmp_join;
struct work_struct igmp_leave;
unsigned long age_interval;
struct timer_list age_timer;
spinlock_t hash_lock;
unsigned int addrcnt;
unsigned int addrmax;
struct hlist_head fdb_head[FDB_HASH_SIZE];
};
/* salt for hash table */
static u32 vxlan_salt __read_mostly;
static struct workqueue_struct *vxlan_wq;
static void vxlan_sock_work(struct work_struct *work);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
static inline
bool vxlan_addr_equal(const union vxlan_addr *a, const union vxlan_addr *b)
{
if (a->sa.sa_family != b->sa.sa_family)
return false;
if (a->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
return ipv6_addr_equal(&a->sin6.sin6_addr, &b->sin6.sin6_addr);
else
return a->sin.sin_addr.s_addr == b->sin.sin_addr.s_addr;
}
static inline bool vxlan_addr_any(const union vxlan_addr *ipa)
{
if (ipa->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
return ipv6_addr_any(&ipa->sin6.sin6_addr);
else
return ipa->sin.sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_ANY);
}
static inline bool vxlan_addr_multicast(const union vxlan_addr *ipa)
{
if (ipa->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
return ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&ipa->sin6.sin6_addr);
else
return IN_MULTICAST(ntohl(ipa->sin.sin_addr.s_addr));
}
static int vxlan_nla_get_addr(union vxlan_addr *ip, struct nlattr *nla)
{
if (nla_len(nla) >= sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
nla_memcpy(&ip->sin6.sin6_addr, nla, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ip->sa.sa_family = AF_INET6;
return 0;
} else if (nla_len(nla) >= sizeof(__be32)) {
ip->sin.sin_addr.s_addr = nla_get_be32(nla);
ip->sa.sa_family = AF_INET;
return 0;
} else {
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
}
static int vxlan_nla_put_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, int attr,
const union vxlan_addr *ip)
{
if (ip->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
return nla_put(skb, attr, sizeof(struct in6_addr), &ip->sin6.sin6_addr);
else
return nla_put_be32(skb, attr, ip->sin.sin_addr.s_addr);
}
#else /* !CONFIG_IPV6 */
static inline
bool vxlan_addr_equal(const union vxlan_addr *a, const union vxlan_addr *b)
{
return a->sin.sin_addr.s_addr == b->sin.sin_addr.s_addr;
}
static inline bool vxlan_addr_any(const union vxlan_addr *ipa)
{
return ipa->sin.sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_ANY);
}
static inline bool vxlan_addr_multicast(const union vxlan_addr *ipa)
{
return IN_MULTICAST(ntohl(ipa->sin.sin_addr.s_addr));
}
static int vxlan_nla_get_addr(union vxlan_addr *ip, struct nlattr *nla)
{
if (nla_len(nla) >= sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
} else if (nla_len(nla) >= sizeof(__be32)) {
ip->sin.sin_addr.s_addr = nla_get_be32(nla);
ip->sa.sa_family = AF_INET;
return 0;
} else {
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
}
static int vxlan_nla_put_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, int attr,
const union vxlan_addr *ip)
{
return nla_put_be32(skb, attr, ip->sin.sin_addr.s_addr);
}
#endif
/* Virtual Network hash table head */
static inline struct hlist_head *vni_head(struct vxlan_sock *vs, u32 id)
{
return &vs->vni_list[hash_32(id, VNI_HASH_BITS)];
}
/* Socket hash table head */
static inline struct hlist_head *vs_head(struct net *net, __be16 port)
{
struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(net, vxlan_net_id);
return &vn->sock_list[hash_32(ntohs(port), PORT_HASH_BITS)];
}
/* First remote destination for a forwarding entry.
* Guaranteed to be non-NULL because remotes are never deleted.
*/
static inline struct vxlan_rdst *first_remote_rcu(struct vxlan_fdb *fdb)
{
return list_entry_rcu(fdb->remotes.next, struct vxlan_rdst, list);
}
static inline struct vxlan_rdst *first_remote_rtnl(struct vxlan_fdb *fdb)
{
return list_first_entry(&fdb->remotes, struct vxlan_rdst, list);
}
/* Find VXLAN socket based on network namespace, address family and UDP port
* and enabled unshareable flags.
*/
static struct vxlan_sock *vxlan_find_sock(struct net *net, sa_family_t family,
__be16 port, u32 flags)
{
struct vxlan_sock *vs;
u32 match_flags = flags & VXLAN_F_UNSHAREABLE;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(vs, vs_head(net, port), hlist) {
if (inet_sk(vs->sock->sk)->inet_sport == port &&
inet_sk(vs->sock->sk)->sk.sk_family == family &&
(vs->flags & VXLAN_F_UNSHAREABLE) == match_flags)
return vs;
}
return NULL;
}
static struct vxlan_dev *vxlan_vs_find_vni(struct vxlan_sock *vs, u32 id)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(vxlan, vni_head(vs, id), hlist) {
if (vxlan->default_dst.remote_vni == id)
return vxlan;
}
return NULL;
}
/* Look up VNI in a per net namespace table */
static struct vxlan_dev *vxlan_find_vni(struct net *net, u32 id,
sa_family_t family, __be16 port,
u32 flags)
{
struct vxlan_sock *vs;
vs = vxlan_find_sock(net, family, port, flags);
if (!vs)
return NULL;
return vxlan_vs_find_vni(vs, id);
}
/* Fill in neighbour message in skbuff. */
static int vxlan_fdb_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct vxlan_dev *vxlan,
const struct vxlan_fdb *fdb,
u32 portid, u32 seq, int type, unsigned int flags,
const struct vxlan_rdst *rdst)
{
unsigned long now = jiffies;
struct nda_cacheinfo ci;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct ndmsg *ndm;
bool send_ip, send_eth;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, type, sizeof(*ndm), flags);
if (nlh == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
ndm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
memset(ndm, 0, sizeof(*ndm));
send_eth = send_ip = true;
if (type == RTM_GETNEIGH) {
ndm->ndm_family = AF_INET;
send_ip = !vxlan_addr_any(&rdst->remote_ip);
send_eth = !is_zero_ether_addr(fdb->eth_addr);
} else
ndm->ndm_family = AF_BRIDGE;
ndm->ndm_state = fdb->state;
ndm->ndm_ifindex = vxlan->dev->ifindex;
ndm->ndm_flags = fdb->flags;
ndm->ndm_type = RTN_UNICAST;
if (!net_eq(dev_net(vxlan->dev), vxlan->net) &&
nla_put_s32(skb, NDA_NDM_IFINDEX_NETNSID,
peernet2id(vxlan->net, dev_net(vxlan->dev))))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (send_eth && nla_put(skb, NDA_LLADDR, ETH_ALEN, &fdb->eth_addr))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (send_ip && vxlan_nla_put_addr(skb, NDA_DST, &rdst->remote_ip))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (rdst->remote_port && rdst->remote_port != vxlan->dst_port &&
nla_put_be16(skb, NDA_PORT, rdst->remote_port))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (rdst->remote_vni != vxlan->default_dst.remote_vni &&
nla_put_u32(skb, NDA_VNI, rdst->remote_vni))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (rdst->remote_ifindex &&
nla_put_u32(skb, NDA_IFINDEX, rdst->remote_ifindex))
goto nla_put_failure;
ci.ndm_used = jiffies_to_clock_t(now - fdb->used);
ci.ndm_confirmed = 0;
ci.ndm_updated = jiffies_to_clock_t(now - fdb->updated);
ci.ndm_refcnt = 0;
if (nla_put(skb, NDA_CACHEINFO, sizeof(ci), &ci))
goto nla_put_failure;
netlink: make nlmsg_end() and genlmsg_end() void Contrary to common expectations for an "int" return, these functions return only a positive value -- if used correctly they cannot even return 0 because the message header will necessarily be in the skb. This makes the very common pattern of if (genlmsg_end(...) < 0) { ... } be a whole bunch of dead code. Many places also simply do return nlmsg_end(...); and the caller is expected to deal with it. This also commonly (at least for me) causes errors, because it is very common to write if (my_function(...)) /* error condition */ and if my_function() does "return nlmsg_end()" this is of course wrong. Additionally, there's not a single place in the kernel that actually needs the message length returned, and if anyone needs it later then it'll be very easy to just use skb->len there. Remove this, and make the functions void. This removes a bunch of dead code as described above. The patch adds lines because I did - return nlmsg_end(...); + nlmsg_end(...); + return 0; I could have preserved all the function's return values by returning skb->len, but instead I've audited all the places calling the affected functions and found that none cared. A few places actually compared the return value with <= 0 in dump functionality, but that could just be changed to < 0 with no change in behaviour, so I opted for the more efficient version. One instance of the error I've made numerous times now is also present in net/phonet/pn_netlink.c in the route_dumpit() function - it didn't check for <0 or <=0 and thus broke out of the loop every single time. I've preserved this since it will (I think) have caused the messages to userspace to be formatted differently with just a single message for every SKB returned to userspace. It's possible that this isn't needed for the tools that actually use this, but I don't even know what they are so couldn't test that changing this behaviour would be acceptable. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-17 05:09:00 +08:00
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
static inline size_t vxlan_nlmsg_size(void)
{
return NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct ndmsg))
+ nla_total_size(ETH_ALEN) /* NDA_LLADDR */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct in6_addr)) /* NDA_DST */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(__be16)) /* NDA_PORT */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(__be32)) /* NDA_VNI */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(__u32)) /* NDA_IFINDEX */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct nda_cacheinfo));
}
static void vxlan_fdb_notify(struct vxlan_dev *vxlan, struct vxlan_fdb *fdb,
struct vxlan_rdst *rd, int type)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(vxlan->dev);
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err = -ENOBUFS;
skb = nlmsg_new(vxlan_nlmsg_size(), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
goto errout;
err = vxlan_fdb_info(skb, vxlan, fdb, 0, 0, type, 0, rd);
if (err < 0) {
/* -EMSGSIZE implies BUG in vxlan_nlmsg_size() */
WARN_ON(err == -EMSGSIZE);
kfree_skb(skb);
goto errout;
}
rtnl_notify(skb, net, 0, RTNLGRP_NEIGH, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
return;
errout:
if (err < 0)
rtnl_set_sk_err(net, RTNLGRP_NEIGH, err);
}
static void vxlan_ip_miss(struct net_device *dev, union vxlan_addr *ipa)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
struct vxlan_fdb f = {
.state = NUD_STALE,
};
struct vxlan_rdst remote = {
.remote_ip = *ipa, /* goes to NDA_DST */
.remote_vni = VXLAN_N_VID,
};
vxlan_fdb_notify(vxlan, &f, &remote, RTM_GETNEIGH);
}
static void vxlan_fdb_miss(struct vxlan_dev *vxlan, const u8 eth_addr[ETH_ALEN])
{
struct vxlan_fdb f = {
.state = NUD_STALE,
};
struct vxlan_rdst remote = { };
memcpy(f.eth_addr, eth_addr, ETH_ALEN);
vxlan_fdb_notify(vxlan, &f, &remote, RTM_GETNEIGH);
}
/* Hash Ethernet address */
static u32 eth_hash(const unsigned char *addr)
{
u64 value = get_unaligned((u64 *)addr);
/* only want 6 bytes */
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
value >>= 16;
#else
value <<= 16;
#endif
return hash_64(value, FDB_HASH_BITS);
}
/* Hash chain to use given mac address */
static inline struct hlist_head *vxlan_fdb_head(struct vxlan_dev *vxlan,
const u8 *mac)
{
return &vxlan->fdb_head[eth_hash(mac)];
}
/* Look up Ethernet address in forwarding table */
static struct vxlan_fdb *__vxlan_find_mac(struct vxlan_dev *vxlan,
const u8 *mac)
{
struct hlist_head *head = vxlan_fdb_head(vxlan, mac);
struct vxlan_fdb *f;
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 09:06:00 +08:00
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(f, head, hlist) {
if (ether_addr_equal(mac, f->eth_addr))
return f;
}
return NULL;
}
static struct vxlan_fdb *vxlan_find_mac(struct vxlan_dev *vxlan,
const u8 *mac)
{
struct vxlan_fdb *f;
f = __vxlan_find_mac(vxlan, mac);
if (f)
f->used = jiffies;
return f;
}
/* caller should hold vxlan->hash_lock */
static struct vxlan_rdst *vxlan_fdb_find_rdst(struct vxlan_fdb *f,
union vxlan_addr *ip, __be16 port,
__u32 vni, __u32 ifindex)
{
struct vxlan_rdst *rd;
list_for_each_entry(rd, &f->remotes, list) {
if (vxlan_addr_equal(&rd->remote_ip, ip) &&
rd->remote_port == port &&
rd->remote_vni == vni &&
rd->remote_ifindex == ifindex)
return rd;
}
return NULL;
}
/* Replace destination of unicast mac */
static int vxlan_fdb_replace(struct vxlan_fdb *f,
union vxlan_addr *ip, __be16 port, __u32 vni, __u32 ifindex)
{
struct vxlan_rdst *rd;
rd = vxlan_fdb_find_rdst(f, ip, port, vni, ifindex);
if (rd)
return 0;
rd = list_first_entry_or_null(&f->remotes, struct vxlan_rdst, list);
if (!rd)
return 0;
rd->remote_ip = *ip;
rd->remote_port = port;
rd->remote_vni = vni;
rd->remote_ifindex = ifindex;
return 1;
}
/* Add/update destinations for multicast */
static int vxlan_fdb_append(struct vxlan_fdb *f,
union vxlan_addr *ip, __be16 port, __u32 vni,
__u32 ifindex, struct vxlan_rdst **rdp)
{
struct vxlan_rdst *rd;
rd = vxlan_fdb_find_rdst(f, ip, port, vni, ifindex);
if (rd)
return 0;
rd = kmalloc(sizeof(*rd), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (rd == NULL)
return -ENOBUFS;
rd->remote_ip = *ip;
rd->remote_port = port;
rd->remote_vni = vni;
rd->remote_ifindex = ifindex;
list_add_tail_rcu(&rd->list, &f->remotes);
*rdp = rd;
return 1;
}
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
static struct vxlanhdr *vxlan_gro_remcsum(struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int off,
struct vxlanhdr *vh, size_t hdrlen,
u32 data)
{
size_t start, offset, plen;
__wsum delta;
if (skb->remcsum_offload)
return vh;
if (!NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_valid)
return NULL;
start = (data & VXLAN_RCO_MASK) << VXLAN_RCO_SHIFT;
offset = start + ((data & VXLAN_RCO_UDP) ?
offsetof(struct udphdr, check) :
offsetof(struct tcphdr, check));
plen = hdrlen + offset + sizeof(u16);
/* Pull checksum that will be written */
if (skb_gro_header_hard(skb, off + plen)) {
vh = skb_gro_header_slow(skb, off + plen, off);
if (!vh)
return NULL;
}
delta = remcsum_adjust((void *)vh + hdrlen,
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum, start, offset);
/* Adjust skb->csum since we changed the packet */
skb->csum = csum_add(skb->csum, delta);
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum = csum_add(NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum, delta);
skb->remcsum_offload = 1;
return vh;
}
static struct sk_buff **vxlan_gro_receive(struct sk_buff **head,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct udp_offload *uoff)
{
struct sk_buff *p, **pp = NULL;
struct vxlanhdr *vh, *vh2;
unsigned int hlen, off_vx;
int flush = 1;
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
struct vxlan_sock *vs = container_of(uoff, struct vxlan_sock,
udp_offloads);
u32 flags;
off_vx = skb_gro_offset(skb);
hlen = off_vx + sizeof(*vh);
vh = skb_gro_header_fast(skb, off_vx);
if (skb_gro_header_hard(skb, hlen)) {
vh = skb_gro_header_slow(skb, hlen, off_vx);
if (unlikely(!vh))
goto out;
}
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
skb_gro_pull(skb, sizeof(struct vxlanhdr)); /* pull vxlan header */
skb_gro_postpull_rcsum(skb, vh, sizeof(struct vxlanhdr));
flags = ntohl(vh->vx_flags);
if ((flags & VXLAN_HF_RCO) && (vs->flags & VXLAN_F_REMCSUM_RX)) {
vh = vxlan_gro_remcsum(skb, off_vx, vh, sizeof(struct vxlanhdr),
ntohl(vh->vx_vni));
if (!vh)
goto out;
}
flush = 0;
for (p = *head; p; p = p->next) {
if (!NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow)
continue;
vh2 = (struct vxlanhdr *)(p->data + off_vx);
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
if (vh->vx_flags != vh2->vx_flags ||
vh->vx_vni != vh2->vx_vni) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow = 0;
continue;
}
}
pp = eth_gro_receive(head, skb);
out:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush |= flush;
return pp;
}
static int vxlan_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhoff,
struct udp_offload *uoff)
{
udp_tunnel_gro_complete(skb, nhoff);
return eth_gro_complete(skb, nhoff + sizeof(struct vxlanhdr));
}
/* Notify netdevs that UDP port started listening */
static void vxlan_notify_add_rx_port(struct vxlan_sock *vs)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct sock *sk = vs->sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
sa_family_t sa_family = sk->sk_family;
__be16 port = inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport;
int err;
if (sa_family == AF_INET) {
err = udp_add_offload(&vs->udp_offloads);
if (err)
pr_warn("vxlan: udp_add_offload failed with status %d\n", err);
}
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_netdev_rcu(net, dev) {
if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_add_vxlan_port)
dev->netdev_ops->ndo_add_vxlan_port(dev, sa_family,
port);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
/* Notify netdevs that UDP port is no more listening */
static void vxlan_notify_del_rx_port(struct vxlan_sock *vs)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct sock *sk = vs->sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
sa_family_t sa_family = sk->sk_family;
__be16 port = inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport;
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_netdev_rcu(net, dev) {
if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_del_vxlan_port)
dev->netdev_ops->ndo_del_vxlan_port(dev, sa_family,
port);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (sa_family == AF_INET)
udp_del_offload(&vs->udp_offloads);
}
/* Add new entry to forwarding table -- assumes lock held */
static int vxlan_fdb_create(struct vxlan_dev *vxlan,
const u8 *mac, union vxlan_addr *ip,
__u16 state, __u16 flags,
__be16 port, __u32 vni, __u32 ifindex,
__u8 ndm_flags)
{
struct vxlan_rdst *rd = NULL;
struct vxlan_fdb *f;
int notify = 0;
f = __vxlan_find_mac(vxlan, mac);
if (f) {
if (flags & NLM_F_EXCL) {
netdev_dbg(vxlan->dev,
"lost race to create %pM\n", mac);
return -EEXIST;
}
if (f->state != state) {
f->state = state;
f->updated = jiffies;
notify = 1;
}
if (f->flags != ndm_flags) {
f->flags = ndm_flags;
f->updated = jiffies;
notify = 1;
}
if ((flags & NLM_F_REPLACE)) {
/* Only change unicasts */
if (!(is_multicast_ether_addr(f->eth_addr) ||
is_zero_ether_addr(f->eth_addr))) {
int rc = vxlan_fdb_replace(f, ip, port, vni,
ifindex);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
notify |= rc;
} else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if ((flags & NLM_F_APPEND) &&
(is_multicast_ether_addr(f->eth_addr) ||
is_zero_ether_addr(f->eth_addr))) {
int rc = vxlan_fdb_append(f, ip, port, vni, ifindex,
&rd);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
notify |= rc;
}
} else {
if (!(flags & NLM_F_CREATE))
return -ENOENT;
if (vxlan->addrmax && vxlan->addrcnt >= vxlan->addrmax)
return -ENOSPC;
/* Disallow replace to add a multicast entry */
if ((flags & NLM_F_REPLACE) &&
(is_multicast_ether_addr(mac) || is_zero_ether_addr(mac)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
netdev_dbg(vxlan->dev, "add %pM -> %pIS\n", mac, ip);
f = kmalloc(sizeof(*f), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!f)
return -ENOMEM;
notify = 1;
f->state = state;
f->flags = ndm_flags;
f->updated = f->used = jiffies;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&f->remotes);
memcpy(f->eth_addr, mac, ETH_ALEN);
vxlan_fdb_append(f, ip, port, vni, ifindex, &rd);
++vxlan->addrcnt;
hlist_add_head_rcu(&f->hlist,
vxlan_fdb_head(vxlan, mac));
}
if (notify) {
if (rd == NULL)
rd = first_remote_rtnl(f);
vxlan_fdb_notify(vxlan, f, rd, RTM_NEWNEIGH);
}
return 0;
}
static void vxlan_fdb_free(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct vxlan_fdb *f = container_of(head, struct vxlan_fdb, rcu);
struct vxlan_rdst *rd, *nd;
list_for_each_entry_safe(rd, nd, &f->remotes, list)
kfree(rd);
kfree(f);
}
static void vxlan_fdb_destroy(struct vxlan_dev *vxlan, struct vxlan_fdb *f)
{
netdev_dbg(vxlan->dev,
"delete %pM\n", f->eth_addr);
--vxlan->addrcnt;
vxlan_fdb_notify(vxlan, f, first_remote_rtnl(f), RTM_DELNEIGH);
hlist_del_rcu(&f->hlist);
call_rcu(&f->rcu, vxlan_fdb_free);
}
static int vxlan_fdb_parse(struct nlattr *tb[], struct vxlan_dev *vxlan,
union vxlan_addr *ip, __be16 *port, u32 *vni, u32 *ifindex)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(vxlan->dev);
int err;
if (tb[NDA_DST]) {
err = vxlan_nla_get_addr(ip, tb[NDA_DST]);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
union vxlan_addr *remote = &vxlan->default_dst.remote_ip;
if (remote->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
ip->sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
ip->sa.sa_family = AF_INET;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else {
ip->sin6.sin6_addr = in6addr_any;
ip->sa.sa_family = AF_INET6;
#endif
}
}
if (tb[NDA_PORT]) {
if (nla_len(tb[NDA_PORT]) != sizeof(__be16))
return -EINVAL;
*port = nla_get_be16(tb[NDA_PORT]);
} else {
*port = vxlan->dst_port;
}
if (tb[NDA_VNI]) {
if (nla_len(tb[NDA_VNI]) != sizeof(u32))
return -EINVAL;
*vni = nla_get_u32(tb[NDA_VNI]);
} else {
*vni = vxlan->default_dst.remote_vni;
}
if (tb[NDA_IFINDEX]) {
struct net_device *tdev;
if (nla_len(tb[NDA_IFINDEX]) != sizeof(u32))
return -EINVAL;
*ifindex = nla_get_u32(tb[NDA_IFINDEX]);
tdev = __dev_get_by_index(net, *ifindex);
if (!tdev)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
} else {
*ifindex = 0;
}
return 0;
}
/* Add static entry (via netlink) */
static int vxlan_fdb_add(struct ndmsg *ndm, struct nlattr *tb[],
struct net_device *dev,
const unsigned char *addr, u16 vid, u16 flags)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
/* struct net *net = dev_net(vxlan->dev); */
union vxlan_addr ip;
__be16 port;
u32 vni, ifindex;
int err;
if (!(ndm->ndm_state & (NUD_PERMANENT|NUD_REACHABLE))) {
pr_info("RTM_NEWNEIGH with invalid state %#x\n",
ndm->ndm_state);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (tb[NDA_DST] == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
err = vxlan_fdb_parse(tb, vxlan, &ip, &port, &vni, &ifindex);
if (err)
return err;
net: vxlan: fix crash when interface is created with no group If the vxlan interface is created without explicit group definition, there are corner cases which may cause kernel panic. For instance, in the following scenario: node A: $ ip link add dev vxlan42 address 2c:c2:60:00:10:20 type vxlan id 42 $ ip addr add dev vxlan42 10.0.0.1/24 $ ip link set up dev vxlan42 $ arp -i vxlan42 -s 10.0.0.2 2c:c2:60:00:01:02 $ bridge fdb add dev vxlan42 to 2c:c2:60:00:01:02 dst <IPv4 address> $ ping 10.0.0.2 node B: $ ip link add dev vxlan42 address 2c:c2:60:00:01:02 type vxlan id 42 $ ip addr add dev vxlan42 10.0.0.2/24 $ ip link set up dev vxlan42 $ arp -i vxlan42 -s 10.0.0.1 2c:c2:60:00:10:20 node B crashes: vxlan42: 2c:c2:60:00:10:20 migrated from 4011:eca4:c0a8:6466:c0a8:6415:8e09:2118 to (invalid address) vxlan42: 2c:c2:60:00:10:20 migrated from 4011:eca4:c0a8:6466:c0a8:6415:8e09:2118 to (invalid address) BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000046 IP: [<ffffffff8143c459>] ip6_route_output+0x58/0x82 PGD 7bd89067 PUD 7bd4e067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 3.14.0-rc8-hvx-xen-00019-g97a5221-dirty #154 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88007c774f50 ti: ffff88007c79c000 task.ti: ffff88007c79c000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8143c459>] [<ffffffff8143c459>] ip6_route_output+0x58/0x82 RSP: 0018:ffff88007fd03668 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8186a000 RCX: 0000000000000040 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88007b0e4a80 RDI: ffff88007fd03754 RBP: ffff88007fd03688 R08: ffff88007b0e4a80 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0200000a0100000a R11: 0001002200000000 R12: ffff88007fd03740 R13: ffff88007b0e4a80 R14: ffff88007b0e4a80 R15: ffff88007bba0c50 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000000000000046 CR3: 000000007bb60000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: 0000000000000000 ffff88007fd037a0 ffffffff8186a000 ffff88007fd03740 ffff88007fd036c8 ffffffff814320bb 0000000000006e49 ffff88007b8b7360 ffff88007bdbf200 ffff88007bcbc000 ffff88007b8b7000 ffff88007b8b7360 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff814320bb>] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x2d/0xa4 [<ffffffff814322a5>] ip6_dst_lookup+0x10/0x12 [<ffffffff81323b4e>] vxlan_xmit_one+0x32a/0x68c [<ffffffff814a325a>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x12/0x14 [<ffffffff8104c551>] ? lock_timer_base.isra.23+0x26/0x4b [<ffffffff8132451a>] vxlan_xmit+0x66a/0x6a8 [<ffffffff8141a365>] ? ipt_do_table+0x35f/0x37e [<ffffffff81204ba2>] ? selinux_ip_postroute+0x41/0x26e [<ffffffff8139d0c1>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x2ce/0x3ce [<ffffffff8139d491>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x2d0/0x392 [<ffffffff813b380f>] ? eth_header+0x28/0xb5 [<ffffffff8139d569>] dev_queue_xmit+0xb/0xd [<ffffffff813a5aa6>] neigh_resolve_output+0x134/0x152 [<ffffffff813db741>] ip_finish_output2+0x236/0x299 [<ffffffff813dc074>] ip_finish_output+0x98/0x9d [<ffffffff813dc749>] ip_output+0x62/0x67 [<ffffffff813da9f2>] dst_output+0xf/0x11 [<ffffffff813dc11c>] ip_local_out+0x1b/0x1f [<ffffffff813dcf1b>] ip_send_skb+0x11/0x37 [<ffffffff813dcf70>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x2f/0x33 [<ffffffff813ff732>] icmp_push_reply+0x106/0x115 [<ffffffff813ff9e4>] icmp_reply+0x142/0x164 [<ffffffff813ffb3b>] icmp_echo.part.16+0x46/0x48 [<ffffffff813c1d30>] ? nf_iterate+0x43/0x80 [<ffffffff813d8037>] ? xfrm4_policy_check.constprop.11+0x52/0x52 [<ffffffff813ffb62>] icmp_echo+0x25/0x27 [<ffffffff814005f7>] icmp_rcv+0x1d2/0x20a [<ffffffff813d8037>] ? xfrm4_policy_check.constprop.11+0x52/0x52 [<ffffffff813d810d>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xd6/0x14f [<ffffffff813d8037>] ? xfrm4_policy_check.constprop.11+0x52/0x52 [<ffffffff813d7fde>] NF_HOOK.constprop.10+0x4c/0x53 [<ffffffff813d82bf>] ip_local_deliver+0x4a/0x4f [<ffffffff813d7f7b>] ip_rcv_finish+0x253/0x26a [<ffffffff813d7d28>] ? inet_add_protocol+0x3e/0x3e [<ffffffff813d7fde>] NF_HOOK.constprop.10+0x4c/0x53 [<ffffffff813d856a>] ip_rcv+0x2a6/0x2ec [<ffffffff8139a9a0>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x43e/0x478 [<ffffffff812a346f>] ? virtqueue_poll+0x16/0x27 [<ffffffff8139aa2f>] __netif_receive_skb+0x55/0x5a [<ffffffff8139aaaa>] process_backlog+0x76/0x12f [<ffffffff8139add8>] net_rx_action+0xa2/0x1ab [<ffffffff81047847>] __do_softirq+0xca/0x1d1 [<ffffffff81047ace>] irq_exit+0x3e/0x85 [<ffffffff8100b98b>] do_IRQ+0xa9/0xc4 [<ffffffff814a37ad>] common_interrupt+0x6d/0x6d <EOI> [<ffffffff810378db>] ? native_safe_halt+0x6/0x8 [<ffffffff810110c7>] default_idle+0x9/0xd [<ffffffff81011694>] arch_cpu_idle+0x13/0x1c [<ffffffff8107480d>] cpu_startup_entry+0xbc/0x137 [<ffffffff8102e741>] start_secondary+0x1a0/0x1a5 Code: 24 14 e8 f1 e5 01 00 31 d2 a8 32 0f 95 c2 49 8b 44 24 2c 49 0b 44 24 24 74 05 83 ca 04 eb 1c 4d 85 ed 74 17 49 8b 85 a8 02 00 00 <66> 8b 40 46 66 c1 e8 07 83 e0 07 c1 e0 03 09 c2 4c 89 e6 48 89 RIP [<ffffffff8143c459>] ip6_route_output+0x58/0x82 RSP <ffff88007fd03668> CR2: 0000000000000046 ---[ end trace 4612329caab37efd ]--- When vxlan interface is created without explicit group definition, the default_dst protocol family is initialiazed to AF_UNSPEC and the driver assumes IPv4 configuration. On the other side, the default_dst protocol family is used to differentiate between IPv4 and IPv6 cases and, since, AF_UNSPEC != AF_INET, the processing takes the IPv6 path. Making the IPv4 assumption explicit by settting default_dst protocol family to AF_INET4 and preventing mixing of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in snooped fdb entries fixes the corner case crashes. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <mike.rapoport@ravellosystems.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-01 14:23:01 +08:00
if (vxlan->default_dst.remote_ip.sa.sa_family != ip.sa.sa_family)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
spin_lock_bh(&vxlan->hash_lock);
err = vxlan_fdb_create(vxlan, addr, &ip, ndm->ndm_state, flags,
port, vni, ifindex, ndm->ndm_flags);
spin_unlock_bh(&vxlan->hash_lock);
return err;
}
/* Delete entry (via netlink) */
static int vxlan_fdb_delete(struct ndmsg *ndm, struct nlattr *tb[],
struct net_device *dev,
const unsigned char *addr, u16 vid)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
struct vxlan_fdb *f;
struct vxlan_rdst *rd = NULL;
union vxlan_addr ip;
__be16 port;
u32 vni, ifindex;
int err;
err = vxlan_fdb_parse(tb, vxlan, &ip, &port, &vni, &ifindex);
if (err)
return err;
err = -ENOENT;
spin_lock_bh(&vxlan->hash_lock);
f = vxlan_find_mac(vxlan, addr);
if (!f)
goto out;
if (!vxlan_addr_any(&ip)) {
rd = vxlan_fdb_find_rdst(f, &ip, port, vni, ifindex);
if (!rd)
goto out;
}
err = 0;
/* remove a destination if it's not the only one on the list,
* otherwise destroy the fdb entry
*/
if (rd && !list_is_singular(&f->remotes)) {
list_del_rcu(&rd->list);
vxlan_fdb_notify(vxlan, f, rd, RTM_DELNEIGH);
kfree_rcu(rd, rcu);
goto out;
}
vxlan_fdb_destroy(vxlan, f);
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&vxlan->hash_lock);
return err;
}
/* Dump forwarding table */
static int vxlan_fdb_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb,
struct net_device *dev,
struct net_device *filter_dev, int idx)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
unsigned int h;
for (h = 0; h < FDB_HASH_SIZE; ++h) {
struct vxlan_fdb *f;
int err;
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 09:06:00 +08:00
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(f, &vxlan->fdb_head[h], hlist) {
struct vxlan_rdst *rd;
if (idx < cb->args[0])
goto skip;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(rd, &f->remotes, list) {
err = vxlan_fdb_info(skb, vxlan, f,
NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
RTM_NEWNEIGH,
NLM_F_MULTI, rd);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
}
skip:
++idx;
}
}
out:
return idx;
}
/* Watch incoming packets to learn mapping between Ethernet address
* and Tunnel endpoint.
* Return true if packet is bogus and should be droppped.
*/
static bool vxlan_snoop(struct net_device *dev,
union vxlan_addr *src_ip, const u8 *src_mac)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
struct vxlan_fdb *f;
f = vxlan_find_mac(vxlan, src_mac);
if (likely(f)) {
struct vxlan_rdst *rdst = first_remote_rcu(f);
if (likely(vxlan_addr_equal(&rdst->remote_ip, src_ip)))
return false;
/* Don't migrate static entries, drop packets */
if (f->state & NUD_NOARP)
return true;
if (net_ratelimit())
netdev_info(dev,
"%pM migrated from %pIS to %pIS\n",
src_mac, &rdst->remote_ip, &src_ip);
rdst->remote_ip = *src_ip;
f->updated = jiffies;
vxlan_fdb_notify(vxlan, f, rdst, RTM_NEWNEIGH);
} else {
/* learned new entry */
spin_lock(&vxlan->hash_lock);
/* close off race between vxlan_flush and incoming packets */
if (netif_running(dev))
vxlan_fdb_create(vxlan, src_mac, src_ip,
NUD_REACHABLE,
NLM_F_EXCL|NLM_F_CREATE,
vxlan->dst_port,
vxlan->default_dst.remote_vni,
0, NTF_SELF);
spin_unlock(&vxlan->hash_lock);
}
return false;
}
/* See if multicast group is already in use by other ID */
static bool vxlan_group_used(struct vxlan_net *vn, struct vxlan_dev *dev)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan;
/* The vxlan_sock is only used by dev, leaving group has
* no effect on other vxlan devices.
*/
if (atomic_read(&dev->vn_sock->refcnt) == 1)
return false;
list_for_each_entry(vxlan, &vn->vxlan_list, next) {
if (!netif_running(vxlan->dev) || vxlan == dev)
continue;
if (vxlan->vn_sock != dev->vn_sock)
continue;
if (!vxlan_addr_equal(&vxlan->default_dst.remote_ip,
&dev->default_dst.remote_ip))
continue;
if (vxlan->default_dst.remote_ifindex !=
dev->default_dst.remote_ifindex)
continue;
return true;
}
return false;
}
static void vxlan_sock_hold(struct vxlan_sock *vs)
{
atomic_inc(&vs->refcnt);
}
void vxlan_sock_release(struct vxlan_sock *vs)
{
struct sock *sk = vs->sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(net, vxlan_net_id);
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&vs->refcnt))
return;
spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock);
hlist_del_rcu(&vs->hlist);
vxlan_notify_del_rx_port(vs);
spin_unlock(&vn->sock_lock);
queue_work(vxlan_wq, &vs->del_work);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vxlan_sock_release);
/* Callback to update multicast group membership when first VNI on
* multicast asddress is brought up
* Done as workqueue because ip_mc_join_group acquires RTNL.
*/
static void vxlan_igmp_join(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = container_of(work, struct vxlan_dev, igmp_join);
struct vxlan_sock *vs = vxlan->vn_sock;
struct sock *sk = vs->sock->sk;
union vxlan_addr *ip = &vxlan->default_dst.remote_ip;
int ifindex = vxlan->default_dst.remote_ifindex;
lock_sock(sk);
if (ip->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
struct ip_mreqn mreq = {
.imr_multiaddr.s_addr = ip->sin.sin_addr.s_addr,
.imr_ifindex = ifindex,
};
ip_mc_join_group(sk, &mreq);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else {
ipv6_stub->ipv6_sock_mc_join(sk, ifindex,
&ip->sin6.sin6_addr);
#endif
}
release_sock(sk);
vxlan_sock_release(vs);
dev_put(vxlan->dev);
}
/* Inverse of vxlan_igmp_join when last VNI is brought down */
static void vxlan_igmp_leave(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = container_of(work, struct vxlan_dev, igmp_leave);
struct vxlan_sock *vs = vxlan->vn_sock;
struct sock *sk = vs->sock->sk;
union vxlan_addr *ip = &vxlan->default_dst.remote_ip;
int ifindex = vxlan->default_dst.remote_ifindex;
lock_sock(sk);
if (ip->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
struct ip_mreqn mreq = {
.imr_multiaddr.s_addr = ip->sin.sin_addr.s_addr,
.imr_ifindex = ifindex,
};
ip_mc_leave_group(sk, &mreq);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else {
ipv6_stub->ipv6_sock_mc_drop(sk, ifindex,
&ip->sin6.sin6_addr);
#endif
}
release_sock(sk);
vxlan_sock_release(vs);
dev_put(vxlan->dev);
}
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
static struct vxlanhdr *vxlan_remcsum(struct sk_buff *skb, struct vxlanhdr *vh,
size_t hdrlen, u32 data)
{
size_t start, offset, plen;
__wsum delta;
if (skb->remcsum_offload) {
/* Already processed in GRO path */
skb->remcsum_offload = 0;
return vh;
}
start = (data & VXLAN_RCO_MASK) << VXLAN_RCO_SHIFT;
offset = start + ((data & VXLAN_RCO_UDP) ?
offsetof(struct udphdr, check) :
offsetof(struct tcphdr, check));
plen = hdrlen + offset + sizeof(u16);
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, plen))
return NULL;
vh = (struct vxlanhdr *)(udp_hdr(skb) + 1);
if (unlikely(skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_COMPLETE))
__skb_checksum_complete(skb);
delta = remcsum_adjust((void *)vh + hdrlen,
skb->csum, start, offset);
/* Adjust skb->csum since we changed the packet */
skb->csum = csum_add(skb->csum, delta);
return vh;
}
/* Callback from net/ipv4/udp.c to receive packets */
static int vxlan_udp_encap_recv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct vxlan_sock *vs;
struct vxlanhdr *vxh;
u32 flags, vni;
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
struct vxlan_metadata md = {0};
/* Need Vxlan and inner Ethernet header to be present */
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, VXLAN_HLEN))
goto error;
vxh = (struct vxlanhdr *)(udp_hdr(skb) + 1);
flags = ntohl(vxh->vx_flags);
vni = ntohl(vxh->vx_vni);
if (flags & VXLAN_HF_VNI) {
flags &= ~VXLAN_HF_VNI;
} else {
/* VNI flag always required to be set */
goto bad_flags;
}
if (iptunnel_pull_header(skb, VXLAN_HLEN, htons(ETH_P_TEB)))
goto drop;
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
vxh = (struct vxlanhdr *)(udp_hdr(skb) + 1);
vs = rcu_dereference_sk_user_data(sk);
if (!vs)
goto drop;
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
if ((flags & VXLAN_HF_RCO) && (vs->flags & VXLAN_F_REMCSUM_RX)) {
vxh = vxlan_remcsum(skb, vxh, sizeof(struct vxlanhdr), vni);
if (!vxh)
goto drop;
flags &= ~VXLAN_HF_RCO;
vni &= VXLAN_VID_MASK;
}
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
/* For backwards compatibility, only allow reserved fields to be
* used by VXLAN extensions if explicitly requested.
*/
if ((flags & VXLAN_HF_GBP) && (vs->flags & VXLAN_F_GBP)) {
struct vxlanhdr_gbp *gbp;
gbp = (struct vxlanhdr_gbp *)vxh;
md.gbp = ntohs(gbp->policy_id);
if (gbp->dont_learn)
md.gbp |= VXLAN_GBP_DONT_LEARN;
if (gbp->policy_applied)
md.gbp |= VXLAN_GBP_POLICY_APPLIED;
flags &= ~VXLAN_GBP_USED_BITS;
}
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
if (flags || (vni & ~VXLAN_VID_MASK)) {
/* If there are any unprocessed flags remaining treat
* this as a malformed packet. This behavior diverges from
* VXLAN RFC (RFC7348) which stipulates that bits in reserved
* in reserved fields are to be ignored. The approach here
* maintains compatbility with previous stack code, and also
* is more robust and provides a little more security in
* adding extensions to VXLAN.
*/
goto bad_flags;
}
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
md.vni = vxh->vx_vni;
vs->rcv(vs, skb, &md);
return 0;
drop:
/* Consume bad packet */
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
bad_flags:
netdev_dbg(skb->dev, "invalid vxlan flags=%#x vni=%#x\n",
ntohl(vxh->vx_flags), ntohl(vxh->vx_vni));
error:
/* Return non vxlan pkt */
return 1;
}
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
static void vxlan_rcv(struct vxlan_sock *vs, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct vxlan_metadata *md)
{
struct iphdr *oip = NULL;
struct ipv6hdr *oip6 = NULL;
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan;
struct pcpu_sw_netstats *stats;
union vxlan_addr saddr;
__u32 vni;
int err = 0;
union vxlan_addr *remote_ip;
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
vni = ntohl(md->vni) >> 8;
/* Is this VNI defined? */
vxlan = vxlan_vs_find_vni(vs, vni);
if (!vxlan)
goto drop;
remote_ip = &vxlan->default_dst.remote_ip;
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
skb_scrub_packet(skb, !net_eq(vxlan->net, dev_net(vxlan->dev)));
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, vxlan->dev);
skb_postpull_rcsum(skb, eth_hdr(skb), ETH_HLEN);
/* Ignore packet loops (and multicast echo) */
if (ether_addr_equal(eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, vxlan->dev->dev_addr))
goto drop;
/* Re-examine inner Ethernet packet */
if (remote_ip->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
oip = ip_hdr(skb);
saddr.sin.sin_addr.s_addr = oip->saddr;
saddr.sa.sa_family = AF_INET;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else {
oip6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
saddr.sin6.sin6_addr = oip6->saddr;
saddr.sa.sa_family = AF_INET6;
#endif
}
if ((vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_LEARN) &&
vxlan_snoop(skb->dev, &saddr, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source))
goto drop;
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
skb->mark = md->gbp;
if (oip6)
err = IP6_ECN_decapsulate(oip6, skb);
if (oip)
err = IP_ECN_decapsulate(oip, skb);
if (unlikely(err)) {
if (log_ecn_error) {
if (oip6)
net_info_ratelimited("non-ECT from %pI6\n",
&oip6->saddr);
if (oip)
net_info_ratelimited("non-ECT from %pI4 with TOS=%#x\n",
&oip->saddr, oip->tos);
}
if (err > 1) {
++vxlan->dev->stats.rx_frame_errors;
++vxlan->dev->stats.rx_errors;
goto drop;
}
}
stats = this_cpu_ptr(vxlan->dev->tstats);
u64_stats_update_begin(&stats->syncp);
stats->rx_packets++;
stats->rx_bytes += skb->len;
u64_stats_update_end(&stats->syncp);
netif_rx(skb);
return;
drop:
/* Consume bad packet */
kfree_skb(skb);
}
static int arp_reduce(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
struct arphdr *parp;
u8 *arpptr, *sha;
__be32 sip, tip;
struct neighbour *n;
if (dev->flags & IFF_NOARP)
goto out;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, arp_hdr_len(dev))) {
dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
goto out;
}
parp = arp_hdr(skb);
if ((parp->ar_hrd != htons(ARPHRD_ETHER) &&
parp->ar_hrd != htons(ARPHRD_IEEE802)) ||
parp->ar_pro != htons(ETH_P_IP) ||
parp->ar_op != htons(ARPOP_REQUEST) ||
parp->ar_hln != dev->addr_len ||
parp->ar_pln != 4)
goto out;
arpptr = (u8 *)parp + sizeof(struct arphdr);
sha = arpptr;
arpptr += dev->addr_len; /* sha */
memcpy(&sip, arpptr, sizeof(sip));
arpptr += sizeof(sip);
arpptr += dev->addr_len; /* tha */
memcpy(&tip, arpptr, sizeof(tip));
if (ipv4_is_loopback(tip) ||
ipv4_is_multicast(tip))
goto out;
n = neigh_lookup(&arp_tbl, &tip, dev);
if (n) {
struct vxlan_fdb *f;
struct sk_buff *reply;
if (!(n->nud_state & NUD_CONNECTED)) {
neigh_release(n);
goto out;
}
f = vxlan_find_mac(vxlan, n->ha);
if (f && vxlan_addr_any(&(first_remote_rcu(f)->remote_ip))) {
/* bridge-local neighbor */
neigh_release(n);
goto out;
}
reply = arp_create(ARPOP_REPLY, ETH_P_ARP, sip, dev, tip, sha,
n->ha, sha);
neigh_release(n);
if (reply == NULL)
goto out;
skb_reset_mac_header(reply);
__skb_pull(reply, skb_network_offset(reply));
reply->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
reply->pkt_type = PACKET_HOST;
if (netif_rx_ni(reply) == NET_RX_DROP)
dev->stats.rx_dropped++;
} else if (vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_L3MISS) {
union vxlan_addr ipa = {
.sin.sin_addr.s_addr = tip,
.sin.sin_family = AF_INET,
};
vxlan_ip_miss(dev, &ipa);
}
out:
consume_skb(skb);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
vxlan: fix nonfunctional neigh_reduce() The VXLAN neigh_reduce() code is completely non-functional since check-in. Specific errors: 1) The original code drops all packets with a multicast destination address, even though neighbor solicitations are sent to the solicited-node address, a multicast address. The code after this check was never run. 2) The neighbor table lookup used the IPv6 header destination, which is the solicited node address, rather than the target address from the neighbor solicitation. So neighbor lookups would always fail if it got this far. Also for L3MISSes. 3) The code calls ndisc_send_na(), which does a send on the tunnel device. The context for neigh_reduce() is the transmit path, vxlan_xmit(), where the host or a bridge-attached neighbor is trying to transmit a neighbor solicitation. To respond to it, the tunnel endpoint needs to do a *receive* of the appropriate neighbor advertisement. Doing a send, would only try to send the advertisement, encapsulated, to the remote destinations in the fdb -- hosts that definitely did not do the corresponding solicitation. 4) The code uses the tunnel endpoint IPv6 forwarding flag to determine the isrouter flag in the advertisement. This has nothing to do with whether or not the target is a router, and generally won't be set since the tunnel endpoint is bridging, not routing, traffic. The patch below creates a proxy neighbor advertisement to respond to neighbor solicitions as intended, providing proper IPv6 support for neighbor reduction. Signed-off-by: David L Stevens <dlstevens@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-24 22:39:58 +08:00
static struct sk_buff *vxlan_na_create(struct sk_buff *request,
struct neighbour *n, bool isrouter)
{
struct net_device *dev = request->dev;
struct sk_buff *reply;
struct nd_msg *ns, *na;
struct ipv6hdr *pip6;
u8 *daddr;
int na_olen = 8; /* opt hdr + ETH_ALEN for target */
int ns_olen;
int i, len;
if (dev == NULL)
return NULL;
len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) +
sizeof(*na) + na_olen + dev->needed_tailroom;
reply = alloc_skb(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (reply == NULL)
return NULL;
reply->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
reply->dev = dev;
skb_reserve(reply, LL_RESERVED_SPACE(request->dev));
skb_push(reply, sizeof(struct ethhdr));
skb_set_mac_header(reply, 0);
ns = (struct nd_msg *)skb_transport_header(request);
daddr = eth_hdr(request)->h_source;
ns_olen = request->len - skb_transport_offset(request) - sizeof(*ns);
for (i = 0; i < ns_olen-1; i += (ns->opt[i+1]<<3)) {
if (ns->opt[i] == ND_OPT_SOURCE_LL_ADDR) {
daddr = ns->opt + i + sizeof(struct nd_opt_hdr);
break;
}
}
/* Ethernet header */
ether_addr_copy(eth_hdr(reply)->h_dest, daddr);
ether_addr_copy(eth_hdr(reply)->h_source, n->ha);
eth_hdr(reply)->h_proto = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
reply->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
skb_pull(reply, sizeof(struct ethhdr));
skb_set_network_header(reply, 0);
skb_put(reply, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
/* IPv6 header */
pip6 = ipv6_hdr(reply);
memset(pip6, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
pip6->version = 6;
pip6->priority = ipv6_hdr(request)->priority;
pip6->nexthdr = IPPROTO_ICMPV6;
pip6->hop_limit = 255;
pip6->daddr = ipv6_hdr(request)->saddr;
pip6->saddr = *(struct in6_addr *)n->primary_key;
skb_pull(reply, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
skb_set_transport_header(reply, 0);
na = (struct nd_msg *)skb_put(reply, sizeof(*na) + na_olen);
/* Neighbor Advertisement */
memset(na, 0, sizeof(*na)+na_olen);
na->icmph.icmp6_type = NDISC_NEIGHBOUR_ADVERTISEMENT;
na->icmph.icmp6_router = isrouter;
na->icmph.icmp6_override = 1;
na->icmph.icmp6_solicited = 1;
na->target = ns->target;
ether_addr_copy(&na->opt[2], n->ha);
na->opt[0] = ND_OPT_TARGET_LL_ADDR;
na->opt[1] = na_olen >> 3;
na->icmph.icmp6_cksum = csum_ipv6_magic(&pip6->saddr,
&pip6->daddr, sizeof(*na)+na_olen, IPPROTO_ICMPV6,
csum_partial(na, sizeof(*na)+na_olen, 0));
pip6->payload_len = htons(sizeof(*na)+na_olen);
skb_push(reply, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
reply->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
return reply;
}
static int neigh_reduce(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
vxlan: fix nonfunctional neigh_reduce() The VXLAN neigh_reduce() code is completely non-functional since check-in. Specific errors: 1) The original code drops all packets with a multicast destination address, even though neighbor solicitations are sent to the solicited-node address, a multicast address. The code after this check was never run. 2) The neighbor table lookup used the IPv6 header destination, which is the solicited node address, rather than the target address from the neighbor solicitation. So neighbor lookups would always fail if it got this far. Also for L3MISSes. 3) The code calls ndisc_send_na(), which does a send on the tunnel device. The context for neigh_reduce() is the transmit path, vxlan_xmit(), where the host or a bridge-attached neighbor is trying to transmit a neighbor solicitation. To respond to it, the tunnel endpoint needs to do a *receive* of the appropriate neighbor advertisement. Doing a send, would only try to send the advertisement, encapsulated, to the remote destinations in the fdb -- hosts that definitely did not do the corresponding solicitation. 4) The code uses the tunnel endpoint IPv6 forwarding flag to determine the isrouter flag in the advertisement. This has nothing to do with whether or not the target is a router, and generally won't be set since the tunnel endpoint is bridging, not routing, traffic. The patch below creates a proxy neighbor advertisement to respond to neighbor solicitions as intended, providing proper IPv6 support for neighbor reduction. Signed-off-by: David L Stevens <dlstevens@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-24 22:39:58 +08:00
struct nd_msg *msg;
const struct ipv6hdr *iphdr;
const struct in6_addr *saddr, *daddr;
vxlan: fix nonfunctional neigh_reduce() The VXLAN neigh_reduce() code is completely non-functional since check-in. Specific errors: 1) The original code drops all packets with a multicast destination address, even though neighbor solicitations are sent to the solicited-node address, a multicast address. The code after this check was never run. 2) The neighbor table lookup used the IPv6 header destination, which is the solicited node address, rather than the target address from the neighbor solicitation. So neighbor lookups would always fail if it got this far. Also for L3MISSes. 3) The code calls ndisc_send_na(), which does a send on the tunnel device. The context for neigh_reduce() is the transmit path, vxlan_xmit(), where the host or a bridge-attached neighbor is trying to transmit a neighbor solicitation. To respond to it, the tunnel endpoint needs to do a *receive* of the appropriate neighbor advertisement. Doing a send, would only try to send the advertisement, encapsulated, to the remote destinations in the fdb -- hosts that definitely did not do the corresponding solicitation. 4) The code uses the tunnel endpoint IPv6 forwarding flag to determine the isrouter flag in the advertisement. This has nothing to do with whether or not the target is a router, and generally won't be set since the tunnel endpoint is bridging, not routing, traffic. The patch below creates a proxy neighbor advertisement to respond to neighbor solicitions as intended, providing proper IPv6 support for neighbor reduction. Signed-off-by: David L Stevens <dlstevens@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-24 22:39:58 +08:00
struct neighbour *n;
struct inet6_dev *in6_dev;
in6_dev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
if (!in6_dev)
goto out;
iphdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
saddr = &iphdr->saddr;
daddr = &iphdr->daddr;
msg = (struct nd_msg *)skb_transport_header(skb);
if (msg->icmph.icmp6_code != 0 ||
msg->icmph.icmp6_type != NDISC_NEIGHBOUR_SOLICITATION)
goto out;
vxlan: fix nonfunctional neigh_reduce() The VXLAN neigh_reduce() code is completely non-functional since check-in. Specific errors: 1) The original code drops all packets with a multicast destination address, even though neighbor solicitations are sent to the solicited-node address, a multicast address. The code after this check was never run. 2) The neighbor table lookup used the IPv6 header destination, which is the solicited node address, rather than the target address from the neighbor solicitation. So neighbor lookups would always fail if it got this far. Also for L3MISSes. 3) The code calls ndisc_send_na(), which does a send on the tunnel device. The context for neigh_reduce() is the transmit path, vxlan_xmit(), where the host or a bridge-attached neighbor is trying to transmit a neighbor solicitation. To respond to it, the tunnel endpoint needs to do a *receive* of the appropriate neighbor advertisement. Doing a send, would only try to send the advertisement, encapsulated, to the remote destinations in the fdb -- hosts that definitely did not do the corresponding solicitation. 4) The code uses the tunnel endpoint IPv6 forwarding flag to determine the isrouter flag in the advertisement. This has nothing to do with whether or not the target is a router, and generally won't be set since the tunnel endpoint is bridging, not routing, traffic. The patch below creates a proxy neighbor advertisement to respond to neighbor solicitions as intended, providing proper IPv6 support for neighbor reduction. Signed-off-by: David L Stevens <dlstevens@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-24 22:39:58 +08:00
if (ipv6_addr_loopback(daddr) ||
ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&msg->target))
goto out;
n = neigh_lookup(ipv6_stub->nd_tbl, &msg->target, dev);
if (n) {
struct vxlan_fdb *f;
vxlan: fix nonfunctional neigh_reduce() The VXLAN neigh_reduce() code is completely non-functional since check-in. Specific errors: 1) The original code drops all packets with a multicast destination address, even though neighbor solicitations are sent to the solicited-node address, a multicast address. The code after this check was never run. 2) The neighbor table lookup used the IPv6 header destination, which is the solicited node address, rather than the target address from the neighbor solicitation. So neighbor lookups would always fail if it got this far. Also for L3MISSes. 3) The code calls ndisc_send_na(), which does a send on the tunnel device. The context for neigh_reduce() is the transmit path, vxlan_xmit(), where the host or a bridge-attached neighbor is trying to transmit a neighbor solicitation. To respond to it, the tunnel endpoint needs to do a *receive* of the appropriate neighbor advertisement. Doing a send, would only try to send the advertisement, encapsulated, to the remote destinations in the fdb -- hosts that definitely did not do the corresponding solicitation. 4) The code uses the tunnel endpoint IPv6 forwarding flag to determine the isrouter flag in the advertisement. This has nothing to do with whether or not the target is a router, and generally won't be set since the tunnel endpoint is bridging, not routing, traffic. The patch below creates a proxy neighbor advertisement to respond to neighbor solicitions as intended, providing proper IPv6 support for neighbor reduction. Signed-off-by: David L Stevens <dlstevens@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-24 22:39:58 +08:00
struct sk_buff *reply;
if (!(n->nud_state & NUD_CONNECTED)) {
neigh_release(n);
goto out;
}
f = vxlan_find_mac(vxlan, n->ha);
if (f && vxlan_addr_any(&(first_remote_rcu(f)->remote_ip))) {
/* bridge-local neighbor */
neigh_release(n);
goto out;
}
vxlan: fix nonfunctional neigh_reduce() The VXLAN neigh_reduce() code is completely non-functional since check-in. Specific errors: 1) The original code drops all packets with a multicast destination address, even though neighbor solicitations are sent to the solicited-node address, a multicast address. The code after this check was never run. 2) The neighbor table lookup used the IPv6 header destination, which is the solicited node address, rather than the target address from the neighbor solicitation. So neighbor lookups would always fail if it got this far. Also for L3MISSes. 3) The code calls ndisc_send_na(), which does a send on the tunnel device. The context for neigh_reduce() is the transmit path, vxlan_xmit(), where the host or a bridge-attached neighbor is trying to transmit a neighbor solicitation. To respond to it, the tunnel endpoint needs to do a *receive* of the appropriate neighbor advertisement. Doing a send, would only try to send the advertisement, encapsulated, to the remote destinations in the fdb -- hosts that definitely did not do the corresponding solicitation. 4) The code uses the tunnel endpoint IPv6 forwarding flag to determine the isrouter flag in the advertisement. This has nothing to do with whether or not the target is a router, and generally won't be set since the tunnel endpoint is bridging, not routing, traffic. The patch below creates a proxy neighbor advertisement to respond to neighbor solicitions as intended, providing proper IPv6 support for neighbor reduction. Signed-off-by: David L Stevens <dlstevens@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-24 22:39:58 +08:00
reply = vxlan_na_create(skb, n,
!!(f ? f->flags & NTF_ROUTER : 0));
neigh_release(n);
vxlan: fix nonfunctional neigh_reduce() The VXLAN neigh_reduce() code is completely non-functional since check-in. Specific errors: 1) The original code drops all packets with a multicast destination address, even though neighbor solicitations are sent to the solicited-node address, a multicast address. The code after this check was never run. 2) The neighbor table lookup used the IPv6 header destination, which is the solicited node address, rather than the target address from the neighbor solicitation. So neighbor lookups would always fail if it got this far. Also for L3MISSes. 3) The code calls ndisc_send_na(), which does a send on the tunnel device. The context for neigh_reduce() is the transmit path, vxlan_xmit(), where the host or a bridge-attached neighbor is trying to transmit a neighbor solicitation. To respond to it, the tunnel endpoint needs to do a *receive* of the appropriate neighbor advertisement. Doing a send, would only try to send the advertisement, encapsulated, to the remote destinations in the fdb -- hosts that definitely did not do the corresponding solicitation. 4) The code uses the tunnel endpoint IPv6 forwarding flag to determine the isrouter flag in the advertisement. This has nothing to do with whether or not the target is a router, and generally won't be set since the tunnel endpoint is bridging, not routing, traffic. The patch below creates a proxy neighbor advertisement to respond to neighbor solicitions as intended, providing proper IPv6 support for neighbor reduction. Signed-off-by: David L Stevens <dlstevens@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-24 22:39:58 +08:00
if (reply == NULL)
goto out;
if (netif_rx_ni(reply) == NET_RX_DROP)
dev->stats.rx_dropped++;
} else if (vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_L3MISS) {
vxlan: fix nonfunctional neigh_reduce() The VXLAN neigh_reduce() code is completely non-functional since check-in. Specific errors: 1) The original code drops all packets with a multicast destination address, even though neighbor solicitations are sent to the solicited-node address, a multicast address. The code after this check was never run. 2) The neighbor table lookup used the IPv6 header destination, which is the solicited node address, rather than the target address from the neighbor solicitation. So neighbor lookups would always fail if it got this far. Also for L3MISSes. 3) The code calls ndisc_send_na(), which does a send on the tunnel device. The context for neigh_reduce() is the transmit path, vxlan_xmit(), where the host or a bridge-attached neighbor is trying to transmit a neighbor solicitation. To respond to it, the tunnel endpoint needs to do a *receive* of the appropriate neighbor advertisement. Doing a send, would only try to send the advertisement, encapsulated, to the remote destinations in the fdb -- hosts that definitely did not do the corresponding solicitation. 4) The code uses the tunnel endpoint IPv6 forwarding flag to determine the isrouter flag in the advertisement. This has nothing to do with whether or not the target is a router, and generally won't be set since the tunnel endpoint is bridging, not routing, traffic. The patch below creates a proxy neighbor advertisement to respond to neighbor solicitions as intended, providing proper IPv6 support for neighbor reduction. Signed-off-by: David L Stevens <dlstevens@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-24 22:39:58 +08:00
union vxlan_addr ipa = {
.sin6.sin6_addr = msg->target,
.sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6,
vxlan: fix nonfunctional neigh_reduce() The VXLAN neigh_reduce() code is completely non-functional since check-in. Specific errors: 1) The original code drops all packets with a multicast destination address, even though neighbor solicitations are sent to the solicited-node address, a multicast address. The code after this check was never run. 2) The neighbor table lookup used the IPv6 header destination, which is the solicited node address, rather than the target address from the neighbor solicitation. So neighbor lookups would always fail if it got this far. Also for L3MISSes. 3) The code calls ndisc_send_na(), which does a send on the tunnel device. The context for neigh_reduce() is the transmit path, vxlan_xmit(), where the host or a bridge-attached neighbor is trying to transmit a neighbor solicitation. To respond to it, the tunnel endpoint needs to do a *receive* of the appropriate neighbor advertisement. Doing a send, would only try to send the advertisement, encapsulated, to the remote destinations in the fdb -- hosts that definitely did not do the corresponding solicitation. 4) The code uses the tunnel endpoint IPv6 forwarding flag to determine the isrouter flag in the advertisement. This has nothing to do with whether or not the target is a router, and generally won't be set since the tunnel endpoint is bridging, not routing, traffic. The patch below creates a proxy neighbor advertisement to respond to neighbor solicitions as intended, providing proper IPv6 support for neighbor reduction. Signed-off-by: David L Stevens <dlstevens@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-24 22:39:58 +08:00
};
vxlan_ip_miss(dev, &ipa);
}
out:
consume_skb(skb);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
#endif
static bool route_shortcircuit(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
struct neighbour *n;
if (is_multicast_ether_addr(eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest))
return false;
n = NULL;
switch (ntohs(eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto)) {
case ETH_P_IP:
{
struct iphdr *pip;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)))
return false;
pip = ip_hdr(skb);
n = neigh_lookup(&arp_tbl, &pip->daddr, dev);
if (!n && (vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_L3MISS)) {
union vxlan_addr ipa = {
.sin.sin_addr.s_addr = pip->daddr,
.sin.sin_family = AF_INET,
};
vxlan_ip_miss(dev, &ipa);
return false;
}
break;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case ETH_P_IPV6:
{
struct ipv6hdr *pip6;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))
return false;
pip6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
n = neigh_lookup(ipv6_stub->nd_tbl, &pip6->daddr, dev);
if (!n && (vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_L3MISS)) {
union vxlan_addr ipa = {
.sin6.sin6_addr = pip6->daddr,
.sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6,
};
vxlan_ip_miss(dev, &ipa);
return false;
}
break;
}
#endif
default:
return false;
}
if (n) {
bool diff;
diff = !ether_addr_equal(eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest, n->ha);
if (diff) {
memcpy(eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest,
dev->addr_len);
memcpy(eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest, n->ha, dev->addr_len);
}
neigh_release(n);
return diff;
}
return false;
}
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
static void vxlan_build_gbp_hdr(struct vxlanhdr *vxh, struct vxlan_sock *vs,
struct vxlan_metadata *md)
{
struct vxlanhdr_gbp *gbp;
gbp = (struct vxlanhdr_gbp *)vxh;
vxh->vx_flags |= htonl(VXLAN_HF_GBP);
if (md->gbp & VXLAN_GBP_DONT_LEARN)
gbp->dont_learn = 1;
if (md->gbp & VXLAN_GBP_POLICY_APPLIED)
gbp->policy_applied = 1;
gbp->policy_id = htons(md->gbp & VXLAN_GBP_ID_MASK);
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
static int vxlan6_xmit_skb(struct vxlan_sock *vs,
struct dst_entry *dst, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *dev, struct in6_addr *saddr,
struct in6_addr *daddr, __u8 prio, __u8 ttl,
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
__be16 src_port, __be16 dst_port,
struct vxlan_metadata *md, bool xnet)
{
struct vxlanhdr *vxh;
int min_headroom;
int err;
bool udp_sum = !udp_get_no_check6_tx(vs->sock->sk);
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
int type = udp_sum ? SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL_CSUM : SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
u16 hdrlen = sizeof(struct vxlanhdr);
if ((vs->flags & VXLAN_F_REMCSUM_TX) &&
skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
int csum_start = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb);
if (csum_start <= VXLAN_MAX_REMCSUM_START &&
!(csum_start & VXLAN_RCO_SHIFT_MASK) &&
(skb->csum_offset == offsetof(struct udphdr, check) ||
skb->csum_offset == offsetof(struct tcphdr, check))) {
udp_sum = false;
type |= SKB_GSO_TUNNEL_REMCSUM;
}
}
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
skb = iptunnel_handle_offloads(skb, udp_sum, type);
if (IS_ERR(skb)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
skb_scrub_packet(skb, xnet);
min_headroom = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dst->dev) + dst->header_len
+ VXLAN_HLEN + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)
+ (skb_vlan_tag_present(skb) ? VLAN_HLEN : 0);
/* Need space for new headers (invalidates iph ptr) */
err = skb_cow_head(skb, min_headroom);
if (unlikely(err)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto err;
}
skb = vlan_hwaccel_push_inside(skb);
if (WARN_ON(!skb)) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
vxh = (struct vxlanhdr *) __skb_push(skb, sizeof(*vxh));
vxh->vx_flags = htonl(VXLAN_HF_VNI);
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
vxh->vx_vni = md->vni;
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
if (type & SKB_GSO_TUNNEL_REMCSUM) {
u32 data = (skb_checksum_start_offset(skb) - hdrlen) >>
VXLAN_RCO_SHIFT;
if (skb->csum_offset == offsetof(struct udphdr, check))
data |= VXLAN_RCO_UDP;
vxh->vx_vni |= htonl(data);
vxh->vx_flags |= htonl(VXLAN_HF_RCO);
if (!skb_is_gso(skb)) {
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb->encapsulation = 0;
}
}
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
if (vs->flags & VXLAN_F_GBP)
vxlan_build_gbp_hdr(vxh, vs, md);
skb_set_inner_protocol(skb, htons(ETH_P_TEB));
udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb(vs->sock, dst, skb, dev, saddr, daddr, prio,
ttl, src_port, dst_port);
return 0;
err:
dst_release(dst);
return err;
}
#endif
int vxlan_xmit_skb(struct vxlan_sock *vs,
struct rtable *rt, struct sk_buff *skb,
__be32 src, __be32 dst, __u8 tos, __u8 ttl, __be16 df,
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
__be16 src_port, __be16 dst_port,
struct vxlan_metadata *md, bool xnet)
{
struct vxlanhdr *vxh;
int min_headroom;
int err;
bool udp_sum = !vs->sock->sk->sk_no_check_tx;
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
int type = udp_sum ? SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL_CSUM : SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
u16 hdrlen = sizeof(struct vxlanhdr);
if ((vs->flags & VXLAN_F_REMCSUM_TX) &&
skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
int csum_start = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb);
if (csum_start <= VXLAN_MAX_REMCSUM_START &&
!(csum_start & VXLAN_RCO_SHIFT_MASK) &&
(skb->csum_offset == offsetof(struct udphdr, check) ||
skb->csum_offset == offsetof(struct tcphdr, check))) {
udp_sum = false;
type |= SKB_GSO_TUNNEL_REMCSUM;
}
}
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
skb = iptunnel_handle_offloads(skb, udp_sum, type);
if (IS_ERR(skb))
return PTR_ERR(skb);
min_headroom = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev) + rt->dst.header_len
+ VXLAN_HLEN + sizeof(struct iphdr)
+ (skb_vlan_tag_present(skb) ? VLAN_HLEN : 0);
/* Need space for new headers (invalidates iph ptr) */
err = skb_cow_head(skb, min_headroom);
if (unlikely(err)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
skb = vlan_hwaccel_push_inside(skb);
if (WARN_ON(!skb))
return -ENOMEM;
vxh = (struct vxlanhdr *) __skb_push(skb, sizeof(*vxh));
vxh->vx_flags = htonl(VXLAN_HF_VNI);
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
vxh->vx_vni = md->vni;
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
if (type & SKB_GSO_TUNNEL_REMCSUM) {
u32 data = (skb_checksum_start_offset(skb) - hdrlen) >>
VXLAN_RCO_SHIFT;
if (skb->csum_offset == offsetof(struct udphdr, check))
data |= VXLAN_RCO_UDP;
vxh->vx_vni |= htonl(data);
vxh->vx_flags |= htonl(VXLAN_HF_RCO);
if (!skb_is_gso(skb)) {
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb->encapsulation = 0;
}
}
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
if (vs->flags & VXLAN_F_GBP)
vxlan_build_gbp_hdr(vxh, vs, md);
skb_set_inner_protocol(skb, htons(ETH_P_TEB));
return udp_tunnel_xmit_skb(vs->sock, rt, skb, src, dst, tos,
ttl, df, src_port, dst_port, xnet);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vxlan_xmit_skb);
/* Bypass encapsulation if the destination is local */
static void vxlan_encap_bypass(struct sk_buff *skb, struct vxlan_dev *src_vxlan,
struct vxlan_dev *dst_vxlan)
{
struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tx_stats, *rx_stats;
union vxlan_addr loopback;
union vxlan_addr *remote_ip = &dst_vxlan->default_dst.remote_ip;
struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
int len = skb->len;
tx_stats = this_cpu_ptr(src_vxlan->dev->tstats);
rx_stats = this_cpu_ptr(dst_vxlan->dev->tstats);
skb->pkt_type = PACKET_HOST;
skb->encapsulation = 0;
skb->dev = dst_vxlan->dev;
__skb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(skb));
if (remote_ip->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
loopback.sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
loopback.sa.sa_family = AF_INET;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else {
loopback.sin6.sin6_addr = in6addr_loopback;
loopback.sa.sa_family = AF_INET6;
#endif
}
if (dst_vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_LEARN)
vxlan_snoop(skb->dev, &loopback, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source);
u64_stats_update_begin(&tx_stats->syncp);
tx_stats->tx_packets++;
tx_stats->tx_bytes += len;
u64_stats_update_end(&tx_stats->syncp);
if (netif_rx(skb) == NET_RX_SUCCESS) {
u64_stats_update_begin(&rx_stats->syncp);
rx_stats->rx_packets++;
rx_stats->rx_bytes += len;
u64_stats_update_end(&rx_stats->syncp);
} else {
dev->stats.rx_dropped++;
}
}
static void vxlan_xmit_one(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct vxlan_rdst *rdst, bool did_rsc)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
const struct iphdr *old_iph;
struct flowi4 fl4;
union vxlan_addr *dst;
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
struct vxlan_metadata md;
__be16 src_port = 0, dst_port;
u32 vni;
__be16 df = 0;
__u8 tos, ttl;
int err;
dst_port = rdst->remote_port ? rdst->remote_port : vxlan->dst_port;
vni = rdst->remote_vni;
dst = &rdst->remote_ip;
if (vxlan_addr_any(dst)) {
if (did_rsc) {
/* short-circuited back to local bridge */
vxlan_encap_bypass(skb, vxlan, vxlan);
return;
}
goto drop;
}
old_iph = ip_hdr(skb);
ttl = vxlan->ttl;
if (!ttl && vxlan_addr_multicast(dst))
ttl = 1;
tos = vxlan->tos;
if (tos == 1)
tos = ip_tunnel_get_dsfield(old_iph, skb);
src_port = udp_flow_src_port(dev_net(dev), skb, vxlan->port_min,
vxlan->port_max, true);
if (dst->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
memset(&fl4, 0, sizeof(fl4));
fl4.flowi4_oif = rdst->remote_ifindex;
fl4.flowi4_tos = RT_TOS(tos);
fl4.daddr = dst->sin.sin_addr.s_addr;
fl4.saddr = vxlan->saddr.sin.sin_addr.s_addr;
rt = ip_route_output_key(vxlan->net, &fl4);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
netdev_dbg(dev, "no route to %pI4\n",
&dst->sin.sin_addr.s_addr);
dev->stats.tx_carrier_errors++;
goto tx_error;
}
if (rt->dst.dev == dev) {
netdev_dbg(dev, "circular route to %pI4\n",
&dst->sin.sin_addr.s_addr);
dev->stats.collisions++;
goto rt_tx_error;
}
/* Bypass encapsulation if the destination is local */
if (rt->rt_flags & RTCF_LOCAL &&
!(rt->rt_flags & (RTCF_BROADCAST | RTCF_MULTICAST))) {
struct vxlan_dev *dst_vxlan;
ip_rt_put(rt);
dst_vxlan = vxlan_find_vni(vxlan->net, vni,
dst->sa.sa_family, dst_port,
vxlan->flags);
if (!dst_vxlan)
goto tx_error;
vxlan_encap_bypass(skb, vxlan, dst_vxlan);
return;
}
tos = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(tos, old_iph, skb);
ttl = ttl ? : ip4_dst_hoplimit(&rt->dst);
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
md.vni = htonl(vni << 8);
md.gbp = skb->mark;
err = vxlan_xmit_skb(vxlan->vn_sock, rt, skb,
fl4.saddr, dst->sin.sin_addr.s_addr,
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
tos, ttl, df, src_port, dst_port, &md,
!net_eq(vxlan->net, dev_net(vxlan->dev)));
if (err < 0) {
/* skb is already freed. */
skb = NULL;
goto rt_tx_error;
}
iptunnel_xmit_stats(err, &dev->stats, dev->tstats);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else {
struct sock *sk = vxlan->vn_sock->sock->sk;
struct dst_entry *ndst;
struct flowi6 fl6;
u32 flags;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_oif = rdst->remote_ifindex;
fl6.daddr = dst->sin6.sin6_addr;
fl6.saddr = vxlan->saddr.sin6.sin6_addr;
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_UDP;
if (ipv6_stub->ipv6_dst_lookup(sk, &ndst, &fl6)) {
netdev_dbg(dev, "no route to %pI6\n",
&dst->sin6.sin6_addr);
dev->stats.tx_carrier_errors++;
goto tx_error;
}
if (ndst->dev == dev) {
netdev_dbg(dev, "circular route to %pI6\n",
&dst->sin6.sin6_addr);
dst_release(ndst);
dev->stats.collisions++;
goto tx_error;
}
/* Bypass encapsulation if the destination is local */
flags = ((struct rt6_info *)ndst)->rt6i_flags;
if (flags & RTF_LOCAL &&
!(flags & (RTCF_BROADCAST | RTCF_MULTICAST))) {
struct vxlan_dev *dst_vxlan;
dst_release(ndst);
dst_vxlan = vxlan_find_vni(vxlan->net, vni,
dst->sa.sa_family, dst_port,
vxlan->flags);
if (!dst_vxlan)
goto tx_error;
vxlan_encap_bypass(skb, vxlan, dst_vxlan);
return;
}
ttl = ttl ? : ip6_dst_hoplimit(ndst);
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
md.vni = htonl(vni << 8);
md.gbp = skb->mark;
err = vxlan6_xmit_skb(vxlan->vn_sock, ndst, skb,
dev, &fl6.saddr, &fl6.daddr, 0, ttl,
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
src_port, dst_port, &md,
!net_eq(vxlan->net, dev_net(vxlan->dev)));
#endif
}
return;
drop:
dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
goto tx_free;
rt_tx_error:
ip_rt_put(rt);
tx_error:
dev->stats.tx_errors++;
tx_free:
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
}
/* Transmit local packets over Vxlan
*
* Outer IP header inherits ECN and DF from inner header.
* Outer UDP destination is the VXLAN assigned port.
* source port is based on hash of flow
*/
static netdev_tx_t vxlan_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
struct ethhdr *eth;
bool did_rsc = false;
vxlan: keep original skb ownership Sathya Perla posted a patch trying to address following problem : <quote> The vxlan driver sets itself as the socket owner for all the TX flows it encapsulates (using vxlan_set_owner()) and assigns it's own skb destructor. This causes all tunneled traffic to land up on only one TXQ as all encapsulated skbs refer to the vxlan socket and not the original socket. Also, the vxlan skb destructor breaks some functionality for tunneled traffic like wmem accounting and as TCP small queues and FQ/pacing packet scheduler. </quote> I reworked Sathya patch and added some explanations. vxlan_xmit() can avoid one skb_clone()/dev_kfree_skb() pair and gain better drop monitor accuracy, by calling kfree_skb() when appropriate. The UDP socket used by vxlan to perform encapsulation of xmit packets do not need to be alive while packets leave vxlan code. Its better to keep original socket ownership to get proper feedback from qdisc and NIC layers. We use skb->sk to A) control amount of bytes/packets queued on behalf of a socket, but prior vxlan code did the skb->sk transfert without any limit/control on vxlan socket sk_sndbuf. B) security purposes (as selinux) or netfilter uses, and I do not think anything is prepared to handle vxlan stacked case in this area. By not changing ownership, vxlan tunnels behave like other tunnels. As Stephen mentioned, we might do the same change in L2TP. Reported-by: Sathya Perla <sathya.perla@emulex.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-07 01:54:31 +08:00
struct vxlan_rdst *rdst, *fdst = NULL;
struct vxlan_fdb *f;
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
eth = eth_hdr(skb);
if ((vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_PROXY)) {
if (ntohs(eth->h_proto) == ETH_P_ARP)
return arp_reduce(dev, skb);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
else if (ntohs(eth->h_proto) == ETH_P_IPV6 &&
pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)
+ sizeof(struct nd_msg)) &&
ipv6_hdr(skb)->nexthdr == IPPROTO_ICMPV6) {
struct nd_msg *msg;
msg = (struct nd_msg *)skb_transport_header(skb);
if (msg->icmph.icmp6_code == 0 &&
msg->icmph.icmp6_type == NDISC_NEIGHBOUR_SOLICITATION)
return neigh_reduce(dev, skb);
}
eth = eth_hdr(skb);
#endif
}
f = vxlan_find_mac(vxlan, eth->h_dest);
did_rsc = false;
if (f && (f->flags & NTF_ROUTER) && (vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_RSC) &&
(ntohs(eth->h_proto) == ETH_P_IP ||
ntohs(eth->h_proto) == ETH_P_IPV6)) {
did_rsc = route_shortcircuit(dev, skb);
if (did_rsc)
f = vxlan_find_mac(vxlan, eth->h_dest);
}
if (f == NULL) {
f = vxlan_find_mac(vxlan, all_zeros_mac);
if (f == NULL) {
if ((vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_L2MISS) &&
!is_multicast_ether_addr(eth->h_dest))
vxlan_fdb_miss(vxlan, eth->h_dest);
dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
vxlan: keep original skb ownership Sathya Perla posted a patch trying to address following problem : <quote> The vxlan driver sets itself as the socket owner for all the TX flows it encapsulates (using vxlan_set_owner()) and assigns it's own skb destructor. This causes all tunneled traffic to land up on only one TXQ as all encapsulated skbs refer to the vxlan socket and not the original socket. Also, the vxlan skb destructor breaks some functionality for tunneled traffic like wmem accounting and as TCP small queues and FQ/pacing packet scheduler. </quote> I reworked Sathya patch and added some explanations. vxlan_xmit() can avoid one skb_clone()/dev_kfree_skb() pair and gain better drop monitor accuracy, by calling kfree_skb() when appropriate. The UDP socket used by vxlan to perform encapsulation of xmit packets do not need to be alive while packets leave vxlan code. Its better to keep original socket ownership to get proper feedback from qdisc and NIC layers. We use skb->sk to A) control amount of bytes/packets queued on behalf of a socket, but prior vxlan code did the skb->sk transfert without any limit/control on vxlan socket sk_sndbuf. B) security purposes (as selinux) or netfilter uses, and I do not think anything is prepared to handle vxlan stacked case in this area. By not changing ownership, vxlan tunnels behave like other tunnels. As Stephen mentioned, we might do the same change in L2TP. Reported-by: Sathya Perla <sathya.perla@emulex.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-07 01:54:31 +08:00
kfree_skb(skb);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
}
list_for_each_entry_rcu(rdst, &f->remotes, list) {
struct sk_buff *skb1;
vxlan: keep original skb ownership Sathya Perla posted a patch trying to address following problem : <quote> The vxlan driver sets itself as the socket owner for all the TX flows it encapsulates (using vxlan_set_owner()) and assigns it's own skb destructor. This causes all tunneled traffic to land up on only one TXQ as all encapsulated skbs refer to the vxlan socket and not the original socket. Also, the vxlan skb destructor breaks some functionality for tunneled traffic like wmem accounting and as TCP small queues and FQ/pacing packet scheduler. </quote> I reworked Sathya patch and added some explanations. vxlan_xmit() can avoid one skb_clone()/dev_kfree_skb() pair and gain better drop monitor accuracy, by calling kfree_skb() when appropriate. The UDP socket used by vxlan to perform encapsulation of xmit packets do not need to be alive while packets leave vxlan code. Its better to keep original socket ownership to get proper feedback from qdisc and NIC layers. We use skb->sk to A) control amount of bytes/packets queued on behalf of a socket, but prior vxlan code did the skb->sk transfert without any limit/control on vxlan socket sk_sndbuf. B) security purposes (as selinux) or netfilter uses, and I do not think anything is prepared to handle vxlan stacked case in this area. By not changing ownership, vxlan tunnels behave like other tunnels. As Stephen mentioned, we might do the same change in L2TP. Reported-by: Sathya Perla <sathya.perla@emulex.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-07 01:54:31 +08:00
if (!fdst) {
fdst = rdst;
continue;
}
skb1 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb1)
vxlan_xmit_one(skb1, dev, rdst, did_rsc);
}
vxlan: keep original skb ownership Sathya Perla posted a patch trying to address following problem : <quote> The vxlan driver sets itself as the socket owner for all the TX flows it encapsulates (using vxlan_set_owner()) and assigns it's own skb destructor. This causes all tunneled traffic to land up on only one TXQ as all encapsulated skbs refer to the vxlan socket and not the original socket. Also, the vxlan skb destructor breaks some functionality for tunneled traffic like wmem accounting and as TCP small queues and FQ/pacing packet scheduler. </quote> I reworked Sathya patch and added some explanations. vxlan_xmit() can avoid one skb_clone()/dev_kfree_skb() pair and gain better drop monitor accuracy, by calling kfree_skb() when appropriate. The UDP socket used by vxlan to perform encapsulation of xmit packets do not need to be alive while packets leave vxlan code. Its better to keep original socket ownership to get proper feedback from qdisc and NIC layers. We use skb->sk to A) control amount of bytes/packets queued on behalf of a socket, but prior vxlan code did the skb->sk transfert without any limit/control on vxlan socket sk_sndbuf. B) security purposes (as selinux) or netfilter uses, and I do not think anything is prepared to handle vxlan stacked case in this area. By not changing ownership, vxlan tunnels behave like other tunnels. As Stephen mentioned, we might do the same change in L2TP. Reported-by: Sathya Perla <sathya.perla@emulex.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-07 01:54:31 +08:00
if (fdst)
vxlan_xmit_one(skb, dev, fdst, did_rsc);
else
kfree_skb(skb);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
/* Walk the forwarding table and purge stale entries */
static void vxlan_cleanup(unsigned long arg)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = (struct vxlan_dev *) arg;
unsigned long next_timer = jiffies + FDB_AGE_INTERVAL;
unsigned int h;
if (!netif_running(vxlan->dev))
return;
spin_lock_bh(&vxlan->hash_lock);
for (h = 0; h < FDB_HASH_SIZE; ++h) {
struct hlist_node *p, *n;
hlist_for_each_safe(p, n, &vxlan->fdb_head[h]) {
struct vxlan_fdb *f
= container_of(p, struct vxlan_fdb, hlist);
unsigned long timeout;
if (f->state & NUD_PERMANENT)
continue;
timeout = f->used + vxlan->age_interval * HZ;
if (time_before_eq(timeout, jiffies)) {
netdev_dbg(vxlan->dev,
"garbage collect %pM\n",
f->eth_addr);
f->state = NUD_STALE;
vxlan_fdb_destroy(vxlan, f);
} else if (time_before(timeout, next_timer))
next_timer = timeout;
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&vxlan->hash_lock);
mod_timer(&vxlan->age_timer, next_timer);
}
static void vxlan_vs_add_dev(struct vxlan_sock *vs, struct vxlan_dev *vxlan)
{
__u32 vni = vxlan->default_dst.remote_vni;
vxlan->vn_sock = vs;
hlist_add_head_rcu(&vxlan->hlist, vni_head(vs, vni));
}
/* Setup stats when device is created */
static int vxlan_init(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(vxlan->net, vxlan_net_id);
struct vxlan_sock *vs;
bool ipv6 = vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_IPV6;
dev->tstats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct pcpu_sw_netstats);
if (!dev->tstats)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock);
vs = vxlan_find_sock(vxlan->net, ipv6 ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET,
vxlan->dst_port, vxlan->flags);
if (vs && atomic_add_unless(&vs->refcnt, 1, 0)) {
/* If we have a socket with same port already, reuse it */
vxlan_vs_add_dev(vs, vxlan);
} else {
/* otherwise make new socket outside of RTNL */
dev_hold(dev);
queue_work(vxlan_wq, &vxlan->sock_work);
}
spin_unlock(&vn->sock_lock);
return 0;
}
static void vxlan_fdb_delete_default(struct vxlan_dev *vxlan)
{
struct vxlan_fdb *f;
spin_lock_bh(&vxlan->hash_lock);
f = __vxlan_find_mac(vxlan, all_zeros_mac);
if (f)
vxlan_fdb_destroy(vxlan, f);
spin_unlock_bh(&vxlan->hash_lock);
}
static void vxlan_uninit(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
struct vxlan_sock *vs = vxlan->vn_sock;
vxlan_fdb_delete_default(vxlan);
if (vs)
vxlan_sock_release(vs);
free_percpu(dev->tstats);
}
/* Start ageing timer and join group when device is brought up */
static int vxlan_open(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
struct vxlan_sock *vs = vxlan->vn_sock;
/* socket hasn't been created */
if (!vs)
return -ENOTCONN;
if (vxlan_addr_multicast(&vxlan->default_dst.remote_ip)) {
vxlan_sock_hold(vs);
dev_hold(dev);
queue_work(vxlan_wq, &vxlan->igmp_join);
}
if (vxlan->age_interval)
mod_timer(&vxlan->age_timer, jiffies + FDB_AGE_INTERVAL);
return 0;
}
/* Purge the forwarding table */
static void vxlan_flush(struct vxlan_dev *vxlan)
{
unsigned int h;
spin_lock_bh(&vxlan->hash_lock);
for (h = 0; h < FDB_HASH_SIZE; ++h) {
struct hlist_node *p, *n;
hlist_for_each_safe(p, n, &vxlan->fdb_head[h]) {
struct vxlan_fdb *f
= container_of(p, struct vxlan_fdb, hlist);
/* the all_zeros_mac entry is deleted at vxlan_uninit */
if (!is_zero_ether_addr(f->eth_addr))
vxlan_fdb_destroy(vxlan, f);
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&vxlan->hash_lock);
}
/* Cleanup timer and forwarding table on shutdown */
static int vxlan_stop(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(vxlan->net, vxlan_net_id);
struct vxlan_sock *vs = vxlan->vn_sock;
if (vs && vxlan_addr_multicast(&vxlan->default_dst.remote_ip) &&
!vxlan_group_used(vn, vxlan)) {
vxlan_sock_hold(vs);
dev_hold(dev);
queue_work(vxlan_wq, &vxlan->igmp_leave);
}
del_timer_sync(&vxlan->age_timer);
vxlan_flush(vxlan);
return 0;
}
/* Stub, nothing needs to be done. */
static void vxlan_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *dev)
{
}
static int vxlan_change_mtu(struct net_device *dev, int new_mtu)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
struct vxlan_rdst *dst = &vxlan->default_dst;
struct net_device *lowerdev;
int max_mtu;
lowerdev = __dev_get_by_index(vxlan->net, dst->remote_ifindex);
if (lowerdev == NULL)
return eth_change_mtu(dev, new_mtu);
if (dst->remote_ip.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
max_mtu = lowerdev->mtu - VXLAN6_HEADROOM;
else
max_mtu = lowerdev->mtu - VXLAN_HEADROOM;
if (new_mtu < 68 || new_mtu > max_mtu)
return -EINVAL;
dev->mtu = new_mtu;
return 0;
}
static const struct net_device_ops vxlan_netdev_ops = {
.ndo_init = vxlan_init,
.ndo_uninit = vxlan_uninit,
.ndo_open = vxlan_open,
.ndo_stop = vxlan_stop,
.ndo_start_xmit = vxlan_xmit,
.ndo_get_stats64 = ip_tunnel_get_stats64,
.ndo_set_rx_mode = vxlan_set_multicast_list,
.ndo_change_mtu = vxlan_change_mtu,
.ndo_validate_addr = eth_validate_addr,
.ndo_set_mac_address = eth_mac_addr,
.ndo_fdb_add = vxlan_fdb_add,
.ndo_fdb_del = vxlan_fdb_delete,
.ndo_fdb_dump = vxlan_fdb_dump,
};
/* Info for udev, that this is a virtual tunnel endpoint */
static struct device_type vxlan_type = {
.name = "vxlan",
};
/* Calls the ndo_add_vxlan_port of the caller in order to
* supply the listening VXLAN udp ports. Callers are expected
* to implement the ndo_add_vxlan_port.
*/
void vxlan_get_rx_port(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct vxlan_sock *vs;
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(net, vxlan_net_id);
sa_family_t sa_family;
__be16 port;
unsigned int i;
spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock);
for (i = 0; i < PORT_HASH_SIZE; ++i) {
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(vs, &vn->sock_list[i], hlist) {
port = inet_sk(vs->sock->sk)->inet_sport;
sa_family = vs->sock->sk->sk_family;
dev->netdev_ops->ndo_add_vxlan_port(dev, sa_family,
port);
}
}
spin_unlock(&vn->sock_lock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vxlan_get_rx_port);
/* Initialize the device structure. */
static void vxlan_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
unsigned int h;
eth_hw_addr_random(dev);
ether_setup(dev);
if (vxlan->default_dst.remote_ip.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
dev->needed_headroom = ETH_HLEN + VXLAN6_HEADROOM;
else
dev->needed_headroom = ETH_HLEN + VXLAN_HEADROOM;
dev->netdev_ops = &vxlan_netdev_ops;
dev->destructor = free_netdev;
SET_NETDEV_DEVTYPE(dev, &vxlan_type);
dev->tx_queue_len = 0;
dev->features |= NETIF_F_LLTX;
dev->features |= NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_HW_CSUM;
dev->features |= NETIF_F_RXCSUM;
dev->features |= NETIF_F_GSO_SOFTWARE;
dev->vlan_features = dev->features;
dev->features |= NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX;
dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_HW_CSUM | NETIF_F_RXCSUM;
dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_GSO_SOFTWARE;
dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX;
netif_keep_dst(dev);
dev->priv_flags |= IFF_LIVE_ADDR_CHANGE;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vxlan->next);
spin_lock_init(&vxlan->hash_lock);
INIT_WORK(&vxlan->igmp_join, vxlan_igmp_join);
INIT_WORK(&vxlan->igmp_leave, vxlan_igmp_leave);
INIT_WORK(&vxlan->sock_work, vxlan_sock_work);
init_timer_deferrable(&vxlan->age_timer);
vxlan->age_timer.function = vxlan_cleanup;
vxlan->age_timer.data = (unsigned long) vxlan;
vxlan->dst_port = htons(vxlan_port);
vxlan->dev = dev;
for (h = 0; h < FDB_HASH_SIZE; ++h)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&vxlan->fdb_head[h]);
}
static const struct nla_policy vxlan_policy[IFLA_VXLAN_MAX + 1] = {
[IFLA_VXLAN_ID] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[IFLA_VXLAN_GROUP] = { .len = FIELD_SIZEOF(struct iphdr, daddr) },
[IFLA_VXLAN_GROUP6] = { .len = sizeof(struct in6_addr) },
[IFLA_VXLAN_LINK] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[IFLA_VXLAN_LOCAL] = { .len = FIELD_SIZEOF(struct iphdr, saddr) },
[IFLA_VXLAN_LOCAL6] = { .len = sizeof(struct in6_addr) },
[IFLA_VXLAN_TOS] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
[IFLA_VXLAN_TTL] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
[IFLA_VXLAN_LEARNING] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
[IFLA_VXLAN_AGEING] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[IFLA_VXLAN_LIMIT] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[IFLA_VXLAN_PORT_RANGE] = { .len = sizeof(struct ifla_vxlan_port_range) },
[IFLA_VXLAN_PROXY] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
[IFLA_VXLAN_RSC] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
[IFLA_VXLAN_L2MISS] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
[IFLA_VXLAN_L3MISS] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
[IFLA_VXLAN_PORT] = { .type = NLA_U16 },
[IFLA_VXLAN_UDP_CSUM] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
[IFLA_VXLAN_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_TX] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
[IFLA_VXLAN_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_RX] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
[IFLA_VXLAN_REMCSUM_TX] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
[IFLA_VXLAN_REMCSUM_RX] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
[IFLA_VXLAN_GBP] = { .type = NLA_FLAG, },
};
static int vxlan_validate(struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[])
{
if (tb[IFLA_ADDRESS]) {
if (nla_len(tb[IFLA_ADDRESS]) != ETH_ALEN) {
pr_debug("invalid link address (not ethernet)\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!is_valid_ether_addr(nla_data(tb[IFLA_ADDRESS]))) {
pr_debug("invalid all zero ethernet address\n");
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
}
if (!data)
return -EINVAL;
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_ID]) {
__u32 id = nla_get_u32(data[IFLA_VXLAN_ID]);
if (id >= VXLAN_VID_MASK)
return -ERANGE;
}
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_PORT_RANGE]) {
const struct ifla_vxlan_port_range *p
= nla_data(data[IFLA_VXLAN_PORT_RANGE]);
if (ntohs(p->high) < ntohs(p->low)) {
pr_debug("port range %u .. %u not valid\n",
ntohs(p->low), ntohs(p->high));
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
static void vxlan_get_drvinfo(struct net_device *netdev,
struct ethtool_drvinfo *drvinfo)
{
strlcpy(drvinfo->version, VXLAN_VERSION, sizeof(drvinfo->version));
strlcpy(drvinfo->driver, "vxlan", sizeof(drvinfo->driver));
}
static const struct ethtool_ops vxlan_ethtool_ops = {
.get_drvinfo = vxlan_get_drvinfo,
.get_link = ethtool_op_get_link,
};
static void vxlan_del_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct vxlan_sock *vs = container_of(work, struct vxlan_sock, del_work);
udp_tunnel_sock_release(vs->sock);
kfree_rcu(vs, rcu);
}
static struct socket *vxlan_create_sock(struct net *net, bool ipv6,
__be16 port, u32 flags)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct udp_port_cfg udp_conf;
int err;
memset(&udp_conf, 0, sizeof(udp_conf));
if (ipv6) {
udp_conf.family = AF_INET6;
udp_conf.use_udp6_tx_checksums =
!(flags & VXLAN_F_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_TX);
udp_conf.use_udp6_rx_checksums =
!(flags & VXLAN_F_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_RX);
} else {
udp_conf.family = AF_INET;
udp_conf.local_ip.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
udp_conf.use_udp_checksums =
!!(flags & VXLAN_F_UDP_CSUM);
}
udp_conf.local_udp_port = port;
/* Open UDP socket */
err = udp_sock_create(net, &udp_conf, &sock);
if (err < 0)
return ERR_PTR(err);
return sock;
}
/* Create new listen socket if needed */
static struct vxlan_sock *vxlan_socket_create(struct net *net, __be16 port,
vxlan_rcv_t *rcv, void *data,
u32 flags)
{
struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(net, vxlan_net_id);
struct vxlan_sock *vs;
struct socket *sock;
unsigned int h;
bool ipv6 = !!(flags & VXLAN_F_IPV6);
struct udp_tunnel_sock_cfg tunnel_cfg;
vs = kzalloc(sizeof(*vs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vs)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
for (h = 0; h < VNI_HASH_SIZE; ++h)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&vs->vni_list[h]);
INIT_WORK(&vs->del_work, vxlan_del_work);
sock = vxlan_create_sock(net, ipv6, port, flags);
if (IS_ERR(sock)) {
kfree(vs);
return ERR_CAST(sock);
}
vs->sock = sock;
atomic_set(&vs->refcnt, 1);
vs->rcv = rcv;
vs->data = data;
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
vs->flags = flags;
/* Initialize the vxlan udp offloads structure */
vs->udp_offloads.port = port;
vs->udp_offloads.callbacks.gro_receive = vxlan_gro_receive;
vs->udp_offloads.callbacks.gro_complete = vxlan_gro_complete;
spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&vs->hlist, vs_head(net, port));
vxlan_notify_add_rx_port(vs);
spin_unlock(&vn->sock_lock);
/* Mark socket as an encapsulation socket. */
tunnel_cfg.sk_user_data = vs;
tunnel_cfg.encap_type = 1;
tunnel_cfg.encap_rcv = vxlan_udp_encap_recv;
tunnel_cfg.encap_destroy = NULL;
setup_udp_tunnel_sock(net, sock, &tunnel_cfg);
return vs;
}
struct vxlan_sock *vxlan_sock_add(struct net *net, __be16 port,
vxlan_rcv_t *rcv, void *data,
bool no_share, u32 flags)
{
struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(net, vxlan_net_id);
struct vxlan_sock *vs;
bool ipv6 = flags & VXLAN_F_IPV6;
vs = vxlan_socket_create(net, port, rcv, data, flags);
if (!IS_ERR(vs))
return vs;
if (no_share) /* Return error if sharing is not allowed. */
return vs;
spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock);
vs = vxlan_find_sock(net, ipv6 ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET, port, flags);
if (vs && ((vs->rcv != rcv) ||
!atomic_add_unless(&vs->refcnt, 1, 0)))
vs = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
spin_unlock(&vn->sock_lock);
if (!vs)
vs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
return vs;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vxlan_sock_add);
/* Scheduled at device creation to bind to a socket */
static void vxlan_sock_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = container_of(work, struct vxlan_dev, sock_work);
struct net *net = vxlan->net;
struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(net, vxlan_net_id);
__be16 port = vxlan->dst_port;
struct vxlan_sock *nvs;
nvs = vxlan_sock_add(net, port, vxlan_rcv, NULL, false, vxlan->flags);
spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock);
if (!IS_ERR(nvs))
vxlan_vs_add_dev(nvs, vxlan);
spin_unlock(&vn->sock_lock);
dev_put(vxlan->dev);
}
static int vxlan_newlink(struct net *net, struct net_device *dev,
struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[])
{
struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(net, vxlan_net_id);
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
struct vxlan_rdst *dst = &vxlan->default_dst;
__u32 vni;
int err;
bool use_ipv6 = false;
if (!data[IFLA_VXLAN_ID])
return -EINVAL;
vxlan->net = dev_net(dev);
vni = nla_get_u32(data[IFLA_VXLAN_ID]);
dst->remote_vni = vni;
net: vxlan: fix crash when interface is created with no group If the vxlan interface is created without explicit group definition, there are corner cases which may cause kernel panic. For instance, in the following scenario: node A: $ ip link add dev vxlan42 address 2c:c2:60:00:10:20 type vxlan id 42 $ ip addr add dev vxlan42 10.0.0.1/24 $ ip link set up dev vxlan42 $ arp -i vxlan42 -s 10.0.0.2 2c:c2:60:00:01:02 $ bridge fdb add dev vxlan42 to 2c:c2:60:00:01:02 dst <IPv4 address> $ ping 10.0.0.2 node B: $ ip link add dev vxlan42 address 2c:c2:60:00:01:02 type vxlan id 42 $ ip addr add dev vxlan42 10.0.0.2/24 $ ip link set up dev vxlan42 $ arp -i vxlan42 -s 10.0.0.1 2c:c2:60:00:10:20 node B crashes: vxlan42: 2c:c2:60:00:10:20 migrated from 4011:eca4:c0a8:6466:c0a8:6415:8e09:2118 to (invalid address) vxlan42: 2c:c2:60:00:10:20 migrated from 4011:eca4:c0a8:6466:c0a8:6415:8e09:2118 to (invalid address) BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000046 IP: [<ffffffff8143c459>] ip6_route_output+0x58/0x82 PGD 7bd89067 PUD 7bd4e067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 3.14.0-rc8-hvx-xen-00019-g97a5221-dirty #154 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88007c774f50 ti: ffff88007c79c000 task.ti: ffff88007c79c000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8143c459>] [<ffffffff8143c459>] ip6_route_output+0x58/0x82 RSP: 0018:ffff88007fd03668 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8186a000 RCX: 0000000000000040 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88007b0e4a80 RDI: ffff88007fd03754 RBP: ffff88007fd03688 R08: ffff88007b0e4a80 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0200000a0100000a R11: 0001002200000000 R12: ffff88007fd03740 R13: ffff88007b0e4a80 R14: ffff88007b0e4a80 R15: ffff88007bba0c50 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000000000000046 CR3: 000000007bb60000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: 0000000000000000 ffff88007fd037a0 ffffffff8186a000 ffff88007fd03740 ffff88007fd036c8 ffffffff814320bb 0000000000006e49 ffff88007b8b7360 ffff88007bdbf200 ffff88007bcbc000 ffff88007b8b7000 ffff88007b8b7360 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff814320bb>] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x2d/0xa4 [<ffffffff814322a5>] ip6_dst_lookup+0x10/0x12 [<ffffffff81323b4e>] vxlan_xmit_one+0x32a/0x68c [<ffffffff814a325a>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x12/0x14 [<ffffffff8104c551>] ? lock_timer_base.isra.23+0x26/0x4b [<ffffffff8132451a>] vxlan_xmit+0x66a/0x6a8 [<ffffffff8141a365>] ? ipt_do_table+0x35f/0x37e [<ffffffff81204ba2>] ? selinux_ip_postroute+0x41/0x26e [<ffffffff8139d0c1>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x2ce/0x3ce [<ffffffff8139d491>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x2d0/0x392 [<ffffffff813b380f>] ? eth_header+0x28/0xb5 [<ffffffff8139d569>] dev_queue_xmit+0xb/0xd [<ffffffff813a5aa6>] neigh_resolve_output+0x134/0x152 [<ffffffff813db741>] ip_finish_output2+0x236/0x299 [<ffffffff813dc074>] ip_finish_output+0x98/0x9d [<ffffffff813dc749>] ip_output+0x62/0x67 [<ffffffff813da9f2>] dst_output+0xf/0x11 [<ffffffff813dc11c>] ip_local_out+0x1b/0x1f [<ffffffff813dcf1b>] ip_send_skb+0x11/0x37 [<ffffffff813dcf70>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x2f/0x33 [<ffffffff813ff732>] icmp_push_reply+0x106/0x115 [<ffffffff813ff9e4>] icmp_reply+0x142/0x164 [<ffffffff813ffb3b>] icmp_echo.part.16+0x46/0x48 [<ffffffff813c1d30>] ? nf_iterate+0x43/0x80 [<ffffffff813d8037>] ? xfrm4_policy_check.constprop.11+0x52/0x52 [<ffffffff813ffb62>] icmp_echo+0x25/0x27 [<ffffffff814005f7>] icmp_rcv+0x1d2/0x20a [<ffffffff813d8037>] ? xfrm4_policy_check.constprop.11+0x52/0x52 [<ffffffff813d810d>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xd6/0x14f [<ffffffff813d8037>] ? xfrm4_policy_check.constprop.11+0x52/0x52 [<ffffffff813d7fde>] NF_HOOK.constprop.10+0x4c/0x53 [<ffffffff813d82bf>] ip_local_deliver+0x4a/0x4f [<ffffffff813d7f7b>] ip_rcv_finish+0x253/0x26a [<ffffffff813d7d28>] ? inet_add_protocol+0x3e/0x3e [<ffffffff813d7fde>] NF_HOOK.constprop.10+0x4c/0x53 [<ffffffff813d856a>] ip_rcv+0x2a6/0x2ec [<ffffffff8139a9a0>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x43e/0x478 [<ffffffff812a346f>] ? virtqueue_poll+0x16/0x27 [<ffffffff8139aa2f>] __netif_receive_skb+0x55/0x5a [<ffffffff8139aaaa>] process_backlog+0x76/0x12f [<ffffffff8139add8>] net_rx_action+0xa2/0x1ab [<ffffffff81047847>] __do_softirq+0xca/0x1d1 [<ffffffff81047ace>] irq_exit+0x3e/0x85 [<ffffffff8100b98b>] do_IRQ+0xa9/0xc4 [<ffffffff814a37ad>] common_interrupt+0x6d/0x6d <EOI> [<ffffffff810378db>] ? native_safe_halt+0x6/0x8 [<ffffffff810110c7>] default_idle+0x9/0xd [<ffffffff81011694>] arch_cpu_idle+0x13/0x1c [<ffffffff8107480d>] cpu_startup_entry+0xbc/0x137 [<ffffffff8102e741>] start_secondary+0x1a0/0x1a5 Code: 24 14 e8 f1 e5 01 00 31 d2 a8 32 0f 95 c2 49 8b 44 24 2c 49 0b 44 24 24 74 05 83 ca 04 eb 1c 4d 85 ed 74 17 49 8b 85 a8 02 00 00 <66> 8b 40 46 66 c1 e8 07 83 e0 07 c1 e0 03 09 c2 4c 89 e6 48 89 RIP [<ffffffff8143c459>] ip6_route_output+0x58/0x82 RSP <ffff88007fd03668> CR2: 0000000000000046 ---[ end trace 4612329caab37efd ]--- When vxlan interface is created without explicit group definition, the default_dst protocol family is initialiazed to AF_UNSPEC and the driver assumes IPv4 configuration. On the other side, the default_dst protocol family is used to differentiate between IPv4 and IPv6 cases and, since, AF_UNSPEC != AF_INET, the processing takes the IPv6 path. Making the IPv4 assumption explicit by settting default_dst protocol family to AF_INET4 and preventing mixing of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in snooped fdb entries fixes the corner case crashes. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <mike.rapoport@ravellosystems.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-01 14:23:01 +08:00
/* Unless IPv6 is explicitly requested, assume IPv4 */
dst->remote_ip.sa.sa_family = AF_INET;
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_GROUP]) {
dst->remote_ip.sin.sin_addr.s_addr = nla_get_be32(data[IFLA_VXLAN_GROUP]);
} else if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_GROUP6]) {
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6))
return -EPFNOSUPPORT;
nla_memcpy(&dst->remote_ip.sin6.sin6_addr, data[IFLA_VXLAN_GROUP6],
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
dst->remote_ip.sa.sa_family = AF_INET6;
use_ipv6 = true;
}
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_LOCAL]) {
vxlan->saddr.sin.sin_addr.s_addr = nla_get_be32(data[IFLA_VXLAN_LOCAL]);
vxlan->saddr.sa.sa_family = AF_INET;
} else if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_LOCAL6]) {
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6))
return -EPFNOSUPPORT;
/* TODO: respect scope id */
nla_memcpy(&vxlan->saddr.sin6.sin6_addr, data[IFLA_VXLAN_LOCAL6],
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
vxlan->saddr.sa.sa_family = AF_INET6;
use_ipv6 = true;
}
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_LINK] &&
(dst->remote_ifindex = nla_get_u32(data[IFLA_VXLAN_LINK]))) {
struct net_device *lowerdev
= __dev_get_by_index(net, dst->remote_ifindex);
if (!lowerdev) {
pr_info("ifindex %d does not exist\n", dst->remote_ifindex);
return -ENODEV;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
if (use_ipv6) {
struct inet6_dev *idev = __in6_dev_get(lowerdev);
if (idev && idev->cnf.disable_ipv6) {
pr_info("IPv6 is disabled via sysctl\n");
return -EPERM;
}
vxlan->flags |= VXLAN_F_IPV6;
}
#endif
if (!tb[IFLA_MTU])
dev->mtu = lowerdev->mtu - (use_ipv6 ? VXLAN6_HEADROOM : VXLAN_HEADROOM);
dev->needed_headroom = lowerdev->hard_header_len +
(use_ipv6 ? VXLAN6_HEADROOM : VXLAN_HEADROOM);
{vxlan, inet6} Mark vxlan_dev flags with VXLAN_F_IPV6 properly Even if user doesn't supply the physical netdev to attach vxlan dev to, and at the same time user want to vxlan sit top of IPv6, mark vxlan_dev flags with VXLAN_F_IPV6 to create IPv6 based socket. Otherwise kernel crashes safely every time spitting below messages, Steps to reproduce: ip link add vxlan0 type vxlan id 42 group ff0e::110 ip link set vxlan0 up [ 62.656266] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference[ 62.656320] ip (3008) used greatest stack depth: 3912 bytes left at 0000000000000046 [ 62.656423] IP: [<ffffffff816d822d>] ip6_route_output+0xbd/0xe0 [ 62.656525] PGD 2c966067 PUD 2c9a2067 PMD 0 [ 62.656674] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 62.656781] Modules linked in: vxlan netconsole deflate zlib_deflate af_key [ 62.657083] CPU: 1 PID: 2128 Comm: whoopsie Not tainted 3.12.0+ #182 [ 62.657083] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 62.657083] task: ffff88002e2335d0 ti: ffff88002c94c000 task.ti: ffff88002c94c000 [ 62.657083] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816d822d>] [<ffffffff816d822d>] ip6_route_output+0xbd/0xe0 [ 62.657083] RSP: 0000:ffff88002fd038f8 EFLAGS: 00210296 [ 62.657083] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88002fd039e0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 62.657083] RDX: ffff88002fd0eb68 RSI: ffff88002fd0d278 RDI: ffff88002fd0d278 [ 62.657083] RBP: ffff88002fd03918 R08: 0000000002000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 62.657083] R10: 00000000000001ff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 62.657083] R13: ffff88002d96b480 R14: ffffffff81c8e2c0 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 62.657083] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88002fd00000(0063) knlGS:00000000f693b740 [ 62.657083] CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 62.657083] CR2: 0000000000000046 CR3: 000000002c9d2000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 62.657083] Stack: [ 62.657083] ffff88002fd03a40 ffffffff81c8e2c0 ffff88002fd039e0 ffff88002d96b480 [ 62.657083] ffff88002fd03958 ffffffff816cac8b ffff880019277cc0 ffff8800192b5d00 [ 62.657083] ffff88002d5bc000 ffff880019277cc0 0000000000001821 0000000000000001 [ 62.657083] Call Trace: [ 62.657083] <IRQ> [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff816cac8b>] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0xdb/0xf0 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff816caea0>] ip6_dst_lookup+0x10/0x20 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffffa0020c13>] vxlan_xmit_one+0x193/0x9c0 [vxlan] [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff8137b3b7>] ? account+0xc7/0x1f0 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffffa0021513>] vxlan_xmit+0xd3/0x400 [vxlan] [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff8161390d>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x49d/0x5e0 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff81613d29>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2d9/0x480 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff817cb854>] ? _raw_write_unlock_bh+0x14/0x20 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff81630565>] ? eth_header+0x35/0xe0 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff8161bc5e>] neigh_resolve_output+0x11e/0x1e0 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff816ce0e0>] ? ip6_fragment+0xad0/0xad0 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff816cb465>] ip6_finish_output2+0x2f5/0x470 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff816ce166>] ip6_finish_output+0x86/0xc0 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff816ce218>] ip6_output+0x78/0xb0 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff816eadd6>] mld_sendpack+0x256/0x2a0 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff816ebd8c>] mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x17c/0x290 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff816ebc10>] ? igmp6_timer_handler+0x80/0x80 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff816ebc10>] ? igmp6_timer_handler+0x80/0x80 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff81051065>] call_timer_fn+0x45/0x150 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff816ebc10>] ? igmp6_timer_handler+0x80/0x80 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff81052353>] run_timer_softirq+0x1f3/0x2a0 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff8102dfd8>] ? lapic_next_event+0x18/0x20 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff8109e36f>] ? clockevents_program_event+0x6f/0x110 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff8104a2f6>] __do_softirq+0xd6/0x2b0 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff8104a75e>] irq_exit+0x7e/0xa0 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff8102ea15>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x45/0x60 [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff817d3eca>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x6a/0x70 [ 62.657083] <EOI> [ 62.657083] [<ffffffff817d4a35>] ? sysenter_dispatch+0x7/0x1a [ 62.657083] Code: 4d 8b 85 a8 02 00 00 4c 89 e9 ba 03 04 00 00 48 c7 c6 c0 be 8d 81 48 c7 c7 48 35 a3 81 31 c0 e8 db 68 0e 00 49 8b 85 a8 02 00 00 <0f> b6 40 46 c0 e8 05 0f b6 c0 c1 e0 03 41 09 c4 e9 77 ff ff ff [ 62.657083] RIP [<ffffffff816d822d>] ip6_route_output+0xbd/0xe0 [ 62.657083] RSP <ffff88002fd038f8> [ 62.657083] CR2: 0000000000000046 [ 62.657083] ---[ end trace ba8a9583d7cd1934 ]--- [ 62.657083] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> Reported-by: Ryan Whelan <rcwhelan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-03 10:18:58 +08:00
} else if (use_ipv6)
vxlan->flags |= VXLAN_F_IPV6;
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_TOS])
vxlan->tos = nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_VXLAN_TOS]);
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_TTL])
vxlan->ttl = nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_VXLAN_TTL]);
if (!data[IFLA_VXLAN_LEARNING] || nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_VXLAN_LEARNING]))
vxlan->flags |= VXLAN_F_LEARN;
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_AGEING])
vxlan->age_interval = nla_get_u32(data[IFLA_VXLAN_AGEING]);
else
vxlan->age_interval = FDB_AGE_DEFAULT;
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_PROXY] && nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_VXLAN_PROXY]))
vxlan->flags |= VXLAN_F_PROXY;
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_RSC] && nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_VXLAN_RSC]))
vxlan->flags |= VXLAN_F_RSC;
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_L2MISS] && nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_VXLAN_L2MISS]))
vxlan->flags |= VXLAN_F_L2MISS;
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_L3MISS] && nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_VXLAN_L3MISS]))
vxlan->flags |= VXLAN_F_L3MISS;
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_LIMIT])
vxlan->addrmax = nla_get_u32(data[IFLA_VXLAN_LIMIT]);
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_PORT_RANGE]) {
const struct ifla_vxlan_port_range *p
= nla_data(data[IFLA_VXLAN_PORT_RANGE]);
vxlan->port_min = ntohs(p->low);
vxlan->port_max = ntohs(p->high);
}
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_PORT])
vxlan->dst_port = nla_get_be16(data[IFLA_VXLAN_PORT]);
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_UDP_CSUM] && nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_VXLAN_UDP_CSUM]))
vxlan->flags |= VXLAN_F_UDP_CSUM;
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_TX] &&
nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_VXLAN_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_TX]))
vxlan->flags |= VXLAN_F_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_TX;
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_RX] &&
nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_VXLAN_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_RX]))
vxlan->flags |= VXLAN_F_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_RX;
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_REMCSUM_TX] &&
nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_VXLAN_REMCSUM_TX]))
vxlan->flags |= VXLAN_F_REMCSUM_TX;
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_REMCSUM_RX] &&
nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_VXLAN_REMCSUM_RX]))
vxlan->flags |= VXLAN_F_REMCSUM_RX;
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_GBP])
vxlan->flags |= VXLAN_F_GBP;
if (vxlan_find_vni(net, vni, use_ipv6 ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET,
vxlan->dst_port, vxlan->flags)) {
pr_info("duplicate VNI %u\n", vni);
return -EEXIST;
}
dev->ethtool_ops = &vxlan_ethtool_ops;
/* create an fdb entry for a valid default destination */
if (!vxlan_addr_any(&vxlan->default_dst.remote_ip)) {
err = vxlan_fdb_create(vxlan, all_zeros_mac,
&vxlan->default_dst.remote_ip,
NUD_REACHABLE|NUD_PERMANENT,
NLM_F_EXCL|NLM_F_CREATE,
vxlan->dst_port,
vxlan->default_dst.remote_vni,
vxlan->default_dst.remote_ifindex,
NTF_SELF);
if (err)
return err;
}
err = register_netdevice(dev);
if (err) {
vxlan_fdb_delete_default(vxlan);
return err;
}
list_add(&vxlan->next, &vn->vxlan_list);
return 0;
}
static void vxlan_dellink(struct net_device *dev, struct list_head *head)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(vxlan->net, vxlan_net_id);
spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock);
if (!hlist_unhashed(&vxlan->hlist))
hlist_del_rcu(&vxlan->hlist);
spin_unlock(&vn->sock_lock);
list_del(&vxlan->next);
unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, head);
}
static size_t vxlan_get_size(const struct net_device *dev)
{
return nla_total_size(sizeof(__u32)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_ID */
nla_total_size(sizeof(struct in6_addr)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_GROUP{6} */
nla_total_size(sizeof(__u32)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_LINK */
nla_total_size(sizeof(struct in6_addr)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_LOCAL{6} */
nla_total_size(sizeof(__u8)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_TTL */
nla_total_size(sizeof(__u8)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_TOS */
nla_total_size(sizeof(__u8)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_LEARNING */
nla_total_size(sizeof(__u8)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_PROXY */
nla_total_size(sizeof(__u8)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_RSC */
nla_total_size(sizeof(__u8)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_L2MISS */
nla_total_size(sizeof(__u8)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_L3MISS */
nla_total_size(sizeof(__u32)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_AGEING */
nla_total_size(sizeof(__u32)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_LIMIT */
nla_total_size(sizeof(struct ifla_vxlan_port_range)) +
nla_total_size(sizeof(__be16)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_PORT */
nla_total_size(sizeof(__u8)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_UDP_CSUM */
nla_total_size(sizeof(__u8)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_TX */
nla_total_size(sizeof(__u8)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_RX */
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
nla_total_size(sizeof(__u8)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_REMCSUM_TX */
nla_total_size(sizeof(__u8)) + /* IFLA_VXLAN_REMCSUM_RX */
0;
}
static int vxlan_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *dev)
{
const struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
const struct vxlan_rdst *dst = &vxlan->default_dst;
struct ifla_vxlan_port_range ports = {
.low = htons(vxlan->port_min),
.high = htons(vxlan->port_max),
};
if (nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_ID, dst->remote_vni))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (!vxlan_addr_any(&dst->remote_ip)) {
if (dst->remote_ip.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
if (nla_put_be32(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_GROUP,
dst->remote_ip.sin.sin_addr.s_addr))
goto nla_put_failure;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else {
if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_GROUP6, sizeof(struct in6_addr),
&dst->remote_ip.sin6.sin6_addr))
goto nla_put_failure;
#endif
}
}
if (dst->remote_ifindex && nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_LINK, dst->remote_ifindex))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (!vxlan_addr_any(&vxlan->saddr)) {
if (vxlan->saddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
if (nla_put_be32(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_LOCAL,
vxlan->saddr.sin.sin_addr.s_addr))
goto nla_put_failure;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else {
if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_LOCAL6, sizeof(struct in6_addr),
&vxlan->saddr.sin6.sin6_addr))
goto nla_put_failure;
#endif
}
}
if (nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_TTL, vxlan->ttl) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_TOS, vxlan->tos) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_LEARNING,
!!(vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_LEARN)) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_PROXY,
!!(vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_PROXY)) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_RSC, !!(vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_RSC)) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_L2MISS,
!!(vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_L2MISS)) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_L3MISS,
!!(vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_L3MISS)) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_AGEING, vxlan->age_interval) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_LIMIT, vxlan->addrmax) ||
nla_put_be16(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_PORT, vxlan->dst_port) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_UDP_CSUM,
!!(vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_UDP_CSUM)) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_TX,
!!(vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_TX)) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_RX,
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
!!(vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_RX)) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_REMCSUM_TX,
!!(vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_REMCSUM_TX)) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_REMCSUM_RX,
!!(vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_REMCSUM_RX)))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_PORT_RANGE, sizeof(ports), &ports))
goto nla_put_failure;
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
if (vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_GBP &&
nla_put_flag(skb, IFLA_VXLAN_GBP))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
static struct net *vxlan_get_link_net(const struct net_device *dev)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
return vxlan->net;
}
static struct rtnl_link_ops vxlan_link_ops __read_mostly = {
.kind = "vxlan",
.maxtype = IFLA_VXLAN_MAX,
.policy = vxlan_policy,
.priv_size = sizeof(struct vxlan_dev),
.setup = vxlan_setup,
.validate = vxlan_validate,
.newlink = vxlan_newlink,
.dellink = vxlan_dellink,
.get_size = vxlan_get_size,
.fill_info = vxlan_fill_info,
.get_link_net = vxlan_get_link_net,
};
net: vxlan: when lower dev unregisters remove vxlan dev as well We can create a vxlan device with an explicit underlying carrier. In that case, when the carrier link is being deleted from the system (e.g. due to module unload) we should also clean up all created vxlan devices on top of it since otherwise we're in an inconsistent state in vxlan device. In that case, the user needs to remove all such devices, while in case of other virtual devs that sit on top of physical ones, it is usually the case that these devices do unregister automatically as well and do not leave the burden on the user. This work is not necessary when vxlan device was not created with a real underlying device, as connections can resume in that case when driver is plugged again. But at least for the other cases, we should go ahead and do the cleanup on removal. We don't register the notifier during vxlan_newlink() here since I consider this event rather rare, and therefore we should not bloat vxlan's core structure unecessary. Also, we can simply make use of unregister_netdevice_many() to batch that. fdb is flushed upon ndo_stop(). E.g. `ip -d link show vxlan13` after carrier removal before this patch: 5: vxlan13: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1450 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default link/ether 1e:47:da:6d:4d:99 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff promiscuity 0 vxlan id 13 group 239.0.0.10 dev 2 port 32768 61000 ageing 300 ^^^^^ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-14 01:41:19 +08:00
static void vxlan_handle_lowerdev_unregister(struct vxlan_net *vn,
struct net_device *dev)
{
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan, *next;
LIST_HEAD(list_kill);
list_for_each_entry_safe(vxlan, next, &vn->vxlan_list, next) {
struct vxlan_rdst *dst = &vxlan->default_dst;
/* In case we created vxlan device with carrier
* and we loose the carrier due to module unload
* we also need to remove vxlan device. In other
* cases, it's not necessary and remote_ifindex
* is 0 here, so no matches.
*/
if (dst->remote_ifindex == dev->ifindex)
vxlan_dellink(vxlan->dev, &list_kill);
}
unregister_netdevice_many(&list_kill);
}
static int vxlan_lowerdev_event(struct notifier_block *unused,
unsigned long event, void *ptr)
{
struct net_device *dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr);
struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(dev_net(dev), vxlan_net_id);
net: vxlan: when lower dev unregisters remove vxlan dev as well We can create a vxlan device with an explicit underlying carrier. In that case, when the carrier link is being deleted from the system (e.g. due to module unload) we should also clean up all created vxlan devices on top of it since otherwise we're in an inconsistent state in vxlan device. In that case, the user needs to remove all such devices, while in case of other virtual devs that sit on top of physical ones, it is usually the case that these devices do unregister automatically as well and do not leave the burden on the user. This work is not necessary when vxlan device was not created with a real underlying device, as connections can resume in that case when driver is plugged again. But at least for the other cases, we should go ahead and do the cleanup on removal. We don't register the notifier during vxlan_newlink() here since I consider this event rather rare, and therefore we should not bloat vxlan's core structure unecessary. Also, we can simply make use of unregister_netdevice_many() to batch that. fdb is flushed upon ndo_stop(). E.g. `ip -d link show vxlan13` after carrier removal before this patch: 5: vxlan13: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1450 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default link/ether 1e:47:da:6d:4d:99 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff promiscuity 0 vxlan id 13 group 239.0.0.10 dev 2 port 32768 61000 ageing 300 ^^^^^ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-14 01:41:19 +08:00
if (event == NETDEV_UNREGISTER)
net: vxlan: when lower dev unregisters remove vxlan dev as well We can create a vxlan device with an explicit underlying carrier. In that case, when the carrier link is being deleted from the system (e.g. due to module unload) we should also clean up all created vxlan devices on top of it since otherwise we're in an inconsistent state in vxlan device. In that case, the user needs to remove all such devices, while in case of other virtual devs that sit on top of physical ones, it is usually the case that these devices do unregister automatically as well and do not leave the burden on the user. This work is not necessary when vxlan device was not created with a real underlying device, as connections can resume in that case when driver is plugged again. But at least for the other cases, we should go ahead and do the cleanup on removal. We don't register the notifier during vxlan_newlink() here since I consider this event rather rare, and therefore we should not bloat vxlan's core structure unecessary. Also, we can simply make use of unregister_netdevice_many() to batch that. fdb is flushed upon ndo_stop(). E.g. `ip -d link show vxlan13` after carrier removal before this patch: 5: vxlan13: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1450 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default link/ether 1e:47:da:6d:4d:99 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff promiscuity 0 vxlan id 13 group 239.0.0.10 dev 2 port 32768 61000 ageing 300 ^^^^^ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-14 01:41:19 +08:00
vxlan_handle_lowerdev_unregister(vn, dev);
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
static struct notifier_block vxlan_notifier_block __read_mostly = {
.notifier_call = vxlan_lowerdev_event,
};
static __net_init int vxlan_init_net(struct net *net)
{
struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(net, vxlan_net_id);
unsigned int h;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vn->vxlan_list);
spin_lock_init(&vn->sock_lock);
for (h = 0; h < PORT_HASH_SIZE; ++h)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&vn->sock_list[h]);
return 0;
}
static void __net_exit vxlan_exit_net(struct net *net)
{
struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(net, vxlan_net_id);
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan, *next;
struct net_device *dev, *aux;
LIST_HEAD(list);
rtnl_lock();
for_each_netdev_safe(net, dev, aux)
if (dev->rtnl_link_ops == &vxlan_link_ops)
unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, &list);
list_for_each_entry_safe(vxlan, next, &vn->vxlan_list, next) {
/* If vxlan->dev is in the same netns, it has already been added
* to the list by the previous loop.
*/
if (!net_eq(dev_net(vxlan->dev), net))
unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, &list);
}
unregister_netdevice_many(&list);
rtnl_unlock();
}
static struct pernet_operations vxlan_net_ops = {
.init = vxlan_init_net,
.exit = vxlan_exit_net,
.id = &vxlan_net_id,
.size = sizeof(struct vxlan_net),
};
static int __init vxlan_init_module(void)
{
int rc;
vxlan_wq = alloc_workqueue("vxlan", 0, 0);
if (!vxlan_wq)
return -ENOMEM;
get_random_bytes(&vxlan_salt, sizeof(vxlan_salt));
rc = register_pernet_subsys(&vxlan_net_ops);
if (rc)
goto out1;
net: vxlan: when lower dev unregisters remove vxlan dev as well We can create a vxlan device with an explicit underlying carrier. In that case, when the carrier link is being deleted from the system (e.g. due to module unload) we should also clean up all created vxlan devices on top of it since otherwise we're in an inconsistent state in vxlan device. In that case, the user needs to remove all such devices, while in case of other virtual devs that sit on top of physical ones, it is usually the case that these devices do unregister automatically as well and do not leave the burden on the user. This work is not necessary when vxlan device was not created with a real underlying device, as connections can resume in that case when driver is plugged again. But at least for the other cases, we should go ahead and do the cleanup on removal. We don't register the notifier during vxlan_newlink() here since I consider this event rather rare, and therefore we should not bloat vxlan's core structure unecessary. Also, we can simply make use of unregister_netdevice_many() to batch that. fdb is flushed upon ndo_stop(). E.g. `ip -d link show vxlan13` after carrier removal before this patch: 5: vxlan13: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1450 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default link/ether 1e:47:da:6d:4d:99 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff promiscuity 0 vxlan id 13 group 239.0.0.10 dev 2 port 32768 61000 ageing 300 ^^^^^ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-14 01:41:19 +08:00
rc = register_netdevice_notifier(&vxlan_notifier_block);
if (rc)
goto out2;
net: vxlan: when lower dev unregisters remove vxlan dev as well We can create a vxlan device with an explicit underlying carrier. In that case, when the carrier link is being deleted from the system (e.g. due to module unload) we should also clean up all created vxlan devices on top of it since otherwise we're in an inconsistent state in vxlan device. In that case, the user needs to remove all such devices, while in case of other virtual devs that sit on top of physical ones, it is usually the case that these devices do unregister automatically as well and do not leave the burden on the user. This work is not necessary when vxlan device was not created with a real underlying device, as connections can resume in that case when driver is plugged again. But at least for the other cases, we should go ahead and do the cleanup on removal. We don't register the notifier during vxlan_newlink() here since I consider this event rather rare, and therefore we should not bloat vxlan's core structure unecessary. Also, we can simply make use of unregister_netdevice_many() to batch that. fdb is flushed upon ndo_stop(). E.g. `ip -d link show vxlan13` after carrier removal before this patch: 5: vxlan13: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1450 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default link/ether 1e:47:da:6d:4d:99 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff promiscuity 0 vxlan id 13 group 239.0.0.10 dev 2 port 32768 61000 ageing 300 ^^^^^ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-14 01:41:19 +08:00
rc = rtnl_link_register(&vxlan_link_ops);
if (rc)
goto out3;
net: vxlan: when lower dev unregisters remove vxlan dev as well We can create a vxlan device with an explicit underlying carrier. In that case, when the carrier link is being deleted from the system (e.g. due to module unload) we should also clean up all created vxlan devices on top of it since otherwise we're in an inconsistent state in vxlan device. In that case, the user needs to remove all such devices, while in case of other virtual devs that sit on top of physical ones, it is usually the case that these devices do unregister automatically as well and do not leave the burden on the user. This work is not necessary when vxlan device was not created with a real underlying device, as connections can resume in that case when driver is plugged again. But at least for the other cases, we should go ahead and do the cleanup on removal. We don't register the notifier during vxlan_newlink() here since I consider this event rather rare, and therefore we should not bloat vxlan's core structure unecessary. Also, we can simply make use of unregister_netdevice_many() to batch that. fdb is flushed upon ndo_stop(). E.g. `ip -d link show vxlan13` after carrier removal before this patch: 5: vxlan13: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1450 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default link/ether 1e:47:da:6d:4d:99 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff promiscuity 0 vxlan id 13 group 239.0.0.10 dev 2 port 32768 61000 ageing 300 ^^^^^ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-14 01:41:19 +08:00
return 0;
out3:
unregister_netdevice_notifier(&vxlan_notifier_block);
out2:
unregister_pernet_subsys(&vxlan_net_ops);
out1:
destroy_workqueue(vxlan_wq);
return rc;
}
late_initcall(vxlan_init_module);
static void __exit vxlan_cleanup_module(void)
{
rtnl_link_unregister(&vxlan_link_ops);
net: vxlan: when lower dev unregisters remove vxlan dev as well We can create a vxlan device with an explicit underlying carrier. In that case, when the carrier link is being deleted from the system (e.g. due to module unload) we should also clean up all created vxlan devices on top of it since otherwise we're in an inconsistent state in vxlan device. In that case, the user needs to remove all such devices, while in case of other virtual devs that sit on top of physical ones, it is usually the case that these devices do unregister automatically as well and do not leave the burden on the user. This work is not necessary when vxlan device was not created with a real underlying device, as connections can resume in that case when driver is plugged again. But at least for the other cases, we should go ahead and do the cleanup on removal. We don't register the notifier during vxlan_newlink() here since I consider this event rather rare, and therefore we should not bloat vxlan's core structure unecessary. Also, we can simply make use of unregister_netdevice_many() to batch that. fdb is flushed upon ndo_stop(). E.g. `ip -d link show vxlan13` after carrier removal before this patch: 5: vxlan13: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1450 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default link/ether 1e:47:da:6d:4d:99 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff promiscuity 0 vxlan id 13 group 239.0.0.10 dev 2 port 32768 61000 ageing 300 ^^^^^ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-14 01:41:19 +08:00
unregister_netdevice_notifier(&vxlan_notifier_block);
destroy_workqueue(vxlan_wq);
unregister_pernet_subsys(&vxlan_net_ops);
/* rcu_barrier() is called by netns */
}
module_exit(vxlan_cleanup_module);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_VERSION(VXLAN_VERSION);
MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Driver for VXLAN encapsulated traffic");
MODULE_ALIAS_RTNL_LINK("vxlan");