2019-06-03 13:44:50 +08:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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2015-07-06 19:23:54 +08:00
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/*
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* arm64 callchain support
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2015 ARM Limited
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*/
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#include <linux/perf_event.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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2018-12-08 02:39:27 +08:00
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#include <asm/pointer_auth.h>
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2015-07-06 19:23:54 +08:00
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#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
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struct frame_tail {
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struct frame_tail __user *fp;
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unsigned long lr;
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} __attribute__((packed));
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/*
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* Get the return address for a single stackframe and return a pointer to the
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* next frame tail.
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*/
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static struct frame_tail __user *
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user_backtrace(struct frame_tail __user *tail,
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2016-04-28 23:30:53 +08:00
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struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry)
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2015-07-06 19:23:54 +08:00
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{
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struct frame_tail buftail;
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unsigned long err;
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2018-12-08 02:39:27 +08:00
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unsigned long lr;
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2015-07-06 19:23:54 +08:00
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/* Also check accessibility of one struct frame_tail beyond */
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Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
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if (!access_ok(tail, sizeof(buftail)))
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2015-07-06 19:23:54 +08:00
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return NULL;
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pagefault_disable();
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err = __copy_from_user_inatomic(&buftail, tail, sizeof(buftail));
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pagefault_enable();
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if (err)
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return NULL;
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2018-12-08 02:39:27 +08:00
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lr = ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(buftail.lr);
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perf_callchain_store(entry, lr);
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2015-07-06 19:23:54 +08:00
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/*
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* Frame pointers should strictly progress back up the stack
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* (towards higher addresses).
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*/
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if (tail >= buftail.fp)
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return NULL;
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return buftail.fp;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
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/*
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* The registers we're interested in are at the end of the variable
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* length saved register structure. The fp points at the end of this
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* structure so the address of this struct is:
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* (struct compat_frame_tail *)(xxx->fp)-1
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*
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* This code has been adapted from the ARM OProfile support.
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*/
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struct compat_frame_tail {
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compat_uptr_t fp; /* a (struct compat_frame_tail *) in compat mode */
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u32 sp;
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u32 lr;
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} __attribute__((packed));
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static struct compat_frame_tail __user *
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compat_user_backtrace(struct compat_frame_tail __user *tail,
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2016-04-28 23:30:53 +08:00
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struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry)
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2015-07-06 19:23:54 +08:00
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{
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struct compat_frame_tail buftail;
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unsigned long err;
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/* Also check accessibility of one struct frame_tail beyond */
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Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
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if (!access_ok(tail, sizeof(buftail)))
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2015-07-06 19:23:54 +08:00
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return NULL;
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pagefault_disable();
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err = __copy_from_user_inatomic(&buftail, tail, sizeof(buftail));
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pagefault_enable();
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if (err)
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return NULL;
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perf_callchain_store(entry, buftail.lr);
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/*
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* Frame pointers should strictly progress back up the stack
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* (towards higher addresses).
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*/
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if (tail + 1 >= (struct compat_frame_tail __user *)
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compat_ptr(buftail.fp))
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return NULL;
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return (struct compat_frame_tail __user *)compat_ptr(buftail.fp) - 1;
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
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2016-04-28 23:30:53 +08:00
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void perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry,
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2015-07-06 19:23:54 +08:00
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struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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if (perf_guest_cbs && perf_guest_cbs->is_in_guest()) {
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/* We don't support guest os callchain now */
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return;
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}
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perf_callchain_store(entry, regs->pc);
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if (!compat_user_mode(regs)) {
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/* AARCH64 mode */
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struct frame_tail __user *tail;
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tail = (struct frame_tail __user *)regs->regs[29];
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perf core: Add a 'nr' field to perf_event_callchain_context
We will use it to count how many addresses are in the entry->ip[] array,
excluding PERF_CONTEXT_{KERNEL,USER,etc} entries, so that we can really
return the number of entries specified by the user via the relevant
sysctl, kernel.perf_event_max_contexts, or via the per event
perf_event_attr.sample_max_stack knob.
This way we keep the perf_sample->ip_callchain->nr meaning, that is the
number of entries, be it real addresses or PERF_CONTEXT_ entries, while
honouring the max_stack knobs, i.e. the end result will be max_stack
entries if we have at least that many entries in a given stack trace.
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-s8teto51tdqvlfhefndtat9r@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
2016-05-11 05:08:32 +08:00
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while (entry->nr < entry->max_stack &&
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2015-07-06 19:23:54 +08:00
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tail && !((unsigned long)tail & 0xf))
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tail = user_backtrace(tail, entry);
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} else {
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#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
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/* AARCH32 compat mode */
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struct compat_frame_tail __user *tail;
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tail = (struct compat_frame_tail __user *)regs->compat_fp - 1;
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perf core: Add a 'nr' field to perf_event_callchain_context
We will use it to count how many addresses are in the entry->ip[] array,
excluding PERF_CONTEXT_{KERNEL,USER,etc} entries, so that we can really
return the number of entries specified by the user via the relevant
sysctl, kernel.perf_event_max_contexts, or via the per event
perf_event_attr.sample_max_stack knob.
This way we keep the perf_sample->ip_callchain->nr meaning, that is the
number of entries, be it real addresses or PERF_CONTEXT_ entries, while
honouring the max_stack knobs, i.e. the end result will be max_stack
entries if we have at least that many entries in a given stack trace.
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-s8teto51tdqvlfhefndtat9r@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
2016-05-11 05:08:32 +08:00
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while ((entry->nr < entry->max_stack) &&
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2015-07-06 19:23:54 +08:00
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tail && !((unsigned long)tail & 0x3))
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tail = compat_user_backtrace(tail, entry);
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#endif
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}
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}
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/*
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* Gets called by walk_stackframe() for every stackframe. This will be called
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* whist unwinding the stackframe and is like a subroutine return so we use
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* the PC.
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*/
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static int callchain_trace(struct stackframe *frame, void *data)
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{
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2016-04-28 23:30:53 +08:00
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struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry = data;
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2015-07-06 19:23:54 +08:00
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perf_callchain_store(entry, frame->pc);
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return 0;
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}
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2016-04-28 23:30:53 +08:00
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void perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry,
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2015-07-06 19:23:54 +08:00
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struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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struct stackframe frame;
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if (perf_guest_cbs && perf_guest_cbs->is_in_guest()) {
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/* We don't support guest os callchain now */
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return;
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}
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2019-07-02 21:07:28 +08:00
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start_backtrace(&frame, regs->regs[29], regs->pc);
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2015-12-15 16:33:40 +08:00
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walk_stackframe(current, &frame, callchain_trace, entry);
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2015-07-06 19:23:54 +08:00
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}
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unsigned long perf_instruction_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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if (perf_guest_cbs && perf_guest_cbs->is_in_guest())
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return perf_guest_cbs->get_guest_ip();
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return instruction_pointer(regs);
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}
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unsigned long perf_misc_flags(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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int misc = 0;
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if (perf_guest_cbs && perf_guest_cbs->is_in_guest()) {
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if (perf_guest_cbs->is_user_mode())
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misc |= PERF_RECORD_MISC_GUEST_USER;
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else
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misc |= PERF_RECORD_MISC_GUEST_KERNEL;
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} else {
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if (user_mode(regs))
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misc |= PERF_RECORD_MISC_USER;
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else
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misc |= PERF_RECORD_MISC_KERNEL;
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}
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return misc;
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}
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