linux/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c

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/*
* a.out loader for x86-64
*
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992, 1996 Linus Torvalds
* Hacked together by Andi Kleen
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/a.out.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/stat.h>
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/user.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/user32.h>
#include <asm/ia32.h>
#undef WARN_OLD
#undef CORE_DUMP /* definitely broken */
static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *);
static int load_aout_library(struct file *);
#ifdef CORE_DUMP
static int aout_core_dump(long signr, struct pt_regs *regs, struct file *file,
unsigned long limit);
/*
* fill in the user structure for a core dump..
*/
static void dump_thread32(struct pt_regs *regs, struct user32 *dump)
{
u32 fs, gs;
/* changed the size calculations - should hopefully work better. lbt */
dump->magic = CMAGIC;
dump->start_code = 0;
dump->start_stack = regs->sp & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
dump->u_tsize = ((unsigned long) current->mm->end_code) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
dump->u_dsize = ((unsigned long)
(current->mm->brk + (PAGE_SIZE-1))) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
dump->u_dsize -= dump->u_tsize;
dump->u_ssize = 0;
dump->u_debugreg[0] = current->thread.debugreg0;
dump->u_debugreg[1] = current->thread.debugreg1;
dump->u_debugreg[2] = current->thread.debugreg2;
dump->u_debugreg[3] = current->thread.debugreg3;
dump->u_debugreg[4] = 0;
dump->u_debugreg[5] = 0;
dump->u_debugreg[6] = current->thread.debugreg6;
dump->u_debugreg[7] = current->thread.debugreg7;
if (dump->start_stack < 0xc0000000) {
unsigned long tmp;
tmp = (unsigned long) (0xc0000000 - dump->start_stack);
dump->u_ssize = tmp >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
dump->regs.bx = regs->bx;
dump->regs.cx = regs->cx;
dump->regs.dx = regs->dx;
dump->regs.si = regs->si;
dump->regs.di = regs->di;
dump->regs.bp = regs->bp;
dump->regs.ax = regs->ax;
dump->regs.ds = current->thread.ds;
dump->regs.es = current->thread.es;
savesegment(fs, fs);
dump->regs.fs = fs;
savesegment(gs, gs);
dump->regs.gs = gs;
dump->regs.orig_ax = regs->orig_ax;
dump->regs.ip = regs->ip;
dump->regs.cs = regs->cs;
dump->regs.flags = regs->flags;
dump->regs.sp = regs->sp;
dump->regs.ss = regs->ss;
#if 1 /* FIXME */
dump->u_fpvalid = 0;
#else
dump->u_fpvalid = dump_fpu(regs, &dump->i387);
#endif
}
#endif
static struct linux_binfmt aout_format = {
.module = THIS_MODULE,
.load_binary = load_aout_binary,
.load_shlib = load_aout_library,
#ifdef CORE_DUMP
.core_dump = aout_core_dump,
#endif
.min_coredump = PAGE_SIZE
};
static void set_brk(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
end = PAGE_ALIGN(end);
if (end <= start)
return;
vm_brk(start, end - start);
}
#ifdef CORE_DUMP
/*
* These are the only things you should do on a core-file: use only these
* macros to write out all the necessary info.
*/
#include <linux/coredump.h>
#define DUMP_WRITE(addr, nr) \
if (!dump_write(file, (void *)(addr), (nr))) \
goto end_coredump;
#define DUMP_SEEK(offset) \
if (!dump_seek(file, offset)) \
goto end_coredump;
#define START_DATA() (u.u_tsize << PAGE_SHIFT)
#define START_STACK(u) (u.start_stack)
/*
* Routine writes a core dump image in the current directory.
* Currently only a stub-function.
*
* Note that setuid/setgid files won't make a core-dump if the uid/gid
* changed due to the set[u|g]id. It's enforced by the "current->mm->dumpable"
* field, which also makes sure the core-dumps won't be recursive if the
* dumping of the process results in another error..
*/
static int aout_core_dump(long signr, struct pt_regs *regs, struct file *file,
unsigned long limit)
{
mm_segment_t fs;
int has_dumped = 0;
unsigned long dump_start, dump_size;
struct user32 dump;
fs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
has_dumped = 1;
current->flags |= PF_DUMPCORE;
strncpy(dump.u_comm, current->comm, sizeof(current->comm));
Sanitize the type of struct user.u_ar0 struct user.u_ar0 is defined to contain a pointer offset on all architectures in which it is defined (all architectures which define an a.out format except SPARC.) However, it has a pointer type in the headers, which is pointless -- <asm/user.h> is not exported to userspace, and it just makes the code messy. Redefine the field as "unsigned long" (which is the same size as a pointer on all Linux architectures) and change the setting code to user offsetof() instead of hand-coded arithmetic. Cc: Linux Arch Mailing List <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Bryan Wu <bryan.wu@analog.com> Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Lennert Buytenhek <kernel@wantstofly.org> Cc: Håvard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@atmel.com> Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Hirokazu Takata <takata@linux-m32r.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-07 16:15:57 +08:00
dump.u_ar0 = offsetof(struct user32, regs);
dump.signal = signr;
dump_thread32(regs, &dump);
/*
* If the size of the dump file exceeds the rlimit, then see
* what would happen if we wrote the stack, but not the data
* area.
*/
core_pattern: ignore RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipe For some time /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern has been able to set its output destination as a pipe, allowing a user space helper to receive and intellegently process a core. This infrastructure however has some shortcommings which can be enhanced. Specifically: 1) The coredump code in the kernel should ignore RLIMIT_CORE limitation when core_pattern is a pipe, since file system resources are not being consumed in this case, unless the user application wishes to save the core, at which point the app is restricted by usual file system limits and restrictions. 2) The core_pattern code should be able to parse and pass options to the user space helper as an argv array. The real core limit of the uid of the crashing proces should also be passable to the user space helper (since it is overridden to zero when called). 3) Some miscellaneous bugs need to be cleaned up (specifically the recognition of a recursive core dump, should the user mode helper itself crash. Also, the core dump code in the kernel should not wait for the user mode helper to exit, since the same context is responsible for writing to the pipe, and a read of the pipe by the user mode helper will result in a deadlock. This patch: Remove the check of RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipe. In the event that core_pattern is a pipe, the entire core will be fed to the user mode helper. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Cc: <martin.pitt@ubuntu.com> Cc: <wwoods@redhat.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 14:26:34 +08:00
if ((dump.u_dsize + dump.u_ssize + 1) * PAGE_SIZE > limit)
dump.u_dsize = 0;
/* Make sure we have enough room to write the stack and data areas. */
core_pattern: ignore RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipe For some time /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern has been able to set its output destination as a pipe, allowing a user space helper to receive and intellegently process a core. This infrastructure however has some shortcommings which can be enhanced. Specifically: 1) The coredump code in the kernel should ignore RLIMIT_CORE limitation when core_pattern is a pipe, since file system resources are not being consumed in this case, unless the user application wishes to save the core, at which point the app is restricted by usual file system limits and restrictions. 2) The core_pattern code should be able to parse and pass options to the user space helper as an argv array. The real core limit of the uid of the crashing proces should also be passable to the user space helper (since it is overridden to zero when called). 3) Some miscellaneous bugs need to be cleaned up (specifically the recognition of a recursive core dump, should the user mode helper itself crash. Also, the core dump code in the kernel should not wait for the user mode helper to exit, since the same context is responsible for writing to the pipe, and a read of the pipe by the user mode helper will result in a deadlock. This patch: Remove the check of RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipe. In the event that core_pattern is a pipe, the entire core will be fed to the user mode helper. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Cc: <martin.pitt@ubuntu.com> Cc: <wwoods@redhat.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 14:26:34 +08:00
if ((dump.u_ssize + 1) * PAGE_SIZE > limit)
dump.u_ssize = 0;
/* make sure we actually have a data and stack area to dump */
set_fs(USER_DS);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, (void *) (unsigned long)START_DATA(dump),
dump.u_dsize << PAGE_SHIFT))
dump.u_dsize = 0;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, (void *) (unsigned long)START_STACK(dump),
dump.u_ssize << PAGE_SHIFT))
dump.u_ssize = 0;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
/* struct user */
DUMP_WRITE(&dump, sizeof(dump));
/* Now dump all of the user data. Include malloced stuff as well */
DUMP_SEEK(PAGE_SIZE);
/* now we start writing out the user space info */
set_fs(USER_DS);
/* Dump the data area */
if (dump.u_dsize != 0) {
dump_start = START_DATA(dump);
dump_size = dump.u_dsize << PAGE_SHIFT;
DUMP_WRITE(dump_start, dump_size);
}
/* Now prepare to dump the stack area */
if (dump.u_ssize != 0) {
dump_start = START_STACK(dump);
dump_size = dump.u_ssize << PAGE_SHIFT;
DUMP_WRITE(dump_start, dump_size);
}
end_coredump:
set_fs(fs);
return has_dumped;
}
#endif
/*
* create_aout_tables() parses the env- and arg-strings in new user
* memory and creates the pointer tables from them, and puts their
* addresses on the "stack", returning the new stack pointer value.
*/
static u32 __user *create_aout_tables(char __user *p, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
u32 __user *argv, *envp, *sp;
int argc = bprm->argc, envc = bprm->envc;
sp = (u32 __user *) ((-(unsigned long)sizeof(u32)) & (unsigned long) p);
sp -= envc+1;
envp = sp;
sp -= argc+1;
argv = sp;
put_user((unsigned long) envp, --sp);
put_user((unsigned long) argv, --sp);
put_user(argc, --sp);
current->mm->arg_start = (unsigned long) p;
while (argc-- > 0) {
char c;
put_user((u32)(unsigned long)p, argv++);
do {
get_user(c, p++);
} while (c);
}
put_user(0, argv);
current->mm->arg_end = current->mm->env_start = (unsigned long) p;
while (envc-- > 0) {
char c;
put_user((u32)(unsigned long)p, envp++);
do {
get_user(c, p++);
} while (c);
}
put_user(0, envp);
current->mm->env_end = (unsigned long) p;
return sp;
}
/*
* These are the functions used to load a.out style executables and shared
* libraries. There is no binary dependent code anywhere else.
*/
static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
unsigned long error, fd_offset, rlim;
struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
struct exec ex;
int retval;
ex = *((struct exec *) bprm->buf); /* exec-header */
if ((N_MAGIC(ex) != ZMAGIC && N_MAGIC(ex) != OMAGIC &&
N_MAGIC(ex) != QMAGIC && N_MAGIC(ex) != NMAGIC) ||
N_TRSIZE(ex) || N_DRSIZE(ex) ||
i_size_read(file_inode(bprm->file)) <
ex.a_text+ex.a_data+N_SYMSIZE(ex)+N_TXTOFF(ex)) {
return -ENOEXEC;
}
fd_offset = N_TXTOFF(ex);
/* Check initial limits. This avoids letting people circumvent
* size limits imposed on them by creating programs with large
* arrays in the data or bss.
*/
rlim = rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA);
if (rlim >= RLIM_INFINITY)
rlim = ~0;
if (ex.a_data + ex.a_bss > rlim)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Flush all traces of the currently running executable */
retval = flush_old_exec(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
/* OK, This is the point of no return */
set_personality(PER_LINUX);
set_personality_ia32(false);
setup_new_exec(bprm);
regs->cs = __USER32_CS;
regs->r8 = regs->r9 = regs->r10 = regs->r11 = regs->r12 =
regs->r13 = regs->r14 = regs->r15 = 0;
current->mm->end_code = ex.a_text +
(current->mm->start_code = N_TXTADDR(ex));
current->mm->end_data = ex.a_data +
(current->mm->start_data = N_DATADDR(ex));
current->mm->brk = ex.a_bss +
(current->mm->start_brk = N_BSSADDR(ex));
current->mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
[PATCH] Avoiding mmap fragmentation Ingo recently introduced a great speedup for allocating new mmaps using the free_area_cache pointer which boosts the specweb SSL benchmark by 4-5% and causes huge performance increases in thread creation. The downside of this patch is that it does lead to fragmentation in the mmap-ed areas (visible via /proc/self/maps), such that some applications that work fine under 2.4 kernels quickly run out of memory on any 2.6 kernel. The problem is twofold: 1) the free_area_cache is used to continue a search for memory where the last search ended. Before the change new areas were always searched from the base address on. So now new small areas are cluttering holes of all sizes throughout the whole mmap-able region whereas before small holes tended to close holes near the base leaving holes far from the base large and available for larger requests. 2) the free_area_cache also is set to the location of the last munmap-ed area so in scenarios where we allocate e.g. five regions of 1K each, then free regions 4 2 3 in this order the next request for 1K will be placed in the position of the old region 3, whereas before we appended it to the still active region 1, placing it at the location of the old region 2. Before we had 1 free region of 2K, now we only get two free regions of 1K -> fragmentation. The patch addresses thes issues by introducing yet another cache descriptor cached_hole_size that contains the largest known hole size below the current free_area_cache. If a new request comes in the size is compared against the cached_hole_size and if the request can be filled with a hole below free_area_cache the search is started from the base instead. The results look promising: Whereas 2.6.12-rc4 fragments quickly and my (earlier posted) leakme.c test program terminates after 50000+ iterations with 96 distinct and fragmented maps in /proc/self/maps it performs nicely (as expected) with thread creation, Ingo's test_str02 with 20000 threads requires 0.7s system time. Taking out Ingo's patch (un-patch available per request) by basically deleting all mentions of free_area_cache from the kernel and starting the search for new memory always at the respective bases we observe: leakme terminates successfully with 11 distinctive hardly fragmented areas in /proc/self/maps but thread creating is gringdingly slow: 30+s(!) system time for Ingo's test_str02 with 20000 threads. Now - drumroll ;-) the appended patch works fine with leakme: it ends with only 7 distinct areas in /proc/self/maps and also thread creation seems sufficiently fast with 0.71s for 20000 threads. Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Wander <wwc@rentec.com> Credit-to: "Richard Purdie" <rpurdie@rpsys.net> Signed-off-by: Ken Chen <kenneth.w.chen@intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> (partly) Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-22 08:14:49 +08:00
current->mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
retval = setup_arg_pages(bprm, IA32_STACK_TOP, EXSTACK_DEFAULT);
if (retval < 0) {
/* Someone check-me: is this error path enough? */
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
return retval;
}
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:24 +08:00
install_exec_creds(bprm);
if (N_MAGIC(ex) == OMAGIC) {
unsigned long text_addr, map_size;
loff_t pos;
text_addr = N_TXTADDR(ex);
pos = 32;
map_size = ex.a_text+ex.a_data;
error = vm_brk(text_addr & PAGE_MASK, map_size);
if (error != (text_addr & PAGE_MASK)) {
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
return error;
}
error = bprm->file->f_op->read(bprm->file,
(char __user *)text_addr,
ex.a_text+ex.a_data, &pos);
if ((signed long)error < 0) {
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
return error;
}
flush_icache_range(text_addr, text_addr+ex.a_text+ex.a_data);
} else {
#ifdef WARN_OLD
static unsigned long error_time, error_time2;
if ((ex.a_text & 0xfff || ex.a_data & 0xfff) &&
(N_MAGIC(ex) != NMAGIC) &&
time_after(jiffies, error_time2 + 5*HZ)) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "executable not page aligned\n");
error_time2 = jiffies;
}
if ((fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0 &&
time_after(jiffies, error_time + 5*HZ)) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"fd_offset is not page aligned. Please convert "
"program: %s\n",
bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name);
error_time = jiffies;
}
#endif
if (!bprm->file->f_op->mmap || (fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0) {
loff_t pos = fd_offset;
vm_brk(N_TXTADDR(ex), ex.a_text+ex.a_data);
bprm->file->f_op->read(bprm->file,
(char __user *)N_TXTADDR(ex),
ex.a_text+ex.a_data, &pos);
flush_icache_range((unsigned long) N_TXTADDR(ex),
(unsigned long) N_TXTADDR(ex) +
ex.a_text+ex.a_data);
goto beyond_if;
}
error = vm_mmap(bprm->file, N_TXTADDR(ex), ex.a_text,
PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC,
MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE |
MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_32BIT,
fd_offset);
if (error != N_TXTADDR(ex)) {
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
return error;
}
error = vm_mmap(bprm->file, N_DATADDR(ex), ex.a_data,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE |
MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_32BIT,
fd_offset + ex.a_text);
if (error != N_DATADDR(ex)) {
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
return error;
}
}
beyond_if:
set_binfmt(&aout_format);
set_brk(current->mm->start_brk, current->mm->brk);
current->mm->start_stack =
(unsigned long)create_aout_tables((char __user *)bprm->p, bprm);
/* start thread */
loadsegment(fs, 0);
loadsegment(ds, __USER32_DS);
loadsegment(es, __USER32_DS);
load_gs_index(0);
(regs)->ip = ex.a_entry;
(regs)->sp = current->mm->start_stack;
(regs)->flags = 0x200;
(regs)->cs = __USER32_CS;
(regs)->ss = __USER32_DS;
regs->r8 = regs->r9 = regs->r10 = regs->r11 =
regs->r12 = regs->r13 = regs->r14 = regs->r15 = 0;
set_fs(USER_DS);
return 0;
}
static int load_aout_library(struct file *file)
{
unsigned long bss, start_addr, len, error;
int retval;
struct exec ex;
retval = -ENOEXEC;
error = kernel_read(file, 0, (char *) &ex, sizeof(ex));
if (error != sizeof(ex))
goto out;
/* We come in here for the regular a.out style of shared libraries */
if ((N_MAGIC(ex) != ZMAGIC && N_MAGIC(ex) != QMAGIC) || N_TRSIZE(ex) ||
N_DRSIZE(ex) || ((ex.a_entry & 0xfff) && N_MAGIC(ex) == ZMAGIC) ||
i_size_read(file_inode(file)) <
ex.a_text+ex.a_data+N_SYMSIZE(ex)+N_TXTOFF(ex)) {
goto out;
}
if (N_FLAGS(ex))
goto out;
/* For QMAGIC, the starting address is 0x20 into the page. We mask
this off to get the starting address for the page */
start_addr = ex.a_entry & 0xfffff000;
if ((N_TXTOFF(ex) & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0) {
loff_t pos = N_TXTOFF(ex);
#ifdef WARN_OLD
static unsigned long error_time;
if (time_after(jiffies, error_time + 5*HZ)) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"N_TXTOFF is not page aligned. Please convert "
"library: %s\n",
file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name);
error_time = jiffies;
}
#endif
vm_brk(start_addr, ex.a_text + ex.a_data + ex.a_bss);
file->f_op->read(file, (char __user *)start_addr,
ex.a_text + ex.a_data, &pos);
flush_icache_range((unsigned long) start_addr,
(unsigned long) start_addr + ex.a_text +
ex.a_data);
retval = 0;
goto out;
}
/* Now use mmap to map the library into memory. */
error = vm_mmap(file, start_addr, ex.a_text + ex.a_data,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_32BIT,
N_TXTOFF(ex));
retval = error;
if (error != start_addr)
goto out;
len = PAGE_ALIGN(ex.a_text + ex.a_data);
bss = ex.a_text + ex.a_data + ex.a_bss;
if (bss > len) {
error = vm_brk(start_addr + len, bss - len);
retval = error;
if (error != start_addr + len)
goto out;
}
retval = 0;
out:
return retval;
}
static int __init init_aout_binfmt(void)
{
register_binfmt(&aout_format);
return 0;
}
static void __exit exit_aout_binfmt(void)
{
unregister_binfmt(&aout_format);
}
module_init(init_aout_binfmt);
module_exit(exit_aout_binfmt);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");