linux/arch/x86/xen/smp_hvm.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2020-08-06 20:35:11 +08:00
#include <linux/thread_info.h>
#include <asm/smp.h>
xen: Revert commits da72ff5bfcb0 and 72a9b186292d Recent discussion (http://marc.info/?l=xen-devel&m=149192184523741) established that commit 72a9b186292d ("xen: Remove event channel notification through Xen PCI platform device") (and thus commit da72ff5bfcb0 ("partially revert "xen: Remove event channel notification through Xen PCI platform device"")) are unnecessary and, in fact, prevent HVM guests from booting on Xen releases prior to 4.0 Therefore we revert both of those commits. The summary of that discussion is below: Here is the brief summary of the current situation: Before the offending commit (72a9b186292): 1) INTx does not work because of the reset_watches path. 2) The reset_watches path is only taken if you have Xen > 4.0 3) The Linux Kernel by default will use vector inject if the hypervisor support. So even INTx does not work no body running the kernel with Xen > 4.0 would notice. Unless he explicitly disabled this feature either in the kernel or in Xen (and this can only be disabled by modifying the code, not user-supported way to do it). After the offending commit (+ partial revert): 1) INTx is no longer support for HVM (only for PV guests). 2) Any HVM guest The kernel will not boot on Xen < 4.0 which does not have vector injection support. Since the only other mode supported is INTx which. So based on this summary, I think before commit (72a9b186292) we were in much better position from a user point of view. Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
2017-04-25 03:04:53 +08:00
#include <xen/events.h>
#include "xen-ops.h"
#include "smp.h"
static void __init xen_hvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
{
BUG_ON(smp_processor_id() != 0);
native_smp_prepare_boot_cpu();
/*
* Setup vcpu_info for boot CPU. Secondary CPUs get their vcpu_info
* in xen_cpu_up_prepare_hvm().
*/
xen_vcpu_setup(0);
/*
* The alternative logic (which patches the unlock/lock) runs before
* the smp bootup up code is activated. Hence we need to set this up
* the core kernel is being patched. Otherwise we will have only
* modules patched but not core code.
*/
xen_init_spinlocks();
}
static void __init xen_hvm_smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)
{
xen/pvh*: Support > 32 VCPUs at domain restore When Xen restores a PVHVM or PVH guest, its shared_info only holds up to 32 CPUs. The hypercall VCPUOP_register_vcpu_info allows us to setup per-page areas for VCPUs. This means we can boot PVH* guests with more than 32 VCPUs. During restore the per-cpu structure is allocated freshly by the hypervisor (vcpu_info_mfn is set to INVALID_MFN) so that the newly restored guest can make a VCPUOP_register_vcpu_info hypercall. However, we end up triggering this condition in Xen: /* Run this command on yourself or on other offline VCPUS. */ if ( (v != current) && !test_bit(_VPF_down, &v->pause_flags) ) which means we are unable to setup the per-cpu VCPU structures for running VCPUS. The Linux PV code paths makes this work by iterating over cpu_possible in xen_vcpu_restore() with: 1) is target CPU up (VCPUOP_is_up hypercall?) 2) if yes, then VCPUOP_down to pause it 3) VCPUOP_register_vcpu_info 4) if it was down, then VCPUOP_up to bring it back up With Xen commit 192df6f9122d ("xen/x86: allow HVM guests to use hypercalls to bring up vCPUs") this is available for non-PV guests. As such first check if VCPUOP_is_up is actually possible before trying this dance. As most of this dance code is done already in xen_vcpu_restore() let's make it callable on PV, PVH and PVHVM. Based-on-patch-by: Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Ankur Arora <ankur.a.arora@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
2017-06-03 08:05:59 +08:00
int cpu;
native_smp_prepare_cpus(max_cpus);
x86/xen: Fix xen_hvm_smp_init() when vector callback not available Only the IPI-related functions in the smp_ops should be conditional on the vector callback being available. The rest should still happen: • xen_hvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu() This function does two things, both of which should still happen if there is no vector callback support. The call to xen_vcpu_setup() for vCPU0 should still happen as it just sets up the vcpu_info for CPU0. That does happen for the secondary vCPUs too, from xen_cpu_up_prepare_hvm(). The second thing it does is call xen_init_spinlocks(), which perhaps counter-intuitively should *also* still be happening in the case without vector callbacks, so that it can clear its local xen_pvspin flag and disable the virt_spin_lock_key accordingly. Checking xen_have_vector_callback in xen_init_spinlocks() itself would affect PV guests, so set the global nopvspin flag in xen_hvm_smp_init() instead, when vector callbacks aren't available. • xen_hvm_smp_prepare_cpus() This does some IPI-related setup by calling xen_smp_intr_init() and xen_init_lock_cpu(), which can be made conditional. And it sets the xen_vcpu_id to XEN_VCPU_ID_INVALID for all possible CPUS, which does need to happen. • xen_smp_cpus_done() This offlines any vCPUs which doesn't fit in the global shared_info page, if separate vcpu_info placement isn't available. That part also needs to happen regardless of vector callback support. • xen_hvm_cpu_die() This doesn't actually do anything other than commin_cpu_die() right right now in the !vector_callback case; all three teardown functions it calls should be no-ops. But to guard against future regressions it's useful to call it anyway, and for it to explicitly check for xen_have_vector_callback before calling those additional functions. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210106153958.584169-6-dwmw2@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
2021-01-06 23:39:58 +08:00
if (xen_have_vector_callback) {
WARN_ON(xen_smp_intr_init(0));
xen_init_lock_cpu(0);
}
xen/pvh*: Support > 32 VCPUs at domain restore When Xen restores a PVHVM or PVH guest, its shared_info only holds up to 32 CPUs. The hypercall VCPUOP_register_vcpu_info allows us to setup per-page areas for VCPUs. This means we can boot PVH* guests with more than 32 VCPUs. During restore the per-cpu structure is allocated freshly by the hypervisor (vcpu_info_mfn is set to INVALID_MFN) so that the newly restored guest can make a VCPUOP_register_vcpu_info hypercall. However, we end up triggering this condition in Xen: /* Run this command on yourself or on other offline VCPUS. */ if ( (v != current) && !test_bit(_VPF_down, &v->pause_flags) ) which means we are unable to setup the per-cpu VCPU structures for running VCPUS. The Linux PV code paths makes this work by iterating over cpu_possible in xen_vcpu_restore() with: 1) is target CPU up (VCPUOP_is_up hypercall?) 2) if yes, then VCPUOP_down to pause it 3) VCPUOP_register_vcpu_info 4) if it was down, then VCPUOP_up to bring it back up With Xen commit 192df6f9122d ("xen/x86: allow HVM guests to use hypercalls to bring up vCPUs") this is available for non-PV guests. As such first check if VCPUOP_is_up is actually possible before trying this dance. As most of this dance code is done already in xen_vcpu_restore() let's make it callable on PV, PVH and PVHVM. Based-on-patch-by: Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Ankur Arora <ankur.a.arora@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
2017-06-03 08:05:59 +08:00
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
if (cpu == 0)
continue;
/* Set default vcpu_id to make sure that we don't use cpu-0's */
per_cpu(xen_vcpu_id, cpu) = XEN_VCPU_ID_INVALID;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
static void xen_hvm_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu)
{
if (common_cpu_die(cpu) == 0) {
x86/xen: Fix xen_hvm_smp_init() when vector callback not available Only the IPI-related functions in the smp_ops should be conditional on the vector callback being available. The rest should still happen: • xen_hvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu() This function does two things, both of which should still happen if there is no vector callback support. The call to xen_vcpu_setup() for vCPU0 should still happen as it just sets up the vcpu_info for CPU0. That does happen for the secondary vCPUs too, from xen_cpu_up_prepare_hvm(). The second thing it does is call xen_init_spinlocks(), which perhaps counter-intuitively should *also* still be happening in the case without vector callbacks, so that it can clear its local xen_pvspin flag and disable the virt_spin_lock_key accordingly. Checking xen_have_vector_callback in xen_init_spinlocks() itself would affect PV guests, so set the global nopvspin flag in xen_hvm_smp_init() instead, when vector callbacks aren't available. • xen_hvm_smp_prepare_cpus() This does some IPI-related setup by calling xen_smp_intr_init() and xen_init_lock_cpu(), which can be made conditional. And it sets the xen_vcpu_id to XEN_VCPU_ID_INVALID for all possible CPUS, which does need to happen. • xen_smp_cpus_done() This offlines any vCPUs which doesn't fit in the global shared_info page, if separate vcpu_info placement isn't available. That part also needs to happen regardless of vector callback support. • xen_hvm_cpu_die() This doesn't actually do anything other than commin_cpu_die() right right now in the !vector_callback case; all three teardown functions it calls should be no-ops. But to guard against future regressions it's useful to call it anyway, and for it to explicitly check for xen_have_vector_callback before calling those additional functions. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210106153958.584169-6-dwmw2@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
2021-01-06 23:39:58 +08:00
if (xen_have_vector_callback) {
xen_smp_intr_free(cpu);
xen_uninit_lock_cpu(cpu);
xen_teardown_timer(cpu);
}
}
}
#else
static void xen_hvm_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu)
{
BUG();
}
#endif
void __init xen_hvm_smp_init(void)
{
x86/xen: Fix xen_hvm_smp_init() when vector callback not available Only the IPI-related functions in the smp_ops should be conditional on the vector callback being available. The rest should still happen: • xen_hvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu() This function does two things, both of which should still happen if there is no vector callback support. The call to xen_vcpu_setup() for vCPU0 should still happen as it just sets up the vcpu_info for CPU0. That does happen for the secondary vCPUs too, from xen_cpu_up_prepare_hvm(). The second thing it does is call xen_init_spinlocks(), which perhaps counter-intuitively should *also* still be happening in the case without vector callbacks, so that it can clear its local xen_pvspin flag and disable the virt_spin_lock_key accordingly. Checking xen_have_vector_callback in xen_init_spinlocks() itself would affect PV guests, so set the global nopvspin flag in xen_hvm_smp_init() instead, when vector callbacks aren't available. • xen_hvm_smp_prepare_cpus() This does some IPI-related setup by calling xen_smp_intr_init() and xen_init_lock_cpu(), which can be made conditional. And it sets the xen_vcpu_id to XEN_VCPU_ID_INVALID for all possible CPUS, which does need to happen. • xen_smp_cpus_done() This offlines any vCPUs which doesn't fit in the global shared_info page, if separate vcpu_info placement isn't available. That part also needs to happen regardless of vector callback support. • xen_hvm_cpu_die() This doesn't actually do anything other than commin_cpu_die() right right now in the !vector_callback case; all three teardown functions it calls should be no-ops. But to guard against future regressions it's useful to call it anyway, and for it to explicitly check for xen_have_vector_callback before calling those additional functions. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210106153958.584169-6-dwmw2@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
2021-01-06 23:39:58 +08:00
smp_ops.smp_prepare_boot_cpu = xen_hvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu;
smp_ops.smp_prepare_cpus = xen_hvm_smp_prepare_cpus;
smp_ops.smp_cpus_done = xen_smp_cpus_done;
smp_ops.cpu_die = xen_hvm_cpu_die;
if (!xen_have_vector_callback) {
nopvspin = true;
xen: Revert commits da72ff5bfcb0 and 72a9b186292d Recent discussion (http://marc.info/?l=xen-devel&m=149192184523741) established that commit 72a9b186292d ("xen: Remove event channel notification through Xen PCI platform device") (and thus commit da72ff5bfcb0 ("partially revert "xen: Remove event channel notification through Xen PCI platform device"")) are unnecessary and, in fact, prevent HVM guests from booting on Xen releases prior to 4.0 Therefore we revert both of those commits. The summary of that discussion is below: Here is the brief summary of the current situation: Before the offending commit (72a9b186292): 1) INTx does not work because of the reset_watches path. 2) The reset_watches path is only taken if you have Xen > 4.0 3) The Linux Kernel by default will use vector inject if the hypervisor support. So even INTx does not work no body running the kernel with Xen > 4.0 would notice. Unless he explicitly disabled this feature either in the kernel or in Xen (and this can only be disabled by modifying the code, not user-supported way to do it). After the offending commit (+ partial revert): 1) INTx is no longer support for HVM (only for PV guests). 2) Any HVM guest The kernel will not boot on Xen < 4.0 which does not have vector injection support. Since the only other mode supported is INTx which. So based on this summary, I think before commit (72a9b186292) we were in much better position from a user point of view. Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
2017-04-25 03:04:53 +08:00
return;
x86/xen: Fix xen_hvm_smp_init() when vector callback not available Only the IPI-related functions in the smp_ops should be conditional on the vector callback being available. The rest should still happen: • xen_hvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu() This function does two things, both of which should still happen if there is no vector callback support. The call to xen_vcpu_setup() for vCPU0 should still happen as it just sets up the vcpu_info for CPU0. That does happen for the secondary vCPUs too, from xen_cpu_up_prepare_hvm(). The second thing it does is call xen_init_spinlocks(), which perhaps counter-intuitively should *also* still be happening in the case without vector callbacks, so that it can clear its local xen_pvspin flag and disable the virt_spin_lock_key accordingly. Checking xen_have_vector_callback in xen_init_spinlocks() itself would affect PV guests, so set the global nopvspin flag in xen_hvm_smp_init() instead, when vector callbacks aren't available. • xen_hvm_smp_prepare_cpus() This does some IPI-related setup by calling xen_smp_intr_init() and xen_init_lock_cpu(), which can be made conditional. And it sets the xen_vcpu_id to XEN_VCPU_ID_INVALID for all possible CPUS, which does need to happen. • xen_smp_cpus_done() This offlines any vCPUs which doesn't fit in the global shared_info page, if separate vcpu_info placement isn't available. That part also needs to happen regardless of vector callback support. • xen_hvm_cpu_die() This doesn't actually do anything other than commin_cpu_die() right right now in the !vector_callback case; all three teardown functions it calls should be no-ops. But to guard against future regressions it's useful to call it anyway, and for it to explicitly check for xen_have_vector_callback before calling those additional functions. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210106153958.584169-6-dwmw2@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
2021-01-06 23:39:58 +08:00
}
xen: Revert commits da72ff5bfcb0 and 72a9b186292d Recent discussion (http://marc.info/?l=xen-devel&m=149192184523741) established that commit 72a9b186292d ("xen: Remove event channel notification through Xen PCI platform device") (and thus commit da72ff5bfcb0 ("partially revert "xen: Remove event channel notification through Xen PCI platform device"")) are unnecessary and, in fact, prevent HVM guests from booting on Xen releases prior to 4.0 Therefore we revert both of those commits. The summary of that discussion is below: Here is the brief summary of the current situation: Before the offending commit (72a9b186292): 1) INTx does not work because of the reset_watches path. 2) The reset_watches path is only taken if you have Xen > 4.0 3) The Linux Kernel by default will use vector inject if the hypervisor support. So even INTx does not work no body running the kernel with Xen > 4.0 would notice. Unless he explicitly disabled this feature either in the kernel or in Xen (and this can only be disabled by modifying the code, not user-supported way to do it). After the offending commit (+ partial revert): 1) INTx is no longer support for HVM (only for PV guests). 2) Any HVM guest The kernel will not boot on Xen < 4.0 which does not have vector injection support. Since the only other mode supported is INTx which. So based on this summary, I think before commit (72a9b186292) we were in much better position from a user point of view. Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
2017-04-25 03:04:53 +08:00
smp_ops.smp_send_reschedule = xen_smp_send_reschedule;
smp_ops.send_call_func_ipi = xen_smp_send_call_function_ipi;
smp_ops.send_call_func_single_ipi = xen_smp_send_call_function_single_ipi;
}