linux/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h

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#ifndef _ASM_X86_UACCESS_H
#define _ASM_X86_UACCESS_H
/*
* User space memory access functions
*/
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/thread_info.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/smap.h>
#define VERIFY_READ 0
#define VERIFY_WRITE 1
/*
* The fs value determines whether argument validity checking should be
* performed or not. If get_fs() == USER_DS, checking is performed, with
* get_fs() == KERNEL_DS, checking is bypassed.
*
* For historical reasons, these macros are grossly misnamed.
*/
#define MAKE_MM_SEG(s) ((mm_segment_t) { (s) })
#define KERNEL_DS MAKE_MM_SEG(-1UL)
x86, 64-bit: Clean up user address masking The discussion about using "access_ok()" in get_user_pages_fast() (see commit 7f8189068726492950bf1a2dcfd9b51314560abf: "x86: don't use 'access_ok()' as a range check in get_user_pages_fast()" for details and end result), made us notice that x86-64 was really being very sloppy about virtual address checking. So be way more careful and straightforward about masking x86-64 virtual addresses: - All the VIRTUAL_MASK* variants now cover half of the address space, it's not like we can use the full mask on a signed integer, and the larger mask just invites mistakes when applying it to either half of the 48-bit address space. - /proc/kcore's kc_offset_to_vaddr() becomes a lot more obvious when it transforms a file offset into a (kernel-half) virtual address. - Unify/simplify the 32-bit and 64-bit USER_DS definition to be based on TASK_SIZE_MAX. This cleanup and more careful/obvious user virtual address checking also uncovered a buglet in the x86-64 implementation of strnlen_user(): it would do an "access_ok()" check on the whole potential area, even if the string itself was much shorter, and thus return an error even for valid strings. Our sloppy checking had hidden this. So this fixes 'strnlen_user()' to do this properly, the same way we already handled user strings in 'strncpy_from_user()'. Namely by just checking the first byte, and then relying on fault handling for the rest. That always works, since we impose a guard page that cannot be mapped at the end of the user space address space (and even if we didn't, we'd have the address space hole). Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-06-21 06:40:00 +08:00
#define USER_DS MAKE_MM_SEG(TASK_SIZE_MAX)
#define get_ds() (KERNEL_DS)
#define get_fs() (current_thread_info()->addr_limit)
#define set_fs(x) (current_thread_info()->addr_limit = (x))
#define segment_eq(a, b) ((a).seg == (b).seg)
#define user_addr_max() (current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg)
#define __addr_ok(addr) \
((unsigned long __force)(addr) < user_addr_max())
/*
* Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
* Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
*
* This is equivalent to the following test:
x86, 64-bit: Fix copy_[to/from]_user() checks for the userspace address limit As reported in BZ #30352: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=30352 there's a kernel bug related to reading the last allowed page on x86_64. The _copy_to_user() and _copy_from_user() functions use the following check for address limit: if (buf + size >= limit) fail(); while it should be more permissive: if (buf + size > limit) fail(); That's because the size represents the number of bytes being read/write from/to buf address AND including the buf address. So the copy function will actually never touch the limit address even if "buf + size == limit". Following program fails to use the last page as buffer due to the wrong limit check: #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <assert.h> #define PAGE_SIZE (4096) #define LAST_PAGE ((void*)(0x7fffffffe000)) int main() { int fds[2], err; void * ptr = mmap(LAST_PAGE, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0); assert(ptr == LAST_PAGE); err = socketpair(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0, fds); assert(err == 0); err = send(fds[0], ptr, PAGE_SIZE, 0); perror("send"); assert(err == PAGE_SIZE); err = recv(fds[1], ptr, PAGE_SIZE, MSG_WAITALL); perror("recv"); assert(err == PAGE_SIZE); return 0; } The other place checking the addr limit is the access_ok() function, which is working properly. There's just a misleading comment for the __range_not_ok() macro - which this patch fixes as well. The last page of the user-space address range is a guard page and Brian Gerst observed that the guard page itself due to an erratum on K8 cpus (#121 Sequential Execution Across Non-Canonical Boundary Causes Processor Hang). However, the test code is using the last valid page before the guard page. The bug is that the last byte before the guard page can't be read because of the off-by-one error. The guard page is left in place. This bug would normally not show up because the last page is part of the process stack and never accessed via syscalls. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Acked-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1305210630-7136-1-git-send-email-jolsa@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2011-05-12 22:30:30 +08:00
* (u33)addr + (u33)size > (u33)current->addr_limit.seg (u65 for x86_64)
*
* This needs 33-bit (65-bit for x86_64) arithmetic. We have a carry...
*/
#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit) \
({ \
unsigned long flag, roksum; \
__chk_user_ptr(addr); \
asm("add %3,%1 ; sbb %0,%0 ; cmp %1,%4 ; sbb $0,%0" \
: "=&r" (flag), "=r" (roksum) \
: "1" (addr), "g" ((long)(size)), \
"rm" (limit)); \
flag; \
})
/**
* access_ok: - Checks if a user space pointer is valid
* @type: Type of access: %VERIFY_READ or %VERIFY_WRITE. Note that
* %VERIFY_WRITE is a superset of %VERIFY_READ - if it is safe
* to write to a block, it is always safe to read from it.
* @addr: User space pointer to start of block to check
* @size: Size of block to check
*
* Context: User context only. This function may sleep.
*
* Checks if a pointer to a block of memory in user space is valid.
*
* Returns true (nonzero) if the memory block may be valid, false (zero)
* if it is definitely invalid.
*
* Note that, depending on architecture, this function probably just
* checks that the pointer is in the user space range - after calling
* this function, memory access functions may still return -EFAULT.
*/
#define access_ok(type, addr, size) \
(likely(__range_not_ok(addr, size, user_addr_max()) == 0))
/*
* The exception table consists of pairs of addresses relative to the
* exception table enty itself: the first is the address of an
* instruction that is allowed to fault, and the second is the address
* at which the program should continue. No registers are modified,
* so it is entirely up to the continuation code to figure out what to
* do.
*
* All the routines below use bits of fixup code that are out of line
* with the main instruction path. This means when everything is well,
* we don't even have to jump over them. Further, they do not intrude
* on our cache or tlb entries.
*/
struct exception_table_entry {
int insn, fixup;
};
/* This is not the generic standard exception_table_entry format */
#define ARCH_HAS_SORT_EXTABLE
#define ARCH_HAS_SEARCH_EXTABLE
extern int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs);
extern int early_fixup_exception(unsigned long *ip);
/*
* These are the main single-value transfer routines. They automatically
* use the right size if we just have the right pointer type.
*
* This gets kind of ugly. We want to return _two_ values in "get_user()"
* and yet we don't want to do any pointers, because that is too much
* of a performance impact. Thus we have a few rather ugly macros here,
* and hide all the ugliness from the user.
*
* The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions are versions that
* do not verify the address space, that must have been done previously
* with a separate "access_ok()" call (this is used when we do multiple
* accesses to the same area of user memory).
*/
extern int __get_user_1(void);
extern int __get_user_2(void);
extern int __get_user_4(void);
extern int __get_user_8(void);
extern int __get_user_bad(void);
/*
* This is a type: either unsigned long, if the argument fits into
* that type, or otherwise unsigned long long.
*/
#define __inttype(x) \
__typeof__(__builtin_choose_expr(sizeof(x) > sizeof(0UL), 0ULL, 0UL))
/**
* get_user: - Get a simple variable from user space.
* @x: Variable to store result.
* @ptr: Source address, in user space.
*
* Context: User context only. This function may sleep.
*
* This macro copies a single simple variable from user space to kernel
* space. It supports simple types like char and int, but not larger
* data types like structures or arrays.
*
* @ptr must have pointer-to-simple-variable type, and the result of
* dereferencing @ptr must be assignable to @x without a cast.
*
* Returns zero on success, or -EFAULT on error.
* On error, the variable @x is set to zero.
*/
/*
* Careful: we have to cast the result to the type of the pointer
* for sign reasons.
*
* The use of _ASM_DX as the register specifier is a bit of a
* simplification, as gcc only cares about it as the starting point
* and not size: for a 64-bit value it will use %ecx:%edx on 32 bits
* (%ecx being the next register in gcc's x86 register sequence), and
* %rdx on 64 bits.
*
* Clang/LLVM cares about the size of the register, but still wants
* the base register for something that ends up being a pair.
*/
#define get_user(x, ptr) \
({ \
int __ret_gu; \
register __inttype(*(ptr)) __val_gu asm("%"_ASM_DX); \
__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
might_fault(); \
asm volatile("call __get_user_%P3" \
: "=a" (__ret_gu), "=r" (__val_gu) \
: "0" (ptr), "i" (sizeof(*(ptr)))); \
(x) = (__typeof__(*(ptr))) __val_gu; \
__ret_gu; \
})
#define __put_user_x(size, x, ptr, __ret_pu) \
asm volatile("call __put_user_" #size : "=a" (__ret_pu) \
: "0" ((typeof(*(ptr)))(x)), "c" (ptr) : "ebx")
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
#define __put_user_asm_u64(x, addr, err, errret) \
asm volatile(ASM_STAC "\n" \
"1: movl %%eax,0(%2)\n" \
"2: movl %%edx,4(%2)\n" \
"3: " ASM_CLAC "\n" \
".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \
"4: movl %3,%0\n" \
" jmp 3b\n" \
".previous\n" \
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 4b) \
_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 4b) \
: "=r" (err) \
: "A" (x), "r" (addr), "i" (errret), "0" (err))
#define __put_user_asm_ex_u64(x, addr) \
asm volatile(ASM_STAC "\n" \
"1: movl %%eax,0(%1)\n" \
"2: movl %%edx,4(%1)\n" \
"3: " ASM_CLAC "\n" \
_ASM_EXTABLE_EX(1b, 2b) \
_ASM_EXTABLE_EX(2b, 3b) \
: : "A" (x), "r" (addr))
#define __put_user_x8(x, ptr, __ret_pu) \
asm volatile("call __put_user_8" : "=a" (__ret_pu) \
: "A" ((typeof(*(ptr)))(x)), "c" (ptr) : "ebx")
#else
#define __put_user_asm_u64(x, ptr, retval, errret) \
__put_user_asm(x, ptr, retval, "q", "", "er", errret)
#define __put_user_asm_ex_u64(x, addr) \
__put_user_asm_ex(x, addr, "q", "", "er")
#define __put_user_x8(x, ptr, __ret_pu) __put_user_x(8, x, ptr, __ret_pu)
#endif
extern void __put_user_bad(void);
/*
* Strange magic calling convention: pointer in %ecx,
* value in %eax(:%edx), return value in %eax. clobbers %rbx
*/
extern void __put_user_1(void);
extern void __put_user_2(void);
extern void __put_user_4(void);
extern void __put_user_8(void);
/**
* put_user: - Write a simple value into user space.
* @x: Value to copy to user space.
* @ptr: Destination address, in user space.
*
* Context: User context only. This function may sleep.
*
* This macro copies a single simple value from kernel space to user
* space. It supports simple types like char and int, but not larger
* data types like structures or arrays.
*
* @ptr must have pointer-to-simple-variable type, and @x must be assignable
* to the result of dereferencing @ptr.
*
* Returns zero on success, or -EFAULT on error.
*/
#define put_user(x, ptr) \
({ \
int __ret_pu; \
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __pu_val; \
__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
might_fault(); \
__pu_val = x; \
switch (sizeof(*(ptr))) { \
case 1: \
__put_user_x(1, __pu_val, ptr, __ret_pu); \
break; \
case 2: \
__put_user_x(2, __pu_val, ptr, __ret_pu); \
break; \
case 4: \
__put_user_x(4, __pu_val, ptr, __ret_pu); \
break; \
case 8: \
__put_user_x8(__pu_val, ptr, __ret_pu); \
break; \
default: \
__put_user_x(X, __pu_val, ptr, __ret_pu); \
break; \
} \
__ret_pu; \
})
#define __put_user_size(x, ptr, size, retval, errret) \
do { \
retval = 0; \
__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
switch (size) { \
case 1: \
__put_user_asm(x, ptr, retval, "b", "b", "iq", errret); \
break; \
case 2: \
__put_user_asm(x, ptr, retval, "w", "w", "ir", errret); \
break; \
case 4: \
__put_user_asm(x, ptr, retval, "l", "k", "ir", errret); \
break; \
case 8: \
__put_user_asm_u64((__typeof__(*ptr))(x), ptr, retval, \
errret); \
break; \
default: \
__put_user_bad(); \
} \
} while (0)
#define __put_user_size_ex(x, ptr, size) \
do { \
__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
switch (size) { \
case 1: \
__put_user_asm_ex(x, ptr, "b", "b", "iq"); \
break; \
case 2: \
__put_user_asm_ex(x, ptr, "w", "w", "ir"); \
break; \
case 4: \
__put_user_asm_ex(x, ptr, "l", "k", "ir"); \
break; \
case 8: \
__put_user_asm_ex_u64((__typeof__(*ptr))(x), ptr); \
break; \
default: \
__put_user_bad(); \
} \
} while (0)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
#define __get_user_asm_u64(x, ptr, retval, errret) (x) = __get_user_bad()
#define __get_user_asm_ex_u64(x, ptr) (x) = __get_user_bad()
#else
#define __get_user_asm_u64(x, ptr, retval, errret) \
__get_user_asm(x, ptr, retval, "q", "", "=r", errret)
#define __get_user_asm_ex_u64(x, ptr) \
__get_user_asm_ex(x, ptr, "q", "", "=r")
#endif
#define __get_user_size(x, ptr, size, retval, errret) \
do { \
retval = 0; \
__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
switch (size) { \
case 1: \
__get_user_asm(x, ptr, retval, "b", "b", "=q", errret); \
break; \
case 2: \
__get_user_asm(x, ptr, retval, "w", "w", "=r", errret); \
break; \
case 4: \
__get_user_asm(x, ptr, retval, "l", "k", "=r", errret); \
break; \
case 8: \
__get_user_asm_u64(x, ptr, retval, errret); \
break; \
default: \
(x) = __get_user_bad(); \
} \
} while (0)
#define __get_user_asm(x, addr, err, itype, rtype, ltype, errret) \
asm volatile(ASM_STAC "\n" \
"1: mov"itype" %2,%"rtype"1\n" \
"2: " ASM_CLAC "\n" \
".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \
"3: mov %3,%0\n" \
" xor"itype" %"rtype"1,%"rtype"1\n" \
" jmp 2b\n" \
".previous\n" \
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b) \
: "=r" (err), ltype(x) \
: "m" (__m(addr)), "i" (errret), "0" (err))
#define __get_user_size_ex(x, ptr, size) \
do { \
__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
switch (size) { \
case 1: \
__get_user_asm_ex(x, ptr, "b", "b", "=q"); \
break; \
case 2: \
__get_user_asm_ex(x, ptr, "w", "w", "=r"); \
break; \
case 4: \
__get_user_asm_ex(x, ptr, "l", "k", "=r"); \
break; \
case 8: \
__get_user_asm_ex_u64(x, ptr); \
break; \
default: \
(x) = __get_user_bad(); \
} \
} while (0)
#define __get_user_asm_ex(x, addr, itype, rtype, ltype) \
asm volatile("1: mov"itype" %1,%"rtype"0\n" \
"2:\n" \
_ASM_EXTABLE_EX(1b, 2b) \
: ltype(x) : "m" (__m(addr)))
#define __put_user_nocheck(x, ptr, size) \
({ \
int __pu_err; \
__put_user_size((x), (ptr), (size), __pu_err, -EFAULT); \
__pu_err; \
})
#define __get_user_nocheck(x, ptr, size) \
({ \
int __gu_err; \
unsigned long __gu_val; \
__get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), (size), __gu_err, -EFAULT); \
(x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \
__gu_err; \
})
/* FIXME: this hack is definitely wrong -AK */
struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; };
#define __m(x) (*(struct __large_struct __user *)(x))
/*
* Tell gcc we read from memory instead of writing: this is because
* we do not write to any memory gcc knows about, so there are no
* aliasing issues.
*/
#define __put_user_asm(x, addr, err, itype, rtype, ltype, errret) \
asm volatile(ASM_STAC "\n" \
"1: mov"itype" %"rtype"1,%2\n" \
"2: " ASM_CLAC "\n" \
".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \
"3: mov %3,%0\n" \
" jmp 2b\n" \
".previous\n" \
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b) \
: "=r"(err) \
: ltype(x), "m" (__m(addr)), "i" (errret), "0" (err))
#define __put_user_asm_ex(x, addr, itype, rtype, ltype) \
asm volatile("1: mov"itype" %"rtype"0,%1\n" \
"2:\n" \
_ASM_EXTABLE_EX(1b, 2b) \
: : ltype(x), "m" (__m(addr)))
/*
* uaccess_try and catch
*/
#define uaccess_try do { \
current_thread_info()->uaccess_err = 0; \
stac(); \
barrier();
#define uaccess_catch(err) \
clac(); \
(err) |= (current_thread_info()->uaccess_err ? -EFAULT : 0); \
} while (0)
/**
* __get_user: - Get a simple variable from user space, with less checking.
* @x: Variable to store result.
* @ptr: Source address, in user space.
*
* Context: User context only. This function may sleep.
*
* This macro copies a single simple variable from user space to kernel
* space. It supports simple types like char and int, but not larger
* data types like structures or arrays.
*
* @ptr must have pointer-to-simple-variable type, and the result of
* dereferencing @ptr must be assignable to @x without a cast.
*
* Caller must check the pointer with access_ok() before calling this
* function.
*
* Returns zero on success, or -EFAULT on error.
* On error, the variable @x is set to zero.
*/
#define __get_user(x, ptr) \
__get_user_nocheck((x), (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)))
/**
* __put_user: - Write a simple value into user space, with less checking.
* @x: Value to copy to user space.
* @ptr: Destination address, in user space.
*
* Context: User context only. This function may sleep.
*
* This macro copies a single simple value from kernel space to user
* space. It supports simple types like char and int, but not larger
* data types like structures or arrays.
*
* @ptr must have pointer-to-simple-variable type, and @x must be assignable
* to the result of dereferencing @ptr.
*
* Caller must check the pointer with access_ok() before calling this
* function.
*
* Returns zero on success, or -EFAULT on error.
*/
#define __put_user(x, ptr) \
__put_user_nocheck((__typeof__(*(ptr)))(x), (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)))
#define __get_user_unaligned __get_user
#define __put_user_unaligned __put_user
/*
* {get|put}_user_try and catch
*
* get_user_try {
* get_user_ex(...);
* } get_user_catch(err)
*/
#define get_user_try uaccess_try
#define get_user_catch(err) uaccess_catch(err)
#define get_user_ex(x, ptr) do { \
unsigned long __gue_val; \
__get_user_size_ex((__gue_val), (ptr), (sizeof(*(ptr)))); \
(x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gue_val; \
} while (0)
#define put_user_try uaccess_try
#define put_user_catch(err) uaccess_catch(err)
#define put_user_ex(x, ptr) \
__put_user_size_ex((__typeof__(*(ptr)))(x), (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)))
extern unsigned long
copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
extern __must_check long
strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count);
extern __must_check long strlen_user(const char __user *str);
extern __must_check long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long n);
unsigned long __must_check clear_user(void __user *mem, unsigned long len);
unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *mem, unsigned long len);
/*
* movsl can be slow when source and dest are not both 8-byte aligned
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY
extern struct movsl_mask {
int mask;
} ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp movsl_mask;
#endif
#define ARCH_HAS_NOCACHE_UACCESS 1
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
# include <asm/uaccess_32.h>
#else
# include <asm/uaccess_64.h>
#endif
x86: Unify copy_from_user() size checking Commits 4a3127693001c61a21d1ce680db6340623f52e93 ("x86: Turn the copy_from_user check into an (optional) compile time warning") and 63312b6a6faae3f2e5577f2b001e3b504f10a2aa ("x86: Add a Kconfig option to turn the copy_from_user warnings into errors") touched only the 32-bit variant of copy_from_user(), whereas the original commit 9f0cf4adb6aa0bfccf675c938124e68f7f06349d ("x86: Use __builtin_object_size() to validate the buffer size for copy_from_user()") also added the same code to the 64-bit one. Further the earlier conversion from an inline WARN() to the call to copy_from_user_overflow() went a little too far: When the number of bytes to be copied is not a constant (e.g. [looking at 3.11] in drivers/net/tun.c:__tun_chr_ioctl() or drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aer_inject.c:aer_inject_write()), the compiler will always have to keep the funtion call, and hence there will always be a warning. By using __builtin_constant_p() we can avoid this. And then this slightly extends the effect of CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS in that apart from converting warnings to errors in the constant size case, it retains the (possibly wrong) warnings in the non-constant size case, such that if someone is prepared to get a few false positives, (s)he'll be able to recover the current behavior (except that these diagnostics now will never be converted to errors). Since the 32-bit variant (intentionally) didn't call might_fault(), the unification results in this being called twice now. Adding a suitable #ifdef would be the alternative if that's a problem. I'd like to point out though that with __compiletime_object_size() being restricted to gcc before 4.6, the whole construct is going to become more and more pointless going forward. I would question however that commit 2fb0815c9ee6b9ac50e15dd8360ec76d9fa46a2 ("gcc4: disable __compiletime_object_size for GCC 4.6+") was really necessary, and instead this should have been dealt with as is done here from the beginning. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5265056D02000078000FC4F3@nat28.tlf.novell.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-10-21 16:43:57 +08:00
unsigned long __must_check _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from,
unsigned n);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
# define copy_user_diag __compiletime_error
#else
# define copy_user_diag __compiletime_warning
#endif
extern void copy_user_diag("copy_from_user() buffer size is too small")
copy_from_user_overflow(void);
#undef copy_user_diag
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
extern void
__compiletime_warning("copy_from_user() buffer size is not provably correct")
__copy_from_user_overflow(void) __asm__("copy_from_user_overflow");
#define __copy_from_user_overflow(size, count) __copy_from_user_overflow()
#else
static inline void
__copy_from_user_overflow(int size, unsigned long count)
{
WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected (%d < %lu)!\n", size, count);
}
#endif
static inline unsigned long __must_check
copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
{
int sz = __compiletime_object_size(to);
might_fault();
/*
* While we would like to have the compiler do the checking for us
* even in the non-constant size case, any false positives there are
* a problem (especially when DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS, but even
* without - the [hopefully] dangerous looking nature of the warning
* would make people go look at the respecitive call sites over and
* over again just to find that there's no problem).
*
* And there are cases where it's just not realistic for the compiler
* to prove the count to be in range. For example when multiple call
* sites of a helper function - perhaps in different source files -
* all doing proper range checking, yet the helper function not doing
* so again.
*
* Therefore limit the compile time checking to the constant size
* case, and do only runtime checking for non-constant sizes.
*/
if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n))
n = _copy_from_user(to, from, n);
else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
copy_from_user_overflow();
else
__copy_from_user_overflow(sz, n);
return n;
}
#undef __copy_from_user_overflow
#endif /* _ASM_X86_UACCESS_H */
x86: lockless get_user_pages_fast() Implement get_user_pages_fast without locking in the fastpath on x86. Do an optimistic lockless pagetable walk, without taking mmap_sem or any page table locks or even mmap_sem. Page table existence is guaranteed by turning interrupts off (combined with the fact that we're always looking up the current mm, means we can do the lockless page table walk within the constraints of the TLB shootdown design). Basically we can do this lockless pagetable walk in a similar manner to the way the CPU's pagetable walker does not have to take any locks to find present ptes. This patch (combined with the subsequent ones to convert direct IO to use it) was found to give about 10% performance improvement on a 2 socket 8 core Intel Xeon system running an OLTP workload on DB2 v9.5 "To test the effects of the patch, an OLTP workload was run on an IBM x3850 M2 server with 2 processors (quad-core Intel Xeon processors at 2.93 GHz) using IBM DB2 v9.5 running Linux 2.6.24rc7 kernel. Comparing runs with and without the patch resulted in an overall performance benefit of ~9.8%. Correspondingly, oprofiles showed that samples from __up_read and __down_read routines that is seen during thread contention for system resources was reduced from 2.8% down to .05%. Monitoring the /proc/vmstat output from the patched run showed that the counter for fast_gup contained a very high number while the fast_gup_slow value was zero." (fast_gup is the old name for get_user_pages_fast, fast_gup_slow is a counter we had for the number of times the slowpath was invoked). The main reason for the improvement is that DB2 has multiple threads each issuing direct-IO. Direct-IO uses get_user_pages, and thus the threads contend the mmap_sem cacheline, and can also contend on page table locks. I would anticipate larger performance gains on larger systems, however I think DB2 uses an adaptive mix of threads and processes, so it could be that thread contention remains pretty constant as machine size increases. In which case, we stuck with "only" a 10% gain. The downside of using get_user_pages_fast is that if there is not a pte with the correct permissions for the access, we end up falling back to get_user_pages and so the get_user_pages_fast is a bit of extra work. However this should not be the common case in most performance critical code. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: Kconfig fix] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: Makefile fix/cleanup] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: warning fix] Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com> Cc: Andy Whitcroft <apw@shadowen.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com> Cc: Badari Pulavarty <pbadari@us.ibm.com> Cc: Zach Brown <zach.brown@oracle.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-26 10:45:24 +08:00