linux/include/net/vxlan.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef __NET_VXLAN_H
#define __NET_VXLAN_H 1
#include <linux/if_vlan.h>
#include <net/udp_tunnel.h>
vxlan: Flow based tunneling Allows putting a VXLAN device into a new flow-based mode in which skbs with a ip_tunnel_info dst metadata attached will be encapsulated according to the instructions stored in there with the VXLAN device defaults taken into consideration. Similar on the receive side, if the VXLAN_F_COLLECT_METADATA flag is set, the packet processing will populate a ip_tunnel_info struct for each packet received and attach it to the skb using the new metadata dst. The metadata structure will contain the outer header and tunnel header fields which have been stripped off. Layers further up in the stack such as routing, tc or netfitler can later match on these fields and perform forwarding. It is the responsibility of upper layers to ensure that the flag is set if the metadata is needed. The flag limits the additional cost of metadata collecting based on demand. This prepares the VXLAN device to be steered by the routing and other subsystems which allows to support encapsulation for a large number of tunnel endpoints and tunnel ids through a single net_device which improves the scalability. It also allows for OVS to leverage this mode which in turn allows for the removal of the OVS specific VXLAN code. Because the skb is currently scrubed in vxlan_rcv(), the attachment of the new dst metadata is postponed until after scrubing which requires the temporary addition of a new member to vxlan_metadata. This member is removed again in a later commit after the indirect VXLAN receive API has been removed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-07-21 16:43:58 +08:00
#include <net/dst_metadata.h>
#include <net/rtnetlink.h>
#include <net/switchdev.h>
vxlan: ecmp support for mac fdb entries Todays vxlan mac fdb entries can point to multiple remote ips (rdsts) with the sole purpose of replicating broadcast-multicast and unknown unicast packets to those remote ips. E-VPN multihoming [1,2,3] requires bridged vxlan traffic to be load balanced to remote switches (vteps) belonging to the same multi-homed ethernet segment (E-VPN multihoming is analogous to multi-homed LAG implementations, but with the inter-switch peerlink replaced with a vxlan tunnel). In other words it needs support for mac ecmp. Furthermore, for faster convergence, E-VPN multihoming needs the ability to update fdb ecmp nexthops independent of the fdb entries. New route nexthop API is perfect for this usecase. This patch extends the vxlan fdb code to take a nexthop id pointing to an ecmp nexthop group. Changes include: - New NDA_NH_ID attribute for fdbs - Use the newly added fdb nexthop groups - makes vxlan rdsts and nexthop handling code mutually exclusive - since this is a new use-case and the requirement is for ecmp nexthop groups, the fdb add and update path checks that the nexthop is really an ecmp nexthop group. This check can be relaxed in the future, if we want to introduce replication fdb nexthop groups and allow its use in lieu of current rdst lists. - fdb update requests with nexthop id's only allowed for existing fdb's that have nexthop id's - learning will not override an existing fdb entry with nexthop group - I have wrapped the switchdev offload code around the presence of rdst [1] E-VPN RFC https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7432 [2] E-VPN with vxlan https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8365 [3] http://vger.kernel.org/lpc_net2018_talks/scaling_bridge_fdb_database_slidesV3.pdf Includes a null check fix in vxlan_xmit from Nikolay v2 - Fixed build issue: Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-05-22 13:26:14 +08:00
#include <net/nexthop.h>
#define IANA_VXLAN_UDP_PORT 4789
/* VXLAN protocol (RFC 7348) header:
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* |R|R|R|R|I|R|R|R| Reserved |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI) | Reserved |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
* I = VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI) present.
*/
struct vxlanhdr {
__be32 vx_flags;
__be32 vx_vni;
};
/* VXLAN header flags. */
#define VXLAN_HF_VNI cpu_to_be32(BIT(27))
#define VXLAN_N_VID (1u << 24)
#define VXLAN_VID_MASK (VXLAN_N_VID - 1)
#define VXLAN_VNI_MASK cpu_to_be32(VXLAN_VID_MASK << 8)
#define VXLAN_HLEN (sizeof(struct udphdr) + sizeof(struct vxlanhdr))
#define VNI_HASH_BITS 10
#define VNI_HASH_SIZE (1<<VNI_HASH_BITS)
#define FDB_HASH_BITS 8
#define FDB_HASH_SIZE (1<<FDB_HASH_BITS)
/* Remote checksum offload for VXLAN (VXLAN_F_REMCSUM_[RT]X):
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* |R|R|R|R|I|R|R|R|R|R|C| Reserved |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI) |O| Csum start |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
* C = Remote checksum offload bit. When set indicates that the
* remote checksum offload data is present.
*
* O = Offset bit. Indicates the checksum offset relative to
* checksum start.
*
* Csum start = Checksum start divided by two.
*
* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco
*/
/* VXLAN-RCO header flags. */
#define VXLAN_HF_RCO cpu_to_be32(BIT(21))
/* Remote checksum offload header option */
#define VXLAN_RCO_MASK cpu_to_be32(0x7f) /* Last byte of vni field */
#define VXLAN_RCO_UDP cpu_to_be32(0x80) /* Indicate UDP RCO (TCP when not set *) */
#define VXLAN_RCO_SHIFT 1 /* Left shift of start */
#define VXLAN_RCO_SHIFT_MASK ((1 << VXLAN_RCO_SHIFT) - 1)
#define VXLAN_MAX_REMCSUM_START (0x7f << VXLAN_RCO_SHIFT)
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
/*
* VXLAN Group Based Policy Extension (VXLAN_F_GBP):
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* |G|R|R|R|I|R|R|R|R|D|R|R|A|R|R|R| Group Policy ID |
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI) | Reserved |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
* G = Group Policy ID present.
*
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
* D = Don't Learn bit. When set, this bit indicates that the egress
* VTEP MUST NOT learn the source address of the encapsulated frame.
*
* A = Indicates that the group policy has already been applied to
* this packet. Policies MUST NOT be applied by devices when the
* A bit is set.
*
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
*/
struct vxlanhdr_gbp {
u8 vx_flags;
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN_BITFIELD
u8 reserved_flags1:3,
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
policy_applied:1,
reserved_flags2:2,
dont_learn:1,
reserved_flags3:1;
#elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
u8 reserved_flags1:1,
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
dont_learn:1,
reserved_flags2:2,
policy_applied:1,
reserved_flags3:3;
#else
#error "Please fix <asm/byteorder.h>"
#endif
__be16 policy_id;
__be32 vx_vni;
};
/* VXLAN-GBP header flags. */
#define VXLAN_HF_GBP cpu_to_be32(BIT(31))
#define VXLAN_GBP_USED_BITS (VXLAN_HF_GBP | cpu_to_be32(0xFFFFFF))
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
/* skb->mark mapping
*
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* |R|R|R|R|R|R|R|R|R|D|R|R|A|R|R|R| Group Policy ID |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*/
#define VXLAN_GBP_DONT_LEARN (BIT(6) << 16)
#define VXLAN_GBP_POLICY_APPLIED (BIT(3) << 16)
#define VXLAN_GBP_ID_MASK (0xFFFF)
#define VXLAN_GBP_MASK (VXLAN_GBP_DONT_LEARN | VXLAN_GBP_POLICY_APPLIED | \
VXLAN_GBP_ID_MASK)
/*
* VXLAN Generic Protocol Extension (VXLAN_F_GPE):
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* |R|R|Ver|I|P|R|O| Reserved |Next Protocol |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI) | Reserved |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
* Ver = Version. Indicates VXLAN GPE protocol version.
*
* P = Next Protocol Bit. The P bit is set to indicate that the
* Next Protocol field is present.
*
* O = OAM Flag Bit. The O bit is set to indicate that the packet
* is an OAM packet.
*
* Next Protocol = This 8 bit field indicates the protocol header
* immediately following the VXLAN GPE header.
*
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-nvo3-vxlan-gpe-01
*/
struct vxlanhdr_gpe {
#if defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
u8 oam_flag:1,
reserved_flags1:1,
np_applied:1,
instance_applied:1,
version:2,
reserved_flags2:2;
#elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
u8 reserved_flags2:2,
version:2,
instance_applied:1,
np_applied:1,
reserved_flags1:1,
oam_flag:1;
#endif
u8 reserved_flags3;
u8 reserved_flags4;
u8 next_protocol;
__be32 vx_vni;
};
/* VXLAN-GPE header flags. */
#define VXLAN_HF_VER cpu_to_be32(BIT(29) | BIT(28))
#define VXLAN_HF_NP cpu_to_be32(BIT(26))
#define VXLAN_HF_OAM cpu_to_be32(BIT(24))
#define VXLAN_GPE_USED_BITS (VXLAN_HF_VER | VXLAN_HF_NP | VXLAN_HF_OAM | \
cpu_to_be32(0xff))
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
struct vxlan_metadata {
u32 gbp;
};
/* per UDP socket information */
struct vxlan_sock {
struct hlist_node hlist;
struct socket *sock;
struct hlist_head vni_list[VNI_HASH_SIZE];
refcount_t refcnt;
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
u32 flags;
};
union vxlan_addr {
struct sockaddr_in sin;
struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
struct sockaddr sa;
};
struct vxlan_rdst {
union vxlan_addr remote_ip;
__be16 remote_port;
u8 offloaded:1;
__be32 remote_vni;
u32 remote_ifindex;
vxlan: add adjacent link to limit depth level Current vxlan code doesn't limit the number of nested devices. Nested devices would be handled recursively and this routine needs huge stack memory. So, unlimited nested devices could make stack overflow. In order to fix this issue, this patch adds adjacent links. The adjacent link APIs internally check the depth level. Test commands: ip link add dummy0 type dummy ip link add vxlan0 type vxlan id 0 group 239.1.1.1 dev dummy0 \ dstport 4789 for i in {1..100} do let A=$i-1 ip link add vxlan$i type vxlan id $i group 239.1.1.1 \ dev vxlan$A dstport 4789 done ip link del dummy0 The top upper link is vxlan100 and the lowest link is vxlan0. When vxlan0 is deleting, the upper devices will be deleted recursively. It needs huge stack memory so it makes stack overflow. Splat looks like: [ 229.628477] ============================================================================= [ 229.629785] BUG page->ptl (Not tainted): Padding overwritten. 0x0000000026abf214-0x0000000091f6abb2 [ 229.629785] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 229.629785] [ 229.655439] ================================================================== [ 229.629785] INFO: Slab 0x00000000ff7cfda8 objects=19 used=19 fp=0x00000000fe33776c flags=0x200000000010200 [ 229.655688] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in unmap_single_vma+0x25a/0x2e0 [ 229.655688] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888113076928 by task vlan-network-in/2334 [ 229.655688] [ 229.629785] Padding 0000000026abf214: 00 80 14 0d 81 88 ff ff 68 91 81 14 81 88 ff ff ........h....... [ 229.629785] Padding 0000000001e24790: 38 91 81 14 81 88 ff ff 68 91 81 14 81 88 ff ff 8.......h....... [ 229.629785] Padding 00000000b39397c8: 33 30 62 a7 ff ff ff ff ff eb 60 22 10 f1 ff 1f 30b.......`".... [ 229.629785] Padding 00000000bc98f53a: 80 60 07 13 81 88 ff ff 00 80 14 0d 81 88 ff ff .`.............. [ 229.629785] Padding 000000002aa8123d: 68 91 81 14 81 88 ff ff f7 21 17 a7 ff ff ff ff h........!...... [ 229.629785] Padding 000000001c8c2369: 08 81 14 0d 81 88 ff ff 03 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 229.629785] Padding 000000004e290c5d: 21 90 a2 21 10 ed ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df !..!............ [ 229.629785] Padding 000000000e25d731: 18 60 07 13 81 88 ff ff c0 8b 13 05 81 88 ff ff .`.............. [ 229.629785] Padding 000000007adc7ab3: b3 8a b5 41 00 00 00 00 ...A.... [ 229.629785] FIX page->ptl: Restoring 0x0000000026abf214-0x0000000091f6abb2=0x5a [ ... ] Fixes: acaf4e70997f ("net: vxlan: when lower dev unregisters remove vxlan dev as well") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-10-22 02:47:57 +08:00
struct net_device *remote_dev;
struct list_head list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
struct dst_cache dst_cache;
};
struct vxlan_config {
union vxlan_addr remote_ip;
union vxlan_addr saddr;
__be32 vni;
int remote_ifindex;
int mtu;
__be16 dst_port;
u16 port_min;
u16 port_max;
u8 tos;
u8 ttl;
__be32 label;
u32 flags;
unsigned long age_interval;
unsigned int addrmax;
bool no_share;
enum ifla_vxlan_df df;
};
struct vxlan_dev_node {
struct hlist_node hlist;
struct vxlan_dev *vxlan;
};
/* Pseudo network device */
struct vxlan_dev {
struct vxlan_dev_node hlist4; /* vni hash table for IPv4 socket */
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
struct vxlan_dev_node hlist6; /* vni hash table for IPv6 socket */
#endif
struct list_head next; /* vxlan's per namespace list */
struct vxlan_sock __rcu *vn4_sock; /* listening socket for IPv4 */
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
struct vxlan_sock __rcu *vn6_sock; /* listening socket for IPv6 */
#endif
struct net_device *dev;
struct net *net; /* netns for packet i/o */
struct vxlan_rdst default_dst; /* default destination */
struct timer_list age_timer;
spinlock_t hash_lock[FDB_HASH_SIZE];
unsigned int addrcnt;
struct gro_cells gro_cells;
struct vxlan_config cfg;
struct hlist_head fdb_head[FDB_HASH_SIZE];
};
#define VXLAN_F_LEARN 0x01
#define VXLAN_F_PROXY 0x02
#define VXLAN_F_RSC 0x04
#define VXLAN_F_L2MISS 0x08
#define VXLAN_F_L3MISS 0x10
#define VXLAN_F_IPV6 0x20
#define VXLAN_F_UDP_ZERO_CSUM_TX 0x40
#define VXLAN_F_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_TX 0x80
#define VXLAN_F_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_RX 0x100
vxlan: Remote checksum offload Add support for remote checksum offload in VXLAN. This uses a reserved bit to indicate that RCO is being done, and uses the low order reserved eight bits of the VNI to hold the start and offset values in a compressed manner. Start is encoded in the low order seven bits of VNI. This is start >> 1 so that the checksum start offset is 0-254 using even values only. Checksum offset (transport checksum field) is indicated in the high order bit in the low order byte of the VNI. If the bit is set, the checksum field is for UDP (so offset = start + 6), else checksum field is for TCP (so offset = start + 16). Only TCP and UDP are supported in this implementation. Remote checksum offload for VXLAN is described in: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-herbert-vxlan-rco-00 Tested by running 200 TCP_STREAM connections with VXLAN (over IPv4). With UDP checksums and Remote Checksum Offload IPv4 Client 11.84% CPU utilization Server 12.96% CPU utilization 9197 Mbps IPv6 Client 12.46% CPU utilization Server 14.48% CPU utilization 8963 Mbps With UDP checksums, no remote checksum offload IPv4 Client 15.67% CPU utilization Server 14.83% CPU utilization 9094 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.21% CPU utilization Server 14.32% CPU utilization 9058 Mbps No UDP checksums IPv4 Client 15.03% CPU utilization Server 23.09% CPU utilization 9089 Mbps IPv6 Client 16.18% CPU utilization Server 26.57% CPU utilization 8954 Mbps Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-13 09:00:38 +08:00
#define VXLAN_F_REMCSUM_TX 0x200
#define VXLAN_F_REMCSUM_RX 0x400
vxlan: Group Policy extension Implements supports for the Group Policy VXLAN extension [0] to provide a lightweight and simple security label mechanism across network peers based on VXLAN. The security context and associated metadata is mapped to/from skb->mark. This allows further mapping to a SELinux context using SECMARK, to implement ACLs directly with nftables, iptables, OVS, tc, etc. The group membership is defined by the lower 16 bits of skb->mark, the upper 16 bits are used for flags. SELinux allows to manage label to secure local resources. However, distributed applications require ACLs to implemented across hosts. This is typically achieved by matching on L2-L4 fields to identify the original sending host and process on the receiver. On top of that, netlabel and specifically CIPSO [1] allow to map security contexts to universal labels. However, netlabel and CIPSO are relatively complex. This patch provides a lightweight alternative for overlay network environments with a trusted underlay. No additional control protocol is required. Host 1: Host 2: Group A Group B Group B Group A +-----+ +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ | lxc | | SELinux CTX | | httpd | | VM | +--+--+ +--+----------+ +---+---+ +--+--+ \---+---/ \----+---/ | | +---+---+ +---+---+ | vxlan | | vxlan | +---+---+ +---+---+ +------------------------------+ Backwards compatibility: A VXLAN-GBP socket can receive standard VXLAN frames and will assign the default group 0x0000 to such frames. A Linux VXLAN socket will drop VXLAN-GBP frames. The extension is therefore disabled by default and needs to be specifically enabled: ip link add [...] type vxlan [...] gbp In a mixed environment with VXLAN and VXLAN-GBP sockets, the GBP socket must run on a separate port number. Examples: iptables: host1# iptables -I OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner 101 -j MARK --set-mark 0x200 host2# iptables -I INPUT -m mark --mark 0x200 -j DROP OVS: # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=1,actions=load:0x200->NXM_NX_TUN_GBP_ID[],NORMAL' # ovs-ofctl add-flow br0 'in_port=2,tun_gbp_id=0x200,actions=drop' [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smith-vxlan-group-policy [1] http://lwn.net/Articles/204905/ Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-01-15 10:53:55 +08:00
#define VXLAN_F_GBP 0x800
#define VXLAN_F_REMCSUM_NOPARTIAL 0x1000
vxlan: Flow based tunneling Allows putting a VXLAN device into a new flow-based mode in which skbs with a ip_tunnel_info dst metadata attached will be encapsulated according to the instructions stored in there with the VXLAN device defaults taken into consideration. Similar on the receive side, if the VXLAN_F_COLLECT_METADATA flag is set, the packet processing will populate a ip_tunnel_info struct for each packet received and attach it to the skb using the new metadata dst. The metadata structure will contain the outer header and tunnel header fields which have been stripped off. Layers further up in the stack such as routing, tc or netfitler can later match on these fields and perform forwarding. It is the responsibility of upper layers to ensure that the flag is set if the metadata is needed. The flag limits the additional cost of metadata collecting based on demand. This prepares the VXLAN device to be steered by the routing and other subsystems which allows to support encapsulation for a large number of tunnel endpoints and tunnel ids through a single net_device which improves the scalability. It also allows for OVS to leverage this mode which in turn allows for the removal of the OVS specific VXLAN code. Because the skb is currently scrubed in vxlan_rcv(), the attachment of the new dst metadata is postponed until after scrubing which requires the temporary addition of a new member to vxlan_metadata. This member is removed again in a later commit after the indirect VXLAN receive API has been removed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-07-21 16:43:58 +08:00
#define VXLAN_F_COLLECT_METADATA 0x2000
#define VXLAN_F_GPE 0x4000
#define VXLAN_F_IPV6_LINKLOCAL 0x8000
#define VXLAN_F_TTL_INHERIT 0x10000
/* Flags that are used in the receive path. These flags must match in
* order for a socket to be shareable
*/
#define VXLAN_F_RCV_FLAGS (VXLAN_F_GBP | \
VXLAN_F_GPE | \
VXLAN_F_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_RX | \
VXLAN_F_REMCSUM_RX | \
vxlan: Flow based tunneling Allows putting a VXLAN device into a new flow-based mode in which skbs with a ip_tunnel_info dst metadata attached will be encapsulated according to the instructions stored in there with the VXLAN device defaults taken into consideration. Similar on the receive side, if the VXLAN_F_COLLECT_METADATA flag is set, the packet processing will populate a ip_tunnel_info struct for each packet received and attach it to the skb using the new metadata dst. The metadata structure will contain the outer header and tunnel header fields which have been stripped off. Layers further up in the stack such as routing, tc or netfitler can later match on these fields and perform forwarding. It is the responsibility of upper layers to ensure that the flag is set if the metadata is needed. The flag limits the additional cost of metadata collecting based on demand. This prepares the VXLAN device to be steered by the routing and other subsystems which allows to support encapsulation for a large number of tunnel endpoints and tunnel ids through a single net_device which improves the scalability. It also allows for OVS to leverage this mode which in turn allows for the removal of the OVS specific VXLAN code. Because the skb is currently scrubed in vxlan_rcv(), the attachment of the new dst metadata is postponed until after scrubing which requires the temporary addition of a new member to vxlan_metadata. This member is removed again in a later commit after the indirect VXLAN receive API has been removed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-07-21 16:43:58 +08:00
VXLAN_F_REMCSUM_NOPARTIAL | \
VXLAN_F_COLLECT_METADATA)
/* Flags that can be set together with VXLAN_F_GPE. */
#define VXLAN_F_ALLOWED_GPE (VXLAN_F_GPE | \
VXLAN_F_IPV6 | \
VXLAN_F_IPV6_LINKLOCAL | \
VXLAN_F_UDP_ZERO_CSUM_TX | \
VXLAN_F_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_TX | \
VXLAN_F_UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_RX | \
VXLAN_F_COLLECT_METADATA)
struct net_device *vxlan_dev_create(struct net *net, const char *name,
u8 name_assign_type, struct vxlan_config *conf);
static inline netdev_features_t vxlan_features_check(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features)
{
u8 l4_hdr = 0;
if (!skb->encapsulation)
return features;
switch (vlan_get_protocol(skb)) {
case htons(ETH_P_IP):
l4_hdr = ip_hdr(skb)->protocol;
break;
case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
l4_hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->nexthdr;
break;
default:
return features;
}
if ((l4_hdr == IPPROTO_UDP) &&
(skb->inner_protocol_type != ENCAP_TYPE_ETHER ||
skb->inner_protocol != htons(ETH_P_TEB) ||
(skb_inner_mac_header(skb) - skb_transport_header(skb) !=
sizeof(struct udphdr) + sizeof(struct vxlanhdr)) ||
(skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_NONE &&
!can_checksum_protocol(features, inner_eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto))))
return features & ~(NETIF_F_CSUM_MASK | NETIF_F_GSO_MASK);
return features;
}
/* IP header + UDP + VXLAN + Ethernet header */
#define VXLAN_HEADROOM (20 + 8 + 8 + 14)
/* IPv6 header + UDP + VXLAN + Ethernet header */
#define VXLAN6_HEADROOM (40 + 8 + 8 + 14)
static inline struct vxlanhdr *vxlan_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return (struct vxlanhdr *)(udp_hdr(skb) + 1);
}
static inline __be32 vxlan_vni(__be32 vni_field)
{
#if defined(__BIG_ENDIAN)
return (__force __be32)((__force u32)vni_field >> 8);
#else
return (__force __be32)((__force u32)(vni_field & VXLAN_VNI_MASK) << 8);
#endif
}
static inline __be32 vxlan_vni_field(__be32 vni)
{
#if defined(__BIG_ENDIAN)
return (__force __be32)((__force u32)vni << 8);
#else
return (__force __be32)((__force u32)vni >> 8);
#endif
}
static inline size_t vxlan_rco_start(__be32 vni_field)
{
return be32_to_cpu(vni_field & VXLAN_RCO_MASK) << VXLAN_RCO_SHIFT;
}
static inline size_t vxlan_rco_offset(__be32 vni_field)
{
return (vni_field & VXLAN_RCO_UDP) ?
offsetof(struct udphdr, check) :
offsetof(struct tcphdr, check);
}
static inline __be32 vxlan_compute_rco(unsigned int start, unsigned int offset)
{
__be32 vni_field = cpu_to_be32(start >> VXLAN_RCO_SHIFT);
if (offset == offsetof(struct udphdr, check))
vni_field |= VXLAN_RCO_UDP;
return vni_field;
}
static inline unsigned short vxlan_get_sk_family(struct vxlan_sock *vs)
{
return vs->sock->sk->sk_family;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
static inline bool vxlan_addr_any(const union vxlan_addr *ipa)
{
if (ipa->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
return ipv6_addr_any(&ipa->sin6.sin6_addr);
else
return ipa->sin.sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_ANY);
}
static inline bool vxlan_addr_multicast(const union vxlan_addr *ipa)
{
if (ipa->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
return ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&ipa->sin6.sin6_addr);
else
return ipv4_is_multicast(ipa->sin.sin_addr.s_addr);
}
#else /* !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
static inline bool vxlan_addr_any(const union vxlan_addr *ipa)
{
return ipa->sin.sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_ANY);
}
static inline bool vxlan_addr_multicast(const union vxlan_addr *ipa)
{
return ipv4_is_multicast(ipa->sin.sin_addr.s_addr);
}
#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
static inline bool netif_is_vxlan(const struct net_device *dev)
{
return dev->rtnl_link_ops &&
!strcmp(dev->rtnl_link_ops->kind, "vxlan");
}
struct switchdev_notifier_vxlan_fdb_info {
struct switchdev_notifier_info info; /* must be first */
union vxlan_addr remote_ip;
__be16 remote_port;
__be32 remote_vni;
u32 remote_ifindex;
u8 eth_addr[ETH_ALEN];
__be32 vni;
bool offloaded;
bool added_by_user;
};
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VXLAN)
int vxlan_fdb_find_uc(struct net_device *dev, const u8 *mac, __be32 vni,
struct switchdev_notifier_vxlan_fdb_info *fdb_info);
int vxlan_fdb_replay(const struct net_device *dev, __be32 vni,
struct notifier_block *nb,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack);
void vxlan_fdb_clear_offload(const struct net_device *dev, __be32 vni);
#else
static inline int
vxlan_fdb_find_uc(struct net_device *dev, const u8 *mac, __be32 vni,
struct switchdev_notifier_vxlan_fdb_info *fdb_info)
{
return -ENOENT;
}
static inline int vxlan_fdb_replay(const struct net_device *dev, __be32 vni,
struct notifier_block *nb,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline void
vxlan_fdb_clear_offload(const struct net_device *dev, __be32 vni)
{
}
#endif
static inline void vxlan_flag_attr_error(int attrtype,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
#define VXLAN_FLAG(flg) \
case IFLA_VXLAN_##flg: \
NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, \
"cannot change " #flg " flag"); \
break
switch (attrtype) {
VXLAN_FLAG(TTL_INHERIT);
VXLAN_FLAG(LEARNING);
VXLAN_FLAG(PROXY);
VXLAN_FLAG(RSC);
VXLAN_FLAG(L2MISS);
VXLAN_FLAG(L3MISS);
VXLAN_FLAG(COLLECT_METADATA);
VXLAN_FLAG(UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_TX);
VXLAN_FLAG(UDP_ZERO_CSUM6_RX);
VXLAN_FLAG(REMCSUM_TX);
VXLAN_FLAG(REMCSUM_RX);
VXLAN_FLAG(GBP);
VXLAN_FLAG(GPE);
VXLAN_FLAG(REMCSUM_NOPARTIAL);
default:
NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, \
"cannot change flag");
break;
}
#undef VXLAN_FLAG
}
vxlan: ecmp support for mac fdb entries Todays vxlan mac fdb entries can point to multiple remote ips (rdsts) with the sole purpose of replicating broadcast-multicast and unknown unicast packets to those remote ips. E-VPN multihoming [1,2,3] requires bridged vxlan traffic to be load balanced to remote switches (vteps) belonging to the same multi-homed ethernet segment (E-VPN multihoming is analogous to multi-homed LAG implementations, but with the inter-switch peerlink replaced with a vxlan tunnel). In other words it needs support for mac ecmp. Furthermore, for faster convergence, E-VPN multihoming needs the ability to update fdb ecmp nexthops independent of the fdb entries. New route nexthop API is perfect for this usecase. This patch extends the vxlan fdb code to take a nexthop id pointing to an ecmp nexthop group. Changes include: - New NDA_NH_ID attribute for fdbs - Use the newly added fdb nexthop groups - makes vxlan rdsts and nexthop handling code mutually exclusive - since this is a new use-case and the requirement is for ecmp nexthop groups, the fdb add and update path checks that the nexthop is really an ecmp nexthop group. This check can be relaxed in the future, if we want to introduce replication fdb nexthop groups and allow its use in lieu of current rdst lists. - fdb update requests with nexthop id's only allowed for existing fdb's that have nexthop id's - learning will not override an existing fdb entry with nexthop group - I have wrapped the switchdev offload code around the presence of rdst [1] E-VPN RFC https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7432 [2] E-VPN with vxlan https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8365 [3] http://vger.kernel.org/lpc_net2018_talks/scaling_bridge_fdb_database_slidesV3.pdf Includes a null check fix in vxlan_xmit from Nikolay v2 - Fixed build issue: Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-05-22 13:26:14 +08:00
static inline bool vxlan_fdb_nh_path_select(struct nexthop *nh,
int hash,
struct vxlan_rdst *rdst)
{
struct fib_nh_common *nhc;
nhc = nexthop_path_fdb_result(nh, hash);
if (unlikely(!nhc))
return false;
switch (nhc->nhc_gw_family) {
case AF_INET:
rdst->remote_ip.sin.sin_addr.s_addr = nhc->nhc_gw.ipv4;
rdst->remote_ip.sa.sa_family = AF_INET;
break;
case AF_INET6:
rdst->remote_ip.sin6.sin6_addr = nhc->nhc_gw.ipv6;
rdst->remote_ip.sa.sa_family = AF_INET6;
break;
}
return true;
}
#endif