linux/net/sctp/inqueue.c

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/* SCTP kernel implementation
* Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Cisco, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Motorola, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2002 International Business Machines, Corp.
*
* This file is part of the SCTP kernel implementation
*
* These functions are the methods for accessing the SCTP inqueue.
*
* An SCTP inqueue is a queue into which you push SCTP packets
* (which might be bundles or fragments of chunks) and out of which you
* pop SCTP whole chunks.
*
* This SCTP implementation is free software;
* you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of
* the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
* any later version.
*
* This SCTP implementation is distributed in the hope that it
* will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
* ************************
* warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
* See the GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with GNU CC; see the file COPYING. If not, see
* <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
* Please send any bug reports or fixes you make to the
* email address(es):
* lksctp developers <linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org>
*
* Written or modified by:
* La Monte H.P. Yarroll <piggy@acm.org>
* Karl Knutson <karl@athena.chicago.il.us>
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <net/sctp/sctp.h>
#include <net/sctp/sm.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
/* Initialize an SCTP inqueue. */
void sctp_inq_init(struct sctp_inq *queue)
{
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&queue->in_chunk_list);
queue->in_progress = NULL;
/* Create a task for delivering data. */
INIT_WORK(&queue->immediate, NULL);
}
/* Release the memory associated with an SCTP inqueue. */
void sctp_inq_free(struct sctp_inq *queue)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk, *tmp;
/* Empty the queue. */
list_for_each_entry_safe(chunk, tmp, &queue->in_chunk_list, list) {
list_del_init(&chunk->list);
sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
}
/* If there is a packet which is currently being worked on,
* free it as well.
*/
if (queue->in_progress) {
sctp_chunk_free(queue->in_progress);
queue->in_progress = NULL;
}
}
/* Put a new packet in an SCTP inqueue.
* We assume that packet->sctp_hdr is set and in host byte order.
*/
void sctp_inq_push(struct sctp_inq *q, struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
/* Directly call the packet handling routine. */
if (chunk->rcvr->dead) {
sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
return;
}
/* We are now calling this either from the soft interrupt
* or from the backlog processing.
* Eventually, we should clean up inqueue to not rely
* on the BH related data structures.
*/
list_add_tail(&chunk->list, &q->in_chunk_list);
sctp: Add support to per-association statistics via a new SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS call The current SCTP stack is lacking a mechanism to have per association statistics. This is an implementation modeled after OpenSolaris' SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS. Userspace part will follow on lksctp if/when there is a general ACK on this. V4: - Move ipackets++ before q->immediate.func() for consistency reasons - Move sctp_max_rto() at the end of sctp_transport_update_rto() to avoid returning bogus RTO values - return asoc->rto_min when max_obs_rto value has not changed V3: - Increase ictrlchunks in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() as well - Move ipackets++ to sctp_inq_push() - return 0 when no rto updates took place since the last call V2: - Implement partial retrieval of stat struct to cope for future expansion - Kill the rtxpackets counter as it cannot be precise anyway - Rename outseqtsns to outofseqtsns to make it clearer that these are out of sequence unexpected TSNs - Move asoc->ipackets++ under a lock to avoid potential miscounts - Fold asoc->opackets++ into the already existing asoc check - Kill unneeded (q->asoc) test when increasing rtxchunks - Do not count octrlchunks if sending failed (SCTP_XMIT_OK != 0) - Don't count SHUTDOWNs as SACKs - Move SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS to the private space API - Adjust the len check in sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats() to allow for future struct growth - Move association statistics in their own struct - Update idupchunks when we send a SACK with dup TSNs - return min_rto in max_rto when RTO has not changed. Also return the transport when max_rto last changed. Signed-off: Michele Baldessari <michele@acksyn.org> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-12-01 12:49:42 +08:00
if (chunk->asoc)
chunk->asoc->stats.ipackets++;
q->immediate.func(&q->immediate);
}
/* Peek at the next chunk on the inqeue. */
struct sctp_chunkhdr *sctp_inq_peek(struct sctp_inq *queue)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch = NULL;
chunk = queue->in_progress;
/* If there is no more chunks in this packet, say so */
if (chunk->singleton ||
chunk->end_of_packet ||
chunk->pdiscard)
return NULL;
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *)chunk->chunk_end;
return ch;
}
/* Extract a chunk from an SCTP inqueue.
*
* WARNING: If you need to put the chunk on another queue, you need to
* make a shallow copy (clone) of it.
*/
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_inq_pop(struct sctp_inq *queue)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch = NULL;
/* The assumption is that we are safe to process the chunks
* at this time.
*/
chunk = queue->in_progress;
if (chunk) {
/* There is a packet that we have been working on.
* Any post processing work to do before we move on?
*/
if (chunk->singleton ||
chunk->end_of_packet ||
chunk->pdiscard) {
if (chunk->head_skb == chunk->skb) {
chunk->skb = skb_shinfo(chunk->skb)->frag_list;
goto new_skb;
}
if (chunk->skb->next) {
chunk->skb = chunk->skb->next;
goto new_skb;
}
if (chunk->head_skb)
chunk->skb = chunk->head_skb;
sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
chunk = queue->in_progress = NULL;
} else {
/* Nothing to do. Next chunk in the packet, please. */
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->chunk_end;
/* Force chunk->skb->data to chunk->chunk_end. */
net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes in the form of ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------> [...] ---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------> ... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton, since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of chunks which it eats up one by one. We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may then turn it into a response flood when flushing the queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF serial numbers and could see the server side consuming excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more]. The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set, but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling. In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the side-effect interpreter run. One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible. I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to look good now. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:33 +08:00
skb_pull(chunk->skb, chunk->chunk_end - chunk->skb->data);
/* We are guaranteed to pull a SCTP header. */
}
}
/* Do we need to take the next packet out of the queue to process? */
if (!chunk) {
struct list_head *entry;
next_chunk:
/* Is the queue empty? */
entry = sctp_list_dequeue(&queue->in_chunk_list);
if (!entry)
return NULL;
chunk = list_entry(entry, struct sctp_chunk, list);
if ((skb_shinfo(chunk->skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_SCTP) == SKB_GSO_SCTP) {
/* GSO-marked skbs but without frags, handle
* them normally
*/
if (skb_shinfo(chunk->skb)->frag_list)
chunk->head_skb = chunk->skb;
/* skbs with "cover letter" */
if (chunk->head_skb && chunk->skb->data_len == chunk->skb->len)
chunk->skb = skb_shinfo(chunk->skb)->frag_list;
if (WARN_ON(!chunk->skb)) {
__SCTP_INC_STATS(dev_net(chunk->skb->dev), SCTP_MIB_IN_PKT_DISCARDS);
sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
goto next_chunk;
}
}
if (chunk->asoc)
sock_rps_save_rxhash(chunk->asoc->base.sk, chunk->skb);
queue->in_progress = chunk;
new_skb:
/* This is the first chunk in the packet. */
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->skb->data;
chunk->singleton = 1;
chunk->data_accepted = 0;
chunk->pdiscard = 0;
chunk->auth = 0;
chunk->has_asconf = 0;
chunk->end_of_packet = 0;
sctp: allow GSO frags to access the chunk too SCTP will try to access original IP headers on sctp_recvmsg in order to copy the addresses used. There are also other places that do similar access to IP or even SCTP headers. But after 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO support") they aren't always there because they are only present in the header skb. SCTP handles the queueing of incoming data by cloning the incoming skb and limiting to only the relevant payload. This clone has its cb updated to something different and it's then queued on socket rx queue. Thus we need to fix this in two moments. For rx path, not related to socket queue yet, this patch uses a partially copied sctp_input_cb to such GSO frags. This restores the ability to access the headers for this part of the code. Regarding the socket rx queue, it removes iif member from sctp_event and also add a chunk pointer on it. With these changes we're always able to reach the headers again. The biggest change here is that now the sctp_chunk struct and the original skb are only freed after the application consumed the buffer. Note however that the original payload was already like this due to the skb cloning. For iif, SCTP's IPv4 code doesn't use it, so no change is necessary. IPv6 now can fetch it directly from original's IPv6 CB as the original skb is still accessible. In the future we probably can simplify sctp_v*_skb_iif() stuff, as sctp_v4_skb_iif() was called but it's return value not used, and now it's not even called, but such cleanup is out of scope for this change. Fixes: 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-14 02:08:57 +08:00
if (chunk->head_skb) {
struct sctp_input_cb
*cb = SCTP_INPUT_CB(chunk->skb),
*head_cb = SCTP_INPUT_CB(chunk->head_skb);
cb->chunk = head_cb->chunk;
cb->af = head_cb->af;
sctp: allow GSO frags to access the chunk too SCTP will try to access original IP headers on sctp_recvmsg in order to copy the addresses used. There are also other places that do similar access to IP or even SCTP headers. But after 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO support") they aren't always there because they are only present in the header skb. SCTP handles the queueing of incoming data by cloning the incoming skb and limiting to only the relevant payload. This clone has its cb updated to something different and it's then queued on socket rx queue. Thus we need to fix this in two moments. For rx path, not related to socket queue yet, this patch uses a partially copied sctp_input_cb to such GSO frags. This restores the ability to access the headers for this part of the code. Regarding the socket rx queue, it removes iif member from sctp_event and also add a chunk pointer on it. With these changes we're always able to reach the headers again. The biggest change here is that now the sctp_chunk struct and the original skb are only freed after the application consumed the buffer. Note however that the original payload was already like this due to the skb cloning. For iif, SCTP's IPv4 code doesn't use it, so no change is necessary. IPv6 now can fetch it directly from original's IPv6 CB as the original skb is still accessible. In the future we probably can simplify sctp_v*_skb_iif() stuff, as sctp_v4_skb_iif() was called but it's return value not used, and now it's not even called, but such cleanup is out of scope for this change. Fixes: 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-14 02:08:57 +08:00
}
}
chunk->chunk_hdr = ch;
chunk->chunk_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length));
skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
chunk->subh.v = NULL; /* Subheader is no longer valid. */
net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes in the form of ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------> [...] ---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------> ... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton, since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of chunks which it eats up one by one. We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may then turn it into a response flood when flushing the queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF serial numbers and could see the server side consuming excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more]. The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set, but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling. In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the side-effect interpreter run. One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible. I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to look good now. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:33 +08:00
if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) <
skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
/* This is not a singleton */
chunk->singleton = 0;
} else if (chunk->chunk_end > skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes in the form of ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------> [...] ---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------> ... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton, since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of chunks which it eats up one by one. We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may then turn it into a response flood when flushing the queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF serial numbers and could see the server side consuming excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more]. The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set, but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling. In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the side-effect interpreter run. One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible. I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to look good now. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:33 +08:00
/* Discard inside state machine. */
chunk->pdiscard = 1;
chunk->chunk_end = skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb);
} else {
/* We are at the end of the packet, so mark the chunk
* in case we need to send a SACK.
*/
chunk->end_of_packet = 1;
}
net: sctp: rework debugging framework to use pr_debug and friends We should get rid of all own SCTP debug printk macros and use the ones that the kernel offers anyway instead. This makes the code more readable and conform to the kernel code, and offers all the features of dynamic debbuging that pr_debug() et al has, such as only turning on/off portions of debug messages at runtime through debugfs. The runtime cost of having CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG enabled, but none of the debug statements printing, is negligible [1]. If kernel debugging is completly turned off, then these statements will also compile into "empty" functions. While we're at it, we also need to change the Kconfig option as it /now/ only refers to the ifdef'ed code portions in outqueue.c that enable further debugging/tracing of SCTP transaction fields. Also, since SCTP_ASSERT code was enabled with this Kconfig option and has now been removed, we transform those code parts into WARNs resp. where appropriate BUG_ONs so that those bugs can be more easily detected as probably not many people have SCTP debugging permanently turned on. To turn on all SCTP debugging, the following steps are needed: # mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug # echo -n 'module sctp +p' > /sys/kernel/debug/dynamic_debug/control This can be done more fine-grained on a per file, per line basis and others as described in [2]. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/ols/2009/ols2009-pages-39-46.pdf [2] Documentation/dynamic-debug-howto.txt Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-06-29 01:49:40 +08:00
pr_debug("+++sctp_inq_pop+++ chunk:%p[%s], length:%d, skb->len:%d\n",
chunk, sctp_cname(SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type)),
ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length), chunk->skb->len);
return chunk;
}
/* Set a top-half handler.
*
* Originally, we the top-half handler was scheduled as a BH. We now
* call the handler directly in sctp_inq_push() at a time that
* we know we are lock safe.
* The intent is that this routine will pull stuff out of the
* inqueue and process it.
*/
void sctp_inq_set_th_handler(struct sctp_inq *q, work_func_t callback)
{
INIT_WORK(&q->immediate, callback);
}