linux/kernel/bpf/core.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* Linux Socket Filter - Kernel level socket filtering
*
* Based on the design of the Berkeley Packet Filter. The new
* internal format has been designed by PLUMgrid:
*
* Copyright (c) 2011 - 2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
*
* Authors:
*
* Jay Schulist <jschlst@samba.org>
* Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
* Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
*
* Andi Kleen - Fix a few bad bugs and races.
* Kris Katterjohn - Added many additional checks in bpf_check_classic()
*/
bpf: Introduce bpf_func_info This patch added interface to load a program with the following additional information: . prog_btf_fd . func_info, func_info_rec_size and func_info_cnt where func_info will provide function range and type_id corresponding to each function. The func_info_rec_size is introduced in the UAPI to specify struct bpf_func_info size passed from user space. This intends to make bpf_func_info structure growable in the future. If the kernel gets a different bpf_func_info size from userspace, it will try to handle user request with part of bpf_func_info it can understand. In this patch, kernel can understand struct bpf_func_info { __u32 insn_offset; __u32 type_id; }; If user passed a bpf func_info record size of 16 bytes, the kernel can still handle part of records with the above definition. If verifier agrees with function range provided by the user, the bpf_prog ksym for each function will use the func name provided in the type_id, which is supposed to provide better encoding as it is not limited by 16 bytes program name limitation and this is better for bpf program which contains multiple subprograms. The bpf_prog_info interface is also extended to return btf_id, func_info, func_info_rec_size and func_info_cnt to userspace, so userspace can print out the function prototype for each xlated function. The insn_offset in the returned func_info corresponds to the insn offset for xlated functions. With other jit related fields in bpf_prog_info, userspace can also print out function prototypes for each jited function. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-11-20 07:29:11 +08:00
#include <uapi/linux/btf.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/moduleloader.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
bpf: Introduce bpf_func_info This patch added interface to load a program with the following additional information: . prog_btf_fd . func_info, func_info_rec_size and func_info_cnt where func_info will provide function range and type_id corresponding to each function. The func_info_rec_size is introduced in the UAPI to specify struct bpf_func_info size passed from user space. This intends to make bpf_func_info structure growable in the future. If the kernel gets a different bpf_func_info size from userspace, it will try to handle user request with part of bpf_func_info it can understand. In this patch, kernel can understand struct bpf_func_info { __u32 insn_offset; __u32 type_id; }; If user passed a bpf func_info record size of 16 bytes, the kernel can still handle part of records with the above definition. If verifier agrees with function range provided by the user, the bpf_prog ksym for each function will use the func name provided in the type_id, which is supposed to provide better encoding as it is not limited by 16 bytes program name limitation and this is better for bpf program which contains multiple subprograms. The bpf_prog_info interface is also extended to return btf_id, func_info, func_info_rec_size and func_info_cnt to userspace, so userspace can print out the function prototype for each xlated function. The insn_offset in the returned func_info corresponds to the insn offset for xlated functions. With other jit related fields in bpf_prog_info, userspace can also print out function prototypes for each jited function. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-11-20 07:29:11 +08:00
#include <linux/btf.h>
bpf: Mark __bpf_prog_run() stack frame as non-standard objtool reports the following false positive warnings: kernel/bpf/core.o: warning: objtool: __bpf_prog_run()+0x5c: sibling call from callable instruction with changed frame pointer kernel/bpf/core.o: warning: objtool: __bpf_prog_run()+0x60: function has unreachable instruction kernel/bpf/core.o: warning: objtool: __bpf_prog_run()+0x64: function has unreachable instruction [...] It's confused by the following dynamic jump instruction in __bpf_prog_run():: jmp *(%r12,%rax,8) which corresponds to the following line in the C code: goto *jumptable[insn->code]; There's no way for objtool to deterministically find all possible branch targets for a dynamic jump, so it can't verify this code. In this case the jumps all stay within the function, and there's nothing unusual going on related to the stack, so we can whitelist the function. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com> Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b90e6bf3fdbfb5c4cc1b164b965502e53cf48935.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 12:22:37 +08:00
#include <linux/frame.h>
bpf: make jited programs visible in traces Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them), thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on dumping stack from a map. This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address() is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent. Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets much better in future, we always have the option to change the default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway. If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms and friends. Before: 7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) After: 7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) [...] 7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-17 05:24:50 +08:00
#include <linux/rbtree_latch.h>
#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
bpf: Add support for BTF pointers to x86 JIT Pointer to BTF object is a pointer to kernel object or NULL. Such pointers can only be used by BPF_LDX instructions. The verifier changed their opcode from LDX|MEM|size to LDX|PROBE_MEM|size to make JITing easier. The number of entries in extable is the number of BPF_LDX insns that access kernel memory via "pointer to BTF type". Only these load instructions can fault. Since x86 extable is relative it has to be allocated in the same memory region as JITed code. Allocate it prior to last pass of JITing and let the last pass populate it. Pointer to extable in bpf_prog_aux is necessary to make page fault handling fast. Page fault handling is done in two steps: 1. bpf_prog_kallsyms_find() finds BPF program that page faulted. It's done by walking rb tree. 2. then extable for given bpf program is binary searched. This process is similar to how page faulting is done for kernel modules. The exception handler skips over faulting x86 instruction and initializes destination register with zero. This mimics exact behavior of bpf_probe_read (when probe_kernel_read faults dest is zeroed). JITs for other architectures can add support in similar way. Until then they will reject unknown opcode and fallback to interpreter. Since extable should be aligned and placed near JITed code make bpf_jit_binary_alloc() return 4 byte aligned image offset, so that extable aligning formula in bpf_int_jit_compile() doesn't need to rely on internal implementation of bpf_jit_binary_alloc(). On x86 gcc defaults to 16-byte alignment for regular kernel functions due to better performance. JITed code may be aligned to 16 in the future, but it will use 4 in the meantime. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191016032505.2089704-10-ast@kernel.org
2019-10-16 11:25:03 +08:00
#include <linux/extable.h>
#include <linux/log2.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
/* Registers */
#define BPF_R0 regs[BPF_REG_0]
#define BPF_R1 regs[BPF_REG_1]
#define BPF_R2 regs[BPF_REG_2]
#define BPF_R3 regs[BPF_REG_3]
#define BPF_R4 regs[BPF_REG_4]
#define BPF_R5 regs[BPF_REG_5]
#define BPF_R6 regs[BPF_REG_6]
#define BPF_R7 regs[BPF_REG_7]
#define BPF_R8 regs[BPF_REG_8]
#define BPF_R9 regs[BPF_REG_9]
#define BPF_R10 regs[BPF_REG_10]
/* Named registers */
#define DST regs[insn->dst_reg]
#define SRC regs[insn->src_reg]
#define FP regs[BPF_REG_FP]
#define AX regs[BPF_REG_AX]
#define ARG1 regs[BPF_REG_ARG1]
#define CTX regs[BPF_REG_CTX]
#define IMM insn->imm
/* No hurry in this branch
*
* Exported for the bpf jit load helper.
*/
void *bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper(const struct sk_buff *skb, int k, unsigned int size)
{
u8 *ptr = NULL;
if (k >= SKF_NET_OFF)
ptr = skb_network_header(skb) + k - SKF_NET_OFF;
else if (k >= SKF_LL_OFF)
ptr = skb_mac_header(skb) + k - SKF_LL_OFF;
if (ptr >= skb->head && ptr + size <= skb_tail_pointer(skb))
return ptr;
return NULL;
}
struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(unsigned int size, gfp_t gfp_extra_flags)
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
{
gfp_t gfp_flags = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO | gfp_extra_flags;
struct bpf_prog_aux *aux;
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
struct bpf_prog *fp;
size = round_up(size, PAGE_SIZE);
fp = __vmalloc(size, gfp_flags, PAGE_KERNEL);
if (fp == NULL)
return NULL;
aux = kzalloc(sizeof(*aux), GFP_KERNEL | gfp_extra_flags);
if (aux == NULL) {
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
vfree(fp);
return NULL;
}
fp->pages = size / PAGE_SIZE;
fp->aux = aux;
fp->aux->prog = fp;
fp->jit_requested = ebpf_jit_enabled();
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
bpf: make jited programs visible in traces Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them), thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on dumping stack from a map. This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address() is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent. Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets much better in future, we always have the option to change the default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway. If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms and friends. Before: 7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) After: 7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) [...] 7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-17 05:24:50 +08:00
INIT_LIST_HEAD_RCU(&fp->aux->ksym_lnode);
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
return fp;
}
struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_alloc(unsigned int size, gfp_t gfp_extra_flags)
{
gfp_t gfp_flags = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO | gfp_extra_flags;
struct bpf_prog *prog;
int cpu;
prog = bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(size, gfp_extra_flags);
if (!prog)
return NULL;
prog->aux->stats = alloc_percpu_gfp(struct bpf_prog_stats, gfp_flags);
if (!prog->aux->stats) {
kfree(prog->aux);
vfree(prog);
return NULL;
}
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
struct bpf_prog_stats *pstats;
pstats = per_cpu_ptr(prog->aux->stats, cpu);
u64_stats_init(&pstats->syncp);
}
return prog;
}
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_prog_alloc);
bpf: Add bpf_line_info support This patch adds bpf_line_info support. It accepts an array of bpf_line_info objects during BPF_PROG_LOAD. The "line_info", "line_info_cnt" and "line_info_rec_size" are added to the "union bpf_attr". The "line_info_rec_size" makes bpf_line_info extensible in the future. The new "check_btf_line()" ensures the userspace line_info is valid for the kernel to use. When the verifier is translating/patching the bpf_prog (through "bpf_patch_insn_single()"), the line_infos' insn_off is also adjusted by the newly added "bpf_adj_linfo()". If the bpf_prog is jited, this patch also provides the jited addrs (in aux->jited_linfo) for the corresponding line_info.insn_off. "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" is added to fill the aux->jited_linfo. It is currently called by the x86 jit. Other jits can also use "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" and it will be done in the followup patches. In the future, if it deemed necessary, a particular jit could also provide its own "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" implementation. A few "*line_info*" fields are added to the bpf_prog_info such that the user can get the xlated line_info back (i.e. the line_info with its insn_off reflecting the translated prog). The jited_line_info is available if the prog is jited. It is an array of __u64. If the prog is not jited, jited_line_info_cnt is 0. The verifier's verbose log with line_info will be done in a follow up patch. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-08 08:42:25 +08:00
int bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
if (!prog->aux->nr_linfo || !prog->jit_requested)
return 0;
prog->aux->jited_linfo = kcalloc(prog->aux->nr_linfo,
sizeof(*prog->aux->jited_linfo),
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!prog->aux->jited_linfo)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
void bpf_prog_free_jited_linfo(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
kfree(prog->aux->jited_linfo);
prog->aux->jited_linfo = NULL;
}
void bpf_prog_free_unused_jited_linfo(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
if (prog->aux->jited_linfo && !prog->aux->jited_linfo[0])
bpf_prog_free_jited_linfo(prog);
}
/* The jit engine is responsible to provide an array
* for insn_off to the jited_off mapping (insn_to_jit_off).
*
* The idx to this array is the insn_off. Hence, the insn_off
* here is relative to the prog itself instead of the main prog.
* This array has one entry for each xlated bpf insn.
*
* jited_off is the byte off to the last byte of the jited insn.
*
* Hence, with
* insn_start:
* The first bpf insn off of the prog. The insn off
* here is relative to the main prog.
* e.g. if prog is a subprog, insn_start > 0
* linfo_idx:
* The prog's idx to prog->aux->linfo and jited_linfo
*
* jited_linfo[linfo_idx] = prog->bpf_func
*
* For i > linfo_idx,
*
* jited_linfo[i] = prog->bpf_func +
* insn_to_jit_off[linfo[i].insn_off - insn_start - 1]
*/
void bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo(struct bpf_prog *prog,
const u32 *insn_to_jit_off)
{
u32 linfo_idx, insn_start, insn_end, nr_linfo, i;
const struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
void **jited_linfo;
if (!prog->aux->jited_linfo)
/* Userspace did not provide linfo */
return;
linfo_idx = prog->aux->linfo_idx;
linfo = &prog->aux->linfo[linfo_idx];
insn_start = linfo[0].insn_off;
insn_end = insn_start + prog->len;
jited_linfo = &prog->aux->jited_linfo[linfo_idx];
jited_linfo[0] = prog->bpf_func;
nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo - linfo_idx;
for (i = 1; i < nr_linfo && linfo[i].insn_off < insn_end; i++)
/* The verifier ensures that linfo[i].insn_off is
* strictly increasing
*/
jited_linfo[i] = prog->bpf_func +
insn_to_jit_off[linfo[i].insn_off - insn_start - 1];
}
void bpf_prog_free_linfo(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
bpf_prog_free_jited_linfo(prog);
kvfree(prog->aux->linfo);
}
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_realloc(struct bpf_prog *fp_old, unsigned int size,
gfp_t gfp_extra_flags)
{
gfp_t gfp_flags = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO | gfp_extra_flags;
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
struct bpf_prog *fp;
bpf: fix overflow in prog accounting Commit aaac3ba95e4c ("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs") made a wrong assumption of charging against prog->pages. Unlike map->pages, prog->pages are still subject to change when we need to expand the program through bpf_prog_realloc(). This can for example happen during verification stage when we need to expand and rewrite parts of the program. Should the required space cross a page boundary, then prog->pages is not the same anymore as its original value that we used to bpf_prog_charge_memlock() on. Thus, we'll hit a wrap-around during bpf_prog_uncharge_memlock() when prog is freed eventually. I noticed this that despite having unlimited memlock, programs suddenly refused to load with EPERM error due to insufficient memlock. There are two ways to fix this issue. One would be to add a cached variable to struct bpf_prog that takes a snapshot of prog->pages at the time of charging. The other approach is to also account for resizes. I chose to go with the latter for a couple of reasons: i) We want accounting rather to be more accurate instead of further fooling limits, ii) adding yet another page counter on struct bpf_prog would also be a waste just for this purpose. We also do want to charge as early as possible to avoid going into the verifier just to find out later on that we crossed limits. The only place that needs to be fixed is bpf_prog_realloc(), since only here we expand the program, so we try to account for the needed delta and should we fail, call-sites check for outcome anyway. On cBPF to eBPF migrations, we don't grab a reference to the user as they are charged differently. With that in place, my test case worked fine. Fixes: aaac3ba95e4c ("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-18 08:52:58 +08:00
u32 pages, delta;
int ret;
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
BUG_ON(fp_old == NULL);
size = round_up(size, PAGE_SIZE);
bpf: fix overflow in prog accounting Commit aaac3ba95e4c ("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs") made a wrong assumption of charging against prog->pages. Unlike map->pages, prog->pages are still subject to change when we need to expand the program through bpf_prog_realloc(). This can for example happen during verification stage when we need to expand and rewrite parts of the program. Should the required space cross a page boundary, then prog->pages is not the same anymore as its original value that we used to bpf_prog_charge_memlock() on. Thus, we'll hit a wrap-around during bpf_prog_uncharge_memlock() when prog is freed eventually. I noticed this that despite having unlimited memlock, programs suddenly refused to load with EPERM error due to insufficient memlock. There are two ways to fix this issue. One would be to add a cached variable to struct bpf_prog that takes a snapshot of prog->pages at the time of charging. The other approach is to also account for resizes. I chose to go with the latter for a couple of reasons: i) We want accounting rather to be more accurate instead of further fooling limits, ii) adding yet another page counter on struct bpf_prog would also be a waste just for this purpose. We also do want to charge as early as possible to avoid going into the verifier just to find out later on that we crossed limits. The only place that needs to be fixed is bpf_prog_realloc(), since only here we expand the program, so we try to account for the needed delta and should we fail, call-sites check for outcome anyway. On cBPF to eBPF migrations, we don't grab a reference to the user as they are charged differently. With that in place, my test case worked fine. Fixes: aaac3ba95e4c ("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-18 08:52:58 +08:00
pages = size / PAGE_SIZE;
if (pages <= fp_old->pages)
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
return fp_old;
bpf: fix overflow in prog accounting Commit aaac3ba95e4c ("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs") made a wrong assumption of charging against prog->pages. Unlike map->pages, prog->pages are still subject to change when we need to expand the program through bpf_prog_realloc(). This can for example happen during verification stage when we need to expand and rewrite parts of the program. Should the required space cross a page boundary, then prog->pages is not the same anymore as its original value that we used to bpf_prog_charge_memlock() on. Thus, we'll hit a wrap-around during bpf_prog_uncharge_memlock() when prog is freed eventually. I noticed this that despite having unlimited memlock, programs suddenly refused to load with EPERM error due to insufficient memlock. There are two ways to fix this issue. One would be to add a cached variable to struct bpf_prog that takes a snapshot of prog->pages at the time of charging. The other approach is to also account for resizes. I chose to go with the latter for a couple of reasons: i) We want accounting rather to be more accurate instead of further fooling limits, ii) adding yet another page counter on struct bpf_prog would also be a waste just for this purpose. We also do want to charge as early as possible to avoid going into the verifier just to find out later on that we crossed limits. The only place that needs to be fixed is bpf_prog_realloc(), since only here we expand the program, so we try to account for the needed delta and should we fail, call-sites check for outcome anyway. On cBPF to eBPF migrations, we don't grab a reference to the user as they are charged differently. With that in place, my test case worked fine. Fixes: aaac3ba95e4c ("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-18 08:52:58 +08:00
delta = pages - fp_old->pages;
ret = __bpf_prog_charge(fp_old->aux->user, delta);
if (ret)
return NULL;
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
fp = __vmalloc(size, gfp_flags, PAGE_KERNEL);
bpf: fix overflow in prog accounting Commit aaac3ba95e4c ("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs") made a wrong assumption of charging against prog->pages. Unlike map->pages, prog->pages are still subject to change when we need to expand the program through bpf_prog_realloc(). This can for example happen during verification stage when we need to expand and rewrite parts of the program. Should the required space cross a page boundary, then prog->pages is not the same anymore as its original value that we used to bpf_prog_charge_memlock() on. Thus, we'll hit a wrap-around during bpf_prog_uncharge_memlock() when prog is freed eventually. I noticed this that despite having unlimited memlock, programs suddenly refused to load with EPERM error due to insufficient memlock. There are two ways to fix this issue. One would be to add a cached variable to struct bpf_prog that takes a snapshot of prog->pages at the time of charging. The other approach is to also account for resizes. I chose to go with the latter for a couple of reasons: i) We want accounting rather to be more accurate instead of further fooling limits, ii) adding yet another page counter on struct bpf_prog would also be a waste just for this purpose. We also do want to charge as early as possible to avoid going into the verifier just to find out later on that we crossed limits. The only place that needs to be fixed is bpf_prog_realloc(), since only here we expand the program, so we try to account for the needed delta and should we fail, call-sites check for outcome anyway. On cBPF to eBPF migrations, we don't grab a reference to the user as they are charged differently. With that in place, my test case worked fine. Fixes: aaac3ba95e4c ("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-18 08:52:58 +08:00
if (fp == NULL) {
__bpf_prog_uncharge(fp_old->aux->user, delta);
} else {
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
memcpy(fp, fp_old, fp_old->pages * PAGE_SIZE);
bpf: fix overflow in prog accounting Commit aaac3ba95e4c ("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs") made a wrong assumption of charging against prog->pages. Unlike map->pages, prog->pages are still subject to change when we need to expand the program through bpf_prog_realloc(). This can for example happen during verification stage when we need to expand and rewrite parts of the program. Should the required space cross a page boundary, then prog->pages is not the same anymore as its original value that we used to bpf_prog_charge_memlock() on. Thus, we'll hit a wrap-around during bpf_prog_uncharge_memlock() when prog is freed eventually. I noticed this that despite having unlimited memlock, programs suddenly refused to load with EPERM error due to insufficient memlock. There are two ways to fix this issue. One would be to add a cached variable to struct bpf_prog that takes a snapshot of prog->pages at the time of charging. The other approach is to also account for resizes. I chose to go with the latter for a couple of reasons: i) We want accounting rather to be more accurate instead of further fooling limits, ii) adding yet another page counter on struct bpf_prog would also be a waste just for this purpose. We also do want to charge as early as possible to avoid going into the verifier just to find out later on that we crossed limits. The only place that needs to be fixed is bpf_prog_realloc(), since only here we expand the program, so we try to account for the needed delta and should we fail, call-sites check for outcome anyway. On cBPF to eBPF migrations, we don't grab a reference to the user as they are charged differently. With that in place, my test case worked fine. Fixes: aaac3ba95e4c ("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-18 08:52:58 +08:00
fp->pages = pages;
fp->aux->prog = fp;
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
/* We keep fp->aux from fp_old around in the new
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
* reallocated structure.
*/
fp_old->aux = NULL;
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
__bpf_prog_free(fp_old);
}
return fp;
}
void __bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
if (fp->aux) {
free_percpu(fp->aux->stats);
kfree(fp->aux);
}
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
vfree(fp);
}
bpf: rework prog_digest into prog_tag Commit 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") was recently discussed, partially due to admittedly suboptimal name of "prog_digest" in combination with sha1 hash usage, thus inevitably and rightfully concerns about its security in terms of collision resistance were raised with regards to use-cases. The intended use cases are for debugging resp. introspection only for providing a stable "tag" over the instruction sequence that both kernel and user space can calculate independently. It's not usable at all for making a security relevant decision. So collisions where two different instruction sequences generate the same tag can happen, but ideally at a rather low rate. The "tag" will be dumped in hex and is short enough to introspect in tracepoints or kallsyms output along with other data such as stack trace, etc. Thus, this patch performs a rename into prog_tag and truncates the tag to a short output (64 bits) to make it obvious it's not collision-free. Should in future a hash or facility be needed with a security relevant focus, then we can think about requirements, constraints, etc that would fit to that situation. For now, rework the exposed parts for the current use cases as long as nothing has been released yet. Tested on x86_64 and s390x. Fixes: 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-14 06:38:15 +08:00
int bpf_prog_calc_tag(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
const u32 bits_offset = SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES - sizeof(__be64);
bpf: rework prog_digest into prog_tag Commit 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") was recently discussed, partially due to admittedly suboptimal name of "prog_digest" in combination with sha1 hash usage, thus inevitably and rightfully concerns about its security in terms of collision resistance were raised with regards to use-cases. The intended use cases are for debugging resp. introspection only for providing a stable "tag" over the instruction sequence that both kernel and user space can calculate independently. It's not usable at all for making a security relevant decision. So collisions where two different instruction sequences generate the same tag can happen, but ideally at a rather low rate. The "tag" will be dumped in hex and is short enough to introspect in tracepoints or kallsyms output along with other data such as stack trace, etc. Thus, this patch performs a rename into prog_tag and truncates the tag to a short output (64 bits) to make it obvious it's not collision-free. Should in future a hash or facility be needed with a security relevant focus, then we can think about requirements, constraints, etc that would fit to that situation. For now, rework the exposed parts for the current use cases as long as nothing has been released yet. Tested on x86_64 and s390x. Fixes: 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-14 06:38:15 +08:00
u32 raw_size = bpf_prog_tag_scratch_size(fp);
u32 digest[SHA_DIGEST_WORDS];
u32 ws[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
u32 i, bsize, psize, blocks;
struct bpf_insn *dst;
bool was_ld_map;
u8 *raw, *todo;
__be32 *result;
__be64 *bits;
raw = vmalloc(raw_size);
if (!raw)
return -ENOMEM;
bpf: rework prog_digest into prog_tag Commit 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") was recently discussed, partially due to admittedly suboptimal name of "prog_digest" in combination with sha1 hash usage, thus inevitably and rightfully concerns about its security in terms of collision resistance were raised with regards to use-cases. The intended use cases are for debugging resp. introspection only for providing a stable "tag" over the instruction sequence that both kernel and user space can calculate independently. It's not usable at all for making a security relevant decision. So collisions where two different instruction sequences generate the same tag can happen, but ideally at a rather low rate. The "tag" will be dumped in hex and is short enough to introspect in tracepoints or kallsyms output along with other data such as stack trace, etc. Thus, this patch performs a rename into prog_tag and truncates the tag to a short output (64 bits) to make it obvious it's not collision-free. Should in future a hash or facility be needed with a security relevant focus, then we can think about requirements, constraints, etc that would fit to that situation. For now, rework the exposed parts for the current use cases as long as nothing has been released yet. Tested on x86_64 and s390x. Fixes: 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-14 06:38:15 +08:00
sha_init(digest);
memset(ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
/* We need to take out the map fd for the digest calculation
* since they are unstable from user space side.
*/
dst = (void *)raw;
for (i = 0, was_ld_map = false; i < fp->len; i++) {
dst[i] = fp->insnsi[i];
if (!was_ld_map &&
dst[i].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW) &&
bpf: implement lookup-free direct value access for maps This generic extension to BPF maps allows for directly loading an address residing inside a BPF map value as a single BPF ldimm64 instruction! The idea is similar to what BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD does today, which is a special src_reg flag for ldimm64 instruction that indicates that inside the first part of the double insns's imm field is a file descriptor which the verifier then replaces as a full 64bit address of the map into both imm parts. For the newly added BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE src_reg flag, the idea is the following: the first part of the double insns's imm field is again a file descriptor corresponding to the map, and the second part of the imm field is an offset into the value. The verifier will then replace both imm parts with an address that points into the BPF map value at the given value offset for maps that support this operation. Currently supported is array map with single entry. It is possible to support more than just single map element by reusing both 16bit off fields of the insns as a map index, so full array map lookup could be expressed that way. It hasn't been implemented here due to lack of concrete use case, but could easily be done so in future in a compatible way, since both off fields right now have to be 0 and would correctly denote a map index 0. The BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE is a distinct flag as otherwise with BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD we could not differ offset 0 between load of map pointer versus load of map's value at offset 0, and changing BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD's encoding into off by one to differ between regular map pointer and map value pointer would add unnecessary complexity and increases barrier for debugability thus less suitable. Using the second part of the imm field as an offset into the value does /not/ come with limitations since maximum possible value size is in u32 universe anyway. This optimization allows for efficiently retrieving an address to a map value memory area without having to issue a helper call which needs to prepare registers according to calling convention, etc, without needing the extra NULL test, and without having to add the offset in an additional instruction to the value base pointer. The verifier then treats the destination register as PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE with constant reg->off from the user passed offset from the second imm field, and guarantees that this is within bounds of the map value. Any subsequent operations are normally treated as typical map value handling without anything extra needed from verification side. The two map operations for direct value access have been added to array map for now. In future other types could be supported as well depending on the use case. The main use case for this commit is to allow for BPF loader support for global variables that reside in .data/.rodata/.bss sections such that we can directly load the address of them with minimal additional infrastructure required. Loader support has been added in subsequent commits for libbpf library. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-04-10 05:20:03 +08:00
(dst[i].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD ||
dst[i].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE)) {
was_ld_map = true;
dst[i].imm = 0;
} else if (was_ld_map &&
dst[i].code == 0 &&
dst[i].dst_reg == 0 &&
dst[i].src_reg == 0 &&
dst[i].off == 0) {
was_ld_map = false;
dst[i].imm = 0;
} else {
was_ld_map = false;
}
}
psize = bpf_prog_insn_size(fp);
memset(&raw[psize], 0, raw_size - psize);
raw[psize++] = 0x80;
bsize = round_up(psize, SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES);
blocks = bsize / SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES;
todo = raw;
if (bsize - psize >= sizeof(__be64)) {
bits = (__be64 *)(todo + bsize - sizeof(__be64));
} else {
bits = (__be64 *)(todo + bsize + bits_offset);
blocks++;
}
*bits = cpu_to_be64((psize - 1) << 3);
while (blocks--) {
bpf: rework prog_digest into prog_tag Commit 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") was recently discussed, partially due to admittedly suboptimal name of "prog_digest" in combination with sha1 hash usage, thus inevitably and rightfully concerns about its security in terms of collision resistance were raised with regards to use-cases. The intended use cases are for debugging resp. introspection only for providing a stable "tag" over the instruction sequence that both kernel and user space can calculate independently. It's not usable at all for making a security relevant decision. So collisions where two different instruction sequences generate the same tag can happen, but ideally at a rather low rate. The "tag" will be dumped in hex and is short enough to introspect in tracepoints or kallsyms output along with other data such as stack trace, etc. Thus, this patch performs a rename into prog_tag and truncates the tag to a short output (64 bits) to make it obvious it's not collision-free. Should in future a hash or facility be needed with a security relevant focus, then we can think about requirements, constraints, etc that would fit to that situation. For now, rework the exposed parts for the current use cases as long as nothing has been released yet. Tested on x86_64 and s390x. Fixes: 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-14 06:38:15 +08:00
sha_transform(digest, todo, ws);
todo += SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES;
}
bpf: rework prog_digest into prog_tag Commit 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") was recently discussed, partially due to admittedly suboptimal name of "prog_digest" in combination with sha1 hash usage, thus inevitably and rightfully concerns about its security in terms of collision resistance were raised with regards to use-cases. The intended use cases are for debugging resp. introspection only for providing a stable "tag" over the instruction sequence that both kernel and user space can calculate independently. It's not usable at all for making a security relevant decision. So collisions where two different instruction sequences generate the same tag can happen, but ideally at a rather low rate. The "tag" will be dumped in hex and is short enough to introspect in tracepoints or kallsyms output along with other data such as stack trace, etc. Thus, this patch performs a rename into prog_tag and truncates the tag to a short output (64 bits) to make it obvious it's not collision-free. Should in future a hash or facility be needed with a security relevant focus, then we can think about requirements, constraints, etc that would fit to that situation. For now, rework the exposed parts for the current use cases as long as nothing has been released yet. Tested on x86_64 and s390x. Fixes: 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-14 06:38:15 +08:00
result = (__force __be32 *)digest;
for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_WORDS; i++)
bpf: rework prog_digest into prog_tag Commit 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") was recently discussed, partially due to admittedly suboptimal name of "prog_digest" in combination with sha1 hash usage, thus inevitably and rightfully concerns about its security in terms of collision resistance were raised with regards to use-cases. The intended use cases are for debugging resp. introspection only for providing a stable "tag" over the instruction sequence that both kernel and user space can calculate independently. It's not usable at all for making a security relevant decision. So collisions where two different instruction sequences generate the same tag can happen, but ideally at a rather low rate. The "tag" will be dumped in hex and is short enough to introspect in tracepoints or kallsyms output along with other data such as stack trace, etc. Thus, this patch performs a rename into prog_tag and truncates the tag to a short output (64 bits) to make it obvious it's not collision-free. Should in future a hash or facility be needed with a security relevant focus, then we can think about requirements, constraints, etc that would fit to that situation. For now, rework the exposed parts for the current use cases as long as nothing has been released yet. Tested on x86_64 and s390x. Fixes: 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-14 06:38:15 +08:00
result[i] = cpu_to_be32(digest[i]);
memcpy(fp->tag, result, sizeof(fp->tag));
vfree(raw);
return 0;
}
static int bpf_adj_delta_to_imm(struct bpf_insn *insn, u32 pos, s32 end_old,
bpf: fix out of bounds backwards jmps due to dead code removal systemtap folks reported the following splat recently: [ 7790.862212] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 26759 at arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c:1022 kprobe_fault_handler+0xec/0xf0 [...] [ 7790.864113] CPU: 3 PID: 26759 Comm: sshd Not tainted 5.1.0-0.rc7.git1.1.fc31.x86_64 #1 [ 7790.864198] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS[...] [ 7790.864314] RIP: 0010:kprobe_fault_handler+0xec/0xf0 [ 7790.864375] Code: 48 8b 50 [...] [ 7790.864714] RSP: 0018:ffffc06800bdbb48 EFLAGS: 00010082 [ 7790.864812] RAX: ffff9e2b75a16320 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 7790.865306] RDX: ffffffffffffffff RSI: 000000000000000e RDI: ffffc06800bdbbf8 [ 7790.865514] RBP: ffffc06800bdbbf8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 7790.865960] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc06800bdbbf8 [ 7790.866037] R13: ffff9e2ab56a0418 R14: ffff9e2b6d0bb400 R15: ffff9e2b6d268000 [ 7790.866114] FS: 00007fde49937d80(0000) GS:ffff9e2b75a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 7790.866193] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 7790.866318] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000012f312000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 7790.866419] Call Trace: [ 7790.866677] do_user_addr_fault+0x64/0x480 [ 7790.867513] do_page_fault+0x33/0x210 [ 7790.868002] async_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [ 7790.868071] RIP: 0010: (null) [ 7790.868144] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 7790.868229] RSP: 0018:ffffc06800bdbca8 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 7790.868362] RAX: ffff9e2b598b60f8 RBX: ffffc06800bdbe48 RCX: 0000000000000004 [ 7790.868629] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffffc06800bdbc6c RDI: ffff9e2b598b60f0 [ 7790.868834] RBP: ffffc06800bdbcf8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000004 [ 7790.870432] R10: 00000000ff6f7a03 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 7790.871859] R13: ffffc06800bdbcb8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9e2acd0a5310 [ 7790.873455] ? vfs_read+0x5/0x170 [ 7790.874639] ? vfs_read+0x1/0x170 [ 7790.875834] ? trace_call_bpf+0xf6/0x260 [ 7790.877044] ? vfs_read+0x1/0x170 [ 7790.878208] ? vfs_read+0x5/0x170 [ 7790.879345] ? kprobe_perf_func+0x233/0x260 [ 7790.880503] ? vfs_read+0x1/0x170 [ 7790.881632] ? vfs_read+0x5/0x170 [ 7790.882751] ? kprobe_ftrace_handler+0x92/0xf0 [ 7790.883926] ? __vfs_read+0x30/0x30 [ 7790.885050] ? ftrace_ops_assist_func+0x94/0x100 [ 7790.886183] ? vfs_read+0x1/0x170 [ 7790.887283] ? vfs_read+0x5/0x170 [ 7790.888348] ? ksys_read+0x5a/0xe0 [ 7790.889389] ? do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xa0 [ 7790.890401] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe After some debugging, turns out that the logic in 2cbd95a5c4fb ("bpf: change parameters of call/branch offset adjustment") has a bug that is exposed after 52875a04f4b2 ("bpf: verifier: remove dead code") in that we miss some of the jump offset adjustments after code patching when we remove dead code, more concretely, upon backward jump spanning over the area that is being removed. BPF insns of a case that was hit pre 52875a04f4b2: [...] 676: (85) call bpf_perf_event_output#-47616 677: (05) goto pc-636 678: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -64) = 0 679: (bf) r7 = r10 680: (07) r7 += -64 681: (05) goto pc-44 682: (05) goto pc-1 683: (05) goto pc-1 BPF insns afterwards: [...] 618: (85) call bpf_perf_event_output#-47616 619: (05) goto pc-638 620: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -64) = 0 621: (bf) r7 = r10 622: (07) r7 += -64 623: (05) goto pc-44 To illustrate the bug, situation looks as follows: ____ 0 | | <-- foo: [...] 1 |____| 2 |____| <-- pos / end_new ^ 3 | | | 4 | | | len 5 |____| | (remove region) 6 | | <-- end_old v 7 | | 8 | | <-- curr (jmp foo) 9 |____| The condition curr >= end_new && curr + off + 1 < end_new in the branch delta adjustments is never hit because curr + off + 1 < end_new is compared as unsigned and therefore curr + off + 1 > end_new in unsigned realm as curr + off + 1 becomes negative since the insns are memmove()'d before the offset adjustments. Correct BPF insns after this fix: [...] 618: (85) call bpf_perf_event_output#-47216 619: (05) goto pc-578 620: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -64) = 0 621: (bf) r7 = r10 622: (07) r7 += -64 623: (05) goto pc-44 Note that unprivileged case is not affected from this. Fixes: 52875a04f4b2 ("bpf: verifier: remove dead code") Fixes: 2cbd95a5c4fb ("bpf: change parameters of call/branch offset adjustment") Reported-by: Frank Ch. Eigler <fche@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-05-11 09:03:09 +08:00
s32 end_new, s32 curr, const bool probe_pass)
{
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
const s64 imm_min = S32_MIN, imm_max = S32_MAX;
s32 delta = end_new - end_old;
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
s64 imm = insn->imm;
if (curr < pos && curr + imm + 1 >= end_old)
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
imm += delta;
else if (curr >= end_new && curr + imm + 1 < end_new)
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
imm -= delta;
if (imm < imm_min || imm > imm_max)
return -ERANGE;
if (!probe_pass)
insn->imm = imm;
return 0;
}
static int bpf_adj_delta_to_off(struct bpf_insn *insn, u32 pos, s32 end_old,
bpf: fix out of bounds backwards jmps due to dead code removal systemtap folks reported the following splat recently: [ 7790.862212] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 26759 at arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c:1022 kprobe_fault_handler+0xec/0xf0 [...] [ 7790.864113] CPU: 3 PID: 26759 Comm: sshd Not tainted 5.1.0-0.rc7.git1.1.fc31.x86_64 #1 [ 7790.864198] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS[...] [ 7790.864314] RIP: 0010:kprobe_fault_handler+0xec/0xf0 [ 7790.864375] Code: 48 8b 50 [...] [ 7790.864714] RSP: 0018:ffffc06800bdbb48 EFLAGS: 00010082 [ 7790.864812] RAX: ffff9e2b75a16320 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 7790.865306] RDX: ffffffffffffffff RSI: 000000000000000e RDI: ffffc06800bdbbf8 [ 7790.865514] RBP: ffffc06800bdbbf8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 7790.865960] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc06800bdbbf8 [ 7790.866037] R13: ffff9e2ab56a0418 R14: ffff9e2b6d0bb400 R15: ffff9e2b6d268000 [ 7790.866114] FS: 00007fde49937d80(0000) GS:ffff9e2b75a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 7790.866193] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 7790.866318] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000012f312000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 7790.866419] Call Trace: [ 7790.866677] do_user_addr_fault+0x64/0x480 [ 7790.867513] do_page_fault+0x33/0x210 [ 7790.868002] async_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [ 7790.868071] RIP: 0010: (null) [ 7790.868144] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 7790.868229] RSP: 0018:ffffc06800bdbca8 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 7790.868362] RAX: ffff9e2b598b60f8 RBX: ffffc06800bdbe48 RCX: 0000000000000004 [ 7790.868629] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffffc06800bdbc6c RDI: ffff9e2b598b60f0 [ 7790.868834] RBP: ffffc06800bdbcf8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000004 [ 7790.870432] R10: 00000000ff6f7a03 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 7790.871859] R13: ffffc06800bdbcb8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9e2acd0a5310 [ 7790.873455] ? vfs_read+0x5/0x170 [ 7790.874639] ? vfs_read+0x1/0x170 [ 7790.875834] ? trace_call_bpf+0xf6/0x260 [ 7790.877044] ? vfs_read+0x1/0x170 [ 7790.878208] ? vfs_read+0x5/0x170 [ 7790.879345] ? kprobe_perf_func+0x233/0x260 [ 7790.880503] ? vfs_read+0x1/0x170 [ 7790.881632] ? vfs_read+0x5/0x170 [ 7790.882751] ? kprobe_ftrace_handler+0x92/0xf0 [ 7790.883926] ? __vfs_read+0x30/0x30 [ 7790.885050] ? ftrace_ops_assist_func+0x94/0x100 [ 7790.886183] ? vfs_read+0x1/0x170 [ 7790.887283] ? vfs_read+0x5/0x170 [ 7790.888348] ? ksys_read+0x5a/0xe0 [ 7790.889389] ? do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xa0 [ 7790.890401] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe After some debugging, turns out that the logic in 2cbd95a5c4fb ("bpf: change parameters of call/branch offset adjustment") has a bug that is exposed after 52875a04f4b2 ("bpf: verifier: remove dead code") in that we miss some of the jump offset adjustments after code patching when we remove dead code, more concretely, upon backward jump spanning over the area that is being removed. BPF insns of a case that was hit pre 52875a04f4b2: [...] 676: (85) call bpf_perf_event_output#-47616 677: (05) goto pc-636 678: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -64) = 0 679: (bf) r7 = r10 680: (07) r7 += -64 681: (05) goto pc-44 682: (05) goto pc-1 683: (05) goto pc-1 BPF insns afterwards: [...] 618: (85) call bpf_perf_event_output#-47616 619: (05) goto pc-638 620: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -64) = 0 621: (bf) r7 = r10 622: (07) r7 += -64 623: (05) goto pc-44 To illustrate the bug, situation looks as follows: ____ 0 | | <-- foo: [...] 1 |____| 2 |____| <-- pos / end_new ^ 3 | | | 4 | | | len 5 |____| | (remove region) 6 | | <-- end_old v 7 | | 8 | | <-- curr (jmp foo) 9 |____| The condition curr >= end_new && curr + off + 1 < end_new in the branch delta adjustments is never hit because curr + off + 1 < end_new is compared as unsigned and therefore curr + off + 1 > end_new in unsigned realm as curr + off + 1 becomes negative since the insns are memmove()'d before the offset adjustments. Correct BPF insns after this fix: [...] 618: (85) call bpf_perf_event_output#-47216 619: (05) goto pc-578 620: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -64) = 0 621: (bf) r7 = r10 622: (07) r7 += -64 623: (05) goto pc-44 Note that unprivileged case is not affected from this. Fixes: 52875a04f4b2 ("bpf: verifier: remove dead code") Fixes: 2cbd95a5c4fb ("bpf: change parameters of call/branch offset adjustment") Reported-by: Frank Ch. Eigler <fche@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-05-11 09:03:09 +08:00
s32 end_new, s32 curr, const bool probe_pass)
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
{
const s32 off_min = S16_MIN, off_max = S16_MAX;
s32 delta = end_new - end_old;
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
s32 off = insn->off;
if (curr < pos && curr + off + 1 >= end_old)
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
off += delta;
else if (curr >= end_new && curr + off + 1 < end_new)
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
off -= delta;
if (off < off_min || off > off_max)
return -ERANGE;
if (!probe_pass)
insn->off = off;
return 0;
}
static int bpf_adj_branches(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 pos, s32 end_old,
s32 end_new, const bool probe_pass)
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
{
u32 i, insn_cnt = prog->len + (probe_pass ? end_new - end_old : 0);
struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
int ret = 0;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
u8 code;
/* In the probing pass we still operate on the original,
* unpatched image in order to check overflows before we
* do any other adjustments. Therefore skip the patchlet.
*/
if (probe_pass && i == pos) {
i = end_new;
insn = prog->insnsi + end_old;
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
}
code = insn->code;
if ((BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP &&
BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) ||
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT)
continue;
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
/* Adjust offset of jmps if we cross patch boundaries. */
if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL) {
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
continue;
ret = bpf_adj_delta_to_imm(insn, pos, end_old,
end_new, i, probe_pass);
} else {
ret = bpf_adj_delta_to_off(insn, pos, end_old,
end_new, i, probe_pass);
}
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
if (ret)
break;
}
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
return ret;
}
bpf: Add bpf_line_info support This patch adds bpf_line_info support. It accepts an array of bpf_line_info objects during BPF_PROG_LOAD. The "line_info", "line_info_cnt" and "line_info_rec_size" are added to the "union bpf_attr". The "line_info_rec_size" makes bpf_line_info extensible in the future. The new "check_btf_line()" ensures the userspace line_info is valid for the kernel to use. When the verifier is translating/patching the bpf_prog (through "bpf_patch_insn_single()"), the line_infos' insn_off is also adjusted by the newly added "bpf_adj_linfo()". If the bpf_prog is jited, this patch also provides the jited addrs (in aux->jited_linfo) for the corresponding line_info.insn_off. "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" is added to fill the aux->jited_linfo. It is currently called by the x86 jit. Other jits can also use "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" and it will be done in the followup patches. In the future, if it deemed necessary, a particular jit could also provide its own "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" implementation. A few "*line_info*" fields are added to the bpf_prog_info such that the user can get the xlated line_info back (i.e. the line_info with its insn_off reflecting the translated prog). The jited_line_info is available if the prog is jited. It is an array of __u64. If the prog is not jited, jited_line_info_cnt is 0. The verifier's verbose log with line_info will be done in a follow up patch. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-08 08:42:25 +08:00
static void bpf_adj_linfo(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 delta)
{
struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
u32 i, nr_linfo;
nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
if (!nr_linfo || !delta)
return;
linfo = prog->aux->linfo;
for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++)
if (off < linfo[i].insn_off)
break;
/* Push all off < linfo[i].insn_off by delta */
for (; i < nr_linfo; i++)
linfo[i].insn_off += delta;
}
struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_single(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off,
const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len)
{
u32 insn_adj_cnt, insn_rest, insn_delta = len - 1;
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
const u32 cnt_max = S16_MAX;
struct bpf_prog *prog_adj;
int err;
/* Since our patchlet doesn't expand the image, we're done. */
if (insn_delta == 0) {
memcpy(prog->insnsi + off, patch, sizeof(*patch));
return prog;
}
insn_adj_cnt = prog->len + insn_delta;
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
/* Reject anything that would potentially let the insn->off
* target overflow when we have excessive program expansions.
* We need to probe here before we do any reallocation where
* we afterwards may not fail anymore.
*/
if (insn_adj_cnt > cnt_max &&
(err = bpf_adj_branches(prog, off, off + 1, off + len, true)))
return ERR_PTR(err);
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
/* Several new instructions need to be inserted. Make room
* for them. Likely, there's no need for a new allocation as
* last page could have large enough tailroom.
*/
prog_adj = bpf_prog_realloc(prog, bpf_prog_size(insn_adj_cnt),
GFP_USER);
if (!prog_adj)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
prog_adj->len = insn_adj_cnt;
/* Patching happens in 3 steps:
*
* 1) Move over tail of insnsi from next instruction onwards,
* so we can patch the single target insn with one or more
* new ones (patching is always from 1 to n insns, n > 0).
* 2) Inject new instructions at the target location.
* 3) Adjust branch offsets if necessary.
*/
insn_rest = insn_adj_cnt - off - len;
memmove(prog_adj->insnsi + off + len, prog_adj->insnsi + off + 1,
sizeof(*patch) * insn_rest);
memcpy(prog_adj->insnsi + off, patch, sizeof(*patch) * len);
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-17 07:44:11 +08:00
/* We are guaranteed to not fail at this point, otherwise
* the ship has sailed to reverse to the original state. An
* overflow cannot happen at this point.
*/
BUG_ON(bpf_adj_branches(prog_adj, off, off + 1, off + len, false));
bpf: Add bpf_line_info support This patch adds bpf_line_info support. It accepts an array of bpf_line_info objects during BPF_PROG_LOAD. The "line_info", "line_info_cnt" and "line_info_rec_size" are added to the "union bpf_attr". The "line_info_rec_size" makes bpf_line_info extensible in the future. The new "check_btf_line()" ensures the userspace line_info is valid for the kernel to use. When the verifier is translating/patching the bpf_prog (through "bpf_patch_insn_single()"), the line_infos' insn_off is also adjusted by the newly added "bpf_adj_linfo()". If the bpf_prog is jited, this patch also provides the jited addrs (in aux->jited_linfo) for the corresponding line_info.insn_off. "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" is added to fill the aux->jited_linfo. It is currently called by the x86 jit. Other jits can also use "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" and it will be done in the followup patches. In the future, if it deemed necessary, a particular jit could also provide its own "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" implementation. A few "*line_info*" fields are added to the bpf_prog_info such that the user can get the xlated line_info back (i.e. the line_info with its insn_off reflecting the translated prog). The jited_line_info is available if the prog is jited. It is an array of __u64. If the prog is not jited, jited_line_info_cnt is 0. The verifier's verbose log with line_info will be done in a follow up patch. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-08 08:42:25 +08:00
bpf_adj_linfo(prog_adj, off, insn_delta);
return prog_adj;
}
int bpf_remove_insns(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 cnt)
{
/* Branch offsets can't overflow when program is shrinking, no need
* to call bpf_adj_branches(..., true) here
*/
memmove(prog->insnsi + off, prog->insnsi + off + cnt,
sizeof(struct bpf_insn) * (prog->len - off - cnt));
prog->len -= cnt;
return WARN_ON_ONCE(bpf_adj_branches(prog, off, off + cnt, off, false));
}
bpf: Fix use after free in subprog's jited symbol removal syzkaller managed to trigger the following crash: [...] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90001923030 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD aa551067 P4D aa551067 PUD aa552067 PMD a572b067 PTE 80000000a1173163 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 7982 Comm: syz-executor912 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:bpf_jit_binary_hdr include/linux/filter.h:787 [inline] RIP: 0010:bpf_get_prog_addr_region kernel/bpf/core.c:531 [inline] RIP: 0010:bpf_tree_comp kernel/bpf/core.c:600 [inline] RIP: 0010:__lt_find include/linux/rbtree_latch.h:115 [inline] RIP: 0010:latch_tree_find include/linux/rbtree_latch.h:208 [inline] RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_kallsyms_find kernel/bpf/core.c:674 [inline] RIP: 0010:is_bpf_text_address+0x184/0x3b0 kernel/bpf/core.c:709 [...] Call Trace: kernel_text_address kernel/extable.c:147 [inline] __kernel_text_address+0x9a/0x110 kernel/extable.c:102 unwind_get_return_address+0x4c/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c:19 arch_stack_walk+0x98/0xe0 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:26 stack_trace_save+0xb6/0x150 kernel/stacktrace.c:123 save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:69 [inline] set_track mm/kasan/common.c:77 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x11c/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:510 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:518 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:584 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3319 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f5/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3483 getname_flags+0xba/0x640 fs/namei.c:138 getname+0x19/0x20 fs/namei.c:209 do_sys_open+0x261/0x560 fs/open.c:1091 __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1115 [inline] __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1110 [inline] __x64_sys_open+0x87/0x90 fs/open.c:1110 do_syscall_64+0xf7/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [...] After further debugging it turns out that we walk kallsyms while in parallel we tear down a BPF program which contains subprograms that have been JITed though the program itself has not been fully exposed and is eventually bailing out with error. The bpf_prog_kallsyms_del_subprogs() in bpf_prog_load()'s error path removes the symbols, however, bpf_prog_free() tears down the JIT memory too early via scheduled work. Instead, it needs to properly respect RCU grace period as the kallsyms walk for BPF is under RCU. Fix it by refactoring __bpf_prog_put()'s tear down and reuse it in our error path where we defer final destruction when we have subprogs in the program. Fixes: 7d1982b4e335 ("bpf: fix panic in prog load calls cleanup") Fixes: 1c2a088a6626 ("bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs") Reported-by: syzbot+710043c5d1d5b5013bc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Tested-by: syzbot+710043c5d1d5b5013bc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/55f6367324c2d7e9583fa9ccf5385dcbba0d7a6e.1571752452.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
2019-10-22 21:57:23 +08:00
static void bpf_prog_kallsyms_del_subprogs(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < fp->aux->func_cnt; i++)
bpf_prog_kallsyms_del(fp->aux->func[i]);
}
void bpf_prog_kallsyms_del_all(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
bpf_prog_kallsyms_del_subprogs(fp);
bpf_prog_kallsyms_del(fp);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT
/* All BPF JIT sysctl knobs here. */
int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON);
int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly;
int bpf_jit_kallsyms __read_mostly;
bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64K Michael and Sandipan report: Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000, and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined. For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit value: root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit -1673527296 and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported: setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8}, 16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524) and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9 host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC with no noticeable errors in the logs. Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For 4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec() so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init(). Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}. Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions in future. Fixes: ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations") Reported-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-11 19:14:12 +08:00
long bpf_jit_limit __read_mostly;
bpf: make jited programs visible in traces Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them), thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on dumping stack from a map. This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address() is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent. Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets much better in future, we always have the option to change the default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway. If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms and friends. Before: 7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) After: 7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) [...] 7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-17 05:24:50 +08:00
static __always_inline void
bpf_get_prog_addr_region(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
unsigned long *symbol_start,
unsigned long *symbol_end)
{
const struct bpf_binary_header *hdr = bpf_jit_binary_hdr(prog);
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)hdr;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!bpf_prog_ebpf_jited(prog));
*symbol_start = addr;
*symbol_end = addr + hdr->pages * PAGE_SIZE;
}
perf, bpf: Introduce PERF_RECORD_BPF_EVENT For better performance analysis of BPF programs, this patch introduces PERF_RECORD_BPF_EVENT, a new perf_event_type that exposes BPF program load/unload information to user space. Each BPF program may contain up to BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS (256) sub programs. The following example shows kernel symbols for a BPF program with 7 sub programs: ffffffffa0257cf9 t bpf_prog_b07ccb89267cf242_F ffffffffa02592e1 t bpf_prog_2dcecc18072623fc_F ffffffffa025b0e9 t bpf_prog_bb7a405ebaec5d5c_F ffffffffa025dd2c t bpf_prog_a7540d4a39ec1fc7_F ffffffffa025fcca t bpf_prog_05762d4ade0e3737_F ffffffffa026108f t bpf_prog_db4bd11e35df90d4_F ffffffffa0263f00 t bpf_prog_89d64e4abf0f0126_F ffffffffa0257cf9 t bpf_prog_ae31629322c4b018__dummy_tracepoi When a bpf program is loaded, PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL is generated for each of these sub programs. Therefore, PERF_RECORD_BPF_EVENT is not needed for simple profiling. For annotation, user space need to listen to PERF_RECORD_BPF_EVENT and gather more information about these (sub) programs via sys_bpf. Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradeaed.org> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: kernel-team@fb.com Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190117161521.1341602-4-songliubraving@fb.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
2019-01-18 00:15:15 +08:00
void bpf_get_prog_name(const struct bpf_prog *prog, char *sym)
bpf: make jited programs visible in traces Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them), thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on dumping stack from a map. This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address() is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent. Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets much better in future, we always have the option to change the default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway. If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms and friends. Before: 7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) After: 7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) [...] 7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-17 05:24:50 +08:00
{
const char *end = sym + KSYM_NAME_LEN;
bpf: Introduce bpf_func_info This patch added interface to load a program with the following additional information: . prog_btf_fd . func_info, func_info_rec_size and func_info_cnt where func_info will provide function range and type_id corresponding to each function. The func_info_rec_size is introduced in the UAPI to specify struct bpf_func_info size passed from user space. This intends to make bpf_func_info structure growable in the future. If the kernel gets a different bpf_func_info size from userspace, it will try to handle user request with part of bpf_func_info it can understand. In this patch, kernel can understand struct bpf_func_info { __u32 insn_offset; __u32 type_id; }; If user passed a bpf func_info record size of 16 bytes, the kernel can still handle part of records with the above definition. If verifier agrees with function range provided by the user, the bpf_prog ksym for each function will use the func name provided in the type_id, which is supposed to provide better encoding as it is not limited by 16 bytes program name limitation and this is better for bpf program which contains multiple subprograms. The bpf_prog_info interface is also extended to return btf_id, func_info, func_info_rec_size and func_info_cnt to userspace, so userspace can print out the function prototype for each xlated function. The insn_offset in the returned func_info corresponds to the insn offset for xlated functions. With other jit related fields in bpf_prog_info, userspace can also print out function prototypes for each jited function. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-11-20 07:29:11 +08:00
const struct btf_type *type;
const char *func_name;
bpf: make jited programs visible in traces Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them), thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on dumping stack from a map. This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address() is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent. Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets much better in future, we always have the option to change the default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway. If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms and friends. Before: 7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) After: 7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) [...] 7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-17 05:24:50 +08:00
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof("bpf_prog_") +
sizeof(prog->tag) * 2 +
/* name has been null terminated.
* We should need +1 for the '_' preceding
* the name. However, the null character
* is double counted between the name and the
* sizeof("bpf_prog_") above, so we omit
* the +1 here.
*/
sizeof(prog->aux->name) > KSYM_NAME_LEN);
bpf: make jited programs visible in traces Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them), thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on dumping stack from a map. This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address() is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent. Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets much better in future, we always have the option to change the default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway. If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms and friends. Before: 7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) After: 7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) [...] 7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-17 05:24:50 +08:00
sym += snprintf(sym, KSYM_NAME_LEN, "bpf_prog_");
sym = bin2hex(sym, prog->tag, sizeof(prog->tag));
bpf: Introduce bpf_func_info This patch added interface to load a program with the following additional information: . prog_btf_fd . func_info, func_info_rec_size and func_info_cnt where func_info will provide function range and type_id corresponding to each function. The func_info_rec_size is introduced in the UAPI to specify struct bpf_func_info size passed from user space. This intends to make bpf_func_info structure growable in the future. If the kernel gets a different bpf_func_info size from userspace, it will try to handle user request with part of bpf_func_info it can understand. In this patch, kernel can understand struct bpf_func_info { __u32 insn_offset; __u32 type_id; }; If user passed a bpf func_info record size of 16 bytes, the kernel can still handle part of records with the above definition. If verifier agrees with function range provided by the user, the bpf_prog ksym for each function will use the func name provided in the type_id, which is supposed to provide better encoding as it is not limited by 16 bytes program name limitation and this is better for bpf program which contains multiple subprograms. The bpf_prog_info interface is also extended to return btf_id, func_info, func_info_rec_size and func_info_cnt to userspace, so userspace can print out the function prototype for each xlated function. The insn_offset in the returned func_info corresponds to the insn offset for xlated functions. With other jit related fields in bpf_prog_info, userspace can also print out function prototypes for each jited function. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-11-20 07:29:11 +08:00
/* prog->aux->name will be ignored if full btf name is available */
bpf: Improve the info.func_info and info.func_info_rec_size behavior 1) When bpf_dump_raw_ok() == false and the kernel can provide >=1 func_info to the userspace, the current behavior is setting the info.func_info_cnt to 0 instead of setting info.func_info to 0. It is different from the behavior in jited_func_lens/nr_jited_func_lens, jited_ksyms/nr_jited_ksyms...etc. This patch fixes it. (i.e. set func_info to 0 instead of func_info_cnt to 0 when bpf_dump_raw_ok() == false). 2) When the userspace passed in info.func_info_cnt == 0, the kernel will set the expected func_info size back to the info.func_info_rec_size. It is a way for the userspace to learn the kernel expected func_info_rec_size introduced in commit 838e96904ff3 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_func_info"). An exception is the kernel expected size is not set when func_info is not available for a bpf_prog. This makes the returned info.func_info_rec_size has different values depending on the returned value of info.func_info_cnt. This patch sets the kernel expected size to info.func_info_rec_size independent of the info.func_info_cnt. 3) The current logic only rejects invalid func_info_rec_size if func_info_cnt is non zero. This patch also rejects invalid nonzero info.func_info_rec_size and not equal to the kernel expected size. 4) Set info.btf_id as long as prog->aux->btf != NULL. That will setup the later copy_to_user() codes look the same as others which then easier to understand and maintain. prog->aux->btf is not NULL only if prog->aux->func_info_cnt > 0. Breaking up info.btf_id from prog->aux->func_info_cnt is needed for the later line info patch anyway. A similar change is made to bpf_get_prog_name(). Fixes: 838e96904ff3 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_func_info") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-06 09:35:43 +08:00
if (prog->aux->func_info_cnt) {
type = btf_type_by_id(prog->aux->btf,
prog->aux->func_info[prog->aux->func_idx].type_id);
bpf: Introduce bpf_func_info This patch added interface to load a program with the following additional information: . prog_btf_fd . func_info, func_info_rec_size and func_info_cnt where func_info will provide function range and type_id corresponding to each function. The func_info_rec_size is introduced in the UAPI to specify struct bpf_func_info size passed from user space. This intends to make bpf_func_info structure growable in the future. If the kernel gets a different bpf_func_info size from userspace, it will try to handle user request with part of bpf_func_info it can understand. In this patch, kernel can understand struct bpf_func_info { __u32 insn_offset; __u32 type_id; }; If user passed a bpf func_info record size of 16 bytes, the kernel can still handle part of records with the above definition. If verifier agrees with function range provided by the user, the bpf_prog ksym for each function will use the func name provided in the type_id, which is supposed to provide better encoding as it is not limited by 16 bytes program name limitation and this is better for bpf program which contains multiple subprograms. The bpf_prog_info interface is also extended to return btf_id, func_info, func_info_rec_size and func_info_cnt to userspace, so userspace can print out the function prototype for each xlated function. The insn_offset in the returned func_info corresponds to the insn offset for xlated functions. With other jit related fields in bpf_prog_info, userspace can also print out function prototypes for each jited function. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-11-20 07:29:11 +08:00
func_name = btf_name_by_offset(prog->aux->btf, type->name_off);
snprintf(sym, (size_t)(end - sym), "_%s", func_name);
return;
}
if (prog->aux->name[0])
snprintf(sym, (size_t)(end - sym), "_%s", prog->aux->name);
else
*sym = 0;
bpf: make jited programs visible in traces Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them), thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on dumping stack from a map. This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address() is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent. Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets much better in future, we always have the option to change the default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway. If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms and friends. Before: 7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) After: 7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) [...] 7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-17 05:24:50 +08:00
}
static __always_inline unsigned long
bpf_get_prog_addr_start(struct latch_tree_node *n)
{
unsigned long symbol_start, symbol_end;
const struct bpf_prog_aux *aux;
aux = container_of(n, struct bpf_prog_aux, ksym_tnode);
bpf_get_prog_addr_region(aux->prog, &symbol_start, &symbol_end);
return symbol_start;
}
static __always_inline bool bpf_tree_less(struct latch_tree_node *a,
struct latch_tree_node *b)
{
return bpf_get_prog_addr_start(a) < bpf_get_prog_addr_start(b);
}
static __always_inline int bpf_tree_comp(void *key, struct latch_tree_node *n)
{
unsigned long val = (unsigned long)key;
unsigned long symbol_start, symbol_end;
const struct bpf_prog_aux *aux;
aux = container_of(n, struct bpf_prog_aux, ksym_tnode);
bpf_get_prog_addr_region(aux->prog, &symbol_start, &symbol_end);
if (val < symbol_start)
return -1;
if (val >= symbol_end)
return 1;
return 0;
}
static const struct latch_tree_ops bpf_tree_ops = {
.less = bpf_tree_less,
.comp = bpf_tree_comp,
};
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bpf_lock);
static LIST_HEAD(bpf_kallsyms);
static struct latch_tree_root bpf_tree __cacheline_aligned;
static void bpf_prog_ksym_node_add(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&aux->ksym_lnode));
list_add_tail_rcu(&aux->ksym_lnode, &bpf_kallsyms);
latch_tree_insert(&aux->ksym_tnode, &bpf_tree, &bpf_tree_ops);
}
static void bpf_prog_ksym_node_del(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
{
if (list_empty(&aux->ksym_lnode))
return;
latch_tree_erase(&aux->ksym_tnode, &bpf_tree, &bpf_tree_ops);
list_del_rcu(&aux->ksym_lnode);
}
static bool bpf_prog_kallsyms_candidate(const struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
return fp->jited && !bpf_prog_was_classic(fp);
}
static bool bpf_prog_kallsyms_verify_off(const struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
return list_empty(&fp->aux->ksym_lnode) ||
fp->aux->ksym_lnode.prev == LIST_POISON2;
}
void bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
if (!bpf_prog_kallsyms_candidate(fp) ||
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return;
spin_lock_bh(&bpf_lock);
bpf: make jited programs visible in traces Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them), thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on dumping stack from a map. This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address() is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent. Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets much better in future, we always have the option to change the default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway. If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms and friends. Before: 7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) After: 7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) [...] 7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-17 05:24:50 +08:00
bpf_prog_ksym_node_add(fp->aux);
spin_unlock_bh(&bpf_lock);
bpf: make jited programs visible in traces Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them), thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on dumping stack from a map. This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address() is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent. Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets much better in future, we always have the option to change the default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway. If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms and friends. Before: 7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) After: 7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) [...] 7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-17 05:24:50 +08:00
}
void bpf_prog_kallsyms_del(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
if (!bpf_prog_kallsyms_candidate(fp))
return;
spin_lock_bh(&bpf_lock);
bpf: make jited programs visible in traces Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them), thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on dumping stack from a map. This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address() is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent. Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets much better in future, we always have the option to change the default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway. If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms and friends. Before: 7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) After: 7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) [...] 7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-17 05:24:50 +08:00
bpf_prog_ksym_node_del(fp->aux);
spin_unlock_bh(&bpf_lock);
bpf: make jited programs visible in traces Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them), thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on dumping stack from a map. This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address() is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent. Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets much better in future, we always have the option to change the default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway. If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms and friends. Before: 7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) After: 7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) [...] 7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-17 05:24:50 +08:00
}
static struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_kallsyms_find(unsigned long addr)
{
struct latch_tree_node *n;
n = latch_tree_find((void *)addr, &bpf_tree, &bpf_tree_ops);
return n ?
container_of(n, struct bpf_prog_aux, ksym_tnode)->prog :
NULL;
}
const char *__bpf_address_lookup(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *size,
unsigned long *off, char *sym)
{
unsigned long symbol_start, symbol_end;
struct bpf_prog *prog;
char *ret = NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
prog = bpf_prog_kallsyms_find(addr);
if (prog) {
bpf_get_prog_addr_region(prog, &symbol_start, &symbol_end);
bpf_get_prog_name(prog, sym);
ret = sym;
if (size)
*size = symbol_end - symbol_start;
if (off)
*off = addr - symbol_start;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
bool is_bpf_text_address(unsigned long addr)
{
bool ret;
rcu_read_lock();
ret = bpf_prog_kallsyms_find(addr) != NULL;
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
bpf: Add support for BTF pointers to x86 JIT Pointer to BTF object is a pointer to kernel object or NULL. Such pointers can only be used by BPF_LDX instructions. The verifier changed their opcode from LDX|MEM|size to LDX|PROBE_MEM|size to make JITing easier. The number of entries in extable is the number of BPF_LDX insns that access kernel memory via "pointer to BTF type". Only these load instructions can fault. Since x86 extable is relative it has to be allocated in the same memory region as JITed code. Allocate it prior to last pass of JITing and let the last pass populate it. Pointer to extable in bpf_prog_aux is necessary to make page fault handling fast. Page fault handling is done in two steps: 1. bpf_prog_kallsyms_find() finds BPF program that page faulted. It's done by walking rb tree. 2. then extable for given bpf program is binary searched. This process is similar to how page faulting is done for kernel modules. The exception handler skips over faulting x86 instruction and initializes destination register with zero. This mimics exact behavior of bpf_probe_read (when probe_kernel_read faults dest is zeroed). JITs for other architectures can add support in similar way. Until then they will reject unknown opcode and fallback to interpreter. Since extable should be aligned and placed near JITed code make bpf_jit_binary_alloc() return 4 byte aligned image offset, so that extable aligning formula in bpf_int_jit_compile() doesn't need to rely on internal implementation of bpf_jit_binary_alloc(). On x86 gcc defaults to 16-byte alignment for regular kernel functions due to better performance. JITed code may be aligned to 16 in the future, but it will use 4 in the meantime. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191016032505.2089704-10-ast@kernel.org
2019-10-16 11:25:03 +08:00
const struct exception_table_entry *search_bpf_extables(unsigned long addr)
{
const struct exception_table_entry *e = NULL;
struct bpf_prog *prog;
rcu_read_lock();
prog = bpf_prog_kallsyms_find(addr);
if (!prog)
goto out;
if (!prog->aux->num_exentries)
goto out;
e = search_extable(prog->aux->extable, prog->aux->num_exentries, addr);
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return e;
}
bpf: make jited programs visible in traces Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them), thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on dumping stack from a map. This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address() is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent. Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets much better in future, we always have the option to change the default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway. If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms and friends. Before: 7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) After: 7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) [...] 7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-17 05:24:50 +08:00
int bpf_get_kallsym(unsigned int symnum, unsigned long *value, char *type,
char *sym)
{
struct bpf_prog_aux *aux;
unsigned int it = 0;
int ret = -ERANGE;
if (!bpf_jit_kallsyms_enabled())
return ret;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(aux, &bpf_kallsyms, ksym_lnode) {
if (it++ != symnum)
continue;
bpf_get_prog_name(aux->prog, sym);
*value = (unsigned long)aux->prog->bpf_func;
bpf: make jited programs visible in traces Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them), thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on dumping stack from a map. This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address() is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent. Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets much better in future, we always have the option to change the default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway. If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms and friends. Before: 7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) After: 7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) [...] 7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-17 05:24:50 +08:00
*type = BPF_SYM_ELF_TYPE;
ret = 0;
break;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out. Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit is reached. Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-23 07:11:04 +08:00
static atomic_long_t bpf_jit_current;
bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64K Michael and Sandipan report: Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000, and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined. For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit value: root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit -1673527296 and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported: setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8}, 16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524) and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9 host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC with no noticeable errors in the logs. Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For 4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec() so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init(). Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}. Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions in future. Fixes: ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations") Reported-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-11 19:14:12 +08:00
/* Can be overridden by an arch's JIT compiler if it has a custom,
* dedicated BPF backend memory area, or if neither of the two
* below apply.
*/
u64 __weak bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit(void)
{
bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out. Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit is reached. Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-23 07:11:04 +08:00
#if defined(MODULES_VADDR)
bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64K Michael and Sandipan report: Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000, and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined. For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit value: root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit -1673527296 and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported: setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8}, 16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524) and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9 host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC with no noticeable errors in the logs. Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For 4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec() so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init(). Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}. Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions in future. Fixes: ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations") Reported-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-11 19:14:12 +08:00
return MODULES_END - MODULES_VADDR;
#else
return VMALLOC_END - VMALLOC_START;
#endif
}
bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out. Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit is reached. Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-23 07:11:04 +08:00
static int __init bpf_jit_charge_init(void)
{
/* Only used as heuristic here to derive limit. */
bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64K Michael and Sandipan report: Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000, and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined. For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit value: root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit -1673527296 and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported: setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8}, 16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524) and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9 host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC with no noticeable errors in the logs. Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For 4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec() so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init(). Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}. Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions in future. Fixes: ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations") Reported-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-11 19:14:12 +08:00
bpf_jit_limit = min_t(u64, round_up(bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() >> 2,
PAGE_SIZE), LONG_MAX);
bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out. Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit is reached. Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-23 07:11:04 +08:00
return 0;
}
pure_initcall(bpf_jit_charge_init);
static int bpf_jit_charge_modmem(u32 pages)
{
if (atomic_long_add_return(pages, &bpf_jit_current) >
(bpf_jit_limit >> PAGE_SHIFT)) {
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
atomic_long_sub(pages, &bpf_jit_current);
return -EPERM;
}
}
return 0;
}
static void bpf_jit_uncharge_modmem(u32 pages)
{
atomic_long_sub(pages, &bpf_jit_current);
}
void *__weak bpf_jit_alloc_exec(unsigned long size)
{
return module_alloc(size);
}
void __weak bpf_jit_free_exec(void *addr)
{
module_memfree(addr);
}
struct bpf_binary_header *
bpf_jit_binary_alloc(unsigned int proglen, u8 **image_ptr,
unsigned int alignment,
bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns)
{
struct bpf_binary_header *hdr;
bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out. Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit is reached. Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-23 07:11:04 +08:00
u32 size, hole, start, pages;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_power_of_2(alignment) ||
alignment > BPF_IMAGE_ALIGNMENT);
/* Most of BPF filters are really small, but if some of them
* fill a page, allow at least 128 extra bytes to insert a
* random section of illegal instructions.
*/
size = round_up(proglen + sizeof(*hdr) + 128, PAGE_SIZE);
bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out. Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit is reached. Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-23 07:11:04 +08:00
pages = size / PAGE_SIZE;
if (bpf_jit_charge_modmem(pages))
return NULL;
hdr = bpf_jit_alloc_exec(size);
bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out. Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit is reached. Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-23 07:11:04 +08:00
if (!hdr) {
bpf_jit_uncharge_modmem(pages);
return NULL;
bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out. Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit is reached. Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-23 07:11:04 +08:00
}
/* Fill space with illegal/arch-dep instructions. */
bpf_fill_ill_insns(hdr, size);
bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out. Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit is reached. Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-23 07:11:04 +08:00
hdr->pages = pages;
hole = min_t(unsigned int, size - (proglen + sizeof(*hdr)),
PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*hdr));
start = (get_random_int() % hole) & ~(alignment - 1);
/* Leave a random number of instructions before BPF code. */
*image_ptr = &hdr->image[start];
return hdr;
}
void bpf_jit_binary_free(struct bpf_binary_header *hdr)
{
bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out. Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit is reached. Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-23 07:11:04 +08:00
u32 pages = hdr->pages;
bpf_jit_free_exec(hdr);
bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out. Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit is reached. Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-23 07:11:04 +08:00
bpf_jit_uncharge_modmem(pages);
}
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
bpf: make jited programs visible in traces Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them), thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on dumping stack from a map. This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address() is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent. Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets much better in future, we always have the option to change the default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway. If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms and friends. Before: 7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) After: 7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) [...] 7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) 7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux) f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so) Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-17 05:24:50 +08:00
/* This symbol is only overridden by archs that have different
* requirements than the usual eBPF JITs, f.e. when they only
* implement cBPF JIT, do not set images read-only, etc.
*/
void __weak bpf_jit_free(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
if (fp->jited) {
struct bpf_binary_header *hdr = bpf_jit_binary_hdr(fp);
bpf_jit_binary_free(hdr);
WARN_ON_ONCE(!bpf_prog_kallsyms_verify_off(fp));
}
bpf_prog_unlock_free(fp);
}
int bpf_jit_get_func_addr(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
const struct bpf_insn *insn, bool extra_pass,
u64 *func_addr, bool *func_addr_fixed)
{
s16 off = insn->off;
s32 imm = insn->imm;
u8 *addr;
*func_addr_fixed = insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL;
if (!*func_addr_fixed) {
/* Place-holder address till the last pass has collected
* all addresses for JITed subprograms in which case we
* can pick them up from prog->aux.
*/
if (!extra_pass)
addr = NULL;
else if (prog->aux->func &&
off >= 0 && off < prog->aux->func_cnt)
addr = (u8 *)prog->aux->func[off]->bpf_func;
else
return -EINVAL;
} else {
/* Address of a BPF helper call. Since part of the core
* kernel, it's always at a fixed location. __bpf_call_base
* and the helper with imm relative to it are both in core
* kernel.
*/
addr = (u8 *)__bpf_call_base + imm;
}
*func_addr = (unsigned long)addr;
return 0;
}
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
static int bpf_jit_blind_insn(const struct bpf_insn *from,
const struct bpf_insn *aux,
struct bpf_insn *to_buff,
bool emit_zext)
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
{
struct bpf_insn *to = to_buff;
u32 imm_rnd = get_random_int();
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
s16 off;
BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_AX + 1 != MAX_BPF_JIT_REG);
BUILD_BUG_ON(MAX_BPF_REG + 1 != MAX_BPF_JIT_REG);
/* Constraints on AX register:
*
* AX register is inaccessible from user space. It is mapped in
* all JITs, and used here for constant blinding rewrites. It is
* typically "stateless" meaning its contents are only valid within
* the executed instruction, but not across several instructions.
* There are a few exceptions however which are further detailed
* below.
*
* Constant blinding is only used by JITs, not in the interpreter.
* The interpreter uses AX in some occasions as a local temporary
* register e.g. in DIV or MOD instructions.
*
* In restricted circumstances, the verifier can also use the AX
* register for rewrites as long as they do not interfere with
* the above cases!
*/
if (from->dst_reg == BPF_REG_AX || from->src_reg == BPF_REG_AX)
goto out;
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
if (from->imm == 0 &&
(from->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOV | BPF_K) ||
from->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_K))) {
*to++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_XOR, from->dst_reg, from->dst_reg);
goto out;
}
switch (from->code) {
case BPF_ALU | BPF_ADD | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU | BPF_SUB | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU | BPF_OR | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU | BPF_XOR | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU | BPF_MUL | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU | BPF_MOV | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_K:
*to++ = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd ^ from->imm);
*to++ = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd);
*to++ = BPF_ALU32_REG(from->code, from->dst_reg, BPF_REG_AX);
break;
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_AND | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_OR | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_XOR | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MUL | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_K:
case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_K:
*to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd ^ from->imm);
*to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd);
*to++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(from->code, from->dst_reg, BPF_REG_AX);
break;
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JNE | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K:
bpf: add BPF_J{LT,LE,SLT,SLE} instructions Currently, eBPF only understands BPF_JGT (>), BPF_JGE (>=), BPF_JSGT (s>), BPF_JSGE (s>=) instructions, this means that particularly *JLT/*JLE counterparts involving immediates need to be rewritten from e.g. X < [IMM] by swapping arguments into [IMM] > X, meaning the immediate first is required to be loaded into a register Y := [IMM], such that then we can compare with Y > X. Note that the destination operand is always required to be a register. This has the downside of having unnecessarily increased register pressure, meaning complex program would need to spill other registers temporarily to stack in order to obtain an unused register for the [IMM]. Loading to registers will thus also affect state pruning since we need to account for that register use and potentially those registers that had to be spilled/filled again. As a consequence slightly more stack space might have been used due to spilling, and BPF programs are a bit longer due to extra code involving the register load and potentially required spill/fills. Thus, add BPF_JLT (<), BPF_JLE (<=), BPF_JSLT (s<), BPF_JSLE (s<=) counterparts to the eBPF instruction set. Modifying LLVM to remove the NegateCC() workaround in a PoC patch at [1] and allowing it to also emit the new instructions resulted in cilium's BPF programs that are injected into the fast-path to have a reduced program length in the range of 2-3% (e.g. accumulated main and tail call sections from one of the object file reduced from 4864 to 4729 insns), reduced complexity in the range of 10-30% (e.g. accumulated sections reduced in one of the cases from 116432 to 88428 insns), and reduced stack usage in the range of 1-5% (e.g. accumulated sections from one of the object files reduced from 824 to 784b). The modification for LLVM will be incorporated in a backwards compatible way. Plan is for LLVM to have i) a target specific option to offer a possibility to explicitly enable the extension by the user (as we have with -m target specific extensions today for various CPU insns), and ii) have the kernel checked for presence of the extensions and enable them transparently when the user is selecting more aggressive options such as -march=native in a bpf target context. (Other frontends generating BPF byte code, e.g. ply can probe the kernel directly for its code generation.) [1] https://github.com/borkmann/llvm/tree/bpf-insns Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:39:55 +08:00
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JLT | BPF_K:
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K:
bpf: add BPF_J{LT,LE,SLT,SLE} instructions Currently, eBPF only understands BPF_JGT (>), BPF_JGE (>=), BPF_JSGT (s>), BPF_JSGE (s>=) instructions, this means that particularly *JLT/*JLE counterparts involving immediates need to be rewritten from e.g. X < [IMM] by swapping arguments into [IMM] > X, meaning the immediate first is required to be loaded into a register Y := [IMM], such that then we can compare with Y > X. Note that the destination operand is always required to be a register. This has the downside of having unnecessarily increased register pressure, meaning complex program would need to spill other registers temporarily to stack in order to obtain an unused register for the [IMM]. Loading to registers will thus also affect state pruning since we need to account for that register use and potentially those registers that had to be spilled/filled again. As a consequence slightly more stack space might have been used due to spilling, and BPF programs are a bit longer due to extra code involving the register load and potentially required spill/fills. Thus, add BPF_JLT (<), BPF_JLE (<=), BPF_JSLT (s<), BPF_JSLE (s<=) counterparts to the eBPF instruction set. Modifying LLVM to remove the NegateCC() workaround in a PoC patch at [1] and allowing it to also emit the new instructions resulted in cilium's BPF programs that are injected into the fast-path to have a reduced program length in the range of 2-3% (e.g. accumulated main and tail call sections from one of the object file reduced from 4864 to 4729 insns), reduced complexity in the range of 10-30% (e.g. accumulated sections reduced in one of the cases from 116432 to 88428 insns), and reduced stack usage in the range of 1-5% (e.g. accumulated sections from one of the object files reduced from 824 to 784b). The modification for LLVM will be incorporated in a backwards compatible way. Plan is for LLVM to have i) a target specific option to offer a possibility to explicitly enable the extension by the user (as we have with -m target specific extensions today for various CPU insns), and ii) have the kernel checked for presence of the extensions and enable them transparently when the user is selecting more aggressive options such as -march=native in a bpf target context. (Other frontends generating BPF byte code, e.g. ply can probe the kernel directly for its code generation.) [1] https://github.com/borkmann/llvm/tree/bpf-insns Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:39:55 +08:00
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JLE | BPF_K:
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSGT | BPF_K:
bpf: add BPF_J{LT,LE,SLT,SLE} instructions Currently, eBPF only understands BPF_JGT (>), BPF_JGE (>=), BPF_JSGT (s>), BPF_JSGE (s>=) instructions, this means that particularly *JLT/*JLE counterparts involving immediates need to be rewritten from e.g. X < [IMM] by swapping arguments into [IMM] > X, meaning the immediate first is required to be loaded into a register Y := [IMM], such that then we can compare with Y > X. Note that the destination operand is always required to be a register. This has the downside of having unnecessarily increased register pressure, meaning complex program would need to spill other registers temporarily to stack in order to obtain an unused register for the [IMM]. Loading to registers will thus also affect state pruning since we need to account for that register use and potentially those registers that had to be spilled/filled again. As a consequence slightly more stack space might have been used due to spilling, and BPF programs are a bit longer due to extra code involving the register load and potentially required spill/fills. Thus, add BPF_JLT (<), BPF_JLE (<=), BPF_JSLT (s<), BPF_JSLE (s<=) counterparts to the eBPF instruction set. Modifying LLVM to remove the NegateCC() workaround in a PoC patch at [1] and allowing it to also emit the new instructions resulted in cilium's BPF programs that are injected into the fast-path to have a reduced program length in the range of 2-3% (e.g. accumulated main and tail call sections from one of the object file reduced from 4864 to 4729 insns), reduced complexity in the range of 10-30% (e.g. accumulated sections reduced in one of the cases from 116432 to 88428 insns), and reduced stack usage in the range of 1-5% (e.g. accumulated sections from one of the object files reduced from 824 to 784b). The modification for LLVM will be incorporated in a backwards compatible way. Plan is for LLVM to have i) a target specific option to offer a possibility to explicitly enable the extension by the user (as we have with -m target specific extensions today for various CPU insns), and ii) have the kernel checked for presence of the extensions and enable them transparently when the user is selecting more aggressive options such as -march=native in a bpf target context. (Other frontends generating BPF byte code, e.g. ply can probe the kernel directly for its code generation.) [1] https://github.com/borkmann/llvm/tree/bpf-insns Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:39:55 +08:00
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSLT | BPF_K:
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSGE | BPF_K:
bpf: add BPF_J{LT,LE,SLT,SLE} instructions Currently, eBPF only understands BPF_JGT (>), BPF_JGE (>=), BPF_JSGT (s>), BPF_JSGE (s>=) instructions, this means that particularly *JLT/*JLE counterparts involving immediates need to be rewritten from e.g. X < [IMM] by swapping arguments into [IMM] > X, meaning the immediate first is required to be loaded into a register Y := [IMM], such that then we can compare with Y > X. Note that the destination operand is always required to be a register. This has the downside of having unnecessarily increased register pressure, meaning complex program would need to spill other registers temporarily to stack in order to obtain an unused register for the [IMM]. Loading to registers will thus also affect state pruning since we need to account for that register use and potentially those registers that had to be spilled/filled again. As a consequence slightly more stack space might have been used due to spilling, and BPF programs are a bit longer due to extra code involving the register load and potentially required spill/fills. Thus, add BPF_JLT (<), BPF_JLE (<=), BPF_JSLT (s<), BPF_JSLE (s<=) counterparts to the eBPF instruction set. Modifying LLVM to remove the NegateCC() workaround in a PoC patch at [1] and allowing it to also emit the new instructions resulted in cilium's BPF programs that are injected into the fast-path to have a reduced program length in the range of 2-3% (e.g. accumulated main and tail call sections from one of the object file reduced from 4864 to 4729 insns), reduced complexity in the range of 10-30% (e.g. accumulated sections reduced in one of the cases from 116432 to 88428 insns), and reduced stack usage in the range of 1-5% (e.g. accumulated sections from one of the object files reduced from 824 to 784b). The modification for LLVM will be incorporated in a backwards compatible way. Plan is for LLVM to have i) a target specific option to offer a possibility to explicitly enable the extension by the user (as we have with -m target specific extensions today for various CPU insns), and ii) have the kernel checked for presence of the extensions and enable them transparently when the user is selecting more aggressive options such as -march=native in a bpf target context. (Other frontends generating BPF byte code, e.g. ply can probe the kernel directly for its code generation.) [1] https://github.com/borkmann/llvm/tree/bpf-insns Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:39:55 +08:00
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSLE | BPF_K:
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K:
/* Accommodate for extra offset in case of a backjump. */
off = from->off;
if (off < 0)
off -= 2;
*to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd ^ from->imm);
*to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd);
*to++ = BPF_JMP_REG(from->code, from->dst_reg, BPF_REG_AX, off);
break;
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JNE | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JGT | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JLT | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JGE | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JLE | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JSGT | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JSLT | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JSGE | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JSLE | BPF_K:
case BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JSET | BPF_K:
/* Accommodate for extra offset in case of a backjump. */
off = from->off;
if (off < 0)
off -= 2;
*to++ = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd ^ from->imm);
*to++ = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd);
*to++ = BPF_JMP32_REG(from->code, from->dst_reg, BPF_REG_AX,
off);
break;
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
case BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW:
*to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd ^ aux[1].imm);
*to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd);
*to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32);
*to++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, aux[0].dst_reg, BPF_REG_AX);
break;
case 0: /* Part 2 of BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW. */
*to++ = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd ^ aux[0].imm);
*to++ = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd);
if (emit_zext)
*to++ = BPF_ZEXT_REG(BPF_REG_AX);
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
*to++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, aux[0].dst_reg, BPF_REG_AX);
break;
case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW:
case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W:
case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H:
case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B:
*to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd ^ from->imm);
*to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd);
*to++ = BPF_STX_MEM(from->code, from->dst_reg, BPF_REG_AX, from->off);
break;
}
out:
return to - to_buff;
}
static struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_clone_create(struct bpf_prog *fp_other,
gfp_t gfp_extra_flags)
{
gfp_t gfp_flags = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO | gfp_extra_flags;
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
struct bpf_prog *fp;
fp = __vmalloc(fp_other->pages * PAGE_SIZE, gfp_flags, PAGE_KERNEL);
if (fp != NULL) {
/* aux->prog still points to the fp_other one, so
* when promoting the clone to the real program,
* this still needs to be adapted.
*/
memcpy(fp, fp_other, fp_other->pages * PAGE_SIZE);
}
return fp;
}
static void bpf_prog_clone_free(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
/* aux was stolen by the other clone, so we cannot free
* it from this path! It will be freed eventually by the
* other program on release.
*
* At this point, we don't need a deferred release since
* clone is guaranteed to not be locked.
*/
fp->aux = NULL;
__bpf_prog_free(fp);
}
void bpf_jit_prog_release_other(struct bpf_prog *fp, struct bpf_prog *fp_other)
{
/* We have to repoint aux->prog to self, as we don't
* know whether fp here is the clone or the original.
*/
fp->aux->prog = fp;
bpf_prog_clone_free(fp_other);
}
struct bpf_prog *bpf_jit_blind_constants(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
struct bpf_insn insn_buff[16], aux[2];
struct bpf_prog *clone, *tmp;
int insn_delta, insn_cnt;
struct bpf_insn *insn;
int i, rewritten;
bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs Typical JIT does several passes over bpf instructions to compute total size and relative offsets of jumps and calls. With multitple bpf functions calling each other all relative calls will have invalid offsets intially therefore we need to additional last pass over the program to emit calls with correct offsets. For example in case of three bpf functions: main: call foo call bpf_map_lookup exit foo: call bar exit bar: exit We will call bpf_int_jit_compile() indepedently for main(), foo() and bar() x64 JIT typically does 4-5 passes to converge. After these initial passes the image for these 3 functions will be good except call targets, since start addresses of foo() and bar() are unknown when we were JITing main() (note that call bpf_map_lookup will be resolved properly during initial passes). Once start addresses of 3 functions are known we patch call_insn->imm to point to right functions and call bpf_int_jit_compile() again which needs only one pass. Additional safety checks are done to make sure this last pass doesn't produce image that is larger or smaller than previous pass. When constant blinding is on it's applied to all functions at the first pass, since doing it once again at the last pass can change size of the JITed code. Tested on x64 and arm64 hw with JIT on/off, blinding on/off. x64 jits bpf-to-bpf calls correctly while arm64 falls back to interpreter. All other JITs that support normal BPF_CALL will behave the same way since bpf-to-bpf call is equivalent to bpf-to-kernel call from JITs point of view. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 09:55:15 +08:00
if (!bpf_jit_blinding_enabled(prog) || prog->blinded)
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
return prog;
clone = bpf_prog_clone_create(prog, GFP_USER);
if (!clone)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
insn_cnt = clone->len;
insn = clone->insnsi;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
/* We temporarily need to hold the original ld64 insn
* so that we can still access the first part in the
* second blinding run.
*/
if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW) &&
insn[1].code == 0)
memcpy(aux, insn, sizeof(aux));
rewritten = bpf_jit_blind_insn(insn, aux, insn_buff,
clone->aux->verifier_zext);
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
if (!rewritten)
continue;
tmp = bpf_patch_insn_single(clone, i, insn_buff, rewritten);
if (IS_ERR(tmp)) {
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
/* Patching may have repointed aux->prog during
* realloc from the original one, so we need to
* fix it up here on error.
*/
bpf_jit_prog_release_other(prog, clone);
return tmp;
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
}
clone = tmp;
insn_delta = rewritten - 1;
/* Walk new program and skip insns we just inserted. */
insn = clone->insnsi + i + insn_delta;
insn_cnt += insn_delta;
i += insn_delta;
}
bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs Typical JIT does several passes over bpf instructions to compute total size and relative offsets of jumps and calls. With multitple bpf functions calling each other all relative calls will have invalid offsets intially therefore we need to additional last pass over the program to emit calls with correct offsets. For example in case of three bpf functions: main: call foo call bpf_map_lookup exit foo: call bar exit bar: exit We will call bpf_int_jit_compile() indepedently for main(), foo() and bar() x64 JIT typically does 4-5 passes to converge. After these initial passes the image for these 3 functions will be good except call targets, since start addresses of foo() and bar() are unknown when we were JITing main() (note that call bpf_map_lookup will be resolved properly during initial passes). Once start addresses of 3 functions are known we patch call_insn->imm to point to right functions and call bpf_int_jit_compile() again which needs only one pass. Additional safety checks are done to make sure this last pass doesn't produce image that is larger or smaller than previous pass. When constant blinding is on it's applied to all functions at the first pass, since doing it once again at the last pass can change size of the JITed code. Tested on x64 and arm64 hw with JIT on/off, blinding on/off. x64 jits bpf-to-bpf calls correctly while arm64 falls back to interpreter. All other JITs that support normal BPF_CALL will behave the same way since bpf-to-bpf call is equivalent to bpf-to-kernel call from JITs point of view. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 09:55:15 +08:00
clone->blinded = 1;
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-14 01:08:32 +08:00
return clone;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_JIT */
/* Base function for offset calculation. Needs to go into .text section,
* therefore keeping it non-static as well; will also be used by JITs
bpf: allow for correlation of maps and helpers in dump Currently a dump of an xlated prog (post verifier stage) doesn't correlate used helpers as well as maps. The prog info lists involved map ids, however there's no correlation of where in the program they are used as of today. Likewise, bpftool does not correlate helper calls with the target functions. The latter can be done w/o any kernel changes through kallsyms, and also has the advantage that this works with inlined helpers and BPF calls. Example, via interpreter: # tc filter show dev foo ingress filter protocol all pref 49152 bpf chain 0 filter protocol all pref 49152 bpf chain 0 handle 0x1 foo.o:[ingress] \ direct-action not_in_hw id 1 tag c74773051b364165 <-- prog id:1 * Output before patch (calls/maps remain unclear): # bpftool prog dump xlated id 1 <-- dump prog id:1 0: (b7) r1 = 2 1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -4 4: (18) r1 = 0xffff95c47a8d4800 6: (85) call unknown#73040 7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+18 8: (bf) r2 = r10 9: (07) r2 += -4 10: (bf) r1 = r0 11: (85) call unknown#73040 12: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23 [...] * Output after patch: # bpftool prog dump xlated id 1 0: (b7) r1 = 2 1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -4 4: (18) r1 = map[id:2] <-- map id:2 6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#73424 <-- helper call 7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+18 8: (bf) r2 = r10 9: (07) r2 += -4 10: (bf) r1 = r0 11: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#73424 12: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23 [...] # bpftool map show id 2 <-- show/dump/etc map id:2 2: hash_of_maps flags 0x0 key 4B value 4B max_entries 3 memlock 4096B Example, JITed, same prog: # tc filter show dev foo ingress filter protocol all pref 49152 bpf chain 0 filter protocol all pref 49152 bpf chain 0 handle 0x1 foo.o:[ingress] \ direct-action not_in_hw id 3 tag c74773051b364165 jited # bpftool prog show id 3 3: sched_cls tag c74773051b364165 loaded_at Dec 19/13:48 uid 0 xlated 384B jited 257B memlock 4096B map_ids 2 # bpftool prog dump xlated id 3 0: (b7) r1 = 2 1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -4 4: (18) r1 = map[id:2] <-- map id:2 6: (85) call __htab_map_lookup_elem#77408 <-+ inlined rewrite 7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+2 | 8: (07) r0 += 56 | 9: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) <-+ 10: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+24 11: (bf) r2 = r10 12: (07) r2 += -4 [...] Example, same prog, but kallsyms disabled (in that case we are also not allowed to pass any relative offsets, etc, so prog becomes pointer sanitized on dump): # sysctl kernel.kptr_restrict=2 kernel.kptr_restrict = 2 # bpftool prog dump xlated id 3 0: (b7) r1 = 2 1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -4 4: (18) r1 = map[id:2] 6: (85) call bpf_unspec#0 7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+2 [...] Example, BPF calls via interpreter: # bpftool prog dump xlated id 1 0: (85) call pc+2#__bpf_prog_run_args32 1: (b7) r0 = 1 2: (95) exit 3: (b7) r0 = 2 4: (95) exit Example, BPF calls via JIT: # sysctl net.core.bpf_jit_enable=1 net.core.bpf_jit_enable = 1 # sysctl net.core.bpf_jit_kallsyms=1 net.core.bpf_jit_kallsyms = 1 # bpftool prog dump xlated id 1 0: (85) call pc+2#bpf_prog_3b185187f1855c4c_F 1: (b7) r0 = 1 2: (95) exit 3: (b7) r0 = 2 4: (95) exit And finally, an example for tail calls that is now working as well wrt correlation: # bpftool prog dump xlated id 2 [...] 10: (b7) r2 = 8 11: (85) call bpf_trace_printk#-41312 12: (bf) r1 = r6 13: (18) r2 = map[id:1] 15: (b7) r3 = 0 16: (85) call bpf_tail_call#12 17: (b7) r1 = 42 18: (6b) *(u16 *)(r6 +46) = r1 19: (b7) r0 = 0 20: (95) exit # bpftool map show id 1 1: prog_array flags 0x0 key 4B value 4B max_entries 1 memlock 4096B Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2017-12-20 20:42:57 +08:00
* anyway later on, so do not let the compiler omit it. This also needs
* to go into kallsyms for correlation from e.g. bpftool, so naming
* must not change.
*/
noinline u64 __bpf_call_base(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5)
{
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__bpf_call_base);
/* All UAPI available opcodes. */
#define BPF_INSN_MAP(INSN_2, INSN_3) \
/* 32 bit ALU operations. */ \
/* Register based. */ \
INSN_3(ALU, ADD, X), \
INSN_3(ALU, SUB, X), \
INSN_3(ALU, AND, X), \
INSN_3(ALU, OR, X), \
INSN_3(ALU, LSH, X), \
INSN_3(ALU, RSH, X), \
INSN_3(ALU, XOR, X), \
INSN_3(ALU, MUL, X), \
INSN_3(ALU, MOV, X), \
INSN_3(ALU, ARSH, X), \
INSN_3(ALU, DIV, X), \
INSN_3(ALU, MOD, X), \
INSN_2(ALU, NEG), \
INSN_3(ALU, END, TO_BE), \
INSN_3(ALU, END, TO_LE), \
/* Immediate based. */ \
INSN_3(ALU, ADD, K), \
INSN_3(ALU, SUB, K), \
INSN_3(ALU, AND, K), \
INSN_3(ALU, OR, K), \
INSN_3(ALU, LSH, K), \
INSN_3(ALU, RSH, K), \
INSN_3(ALU, XOR, K), \
INSN_3(ALU, MUL, K), \
INSN_3(ALU, MOV, K), \
INSN_3(ALU, ARSH, K), \
INSN_3(ALU, DIV, K), \
INSN_3(ALU, MOD, K), \
/* 64 bit ALU operations. */ \
/* Register based. */ \
INSN_3(ALU64, ADD, X), \
INSN_3(ALU64, SUB, X), \
INSN_3(ALU64, AND, X), \
INSN_3(ALU64, OR, X), \
INSN_3(ALU64, LSH, X), \
INSN_3(ALU64, RSH, X), \
INSN_3(ALU64, XOR, X), \
INSN_3(ALU64, MUL, X), \
INSN_3(ALU64, MOV, X), \
INSN_3(ALU64, ARSH, X), \
INSN_3(ALU64, DIV, X), \
INSN_3(ALU64, MOD, X), \
INSN_2(ALU64, NEG), \
/* Immediate based. */ \
INSN_3(ALU64, ADD, K), \
INSN_3(ALU64, SUB, K), \
INSN_3(ALU64, AND, K), \
INSN_3(ALU64, OR, K), \
INSN_3(ALU64, LSH, K), \
INSN_3(ALU64, RSH, K), \
INSN_3(ALU64, XOR, K), \
INSN_3(ALU64, MUL, K), \
INSN_3(ALU64, MOV, K), \
INSN_3(ALU64, ARSH, K), \
INSN_3(ALU64, DIV, K), \
INSN_3(ALU64, MOD, K), \
/* Call instruction. */ \
INSN_2(JMP, CALL), \
/* Exit instruction. */ \
INSN_2(JMP, EXIT), \
/* 32-bit Jump instructions. */ \
/* Register based. */ \
INSN_3(JMP32, JEQ, X), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JNE, X), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JGT, X), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JLT, X), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JGE, X), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JLE, X), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JSGT, X), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JSLT, X), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JSGE, X), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JSLE, X), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JSET, X), \
/* Immediate based. */ \
INSN_3(JMP32, JEQ, K), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JNE, K), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JGT, K), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JLT, K), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JGE, K), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JLE, K), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JSGT, K), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JSLT, K), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JSGE, K), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JSLE, K), \
INSN_3(JMP32, JSET, K), \
/* Jump instructions. */ \
/* Register based. */ \
INSN_3(JMP, JEQ, X), \
INSN_3(JMP, JNE, X), \
INSN_3(JMP, JGT, X), \
INSN_3(JMP, JLT, X), \
INSN_3(JMP, JGE, X), \
INSN_3(JMP, JLE, X), \
INSN_3(JMP, JSGT, X), \
INSN_3(JMP, JSLT, X), \
INSN_3(JMP, JSGE, X), \
INSN_3(JMP, JSLE, X), \
INSN_3(JMP, JSET, X), \
/* Immediate based. */ \
INSN_3(JMP, JEQ, K), \
INSN_3(JMP, JNE, K), \
INSN_3(JMP, JGT, K), \
INSN_3(JMP, JLT, K), \
INSN_3(JMP, JGE, K), \
INSN_3(JMP, JLE, K), \
INSN_3(JMP, JSGT, K), \
INSN_3(JMP, JSLT, K), \
INSN_3(JMP, JSGE, K), \
INSN_3(JMP, JSLE, K), \
INSN_3(JMP, JSET, K), \
INSN_2(JMP, JA), \
/* Store instructions. */ \
/* Register based. */ \
INSN_3(STX, MEM, B), \
INSN_3(STX, MEM, H), \
INSN_3(STX, MEM, W), \
INSN_3(STX, MEM, DW), \
INSN_3(STX, XADD, W), \
INSN_3(STX, XADD, DW), \
/* Immediate based. */ \
INSN_3(ST, MEM, B), \
INSN_3(ST, MEM, H), \
INSN_3(ST, MEM, W), \
INSN_3(ST, MEM, DW), \
/* Load instructions. */ \
/* Register based. */ \
INSN_3(LDX, MEM, B), \
INSN_3(LDX, MEM, H), \
INSN_3(LDX, MEM, W), \
INSN_3(LDX, MEM, DW), \
/* Immediate based. */ \
bpf: implement ld_abs/ld_ind in native bpf The main part of this work is to finally allow removal of LD_ABS and LD_IND from the BPF core by reimplementing them through native eBPF instead. Both LD_ABS/LD_IND were carried over from cBPF and keeping them around in native eBPF caused way more trouble than actually worth it. To just list some of the security issues in the past: * fdfaf64e7539 ("x86: bpf_jit: support negative offsets") * 35607b02dbef ("sparc: bpf_jit: fix loads from negative offsets") * e0ee9c12157d ("x86: bpf_jit: fix two bugs in eBPF JIT compiler") * 07aee9439454 ("bpf, sparc: fix usage of wrong reg for load_skb_regs after call") * 6d59b7dbf72e ("bpf, s390x: do not reload skb pointers in non-skb context") * 87338c8e2cbb ("bpf, ppc64: do not reload skb pointers in non-skb context") For programs in native eBPF, LD_ABS/LD_IND are pretty much legacy these days due to their limitations and more efficient/flexible alternatives that have been developed over time such as direct packet access. LD_ABS/LD_IND only cover 1/2/4 byte loads into a register, the load happens in host endianness and its exception handling can yield unexpected behavior. The latter is explained in depth in f6b1b3bf0d5f ("bpf: fix subprog verifier bypass by div/mod by 0 exception") with similar cases of exceptions we had. In native eBPF more recent program types will disable LD_ABS/LD_IND altogether through may_access_skb() in verifier, and given the limitations in terms of exception handling, it's also disabled in programs that use BPF to BPF calls. In terms of cBPF, the LD_ABS/LD_IND is used in networking programs to access packet data. It is not used in seccomp-BPF but programs that use it for socket filtering or reuseport for demuxing with cBPF. This is mostly relevant for applications that have not yet migrated to native eBPF. The main complexity and source of bugs in LD_ABS/LD_IND is coming from their implementation in the various JITs. Most of them keep the model around from cBPF times by implementing a fastpath written in asm. They use typically two from the BPF program hidden CPU registers for caching the skb's headlen (skb->len - skb->data_len) and skb->data. Throughout the JIT phase this requires to keep track whether LD_ABS/LD_IND are used and if so, the two registers need to be recached each time a BPF helper would change the underlying packet data in native eBPF case. At least in eBPF case, available CPU registers are rare and the additional exit path out of the asm written JIT helper makes it also inflexible since not all parts of the JITer are in control from plain C. A LD_ABS/LD_IND implementation in eBPF therefore allows to significantly reduce the complexity in JITs with comparable performance results for them, e.g.: test_bpf tcpdump port 22 tcpdump complex x64 - before 15 21 10 14 19 18 - after 7 10 10 7 10 15 arm64 - before 40 91 92 40 91 151 - after 51 64 73 51 62 113 For cBPF we now track any usage of LD_ABS/LD_IND in bpf_convert_filter() and cache the skb's headlen and data in the cBPF prologue. The BPF_REG_TMP gets remapped from R8 to R2 since it's mainly just used as a local temporary variable. This allows to shrink the image on x86_64 also for seccomp programs slightly since mapping to %rsi is not an ereg. In callee-saved R8 and R9 we now track skb data and headlen, respectively. For normal prologue emission in the JITs this does not add any extra instructions since R8, R9 are pushed to stack in any case from eBPF side. cBPF uses the convert_bpf_ld_abs() emitter which probes the fast path inline already and falls back to bpf_skb_load_helper_{8,16,32}() helper relying on the cached skb data and headlen as well. R8 and R9 never need to be reloaded due to bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() since all skb access in cBPF is read-only. Then, for the case of native eBPF, we use the bpf_gen_ld_abs() emitter, which calls the bpf_skb_load_helper_{8,16,32}_no_cache() helper unconditionally, does neither cache skb data and headlen nor has an inlined fast path. The reason for the latter is that native eBPF does not have any extra registers available anyway, but even if there were, it avoids any reload of skb data and headlen in the first place. Additionally, for the negative offsets, we provide an alternative bpf_skb_load_bytes_relative() helper in eBPF which operates similarly as bpf_skb_load_bytes() and allows for more flexibility. Tested myself on x64, arm64, s390x, from Sandipan on ppc64. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-04 07:08:14 +08:00
INSN_3(LD, IMM, DW)
bool bpf_opcode_in_insntable(u8 code)
{
#define BPF_INSN_2_TBL(x, y) [BPF_##x | BPF_##y] = true
#define BPF_INSN_3_TBL(x, y, z) [BPF_##x | BPF_##y | BPF_##z] = true
static const bool public_insntable[256] = {
[0 ... 255] = false,
/* Now overwrite non-defaults ... */
BPF_INSN_MAP(BPF_INSN_2_TBL, BPF_INSN_3_TBL),
bpf: implement ld_abs/ld_ind in native bpf The main part of this work is to finally allow removal of LD_ABS and LD_IND from the BPF core by reimplementing them through native eBPF instead. Both LD_ABS/LD_IND were carried over from cBPF and keeping them around in native eBPF caused way more trouble than actually worth it. To just list some of the security issues in the past: * fdfaf64e7539 ("x86: bpf_jit: support negative offsets") * 35607b02dbef ("sparc: bpf_jit: fix loads from negative offsets") * e0ee9c12157d ("x86: bpf_jit: fix two bugs in eBPF JIT compiler") * 07aee9439454 ("bpf, sparc: fix usage of wrong reg for load_skb_regs after call") * 6d59b7dbf72e ("bpf, s390x: do not reload skb pointers in non-skb context") * 87338c8e2cbb ("bpf, ppc64: do not reload skb pointers in non-skb context") For programs in native eBPF, LD_ABS/LD_IND are pretty much legacy these days due to their limitations and more efficient/flexible alternatives that have been developed over time such as direct packet access. LD_ABS/LD_IND only cover 1/2/4 byte loads into a register, the load happens in host endianness and its exception handling can yield unexpected behavior. The latter is explained in depth in f6b1b3bf0d5f ("bpf: fix subprog verifier bypass by div/mod by 0 exception") with similar cases of exceptions we had. In native eBPF more recent program types will disable LD_ABS/LD_IND altogether through may_access_skb() in verifier, and given the limitations in terms of exception handling, it's also disabled in programs that use BPF to BPF calls. In terms of cBPF, the LD_ABS/LD_IND is used in networking programs to access packet data. It is not used in seccomp-BPF but programs that use it for socket filtering or reuseport for demuxing with cBPF. This is mostly relevant for applications that have not yet migrated to native eBPF. The main complexity and source of bugs in LD_ABS/LD_IND is coming from their implementation in the various JITs. Most of them keep the model around from cBPF times by implementing a fastpath written in asm. They use typically two from the BPF program hidden CPU registers for caching the skb's headlen (skb->len - skb->data_len) and skb->data. Throughout the JIT phase this requires to keep track whether LD_ABS/LD_IND are used and if so, the two registers need to be recached each time a BPF helper would change the underlying packet data in native eBPF case. At least in eBPF case, available CPU registers are rare and the additional exit path out of the asm written JIT helper makes it also inflexible since not all parts of the JITer are in control from plain C. A LD_ABS/LD_IND implementation in eBPF therefore allows to significantly reduce the complexity in JITs with comparable performance results for them, e.g.: test_bpf tcpdump port 22 tcpdump complex x64 - before 15 21 10 14 19 18 - after 7 10 10 7 10 15 arm64 - before 40 91 92 40 91 151 - after 51 64 73 51 62 113 For cBPF we now track any usage of LD_ABS/LD_IND in bpf_convert_filter() and cache the skb's headlen and data in the cBPF prologue. The BPF_REG_TMP gets remapped from R8 to R2 since it's mainly just used as a local temporary variable. This allows to shrink the image on x86_64 also for seccomp programs slightly since mapping to %rsi is not an ereg. In callee-saved R8 and R9 we now track skb data and headlen, respectively. For normal prologue emission in the JITs this does not add any extra instructions since R8, R9 are pushed to stack in any case from eBPF side. cBPF uses the convert_bpf_ld_abs() emitter which probes the fast path inline already and falls back to bpf_skb_load_helper_{8,16,32}() helper relying on the cached skb data and headlen as well. R8 and R9 never need to be reloaded due to bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() since all skb access in cBPF is read-only. Then, for the case of native eBPF, we use the bpf_gen_ld_abs() emitter, which calls the bpf_skb_load_helper_{8,16,32}_no_cache() helper unconditionally, does neither cache skb data and headlen nor has an inlined fast path. The reason for the latter is that native eBPF does not have any extra registers available anyway, but even if there were, it avoids any reload of skb data and headlen in the first place. Additionally, for the negative offsets, we provide an alternative bpf_skb_load_bytes_relative() helper in eBPF which operates similarly as bpf_skb_load_bytes() and allows for more flexibility. Tested myself on x64, arm64, s390x, from Sandipan on ppc64. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-05-04 07:08:14 +08:00
/* UAPI exposed, but rewritten opcodes. cBPF carry-over. */
[BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_B] = true,
[BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_H] = true,
[BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_W] = true,
[BPF_LD | BPF_IND | BPF_B] = true,
[BPF_LD | BPF_IND | BPF_H] = true,
[BPF_LD | BPF_IND | BPF_W] = true,
};
#undef BPF_INSN_3_TBL
#undef BPF_INSN_2_TBL
return public_insntable[code];
}
bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715. A quote from goolge project zero blog: "At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying. So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets." To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode. So far eBPF JIT is supported by: x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64 The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only. In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden v2->v3: - move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel) v1->v2: - fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback) - fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback) - add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func - retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk. It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next Considered doing: int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT; but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place and remove this jit_init() function. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-01-10 02:04:29 +08:00
#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
u64 __weak bpf_probe_read_kernel(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr)
{
memset(dst, 0, size);
return -EFAULT;
}
/**
net: filter: split 'struct sk_filter' into socket and bpf parts clean up names related to socket filtering and bpf in the following way: - everything that deals with sockets keeps 'sk_*' prefix - everything that is pure BPF is changed to 'bpf_*' prefix split 'struct sk_filter' into struct sk_filter { atomic_t refcnt; struct rcu_head rcu; struct bpf_prog *prog; }; and struct bpf_prog { u32 jited:1, len:31; struct sock_fprog_kern *orig_prog; unsigned int (*bpf_func)(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct bpf_insn *filter); union { struct sock_filter insns[0]; struct bpf_insn insnsi[0]; struct work_struct work; }; }; so that 'struct bpf_prog' can be used independent of sockets and cleans up 'unattached' bpf use cases split SK_RUN_FILTER macro into: SK_RUN_FILTER to be used with 'struct sk_filter *' and BPF_PROG_RUN to be used with 'struct bpf_prog *' __sk_filter_release(struct sk_filter *) gains __bpf_prog_release(struct bpf_prog *) helper function also perform related renames for the functions that work with 'struct bpf_prog *', since they're on the same lines: sk_filter_size -> bpf_prog_size sk_filter_select_runtime -> bpf_prog_select_runtime sk_filter_free -> bpf_prog_free sk_unattached_filter_create -> bpf_prog_create sk_unattached_filter_destroy -> bpf_prog_destroy sk_store_orig_filter -> bpf_prog_store_orig_filter sk_release_orig_filter -> bpf_release_orig_filter __sk_migrate_filter -> bpf_migrate_filter __sk_prepare_filter -> bpf_prepare_filter API for attaching classic BPF to a socket stays the same: sk_attach_filter(prog, struct sock *)/sk_detach_filter(struct sock *) and SK_RUN_FILTER(struct sk_filter *, ctx) to execute a program which is used by sockets, tun, af_packet API for 'unattached' BPF programs becomes: bpf_prog_create(struct bpf_prog **)/bpf_prog_destroy(struct bpf_prog *) and BPF_PROG_RUN(struct bpf_prog *, ctx) to execute a program which is used by isdn, ppp, team, seccomp, ptp, xt_bpf, cls_bpf, test_bpf Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-31 11:34:16 +08:00
* __bpf_prog_run - run eBPF program on a given context
* @regs: is the array of MAX_BPF_EXT_REG eBPF pseudo-registers
net: filter: split 'struct sk_filter' into socket and bpf parts clean up names related to socket filtering and bpf in the following way: - everything that deals with sockets keeps 'sk_*' prefix - everything that is pure BPF is changed to 'bpf_*' prefix split 'struct sk_filter' into struct sk_filter { atomic_t refcnt; struct rcu_head rcu; struct bpf_prog *prog; }; and struct bpf_prog { u32 jited:1, len:31; struct sock_fprog_kern *orig_prog; unsigned int (*bpf_func)(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct bpf_insn *filter); union { struct sock_filter insns[0]; struct bpf_insn insnsi[0]; struct work_struct work; }; }; so that 'struct bpf_prog' can be used independent of sockets and cleans up 'unattached' bpf use cases split SK_RUN_FILTER macro into: SK_RUN_FILTER to be used with 'struct sk_filter *' and BPF_PROG_RUN to be used with 'struct bpf_prog *' __sk_filter_release(struct sk_filter *) gains __bpf_prog_release(struct bpf_prog *) helper function also perform related renames for the functions that work with 'struct bpf_prog *', since they're on the same lines: sk_filter_size -> bpf_prog_size sk_filter_select_runtime -> bpf_prog_select_runtime sk_filter_free -> bpf_prog_free sk_unattached_filter_create -> bpf_prog_create sk_unattached_filter_destroy -> bpf_prog_destroy sk_store_orig_filter -> bpf_prog_store_orig_filter sk_release_orig_filter -> bpf_release_orig_filter __sk_migrate_filter -> bpf_migrate_filter __sk_prepare_filter -> bpf_prepare_filter API for attaching classic BPF to a socket stays the same: sk_attach_filter(prog, struct sock *)/sk_detach_filter(struct sock *) and SK_RUN_FILTER(struct sk_filter *, ctx) to execute a program which is used by sockets, tun, af_packet API for 'unattached' BPF programs becomes: bpf_prog_create(struct bpf_prog **)/bpf_prog_destroy(struct bpf_prog *) and BPF_PROG_RUN(struct bpf_prog *, ctx) to execute a program which is used by isdn, ppp, team, seccomp, ptp, xt_bpf, cls_bpf, test_bpf Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-31 11:34:16 +08:00
* @insn: is the array of eBPF instructions
* @stack: is the eBPF storage stack
*
net: filter: split 'struct sk_filter' into socket and bpf parts clean up names related to socket filtering and bpf in the following way: - everything that deals with sockets keeps 'sk_*' prefix - everything that is pure BPF is changed to 'bpf_*' prefix split 'struct sk_filter' into struct sk_filter { atomic_t refcnt; struct rcu_head rcu; struct bpf_prog *prog; }; and struct bpf_prog { u32 jited:1, len:31; struct sock_fprog_kern *orig_prog; unsigned int (*bpf_func)(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct bpf_insn *filter); union { struct sock_filter insns[0]; struct bpf_insn insnsi[0]; struct work_struct work; }; }; so that 'struct bpf_prog' can be used independent of sockets and cleans up 'unattached' bpf use cases split SK_RUN_FILTER macro into: SK_RUN_FILTER to be used with 'struct sk_filter *' and BPF_PROG_RUN to be used with 'struct bpf_prog *' __sk_filter_release(struct sk_filter *) gains __bpf_prog_release(struct bpf_prog *) helper function also perform related renames for the functions that work with 'struct bpf_prog *', since they're on the same lines: sk_filter_size -> bpf_prog_size sk_filter_select_runtime -> bpf_prog_select_runtime sk_filter_free -> bpf_prog_free sk_unattached_filter_create -> bpf_prog_create sk_unattached_filter_destroy -> bpf_prog_destroy sk_store_orig_filter -> bpf_prog_store_orig_filter sk_release_orig_filter -> bpf_release_orig_filter __sk_migrate_filter -> bpf_migrate_filter __sk_prepare_filter -> bpf_prepare_filter API for attaching classic BPF to a socket stays the same: sk_attach_filter(prog, struct sock *)/sk_detach_filter(struct sock *) and SK_RUN_FILTER(struct sk_filter *, ctx) to execute a program which is used by sockets, tun, af_packet API for 'unattached' BPF programs becomes: bpf_prog_create(struct bpf_prog **)/bpf_prog_destroy(struct bpf_prog *) and BPF_PROG_RUN(struct bpf_prog *, ctx) to execute a program which is used by isdn, ppp, team, seccomp, ptp, xt_bpf, cls_bpf, test_bpf Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-31 11:34:16 +08:00
* Decode and execute eBPF instructions.
*/
bpf: Disable GCC -fgcse optimization for ___bpf_prog_run() On x86-64, with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n, GCC's "global common subexpression elimination" optimization results in ___bpf_prog_run()'s jumptable code changing from this: select_insn: jmp *jumptable(, %rax, 8) ... ALU64_ADD_X: ... jmp *jumptable(, %rax, 8) ALU_ADD_X: ... jmp *jumptable(, %rax, 8) to this: select_insn: mov jumptable, %r12 jmp *(%r12, %rax, 8) ... ALU64_ADD_X: ... jmp *(%r12, %rax, 8) ALU_ADD_X: ... jmp *(%r12, %rax, 8) The jumptable address is placed in a register once, at the beginning of the function. The function execution can then go through multiple indirect jumps which rely on that same register value. This has a few issues: 1) Objtool isn't smart enough to be able to track such a register value across multiple recursive indirect jumps through the jump table. 2) With CONFIG_RETPOLINE enabled, this optimization actually results in a small slowdown. I measured a ~4.7% slowdown in the test_bpf "tcpdump port 22" selftest. This slowdown is actually predicted by the GCC manual: Note: When compiling a program using computed gotos, a GCC extension, you may get better run-time performance if you disable the global common subexpression elimination pass by adding -fno-gcse to the command line. So just disable the optimization for this function. Fixes: e55a73251da3 ("bpf: Fix ORC unwinding in non-JIT BPF code") Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/30c3ca29ba037afcbd860a8672eef0021addf9fe.1563413318.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2019-07-18 09:36:45 +08:00
static u64 __no_fgcse ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn, u64 *stack)
{
#define BPF_INSN_2_LBL(x, y) [BPF_##x | BPF_##y] = &&x##_##y
#define BPF_INSN_3_LBL(x, y, z) [BPF_##x | BPF_##y | BPF_##z] = &&x##_##y##_##z
static const void * const jumptable[256] __annotate_jump_table = {
[0 ... 255] = &&default_label,
/* Now overwrite non-defaults ... */
BPF_INSN_MAP(BPF_INSN_2_LBL, BPF_INSN_3_LBL),
/* Non-UAPI available opcodes. */
[BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL_ARGS] = &&JMP_CALL_ARGS,
[BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL] = &&JMP_TAIL_CALL,
[BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | BPF_B] = &&LDX_PROBE_MEM_B,
[BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | BPF_H] = &&LDX_PROBE_MEM_H,
[BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | BPF_W] = &&LDX_PROBE_MEM_W,
[BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | BPF_DW] = &&LDX_PROBE_MEM_DW,
};
#undef BPF_INSN_3_LBL
#undef BPF_INSN_2_LBL
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
u32 tail_call_cnt = 0;
#define CONT ({ insn++; goto select_insn; })
#define CONT_JMP ({ insn++; goto select_insn; })
select_insn:
goto *jumptable[insn->code];
/* ALU */
#define ALU(OPCODE, OP) \
ALU64_##OPCODE##_X: \
DST = DST OP SRC; \
CONT; \
ALU_##OPCODE##_X: \
DST = (u32) DST OP (u32) SRC; \
CONT; \
ALU64_##OPCODE##_K: \
DST = DST OP IMM; \
CONT; \
ALU_##OPCODE##_K: \
DST = (u32) DST OP (u32) IMM; \
CONT;
ALU(ADD, +)
ALU(SUB, -)
ALU(AND, &)
ALU(OR, |)
ALU(LSH, <<)
ALU(RSH, >>)
ALU(XOR, ^)
ALU(MUL, *)
#undef ALU
ALU_NEG:
DST = (u32) -DST;
CONT;
ALU64_NEG:
DST = -DST;
CONT;
ALU_MOV_X:
DST = (u32) SRC;
CONT;
ALU_MOV_K:
DST = (u32) IMM;
CONT;
ALU64_MOV_X:
DST = SRC;
CONT;
ALU64_MOV_K:
DST = IMM;
CONT;
net: filter: add "load 64-bit immediate" eBPF instruction add BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction to load 64-bit immediate value into a register. All previous instructions were 8-byte. This is first 16-byte instruction. Two consecutive 'struct bpf_insn' blocks are interpreted as single instruction: insn[0].code = BPF_LD | BPF_DW | BPF_IMM insn[0].dst_reg = destination register insn[0].imm = lower 32-bit insn[1].code = 0 insn[1].imm = upper 32-bit All unused fields must be zero. Classic BPF has similar instruction: BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_IMM which loads 32-bit immediate value into a register. x64 JITs it as single 'movabsq %rax, imm64' arm64 may JIT as sequence of four 'movk x0, #imm16, lsl #shift' insn Note that old eBPF programs are binary compatible with new interpreter. It helps eBPF programs load 64-bit constant into a register with one instruction instead of using two registers and 4 instructions: BPF_MOV32_IMM(R1, imm32) BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, R1, 32) BPF_MOV32_IMM(R2, imm32) BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, R1, R2) User space generated programs will use this instruction to load constants only. To tell kernel that user space needs a pointer the _pseudo_ variant of this instruction may be added later, which will use extra bits of encoding to indicate what type of pointer user space is asking kernel to provide. For example 'off' or 'src_reg' fields can be used for such purpose. src_reg = 1 could mean that user space is asking kernel to validate and load in-kernel map pointer. src_reg = 2 could mean that user space needs readonly data section pointer src_reg = 3 could mean that user space needs a pointer to per-cpu local data All such future pseudo instructions will not be carrying the actual pointer as part of the instruction, but rather will be treated as a request to kernel to provide one. The kernel will verify the request_for_a_pointer, then will drop _pseudo_ marking and will store actual internal pointer inside the instruction, so the end result is the interpreter and JITs never see pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insns and only operate on generic BPF_LD_IMM64 that loads 64-bit immediate into a register. User space never operates on direct pointers and verifier can easily recognize request_for_pointer vs other instructions. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-05 13:17:17 +08:00
LD_IMM_DW:
DST = (u64) (u32) insn[0].imm | ((u64) (u32) insn[1].imm) << 32;
insn++;
CONT;
ALU_ARSH_X:
DST = (u64) (u32) (((s32) DST) >> SRC);
CONT;
ALU_ARSH_K:
DST = (u64) (u32) (((s32) DST) >> IMM);
CONT;
ALU64_ARSH_X:
(*(s64 *) &DST) >>= SRC;
CONT;
ALU64_ARSH_K:
(*(s64 *) &DST) >>= IMM;
CONT;
ALU64_MOD_X:
div64_u64_rem(DST, SRC, &AX);
DST = AX;
CONT;
ALU_MOD_X:
AX = (u32) DST;
DST = do_div(AX, (u32) SRC);
CONT;
ALU64_MOD_K:
div64_u64_rem(DST, IMM, &AX);
DST = AX;
CONT;
ALU_MOD_K:
AX = (u32) DST;
DST = do_div(AX, (u32) IMM);
CONT;
ALU64_DIV_X:
DST = div64_u64(DST, SRC);
CONT;
ALU_DIV_X:
AX = (u32) DST;
do_div(AX, (u32) SRC);
DST = (u32) AX;
CONT;
ALU64_DIV_K:
DST = div64_u64(DST, IMM);
CONT;
ALU_DIV_K:
AX = (u32) DST;
do_div(AX, (u32) IMM);
DST = (u32) AX;
CONT;
ALU_END_TO_BE:
switch (IMM) {
case 16:
DST = (__force u16) cpu_to_be16(DST);
break;
case 32:
DST = (__force u32) cpu_to_be32(DST);
break;
case 64:
DST = (__force u64) cpu_to_be64(DST);
break;
}
CONT;
ALU_END_TO_LE:
switch (IMM) {
case 16:
DST = (__force u16) cpu_to_le16(DST);
break;
case 32:
DST = (__force u32) cpu_to_le32(DST);
break;
case 64:
DST = (__force u64) cpu_to_le64(DST);
break;
}
CONT;
/* CALL */
JMP_CALL:
/* Function call scratches BPF_R1-BPF_R5 registers,
* preserves BPF_R6-BPF_R9, and stores return value
* into BPF_R0.
*/
BPF_R0 = (__bpf_call_base + insn->imm)(BPF_R1, BPF_R2, BPF_R3,
BPF_R4, BPF_R5);
CONT;
JMP_CALL_ARGS:
BPF_R0 = (__bpf_call_base_args + insn->imm)(BPF_R1, BPF_R2,
BPF_R3, BPF_R4,
BPF_R5,
insn + insn->off + 1);
CONT;
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
JMP_TAIL_CALL: {
struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) BPF_R2;
struct bpf_array *array = container_of(map, struct bpf_array, map);
struct bpf_prog *prog;
u32 index = BPF_R3;
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
if (unlikely(index >= array->map.max_entries))
goto out;
if (unlikely(tail_call_cnt > MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT))
goto out;
tail_call_cnt++;
prog = READ_ONCE(array->ptrs[index]);
if (!prog)
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
goto out;
/* ARG1 at this point is guaranteed to point to CTX from
* the verifier side due to the fact that the tail call is
* handeled like a helper, that is, bpf_tail_call_proto,
* where arg1_type is ARG_PTR_TO_CTX.
*/
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
insn = prog->insnsi;
goto select_insn;
out:
CONT;
}
JMP_JA:
insn += insn->off;
CONT;
JMP_EXIT:
return BPF_R0;
/* JMP */
#define COND_JMP(SIGN, OPCODE, CMP_OP) \
JMP_##OPCODE##_X: \
if ((SIGN##64) DST CMP_OP (SIGN##64) SRC) { \
insn += insn->off; \
CONT_JMP; \
} \
CONT; \
JMP32_##OPCODE##_X: \
if ((SIGN##32) DST CMP_OP (SIGN##32) SRC) { \
insn += insn->off; \
CONT_JMP; \
} \
CONT; \
JMP_##OPCODE##_K: \
if ((SIGN##64) DST CMP_OP (SIGN##64) IMM) { \
insn += insn->off; \
CONT_JMP; \
} \
CONT; \
JMP32_##OPCODE##_K: \
if ((SIGN##32) DST CMP_OP (SIGN##32) IMM) { \
insn += insn->off; \
CONT_JMP; \
} \
CONT;
COND_JMP(u, JEQ, ==)
COND_JMP(u, JNE, !=)
COND_JMP(u, JGT, >)
COND_JMP(u, JLT, <)
COND_JMP(u, JGE, >=)
COND_JMP(u, JLE, <=)
COND_JMP(u, JSET, &)
COND_JMP(s, JSGT, >)
COND_JMP(s, JSLT, <)
COND_JMP(s, JSGE, >=)
COND_JMP(s, JSLE, <=)
#undef COND_JMP
/* STX and ST and LDX*/
#define LDST(SIZEOP, SIZE) \
STX_MEM_##SIZEOP: \
*(SIZE *)(unsigned long) (DST + insn->off) = SRC; \
CONT; \
ST_MEM_##SIZEOP: \
*(SIZE *)(unsigned long) (DST + insn->off) = IMM; \
CONT; \
LDX_MEM_##SIZEOP: \
DST = *(SIZE *)(unsigned long) (SRC + insn->off); \
CONT;
LDST(B, u8)
LDST(H, u16)
LDST(W, u32)
LDST(DW, u64)
#undef LDST
#define LDX_PROBE(SIZEOP, SIZE) \
LDX_PROBE_MEM_##SIZEOP: \
bpf_probe_read_kernel(&DST, SIZE, (const void *)(long) (SRC + insn->off)); \
CONT;
LDX_PROBE(B, 1)
LDX_PROBE(H, 2)
LDX_PROBE(W, 4)
LDX_PROBE(DW, 8)
#undef LDX_PROBE
STX_XADD_W: /* lock xadd *(u32 *)(dst_reg + off16) += src_reg */
atomic_add((u32) SRC, (atomic_t *)(unsigned long)
(DST + insn->off));
CONT;
STX_XADD_DW: /* lock xadd *(u64 *)(dst_reg + off16) += src_reg */
atomic64_add((u64) SRC, (atomic64_t *)(unsigned long)
(DST + insn->off));
CONT;
default_label:
/* If we ever reach this, we have a bug somewhere. Die hard here
* instead of just returning 0; we could be somewhere in a subprog,
* so execution could continue otherwise which we do /not/ want.
*
* Note, verifier whitelists all opcodes in bpf_opcode_in_insntable().
*/
pr_warn("BPF interpreter: unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code);
BUG_ON(1);
return 0;
}
bpf: split bpf core interpreter split __bpf_prog_run() interpreter into stack allocation and execution parts. The code section shrinks which helps interpreter performance in some cases. text data bss dec hex filename 26350 10328 624 37302 91b6 kernel/bpf/core.o.before 25777 10328 624 36729 8f79 kernel/bpf/core.o.after Very short programs got slower (due to extra function call): Before: test_bpf: #89 ALU64_ADD_K: 1 + 2 = 3 jited:0 7 PASS test_bpf: #90 ALU64_ADD_K: 3 + 0 = 3 jited:0 8 PASS test_bpf: #91 ALU64_ADD_K: 1 + 2147483646 = 2147483647 jited:0 7 PASS test_bpf: #92 ALU64_ADD_K: 4294967294 + 2 = 4294967296 jited:0 11 PASS test_bpf: #93 ALU64_ADD_K: 2147483646 + -2147483647 = -1 jited:0 7 PASS After: test_bpf: #89 ALU64_ADD_K: 1 + 2 = 3 jited:0 11 PASS test_bpf: #90 ALU64_ADD_K: 3 + 0 = 3 jited:0 11 PASS test_bpf: #91 ALU64_ADD_K: 1 + 2147483646 = 2147483647 jited:0 11 PASS test_bpf: #92 ALU64_ADD_K: 4294967294 + 2 = 4294967296 jited:0 14 PASS test_bpf: #93 ALU64_ADD_K: 2147483646 + -2147483647 = -1 jited:0 10 PASS Longer programs got faster: Before: test_bpf: #266 BPF_MAXINSNS: Ctx heavy transformations jited:0 20286 20513 PASS test_bpf: #267 BPF_MAXINSNS: Call heavy transformations jited:0 31853 31768 PASS test_bpf: #268 BPF_MAXINSNS: Jump heavy test jited:0 9815 PASS test_bpf: #269 BPF_MAXINSNS: Very long jump backwards jited:0 6 PASS test_bpf: #270 BPF_MAXINSNS: Edge hopping nuthouse jited:0 13959 PASS test_bpf: #271 BPF_MAXINSNS: Jump, gap, jump, ... jited:0 210 PASS test_bpf: #272 BPF_MAXINSNS: ld_abs+get_processor_id jited:0 21724 PASS test_bpf: #273 BPF_MAXINSNS: ld_abs+vlan_push/pop jited:0 19118 PASS After: test_bpf: #266 BPF_MAXINSNS: Ctx heavy transformations jited:0 19008 18827 PASS test_bpf: #267 BPF_MAXINSNS: Call heavy transformations jited:0 29238 28450 PASS test_bpf: #268 BPF_MAXINSNS: Jump heavy test jited:0 9485 PASS test_bpf: #269 BPF_MAXINSNS: Very long jump backwards jited:0 12 PASS test_bpf: #270 BPF_MAXINSNS: Edge hopping nuthouse jited:0 13257 PASS test_bpf: #271 BPF_MAXINSNS: Jump, gap, jump, ... jited:0 213 PASS test_bpf: #272 BPF_MAXINSNS: ld_abs+get_processor_id jited:0 19389 PASS test_bpf: #273 BPF_MAXINSNS: ld_abs+vlan_push/pop jited:0 19583 PASS For real world production programs the difference is noise. This patch is first step towards reducing interpreter stack consumption. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-31 04:31:28 +08:00
#define PROG_NAME(stack_size) __bpf_prog_run##stack_size
#define DEFINE_BPF_PROG_RUN(stack_size) \
static unsigned int PROG_NAME(stack_size)(const void *ctx, const struct bpf_insn *insn) \
{ \
u64 stack[stack_size / sizeof(u64)]; \
u64 regs[MAX_BPF_EXT_REG]; \
\
FP = (u64) (unsigned long) &stack[ARRAY_SIZE(stack)]; \
ARG1 = (u64) (unsigned long) ctx; \
return ___bpf_prog_run(regs, insn, stack); \
bpf: split bpf core interpreter split __bpf_prog_run() interpreter into stack allocation and execution parts. The code section shrinks which helps interpreter performance in some cases. text data bss dec hex filename 26350 10328 624 37302 91b6 kernel/bpf/core.o.before 25777 10328 624 36729 8f79 kernel/bpf/core.o.after Very short programs got slower (due to extra function call): Before: test_bpf: #89 ALU64_ADD_K: 1 + 2 = 3 jited:0 7 PASS test_bpf: #90 ALU64_ADD_K: 3 + 0 = 3 jited:0 8 PASS test_bpf: #91 ALU64_ADD_K: 1 + 2147483646 = 2147483647 jited:0 7 PASS test_bpf: #92 ALU64_ADD_K: 4294967294 + 2 = 4294967296 jited:0 11 PASS test_bpf: #93 ALU64_ADD_K: 2147483646 + -2147483647 = -1 jited:0 7 PASS After: test_bpf: #89 ALU64_ADD_K: 1 + 2 = 3 jited:0 11 PASS test_bpf: #90 ALU64_ADD_K: 3 + 0 = 3 jited:0 11 PASS test_bpf: #91 ALU64_ADD_K: 1 + 2147483646 = 2147483647 jited:0 11 PASS test_bpf: #92 ALU64_ADD_K: 4294967294 + 2 = 4294967296 jited:0 14 PASS test_bpf: #93 ALU64_ADD_K: 2147483646 + -2147483647 = -1 jited:0 10 PASS Longer programs got faster: Before: test_bpf: #266 BPF_MAXINSNS: Ctx heavy transformations jited:0 20286 20513 PASS test_bpf: #267 BPF_MAXINSNS: Call heavy transformations jited:0 31853 31768 PASS test_bpf: #268 BPF_MAXINSNS: Jump heavy test jited:0 9815 PASS test_bpf: #269 BPF_MAXINSNS: Very long jump backwards jited:0 6 PASS test_bpf: #270 BPF_MAXINSNS: Edge hopping nuthouse jited:0 13959 PASS test_bpf: #271 BPF_MAXINSNS: Jump, gap, jump, ... jited:0 210 PASS test_bpf: #272 BPF_MAXINSNS: ld_abs+get_processor_id jited:0 21724 PASS test_bpf: #273 BPF_MAXINSNS: ld_abs+vlan_push/pop jited:0 19118 PASS After: test_bpf: #266 BPF_MAXINSNS: Ctx heavy transformations jited:0 19008 18827 PASS test_bpf: #267 BPF_MAXINSNS: Call heavy transformations jited:0 29238 28450 PASS test_bpf: #268 BPF_MAXINSNS: Jump heavy test jited:0 9485 PASS test_bpf: #269 BPF_MAXINSNS: Very long jump backwards jited:0 12 PASS test_bpf: #270 BPF_MAXINSNS: Edge hopping nuthouse jited:0 13257 PASS test_bpf: #271 BPF_MAXINSNS: Jump, gap, jump, ... jited:0 213 PASS test_bpf: #272 BPF_MAXINSNS: ld_abs+get_processor_id jited:0 19389 PASS test_bpf: #273 BPF_MAXINSNS: ld_abs+vlan_push/pop jited:0 19583 PASS For real world production programs the difference is noise. This patch is first step towards reducing interpreter stack consumption. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-31 04:31:28 +08:00
}
#define PROG_NAME_ARGS(stack_size) __bpf_prog_run_args##stack_size
#define DEFINE_BPF_PROG_RUN_ARGS(stack_size) \
static u64 PROG_NAME_ARGS(stack_size)(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5, \
const struct bpf_insn *insn) \
{ \
u64 stack[stack_size / sizeof(u64)]; \
u64 regs[MAX_BPF_EXT_REG]; \
\
FP = (u64) (unsigned long) &stack[ARRAY_SIZE(stack)]; \
BPF_R1 = r1; \
BPF_R2 = r2; \
BPF_R3 = r3; \
BPF_R4 = r4; \
BPF_R5 = r5; \
return ___bpf_prog_run(regs, insn, stack); \
}
#define EVAL1(FN, X) FN(X)
#define EVAL2(FN, X, Y...) FN(X) EVAL1(FN, Y)
#define EVAL3(FN, X, Y...) FN(X) EVAL2(FN, Y)
#define EVAL4(FN, X, Y...) FN(X) EVAL3(FN, Y)
#define EVAL5(FN, X, Y...) FN(X) EVAL4(FN, Y)
#define EVAL6(FN, X, Y...) FN(X) EVAL5(FN, Y)
EVAL6(DEFINE_BPF_PROG_RUN, 32, 64, 96, 128, 160, 192);
EVAL6(DEFINE_BPF_PROG_RUN, 224, 256, 288, 320, 352, 384);
EVAL4(DEFINE_BPF_PROG_RUN, 416, 448, 480, 512);
EVAL6(DEFINE_BPF_PROG_RUN_ARGS, 32, 64, 96, 128, 160, 192);
EVAL6(DEFINE_BPF_PROG_RUN_ARGS, 224, 256, 288, 320, 352, 384);
EVAL4(DEFINE_BPF_PROG_RUN_ARGS, 416, 448, 480, 512);
#define PROG_NAME_LIST(stack_size) PROG_NAME(stack_size),
static unsigned int (*interpreters[])(const void *ctx,
const struct bpf_insn *insn) = {
EVAL6(PROG_NAME_LIST, 32, 64, 96, 128, 160, 192)
EVAL6(PROG_NAME_LIST, 224, 256, 288, 320, 352, 384)
EVAL4(PROG_NAME_LIST, 416, 448, 480, 512)
};
#undef PROG_NAME_LIST
#define PROG_NAME_LIST(stack_size) PROG_NAME_ARGS(stack_size),
static u64 (*interpreters_args[])(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5,
const struct bpf_insn *insn) = {
EVAL6(PROG_NAME_LIST, 32, 64, 96, 128, 160, 192)
EVAL6(PROG_NAME_LIST, 224, 256, 288, 320, 352, 384)
EVAL4(PROG_NAME_LIST, 416, 448, 480, 512)
};
#undef PROG_NAME_LIST
void bpf_patch_call_args(struct bpf_insn *insn, u32 stack_depth)
{
stack_depth = max_t(u32, stack_depth, 1);
insn->off = (s16) insn->imm;
insn->imm = interpreters_args[(round_up(stack_depth, 32) / 32) - 1] -
__bpf_call_base_args;
insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL_ARGS;
}
bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715. A quote from goolge project zero blog: "At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying. So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets." To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode. So far eBPF JIT is supported by: x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64 The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only. In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden v2->v3: - move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel) v1->v2: - fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback) - fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback) - add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func - retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk. It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next Considered doing: int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT; but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place and remove this jit_init() function. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-01-10 02:04:29 +08:00
#else
static unsigned int __bpf_prog_ret0_warn(const void *ctx,
const struct bpf_insn *insn)
bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715. A quote from goolge project zero blog: "At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying. So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets." To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode. So far eBPF JIT is supported by: x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64 The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only. In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden v2->v3: - move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel) v1->v2: - fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback) - fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback) - add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func - retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk. It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next Considered doing: int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT; but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place and remove this jit_init() function. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-01-10 02:04:29 +08:00
{
/* If this handler ever gets executed, then BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
* is not working properly, so warn about it!
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715. A quote from goolge project zero blog: "At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying. So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets." To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode. So far eBPF JIT is supported by: x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64 The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only. In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden v2->v3: - move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel) v1->v2: - fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback) - fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback) - add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func - retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk. It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next Considered doing: int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT; but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place and remove this jit_init() function. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-01-10 02:04:29 +08:00
return 0;
}
#endif
bool bpf_prog_array_compatible(struct bpf_array *array,
const struct bpf_prog *fp)
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
{
if (fp->kprobe_override)
return false;
if (!array->owner_prog_type) {
/* There's no owner yet where we could check for
* compatibility.
*/
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
array->owner_prog_type = fp->type;
array->owner_jited = fp->jited;
return true;
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
}
return array->owner_prog_type == fp->type &&
array->owner_jited == fp->jited;
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
}
static int bpf_check_tail_call(const struct bpf_prog *fp)
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
{
struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = fp->aux;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < aux->used_map_cnt; i++) {
struct bpf_map *map = aux->used_maps[i];
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
struct bpf_array *array;
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY)
continue;
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
array = container_of(map, struct bpf_array, map);
if (!bpf_prog_array_compatible(array, fp))
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
bpf: reject any prog that failed read-only lock We currently lock any JITed image as read-only via bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro() as well as the BPF image as read-only through bpf_prog_lock_ro(). In the case any of these would fail we throw a WARN_ON_ONCE() in order to yell loudly to the log. Perhaps, to some extend, this may be comparable to an allocation where __GFP_NOWARN is explicitly not set. Added via 65869a47f348 ("bpf: improve read-only handling"), this behavior is slightly different compared to any of the other in-kernel set_memory_ro() users who do not check the return code of set_memory_ro() and friends /at all/ (e.g. in the case of module_enable_ro() / module_disable_ro()). Given in BPF this is mandatory hardening step, we want to know whether there are any issues that would leave both BPF data writable. So it happens that syzkaller enabled fault injection and it triggered memory allocation failure deep inside x86's change_page_attr_set_clr() which was triggered from set_memory_ro(). Now, there are two options: i) leaving everything as is, and ii) reworking the image locking code in order to have a final checkpoint out of the central bpf_prog_select_runtime() which probes whether any of the calls during prog setup weren't successful, and then bailing out with an error. Option ii) is a better approach since this additional paranoia avoids altogether leaving any potential W+X pages from BPF side in the system. Therefore, lets be strict about it, and reject programs in such unlikely occasion. While testing I noticed also that one bpf_prog_lock_ro() call was missing on the outer dummy prog in case of calls, e.g. in the destructor we call bpf_prog_free_deferred() on the main prog where we try to bpf_prog_unlock_free() the program, and since we go via bpf_prog_select_runtime() do that as well. Reported-by: syzbot+3b889862e65a98317058@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+9e762b52dd17e616a7a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-06-15 08:30:48 +08:00
static void bpf_prog_select_func(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
u32 stack_depth = max_t(u32, fp->aux->stack_depth, 1);
fp->bpf_func = interpreters[(round_up(stack_depth, 32) / 32) - 1];
#else
fp->bpf_func = __bpf_prog_ret0_warn;
#endif
}
/**
* bpf_prog_select_runtime - select exec runtime for BPF program
net: filter: split 'struct sk_filter' into socket and bpf parts clean up names related to socket filtering and bpf in the following way: - everything that deals with sockets keeps 'sk_*' prefix - everything that is pure BPF is changed to 'bpf_*' prefix split 'struct sk_filter' into struct sk_filter { atomic_t refcnt; struct rcu_head rcu; struct bpf_prog *prog; }; and struct bpf_prog { u32 jited:1, len:31; struct sock_fprog_kern *orig_prog; unsigned int (*bpf_func)(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct bpf_insn *filter); union { struct sock_filter insns[0]; struct bpf_insn insnsi[0]; struct work_struct work; }; }; so that 'struct bpf_prog' can be used independent of sockets and cleans up 'unattached' bpf use cases split SK_RUN_FILTER macro into: SK_RUN_FILTER to be used with 'struct sk_filter *' and BPF_PROG_RUN to be used with 'struct bpf_prog *' __sk_filter_release(struct sk_filter *) gains __bpf_prog_release(struct bpf_prog *) helper function also perform related renames for the functions that work with 'struct bpf_prog *', since they're on the same lines: sk_filter_size -> bpf_prog_size sk_filter_select_runtime -> bpf_prog_select_runtime sk_filter_free -> bpf_prog_free sk_unattached_filter_create -> bpf_prog_create sk_unattached_filter_destroy -> bpf_prog_destroy sk_store_orig_filter -> bpf_prog_store_orig_filter sk_release_orig_filter -> bpf_release_orig_filter __sk_migrate_filter -> bpf_migrate_filter __sk_prepare_filter -> bpf_prepare_filter API for attaching classic BPF to a socket stays the same: sk_attach_filter(prog, struct sock *)/sk_detach_filter(struct sock *) and SK_RUN_FILTER(struct sk_filter *, ctx) to execute a program which is used by sockets, tun, af_packet API for 'unattached' BPF programs becomes: bpf_prog_create(struct bpf_prog **)/bpf_prog_destroy(struct bpf_prog *) and BPF_PROG_RUN(struct bpf_prog *, ctx) to execute a program which is used by isdn, ppp, team, seccomp, ptp, xt_bpf, cls_bpf, test_bpf Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-31 11:34:16 +08:00
* @fp: bpf_prog populated with internal BPF program
* @err: pointer to error variable
*
* Try to JIT eBPF program, if JIT is not available, use interpreter.
* The BPF program will be executed via BPF_PROG_RUN() macro.
*/
struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_prog *fp, int *err)
{
bpf: reject any prog that failed read-only lock We currently lock any JITed image as read-only via bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro() as well as the BPF image as read-only through bpf_prog_lock_ro(). In the case any of these would fail we throw a WARN_ON_ONCE() in order to yell loudly to the log. Perhaps, to some extend, this may be comparable to an allocation where __GFP_NOWARN is explicitly not set. Added via 65869a47f348 ("bpf: improve read-only handling"), this behavior is slightly different compared to any of the other in-kernel set_memory_ro() users who do not check the return code of set_memory_ro() and friends /at all/ (e.g. in the case of module_enable_ro() / module_disable_ro()). Given in BPF this is mandatory hardening step, we want to know whether there are any issues that would leave both BPF data writable. So it happens that syzkaller enabled fault injection and it triggered memory allocation failure deep inside x86's change_page_attr_set_clr() which was triggered from set_memory_ro(). Now, there are two options: i) leaving everything as is, and ii) reworking the image locking code in order to have a final checkpoint out of the central bpf_prog_select_runtime() which probes whether any of the calls during prog setup weren't successful, and then bailing out with an error. Option ii) is a better approach since this additional paranoia avoids altogether leaving any potential W+X pages from BPF side in the system. Therefore, lets be strict about it, and reject programs in such unlikely occasion. While testing I noticed also that one bpf_prog_lock_ro() call was missing on the outer dummy prog in case of calls, e.g. in the destructor we call bpf_prog_free_deferred() on the main prog where we try to bpf_prog_unlock_free() the program, and since we go via bpf_prog_select_runtime() do that as well. Reported-by: syzbot+3b889862e65a98317058@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+9e762b52dd17e616a7a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-06-15 08:30:48 +08:00
/* In case of BPF to BPF calls, verifier did all the prep
* work with regards to JITing, etc.
*/
if (fp->bpf_func)
goto finalize;
bpf: Fix out-of-bound access on interpreters[] The index is off-by-one when fp->aux->stack_depth has already been rounded up to 32. In particular, if stack_depth is 512, the index will be 16. The fix is to round_up and then takes -1 instead of round_down. [ 22.318680] ================================================================== [ 22.319745] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x48a/0x670 [ 22.320737] Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff82aadae0 by task sockex3/1946 [ 22.321646] [ 22.321858] CPU: 1 PID: 1946 Comm: sockex3 Tainted: G W 4.12.0-rc6-01680-g2ee87db3a287 #22 [ 22.323061] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.9.3-1.el7.centos 04/01/2014 [ 22.324260] Call Trace: [ 22.324612] dump_stack+0x67/0x99 [ 22.325081] print_address_description+0x1e8/0x290 [ 22.325734] ? bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x48a/0x670 [ 22.326360] kasan_report+0x265/0x350 [ 22.326860] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 [ 22.327484] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x48a/0x670 [ 22.328109] bpf_prog_load+0x626/0xd40 [ 22.328637] ? __bpf_prog_charge+0xc0/0xc0 [ 22.329222] ? check_nnp_nosuid.isra.61+0x100/0x100 [ 22.329890] ? __might_fault+0xf6/0x1b0 [ 22.330446] ? lock_acquire+0x360/0x360 [ 22.331013] SyS_bpf+0x67c/0x24d0 [ 22.331491] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 22.332049] ? __getnstimeofday64+0xaf/0x1c0 [ 22.332635] ? bpf_prog_get+0x20/0x20 [ 22.333135] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x300/0x600 [ 22.333770] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x540/0xdd0 [ 22.334339] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0xe0/0xe0 [ 22.334950] ? do_syscall_64+0x48/0x410 [ 22.335446] ? bpf_prog_get+0x20/0x20 [ 22.335954] do_syscall_64+0x181/0x410 [ 22.336454] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 [ 22.337121] RIP: 0033:0x7f263fe81f19 [ 22.337618] RSP: 002b:00007ffd9a3440c8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141 [ 22.338619] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000aac5fb RCX: 00007f263fe81f19 [ 22.339600] RDX: 0000000000000030 RSI: 00007ffd9a3440d0 RDI: 0000000000000005 [ 22.340470] RBP: 0000000000a9a1e0 R08: 0000000000a9a1e0 R09: 0000009d00000001 [ 22.341430] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000010000 [ 22.342411] R13: 0000000000a9a023 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 22.343369] [ 22.343593] The buggy address belongs to the variable: [ 22.344241] interpreters+0x80/0x980 [ 22.344708] [ 22.344908] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 22.345556] ffffffff82aad980: 00 00 00 04 fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa [ 22.346449] ffffffff82aada00: 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 [ 22.347361] >ffffffff82aada80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa [ 22.348301] ^ [ 22.349142] ffffffff82aadb00: 00 01 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 22.350058] ffffffff82aadb80: 00 00 07 fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 05 fa fa fa fa fa [ 22.350984] ================================================================== Fixes: b870aa901f4b ("bpf: use different interpreter depending on required stack size") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-29 01:41:24 +08:00
bpf: reject any prog that failed read-only lock We currently lock any JITed image as read-only via bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro() as well as the BPF image as read-only through bpf_prog_lock_ro(). In the case any of these would fail we throw a WARN_ON_ONCE() in order to yell loudly to the log. Perhaps, to some extend, this may be comparable to an allocation where __GFP_NOWARN is explicitly not set. Added via 65869a47f348 ("bpf: improve read-only handling"), this behavior is slightly different compared to any of the other in-kernel set_memory_ro() users who do not check the return code of set_memory_ro() and friends /at all/ (e.g. in the case of module_enable_ro() / module_disable_ro()). Given in BPF this is mandatory hardening step, we want to know whether there are any issues that would leave both BPF data writable. So it happens that syzkaller enabled fault injection and it triggered memory allocation failure deep inside x86's change_page_attr_set_clr() which was triggered from set_memory_ro(). Now, there are two options: i) leaving everything as is, and ii) reworking the image locking code in order to have a final checkpoint out of the central bpf_prog_select_runtime() which probes whether any of the calls during prog setup weren't successful, and then bailing out with an error. Option ii) is a better approach since this additional paranoia avoids altogether leaving any potential W+X pages from BPF side in the system. Therefore, lets be strict about it, and reject programs in such unlikely occasion. While testing I noticed also that one bpf_prog_lock_ro() call was missing on the outer dummy prog in case of calls, e.g. in the destructor we call bpf_prog_free_deferred() on the main prog where we try to bpf_prog_unlock_free() the program, and since we go via bpf_prog_select_runtime() do that as well. Reported-by: syzbot+3b889862e65a98317058@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+9e762b52dd17e616a7a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-06-15 08:30:48 +08:00
bpf_prog_select_func(fp);
/* eBPF JITs can rewrite the program in case constant
* blinding is active. However, in case of error during
* blinding, bpf_int_jit_compile() must always return a
* valid program, which in this case would simply not
* be JITed, but falls back to the interpreter.
*/
if (!bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(fp->aux)) {
bpf: Add bpf_line_info support This patch adds bpf_line_info support. It accepts an array of bpf_line_info objects during BPF_PROG_LOAD. The "line_info", "line_info_cnt" and "line_info_rec_size" are added to the "union bpf_attr". The "line_info_rec_size" makes bpf_line_info extensible in the future. The new "check_btf_line()" ensures the userspace line_info is valid for the kernel to use. When the verifier is translating/patching the bpf_prog (through "bpf_patch_insn_single()"), the line_infos' insn_off is also adjusted by the newly added "bpf_adj_linfo()". If the bpf_prog is jited, this patch also provides the jited addrs (in aux->jited_linfo) for the corresponding line_info.insn_off. "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" is added to fill the aux->jited_linfo. It is currently called by the x86 jit. Other jits can also use "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" and it will be done in the followup patches. In the future, if it deemed necessary, a particular jit could also provide its own "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" implementation. A few "*line_info*" fields are added to the bpf_prog_info such that the user can get the xlated line_info back (i.e. the line_info with its insn_off reflecting the translated prog). The jited_line_info is available if the prog is jited. It is an array of __u64. If the prog is not jited, jited_line_info_cnt is 0. The verifier's verbose log with line_info will be done in a follow up patch. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-08 08:42:25 +08:00
*err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(fp);
if (*err)
return fp;
fp = bpf_int_jit_compile(fp);
bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715. A quote from goolge project zero blog: "At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying. So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets." To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode. So far eBPF JIT is supported by: x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64 The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only. In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden v2->v3: - move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel) v1->v2: - fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback) - fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback) - add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func - retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk. It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next Considered doing: int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT; but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place and remove this jit_init() function. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-01-10 02:04:29 +08:00
if (!fp->jited) {
bpf: Add bpf_line_info support This patch adds bpf_line_info support. It accepts an array of bpf_line_info objects during BPF_PROG_LOAD. The "line_info", "line_info_cnt" and "line_info_rec_size" are added to the "union bpf_attr". The "line_info_rec_size" makes bpf_line_info extensible in the future. The new "check_btf_line()" ensures the userspace line_info is valid for the kernel to use. When the verifier is translating/patching the bpf_prog (through "bpf_patch_insn_single()"), the line_infos' insn_off is also adjusted by the newly added "bpf_adj_linfo()". If the bpf_prog is jited, this patch also provides the jited addrs (in aux->jited_linfo) for the corresponding line_info.insn_off. "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" is added to fill the aux->jited_linfo. It is currently called by the x86 jit. Other jits can also use "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" and it will be done in the followup patches. In the future, if it deemed necessary, a particular jit could also provide its own "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" implementation. A few "*line_info*" fields are added to the bpf_prog_info such that the user can get the xlated line_info back (i.e. the line_info with its insn_off reflecting the translated prog). The jited_line_info is available if the prog is jited. It is an array of __u64. If the prog is not jited, jited_line_info_cnt is 0. The verifier's verbose log with line_info will be done in a follow up patch. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-08 08:42:25 +08:00
bpf_prog_free_jited_linfo(fp);
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715. A quote from goolge project zero blog: "At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying. So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets." To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode. So far eBPF JIT is supported by: x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64 The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only. In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden v2->v3: - move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel) v1->v2: - fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback) - fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback) - add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func - retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk. It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next Considered doing: int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT; but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place and remove this jit_init() function. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-01-10 02:04:29 +08:00
*err = -ENOTSUPP;
return fp;
#endif
bpf: Add bpf_line_info support This patch adds bpf_line_info support. It accepts an array of bpf_line_info objects during BPF_PROG_LOAD. The "line_info", "line_info_cnt" and "line_info_rec_size" are added to the "union bpf_attr". The "line_info_rec_size" makes bpf_line_info extensible in the future. The new "check_btf_line()" ensures the userspace line_info is valid for the kernel to use. When the verifier is translating/patching the bpf_prog (through "bpf_patch_insn_single()"), the line_infos' insn_off is also adjusted by the newly added "bpf_adj_linfo()". If the bpf_prog is jited, this patch also provides the jited addrs (in aux->jited_linfo) for the corresponding line_info.insn_off. "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" is added to fill the aux->jited_linfo. It is currently called by the x86 jit. Other jits can also use "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" and it will be done in the followup patches. In the future, if it deemed necessary, a particular jit could also provide its own "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" implementation. A few "*line_info*" fields are added to the bpf_prog_info such that the user can get the xlated line_info back (i.e. the line_info with its insn_off reflecting the translated prog). The jited_line_info is available if the prog is jited. It is an array of __u64. If the prog is not jited, jited_line_info_cnt is 0. The verifier's verbose log with line_info will be done in a follow up patch. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-08 08:42:25 +08:00
} else {
bpf_prog_free_unused_jited_linfo(fp);
}
} else {
*err = bpf_prog_offload_compile(fp);
if (*err)
return fp;
}
bpf: reject any prog that failed read-only lock We currently lock any JITed image as read-only via bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro() as well as the BPF image as read-only through bpf_prog_lock_ro(). In the case any of these would fail we throw a WARN_ON_ONCE() in order to yell loudly to the log. Perhaps, to some extend, this may be comparable to an allocation where __GFP_NOWARN is explicitly not set. Added via 65869a47f348 ("bpf: improve read-only handling"), this behavior is slightly different compared to any of the other in-kernel set_memory_ro() users who do not check the return code of set_memory_ro() and friends /at all/ (e.g. in the case of module_enable_ro() / module_disable_ro()). Given in BPF this is mandatory hardening step, we want to know whether there are any issues that would leave both BPF data writable. So it happens that syzkaller enabled fault injection and it triggered memory allocation failure deep inside x86's change_page_attr_set_clr() which was triggered from set_memory_ro(). Now, there are two options: i) leaving everything as is, and ii) reworking the image locking code in order to have a final checkpoint out of the central bpf_prog_select_runtime() which probes whether any of the calls during prog setup weren't successful, and then bailing out with an error. Option ii) is a better approach since this additional paranoia avoids altogether leaving any potential W+X pages from BPF side in the system. Therefore, lets be strict about it, and reject programs in such unlikely occasion. While testing I noticed also that one bpf_prog_lock_ro() call was missing on the outer dummy prog in case of calls, e.g. in the destructor we call bpf_prog_free_deferred() on the main prog where we try to bpf_prog_unlock_free() the program, and since we go via bpf_prog_select_runtime() do that as well. Reported-by: syzbot+3b889862e65a98317058@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+9e762b52dd17e616a7a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-06-15 08:30:48 +08:00
finalize:
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
bpf_prog_lock_ro(fp);
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
/* The tail call compatibility check can only be done at
* this late stage as we need to determine, if we deal
* with JITed or non JITed program concatenations and not
* all eBPF JITs might immediately support all features.
*/
*err = bpf_check_tail_call(fp);
bpf: undo prog rejection on read-only lock failure Partially undo commit 9facc336876f ("bpf: reject any prog that failed read-only lock") since it caused a regression, that is, syzkaller was able to manage to cause a panic via fault injection deep in set_memory_ro() path by letting an allocation fail: In x86's __change_page_attr_set_clr() it was able to change the attributes of the primary mapping but not in the alias mapping via cpa_process_alias(), so the second, inner call to the __change_page_attr() via __change_page_attr_set_clr() had to split a larger page and failed in the alloc_pages() with the artifically triggered allocation error which is then propagated down to the call site. Thus, for set_memory_ro() this means that it returned with an error, but from debugging a probe_kernel_write() revealed EFAULT on that memory since the primary mapping succeeded to get changed. Therefore the subsequent hdr->locked = 0 reset triggered the panic as it was performed on read-only memory, so call-site assumptions were infact wrong to assume that it would either succeed /or/ not succeed at all since there's no such rollback in set_memory_*() calls from partial change of mappings, in other words, we're left in a state that is "half done". A later undo via set_memory_rw() is succeeding though due to matching permissions on that part (aka due to the try_preserve_large_page() succeeding). While reproducing locally with explicitly triggering this error, the initial splitting only happens on rare occasions and in real world it would additionally need oom conditions, but that said, it could partially fail. Therefore, it is definitely wrong to bail out on set_memory_ro() error and reject the program with the set_memory_*() semantics we have today. Shouldn't have gone the extra mile since no other user in tree today infact checks for any set_memory_*() errors, e.g. neither module_enable_ro() / module_disable_ro() for module RO/NX handling which is mostly default these days nor kprobes core with alloc_insn_page() / free_insn_page() as examples that could be invoked long after bootup and original 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks") did neither when it got first introduced to BPF so "improving" with bailing out was clearly not right when set_memory_*() cannot handle it today. Kees suggested that if set_memory_*() can fail, we should annotate it with __must_check, and all callers need to deal with it gracefully given those set_memory_*() markings aren't "advisory", but they're expected to actually do what they say. This might be an option worth to move forward in future but would at the same time require that set_memory_*() calls from supporting archs are guaranteed to be "atomic" in that they provide rollback if part of the range fails, once that happened, the transition from RW -> RO could be made more robust that way, while subsequent RO -> RW transition /must/ continue guaranteeing to always succeed the undo part. Reported-by: syzbot+a4eb8c7766952a1ca872@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d866d1925855328eac3b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 9facc336876f ("bpf: reject any prog that failed read-only lock") Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-06-29 05:34:59 +08:00
return fp;
}
net: filter: split 'struct sk_filter' into socket and bpf parts clean up names related to socket filtering and bpf in the following way: - everything that deals with sockets keeps 'sk_*' prefix - everything that is pure BPF is changed to 'bpf_*' prefix split 'struct sk_filter' into struct sk_filter { atomic_t refcnt; struct rcu_head rcu; struct bpf_prog *prog; }; and struct bpf_prog { u32 jited:1, len:31; struct sock_fprog_kern *orig_prog; unsigned int (*bpf_func)(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct bpf_insn *filter); union { struct sock_filter insns[0]; struct bpf_insn insnsi[0]; struct work_struct work; }; }; so that 'struct bpf_prog' can be used independent of sockets and cleans up 'unattached' bpf use cases split SK_RUN_FILTER macro into: SK_RUN_FILTER to be used with 'struct sk_filter *' and BPF_PROG_RUN to be used with 'struct bpf_prog *' __sk_filter_release(struct sk_filter *) gains __bpf_prog_release(struct bpf_prog *) helper function also perform related renames for the functions that work with 'struct bpf_prog *', since they're on the same lines: sk_filter_size -> bpf_prog_size sk_filter_select_runtime -> bpf_prog_select_runtime sk_filter_free -> bpf_prog_free sk_unattached_filter_create -> bpf_prog_create sk_unattached_filter_destroy -> bpf_prog_destroy sk_store_orig_filter -> bpf_prog_store_orig_filter sk_release_orig_filter -> bpf_release_orig_filter __sk_migrate_filter -> bpf_migrate_filter __sk_prepare_filter -> bpf_prepare_filter API for attaching classic BPF to a socket stays the same: sk_attach_filter(prog, struct sock *)/sk_detach_filter(struct sock *) and SK_RUN_FILTER(struct sk_filter *, ctx) to execute a program which is used by sockets, tun, af_packet API for 'unattached' BPF programs becomes: bpf_prog_create(struct bpf_prog **)/bpf_prog_destroy(struct bpf_prog *) and BPF_PROG_RUN(struct bpf_prog *, ctx) to execute a program which is used by isdn, ppp, team, seccomp, ptp, xt_bpf, cls_bpf, test_bpf Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-31 11:34:16 +08:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_prog_select_runtime);
static unsigned int __bpf_prog_ret1(const void *ctx,
const struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
return 1;
}
static struct bpf_prog_dummy {
struct bpf_prog prog;
} dummy_bpf_prog = {
.prog = {
.bpf_func = __bpf_prog_ret1,
},
};
bpf: multi program support for cgroup+bpf introduce BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI flag that can be used to attach multiple bpf programs to a cgroup. The difference between three possible flags for BPF_PROG_ATTACH command: - NONE(default): No further bpf programs allowed in the subtree. - BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE: If a sub-cgroup installs some bpf program, the program in this cgroup yields to sub-cgroup program. - BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI: If a sub-cgroup installs some bpf program, that cgroup program gets run in addition to the program in this cgroup. NONE and BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE existed before. This patch doesn't change their behavior. It only clarifies the semantics in relation to new flag. Only one program is allowed to be attached to a cgroup with NONE or BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE flag. Multiple programs are allowed to be attached to a cgroup with BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI flag. They are executed in FIFO order (those that were attached first, run first) The programs of sub-cgroup are executed first, then programs of this cgroup and then programs of parent cgroup. All eligible programs are executed regardless of return code from earlier programs. To allow efficient execution of multiple programs attached to a cgroup and to avoid penalizing cgroups without any programs attached introduce 'struct bpf_prog_array' which is RCU protected array of pointers to bpf programs. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> for cgroup bits Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-03 13:50:21 +08:00
/* to avoid allocating empty bpf_prog_array for cgroups that
* don't have bpf program attached use one global 'empty_prog_array'
* It will not be modified the caller of bpf_prog_array_alloc()
* (since caller requested prog_cnt == 0)
* that pointer should be 'freed' by bpf_prog_array_free()
*/
static struct {
struct bpf_prog_array hdr;
struct bpf_prog *null_prog;
} empty_prog_array = {
.null_prog = NULL,
};
struct bpf_prog_array *bpf_prog_array_alloc(u32 prog_cnt, gfp_t flags)
bpf: multi program support for cgroup+bpf introduce BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI flag that can be used to attach multiple bpf programs to a cgroup. The difference between three possible flags for BPF_PROG_ATTACH command: - NONE(default): No further bpf programs allowed in the subtree. - BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE: If a sub-cgroup installs some bpf program, the program in this cgroup yields to sub-cgroup program. - BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI: If a sub-cgroup installs some bpf program, that cgroup program gets run in addition to the program in this cgroup. NONE and BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE existed before. This patch doesn't change their behavior. It only clarifies the semantics in relation to new flag. Only one program is allowed to be attached to a cgroup with NONE or BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE flag. Multiple programs are allowed to be attached to a cgroup with BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI flag. They are executed in FIFO order (those that were attached first, run first) The programs of sub-cgroup are executed first, then programs of this cgroup and then programs of parent cgroup. All eligible programs are executed regardless of return code from earlier programs. To allow efficient execution of multiple programs attached to a cgroup and to avoid penalizing cgroups without any programs attached introduce 'struct bpf_prog_array' which is RCU protected array of pointers to bpf programs. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> for cgroup bits Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-03 13:50:21 +08:00
{
if (prog_cnt)
return kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_prog_array) +
sizeof(struct bpf_prog_array_item) *
(prog_cnt + 1),
bpf: multi program support for cgroup+bpf introduce BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI flag that can be used to attach multiple bpf programs to a cgroup. The difference between three possible flags for BPF_PROG_ATTACH command: - NONE(default): No further bpf programs allowed in the subtree. - BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE: If a sub-cgroup installs some bpf program, the program in this cgroup yields to sub-cgroup program. - BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI: If a sub-cgroup installs some bpf program, that cgroup program gets run in addition to the program in this cgroup. NONE and BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE existed before. This patch doesn't change their behavior. It only clarifies the semantics in relation to new flag. Only one program is allowed to be attached to a cgroup with NONE or BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE flag. Multiple programs are allowed to be attached to a cgroup with BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI flag. They are executed in FIFO order (those that were attached first, run first) The programs of sub-cgroup are executed first, then programs of this cgroup and then programs of parent cgroup. All eligible programs are executed regardless of return code from earlier programs. To allow efficient execution of multiple programs attached to a cgroup and to avoid penalizing cgroups without any programs attached introduce 'struct bpf_prog_array' which is RCU protected array of pointers to bpf programs. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> for cgroup bits Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-03 13:50:21 +08:00
flags);
return &empty_prog_array.hdr;
}
bpf: remove __rcu annotations from bpf_prog_array Drop __rcu annotations and rcu read sections from bpf_prog_array helper functions. They are not needed since all existing callers call those helpers from the rcu update side while holding a mutex. This guarantees that use-after-free could not happen. In the next patches I'll fix the callers with missing rcu_dereference_protected to make sparse/lockdep happy, the proper way to use these helpers is: struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs = ...; struct bpf_prog_array *p; mutex_lock(&mtx); p = rcu_dereference_protected(progs, lockdep_is_held(&mtx)); bpf_prog_array_length(p); bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy_info(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_free(p); mutex_unlock(&mtx); No functional changes! rcu_dereference_protected with lockdep_is_held should catch any cases where we update prog array without a mutex (I've looked at existing call sites and I think we hold a mutex everywhere). Motivation is to fix sparse warnings: kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: expected struct callback_head *head kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: got struct callback_head [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *item kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *[assigned] existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * v2: * remove comment about potential race; that can't happen because all callers are in rcu-update section Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-05-29 05:14:41 +08:00
void bpf_prog_array_free(struct bpf_prog_array *progs)
bpf: multi program support for cgroup+bpf introduce BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI flag that can be used to attach multiple bpf programs to a cgroup. The difference between three possible flags for BPF_PROG_ATTACH command: - NONE(default): No further bpf programs allowed in the subtree. - BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE: If a sub-cgroup installs some bpf program, the program in this cgroup yields to sub-cgroup program. - BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI: If a sub-cgroup installs some bpf program, that cgroup program gets run in addition to the program in this cgroup. NONE and BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE existed before. This patch doesn't change their behavior. It only clarifies the semantics in relation to new flag. Only one program is allowed to be attached to a cgroup with NONE or BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE flag. Multiple programs are allowed to be attached to a cgroup with BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI flag. They are executed in FIFO order (those that were attached first, run first) The programs of sub-cgroup are executed first, then programs of this cgroup and then programs of parent cgroup. All eligible programs are executed regardless of return code from earlier programs. To allow efficient execution of multiple programs attached to a cgroup and to avoid penalizing cgroups without any programs attached introduce 'struct bpf_prog_array' which is RCU protected array of pointers to bpf programs. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> for cgroup bits Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-03 13:50:21 +08:00
{
bpf: remove __rcu annotations from bpf_prog_array Drop __rcu annotations and rcu read sections from bpf_prog_array helper functions. They are not needed since all existing callers call those helpers from the rcu update side while holding a mutex. This guarantees that use-after-free could not happen. In the next patches I'll fix the callers with missing rcu_dereference_protected to make sparse/lockdep happy, the proper way to use these helpers is: struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs = ...; struct bpf_prog_array *p; mutex_lock(&mtx); p = rcu_dereference_protected(progs, lockdep_is_held(&mtx)); bpf_prog_array_length(p); bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy_info(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_free(p); mutex_unlock(&mtx); No functional changes! rcu_dereference_protected with lockdep_is_held should catch any cases where we update prog array without a mutex (I've looked at existing call sites and I think we hold a mutex everywhere). Motivation is to fix sparse warnings: kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: expected struct callback_head *head kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: got struct callback_head [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *item kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *[assigned] existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * v2: * remove comment about potential race; that can't happen because all callers are in rcu-update section Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-05-29 05:14:41 +08:00
if (!progs || progs == &empty_prog_array.hdr)
bpf: multi program support for cgroup+bpf introduce BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI flag that can be used to attach multiple bpf programs to a cgroup. The difference between three possible flags for BPF_PROG_ATTACH command: - NONE(default): No further bpf programs allowed in the subtree. - BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE: If a sub-cgroup installs some bpf program, the program in this cgroup yields to sub-cgroup program. - BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI: If a sub-cgroup installs some bpf program, that cgroup program gets run in addition to the program in this cgroup. NONE and BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE existed before. This patch doesn't change their behavior. It only clarifies the semantics in relation to new flag. Only one program is allowed to be attached to a cgroup with NONE or BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE flag. Multiple programs are allowed to be attached to a cgroup with BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI flag. They are executed in FIFO order (those that were attached first, run first) The programs of sub-cgroup are executed first, then programs of this cgroup and then programs of parent cgroup. All eligible programs are executed regardless of return code from earlier programs. To allow efficient execution of multiple programs attached to a cgroup and to avoid penalizing cgroups without any programs attached introduce 'struct bpf_prog_array' which is RCU protected array of pointers to bpf programs. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> for cgroup bits Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-03 13:50:21 +08:00
return;
kfree_rcu(progs, rcu);
}
bpf: remove __rcu annotations from bpf_prog_array Drop __rcu annotations and rcu read sections from bpf_prog_array helper functions. They are not needed since all existing callers call those helpers from the rcu update side while holding a mutex. This guarantees that use-after-free could not happen. In the next patches I'll fix the callers with missing rcu_dereference_protected to make sparse/lockdep happy, the proper way to use these helpers is: struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs = ...; struct bpf_prog_array *p; mutex_lock(&mtx); p = rcu_dereference_protected(progs, lockdep_is_held(&mtx)); bpf_prog_array_length(p); bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy_info(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_free(p); mutex_unlock(&mtx); No functional changes! rcu_dereference_protected with lockdep_is_held should catch any cases where we update prog array without a mutex (I've looked at existing call sites and I think we hold a mutex everywhere). Motivation is to fix sparse warnings: kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: expected struct callback_head *head kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: got struct callback_head [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *item kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *[assigned] existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * v2: * remove comment about potential race; that can't happen because all callers are in rcu-update section Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-05-29 05:14:41 +08:00
int bpf_prog_array_length(struct bpf_prog_array *array)
{
struct bpf_prog_array_item *item;
u32 cnt = 0;
bpf: remove __rcu annotations from bpf_prog_array Drop __rcu annotations and rcu read sections from bpf_prog_array helper functions. They are not needed since all existing callers call those helpers from the rcu update side while holding a mutex. This guarantees that use-after-free could not happen. In the next patches I'll fix the callers with missing rcu_dereference_protected to make sparse/lockdep happy, the proper way to use these helpers is: struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs = ...; struct bpf_prog_array *p; mutex_lock(&mtx); p = rcu_dereference_protected(progs, lockdep_is_held(&mtx)); bpf_prog_array_length(p); bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy_info(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_free(p); mutex_unlock(&mtx); No functional changes! rcu_dereference_protected with lockdep_is_held should catch any cases where we update prog array without a mutex (I've looked at existing call sites and I think we hold a mutex everywhere). Motivation is to fix sparse warnings: kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: expected struct callback_head *head kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: got struct callback_head [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *item kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *[assigned] existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * v2: * remove comment about potential race; that can't happen because all callers are in rcu-update section Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-05-29 05:14:41 +08:00
for (item = array->items; item->prog; item++)
if (item->prog != &dummy_bpf_prog.prog)
cnt++;
return cnt;
}
bpf: implement getsockopt and setsockopt hooks Implement new BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT program type and BPF_CGROUP_{G,S}ETSOCKOPT cgroup hooks. BPF_CGROUP_SETSOCKOPT can modify user setsockopt arguments before passing them down to the kernel or bypass kernel completely. BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT can can inspect/modify getsockopt arguments that kernel returns. Both hooks reuse existing PTR_TO_PACKET{,_END} infrastructure. The buffer memory is pre-allocated (because I don't think there is a precedent for working with __user memory from bpf). This might be slow to do for each {s,g}etsockopt call, that's why I've added __cgroup_bpf_prog_array_is_empty that exits early if there is nothing attached to a cgroup. Note, however, that there is a race between __cgroup_bpf_prog_array_is_empty and BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY where cgroup program layout might have changed; this should not be a problem because in general there is a race between multiple calls to {s,g}etsocktop and user adding/removing bpf progs from a cgroup. The return code of the BPF program is handled as follows: * 0: EPERM * 1: success, continue with next BPF program in the cgroup chain v9: * allow overwriting setsockopt arguments (Alexei Starovoitov): * use set_fs (same as kernel_setsockopt) * buffer is always kzalloc'd (no small on-stack buffer) v8: * use s32 for optlen (Andrii Nakryiko) v7: * return only 0 or 1 (Alexei Starovoitov) * always run all progs (Alexei Starovoitov) * use optval=0 as kernel bypass in setsockopt (Alexei Starovoitov) (decided to use optval=-1 instead, optval=0 might be a valid input) * call getsockopt hook after kernel handlers (Alexei Starovoitov) v6: * rework cgroup chaining; stop as soon as bpf program returns 0 or 2; see patch with the documentation for the details * drop Andrii's and Martin's Acked-by (not sure they are comfortable with the new state of things) v5: * skip copy_to_user() and put_user() when ret == 0 (Martin Lau) v4: * don't export bpf_sk_fullsock helper (Martin Lau) * size != sizeof(__u64) for uapi pointers (Martin Lau) * offsetof instead of bpf_ctx_range when checking ctx access (Martin Lau) v3: * typos in BPF_PROG_CGROUP_SOCKOPT_RUN_ARRAY comments (Andrii Nakryiko) * reverse christmas tree in BPF_PROG_CGROUP_SOCKOPT_RUN_ARRAY (Andrii Nakryiko) * use __bpf_md_ptr instead of __u32 for optval{,_end} (Martin Lau) * use BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF() for consistency (Martin Lau) * new CG_SOCKOPT_ACCESS macro to wrap repeated parts v2: * moved bpf_sockopt_kern fields around to remove a hole (Martin Lau) * aligned bpf_sockopt_kern->buf to 8 bytes (Martin Lau) * bpf_prog_array_is_empty instead of bpf_prog_array_length (Martin Lau) * added [0,2] return code check to verifier (Martin Lau) * dropped unused buf[64] from the stack (Martin Lau) * use PTR_TO_SOCKET for bpf_sockopt->sk (Martin Lau) * dropped bpf_target_off from ctx rewrites (Martin Lau) * use return code for kernel bypass (Martin Lau & Andrii Nakryiko) Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Cc: Martin Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-06-28 04:38:47 +08:00
bool bpf_prog_array_is_empty(struct bpf_prog_array *array)
{
struct bpf_prog_array_item *item;
for (item = array->items; item->prog; item++)
if (item->prog != &dummy_bpf_prog.prog)
return false;
return true;
}
bpf: remove __rcu annotations from bpf_prog_array Drop __rcu annotations and rcu read sections from bpf_prog_array helper functions. They are not needed since all existing callers call those helpers from the rcu update side while holding a mutex. This guarantees that use-after-free could not happen. In the next patches I'll fix the callers with missing rcu_dereference_protected to make sparse/lockdep happy, the proper way to use these helpers is: struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs = ...; struct bpf_prog_array *p; mutex_lock(&mtx); p = rcu_dereference_protected(progs, lockdep_is_held(&mtx)); bpf_prog_array_length(p); bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy_info(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_free(p); mutex_unlock(&mtx); No functional changes! rcu_dereference_protected with lockdep_is_held should catch any cases where we update prog array without a mutex (I've looked at existing call sites and I think we hold a mutex everywhere). Motivation is to fix sparse warnings: kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: expected struct callback_head *head kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: got struct callback_head [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *item kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *[assigned] existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * v2: * remove comment about potential race; that can't happen because all callers are in rcu-update section Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-05-29 05:14:41 +08:00
static bool bpf_prog_array_copy_core(struct bpf_prog_array *array,
bpf/tracing: fix a deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog syzbot reported a possible deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog. The error details: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor7/24531 is trying to acquire lock: (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000008a849b07>] perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 but task is already holding lock: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<0000000038768f87>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x198/0x280 mm/util.c:353 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: __might_fault+0x13a/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4571 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0xf2/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1694 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x1c7/0x2c0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:891 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4750 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4770 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #0 (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 perf_event_free_bpf_prog kernel/events/core.c:8147 [inline] _free_event+0xbdb/0x10f0 kernel/events/core.c:4116 put_event+0x24/0x30 kernel/events/core.c:4204 perf_mmap_close+0x60d/0x1010 kernel/events/core.c:5172 remove_vma+0xb4/0x1b0 mm/mmap.c:172 remove_vma_list mm/mmap.c:2490 [inline] do_munmap+0x82a/0xdf0 mm/mmap.c:2731 mmap_region+0x59e/0x15a0 mm/mmap.c:1646 do_mmap+0x6c0/0xe00 mm/mmap.c:1483 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2223 [inline] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1de/0x280 mm/util.c:355 SYSC_mmap_pgoff mm/mmap.c:1533 [inline] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x462/0x5f0 mm/mmap.c:1491 SYSC_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] SyS_mmap+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** ====================================================== The bug is introduced by Commit f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") where copy_to_user, which requires mm->mmap_sem, is called inside bpf_event_mutex lock. At the same time, during perf_event file descriptor close, mm->mmap_sem is held first and then subsequent perf_event_detach_bpf_prog needs bpf_event_mutex lock. Such a senario caused a deadlock. As suggested by Daniel, moving copy_to_user out of the bpf_event_mutex lock should fix the problem. Fixes: f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") Reported-by: syzbot+dc5ca0e4c9bfafaf2bae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-04-11 00:37:32 +08:00
u32 *prog_ids,
u32 request_cnt)
{
struct bpf_prog_array_item *item;
bpf/tracing: fix a deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog syzbot reported a possible deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog. The error details: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor7/24531 is trying to acquire lock: (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000008a849b07>] perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 but task is already holding lock: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<0000000038768f87>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x198/0x280 mm/util.c:353 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: __might_fault+0x13a/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4571 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0xf2/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1694 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x1c7/0x2c0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:891 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4750 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4770 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #0 (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 perf_event_free_bpf_prog kernel/events/core.c:8147 [inline] _free_event+0xbdb/0x10f0 kernel/events/core.c:4116 put_event+0x24/0x30 kernel/events/core.c:4204 perf_mmap_close+0x60d/0x1010 kernel/events/core.c:5172 remove_vma+0xb4/0x1b0 mm/mmap.c:172 remove_vma_list mm/mmap.c:2490 [inline] do_munmap+0x82a/0xdf0 mm/mmap.c:2731 mmap_region+0x59e/0x15a0 mm/mmap.c:1646 do_mmap+0x6c0/0xe00 mm/mmap.c:1483 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2223 [inline] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1de/0x280 mm/util.c:355 SYSC_mmap_pgoff mm/mmap.c:1533 [inline] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x462/0x5f0 mm/mmap.c:1491 SYSC_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] SyS_mmap+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** ====================================================== The bug is introduced by Commit f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") where copy_to_user, which requires mm->mmap_sem, is called inside bpf_event_mutex lock. At the same time, during perf_event file descriptor close, mm->mmap_sem is held first and then subsequent perf_event_detach_bpf_prog needs bpf_event_mutex lock. Such a senario caused a deadlock. As suggested by Daniel, moving copy_to_user out of the bpf_event_mutex lock should fix the problem. Fixes: f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") Reported-by: syzbot+dc5ca0e4c9bfafaf2bae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-04-11 00:37:32 +08:00
int i = 0;
bpf: remove __rcu annotations from bpf_prog_array Drop __rcu annotations and rcu read sections from bpf_prog_array helper functions. They are not needed since all existing callers call those helpers from the rcu update side while holding a mutex. This guarantees that use-after-free could not happen. In the next patches I'll fix the callers with missing rcu_dereference_protected to make sparse/lockdep happy, the proper way to use these helpers is: struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs = ...; struct bpf_prog_array *p; mutex_lock(&mtx); p = rcu_dereference_protected(progs, lockdep_is_held(&mtx)); bpf_prog_array_length(p); bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy_info(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_free(p); mutex_unlock(&mtx); No functional changes! rcu_dereference_protected with lockdep_is_held should catch any cases where we update prog array without a mutex (I've looked at existing call sites and I think we hold a mutex everywhere). Motivation is to fix sparse warnings: kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: expected struct callback_head *head kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: got struct callback_head [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *item kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *[assigned] existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * v2: * remove comment about potential race; that can't happen because all callers are in rcu-update section Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-05-29 05:14:41 +08:00
for (item = array->items; item->prog; item++) {
if (item->prog == &dummy_bpf_prog.prog)
bpf/tracing: fix a deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog syzbot reported a possible deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog. The error details: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor7/24531 is trying to acquire lock: (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000008a849b07>] perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 but task is already holding lock: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<0000000038768f87>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x198/0x280 mm/util.c:353 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: __might_fault+0x13a/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4571 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0xf2/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1694 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x1c7/0x2c0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:891 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4750 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4770 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #0 (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 perf_event_free_bpf_prog kernel/events/core.c:8147 [inline] _free_event+0xbdb/0x10f0 kernel/events/core.c:4116 put_event+0x24/0x30 kernel/events/core.c:4204 perf_mmap_close+0x60d/0x1010 kernel/events/core.c:5172 remove_vma+0xb4/0x1b0 mm/mmap.c:172 remove_vma_list mm/mmap.c:2490 [inline] do_munmap+0x82a/0xdf0 mm/mmap.c:2731 mmap_region+0x59e/0x15a0 mm/mmap.c:1646 do_mmap+0x6c0/0xe00 mm/mmap.c:1483 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2223 [inline] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1de/0x280 mm/util.c:355 SYSC_mmap_pgoff mm/mmap.c:1533 [inline] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x462/0x5f0 mm/mmap.c:1491 SYSC_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] SyS_mmap+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** ====================================================== The bug is introduced by Commit f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") where copy_to_user, which requires mm->mmap_sem, is called inside bpf_event_mutex lock. At the same time, during perf_event file descriptor close, mm->mmap_sem is held first and then subsequent perf_event_detach_bpf_prog needs bpf_event_mutex lock. Such a senario caused a deadlock. As suggested by Daniel, moving copy_to_user out of the bpf_event_mutex lock should fix the problem. Fixes: f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") Reported-by: syzbot+dc5ca0e4c9bfafaf2bae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-04-11 00:37:32 +08:00
continue;
prog_ids[i] = item->prog->aux->id;
bpf/tracing: fix a deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog syzbot reported a possible deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog. The error details: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor7/24531 is trying to acquire lock: (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000008a849b07>] perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 but task is already holding lock: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<0000000038768f87>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x198/0x280 mm/util.c:353 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: __might_fault+0x13a/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4571 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0xf2/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1694 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x1c7/0x2c0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:891 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4750 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4770 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #0 (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 perf_event_free_bpf_prog kernel/events/core.c:8147 [inline] _free_event+0xbdb/0x10f0 kernel/events/core.c:4116 put_event+0x24/0x30 kernel/events/core.c:4204 perf_mmap_close+0x60d/0x1010 kernel/events/core.c:5172 remove_vma+0xb4/0x1b0 mm/mmap.c:172 remove_vma_list mm/mmap.c:2490 [inline] do_munmap+0x82a/0xdf0 mm/mmap.c:2731 mmap_region+0x59e/0x15a0 mm/mmap.c:1646 do_mmap+0x6c0/0xe00 mm/mmap.c:1483 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2223 [inline] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1de/0x280 mm/util.c:355 SYSC_mmap_pgoff mm/mmap.c:1533 [inline] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x462/0x5f0 mm/mmap.c:1491 SYSC_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] SyS_mmap+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** ====================================================== The bug is introduced by Commit f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") where copy_to_user, which requires mm->mmap_sem, is called inside bpf_event_mutex lock. At the same time, during perf_event file descriptor close, mm->mmap_sem is held first and then subsequent perf_event_detach_bpf_prog needs bpf_event_mutex lock. Such a senario caused a deadlock. As suggested by Daniel, moving copy_to_user out of the bpf_event_mutex lock should fix the problem. Fixes: f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") Reported-by: syzbot+dc5ca0e4c9bfafaf2bae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-04-11 00:37:32 +08:00
if (++i == request_cnt) {
item++;
bpf/tracing: fix a deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog syzbot reported a possible deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog. The error details: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor7/24531 is trying to acquire lock: (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000008a849b07>] perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 but task is already holding lock: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<0000000038768f87>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x198/0x280 mm/util.c:353 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: __might_fault+0x13a/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4571 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0xf2/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1694 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x1c7/0x2c0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:891 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4750 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4770 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #0 (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 perf_event_free_bpf_prog kernel/events/core.c:8147 [inline] _free_event+0xbdb/0x10f0 kernel/events/core.c:4116 put_event+0x24/0x30 kernel/events/core.c:4204 perf_mmap_close+0x60d/0x1010 kernel/events/core.c:5172 remove_vma+0xb4/0x1b0 mm/mmap.c:172 remove_vma_list mm/mmap.c:2490 [inline] do_munmap+0x82a/0xdf0 mm/mmap.c:2731 mmap_region+0x59e/0x15a0 mm/mmap.c:1646 do_mmap+0x6c0/0xe00 mm/mmap.c:1483 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2223 [inline] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1de/0x280 mm/util.c:355 SYSC_mmap_pgoff mm/mmap.c:1533 [inline] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x462/0x5f0 mm/mmap.c:1491 SYSC_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] SyS_mmap+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** ====================================================== The bug is introduced by Commit f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") where copy_to_user, which requires mm->mmap_sem, is called inside bpf_event_mutex lock. At the same time, during perf_event file descriptor close, mm->mmap_sem is held first and then subsequent perf_event_detach_bpf_prog needs bpf_event_mutex lock. Such a senario caused a deadlock. As suggested by Daniel, moving copy_to_user out of the bpf_event_mutex lock should fix the problem. Fixes: f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") Reported-by: syzbot+dc5ca0e4c9bfafaf2bae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-04-11 00:37:32 +08:00
break;
}
}
return !!(item->prog);
bpf/tracing: fix a deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog syzbot reported a possible deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog. The error details: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor7/24531 is trying to acquire lock: (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000008a849b07>] perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 but task is already holding lock: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<0000000038768f87>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x198/0x280 mm/util.c:353 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: __might_fault+0x13a/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4571 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0xf2/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1694 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x1c7/0x2c0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:891 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4750 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4770 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #0 (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 perf_event_free_bpf_prog kernel/events/core.c:8147 [inline] _free_event+0xbdb/0x10f0 kernel/events/core.c:4116 put_event+0x24/0x30 kernel/events/core.c:4204 perf_mmap_close+0x60d/0x1010 kernel/events/core.c:5172 remove_vma+0xb4/0x1b0 mm/mmap.c:172 remove_vma_list mm/mmap.c:2490 [inline] do_munmap+0x82a/0xdf0 mm/mmap.c:2731 mmap_region+0x59e/0x15a0 mm/mmap.c:1646 do_mmap+0x6c0/0xe00 mm/mmap.c:1483 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2223 [inline] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1de/0x280 mm/util.c:355 SYSC_mmap_pgoff mm/mmap.c:1533 [inline] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x462/0x5f0 mm/mmap.c:1491 SYSC_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] SyS_mmap+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** ====================================================== The bug is introduced by Commit f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") where copy_to_user, which requires mm->mmap_sem, is called inside bpf_event_mutex lock. At the same time, during perf_event file descriptor close, mm->mmap_sem is held first and then subsequent perf_event_detach_bpf_prog needs bpf_event_mutex lock. Such a senario caused a deadlock. As suggested by Daniel, moving copy_to_user out of the bpf_event_mutex lock should fix the problem. Fixes: f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") Reported-by: syzbot+dc5ca0e4c9bfafaf2bae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-04-11 00:37:32 +08:00
}
bpf: remove __rcu annotations from bpf_prog_array Drop __rcu annotations and rcu read sections from bpf_prog_array helper functions. They are not needed since all existing callers call those helpers from the rcu update side while holding a mutex. This guarantees that use-after-free could not happen. In the next patches I'll fix the callers with missing rcu_dereference_protected to make sparse/lockdep happy, the proper way to use these helpers is: struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs = ...; struct bpf_prog_array *p; mutex_lock(&mtx); p = rcu_dereference_protected(progs, lockdep_is_held(&mtx)); bpf_prog_array_length(p); bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy_info(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_free(p); mutex_unlock(&mtx); No functional changes! rcu_dereference_protected with lockdep_is_held should catch any cases where we update prog array without a mutex (I've looked at existing call sites and I think we hold a mutex everywhere). Motivation is to fix sparse warnings: kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: expected struct callback_head *head kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: got struct callback_head [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *item kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *[assigned] existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * v2: * remove comment about potential race; that can't happen because all callers are in rcu-update section Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-05-29 05:14:41 +08:00
int bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(struct bpf_prog_array *array,
__u32 __user *prog_ids, u32 cnt)
{
bpf: fix bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user() issues 1. move copy_to_user out of rcu section to fix the following issue: ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:302 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section! stack backtrace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4592 rcu_preempt_sleep_check include/linux/rcupdate.h:301 [inline] ___might_sleep+0x385/0x470 kernel/sched/core.c:6079 __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6067 __might_fault+0xab/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4532 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user+0x217/0x4d0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1587 bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0x17b/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1685 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x196/0x280 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:877 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4737 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4757 2. move *prog under rcu, since it's not ok to dereference it afterwards 3. in a rare case of prog array being swapped between bpf_prog_array_length() and bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user() calls make sure to copy zeros to user space, so the user doesn't walk over uninited prog_ids while kernel reported uattr->query.prog_cnt > 0 Reported-by: syzbot+7dbcd2d3b85f9b608b23@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 468e2f64d220 ("bpf: introduce BPF_PROG_QUERY command") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-02-03 07:14:05 +08:00
unsigned long err = 0;
bool nospc;
bpf/tracing: fix a deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog syzbot reported a possible deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog. The error details: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor7/24531 is trying to acquire lock: (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000008a849b07>] perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 but task is already holding lock: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<0000000038768f87>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x198/0x280 mm/util.c:353 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: __might_fault+0x13a/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4571 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0xf2/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1694 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x1c7/0x2c0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:891 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4750 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4770 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #0 (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 perf_event_free_bpf_prog kernel/events/core.c:8147 [inline] _free_event+0xbdb/0x10f0 kernel/events/core.c:4116 put_event+0x24/0x30 kernel/events/core.c:4204 perf_mmap_close+0x60d/0x1010 kernel/events/core.c:5172 remove_vma+0xb4/0x1b0 mm/mmap.c:172 remove_vma_list mm/mmap.c:2490 [inline] do_munmap+0x82a/0xdf0 mm/mmap.c:2731 mmap_region+0x59e/0x15a0 mm/mmap.c:1646 do_mmap+0x6c0/0xe00 mm/mmap.c:1483 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2223 [inline] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1de/0x280 mm/util.c:355 SYSC_mmap_pgoff mm/mmap.c:1533 [inline] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x462/0x5f0 mm/mmap.c:1491 SYSC_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] SyS_mmap+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** ====================================================== The bug is introduced by Commit f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") where copy_to_user, which requires mm->mmap_sem, is called inside bpf_event_mutex lock. At the same time, during perf_event file descriptor close, mm->mmap_sem is held first and then subsequent perf_event_detach_bpf_prog needs bpf_event_mutex lock. Such a senario caused a deadlock. As suggested by Daniel, moving copy_to_user out of the bpf_event_mutex lock should fix the problem. Fixes: f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") Reported-by: syzbot+dc5ca0e4c9bfafaf2bae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-04-11 00:37:32 +08:00
u32 *ids;
bpf: fix bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user() issues 1. move copy_to_user out of rcu section to fix the following issue: ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:302 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section! stack backtrace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4592 rcu_preempt_sleep_check include/linux/rcupdate.h:301 [inline] ___might_sleep+0x385/0x470 kernel/sched/core.c:6079 __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6067 __might_fault+0xab/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4532 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user+0x217/0x4d0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1587 bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0x17b/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1685 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x196/0x280 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:877 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4737 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4757 2. move *prog under rcu, since it's not ok to dereference it afterwards 3. in a rare case of prog array being swapped between bpf_prog_array_length() and bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user() calls make sure to copy zeros to user space, so the user doesn't walk over uninited prog_ids while kernel reported uattr->query.prog_cnt > 0 Reported-by: syzbot+7dbcd2d3b85f9b608b23@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 468e2f64d220 ("bpf: introduce BPF_PROG_QUERY command") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-02-03 07:14:05 +08:00
/* users of this function are doing:
* cnt = bpf_prog_array_length();
* if (cnt > 0)
* bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(..., cnt);
bpf: remove __rcu annotations from bpf_prog_array Drop __rcu annotations and rcu read sections from bpf_prog_array helper functions. They are not needed since all existing callers call those helpers from the rcu update side while holding a mutex. This guarantees that use-after-free could not happen. In the next patches I'll fix the callers with missing rcu_dereference_protected to make sparse/lockdep happy, the proper way to use these helpers is: struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs = ...; struct bpf_prog_array *p; mutex_lock(&mtx); p = rcu_dereference_protected(progs, lockdep_is_held(&mtx)); bpf_prog_array_length(p); bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy_info(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_free(p); mutex_unlock(&mtx); No functional changes! rcu_dereference_protected with lockdep_is_held should catch any cases where we update prog array without a mutex (I've looked at existing call sites and I think we hold a mutex everywhere). Motivation is to fix sparse warnings: kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: expected struct callback_head *head kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: got struct callback_head [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *item kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *[assigned] existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * v2: * remove comment about potential race; that can't happen because all callers are in rcu-update section Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-05-29 05:14:41 +08:00
* so below kcalloc doesn't need extra cnt > 0 check.
bpf: fix bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user() issues 1. move copy_to_user out of rcu section to fix the following issue: ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:302 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section! stack backtrace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4592 rcu_preempt_sleep_check include/linux/rcupdate.h:301 [inline] ___might_sleep+0x385/0x470 kernel/sched/core.c:6079 __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6067 __might_fault+0xab/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4532 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user+0x217/0x4d0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1587 bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0x17b/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1685 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x196/0x280 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:877 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4737 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4757 2. move *prog under rcu, since it's not ok to dereference it afterwards 3. in a rare case of prog array being swapped between bpf_prog_array_length() and bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user() calls make sure to copy zeros to user space, so the user doesn't walk over uninited prog_ids while kernel reported uattr->query.prog_cnt > 0 Reported-by: syzbot+7dbcd2d3b85f9b608b23@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 468e2f64d220 ("bpf: introduce BPF_PROG_QUERY command") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-02-03 07:14:05 +08:00
*/
ids = kcalloc(cnt, sizeof(u32), GFP_USER | __GFP_NOWARN);
bpf: fix bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user() issues 1. move copy_to_user out of rcu section to fix the following issue: ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:302 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section! stack backtrace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4592 rcu_preempt_sleep_check include/linux/rcupdate.h:301 [inline] ___might_sleep+0x385/0x470 kernel/sched/core.c:6079 __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6067 __might_fault+0xab/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4532 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user+0x217/0x4d0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1587 bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0x17b/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1685 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x196/0x280 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:877 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4737 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4757 2. move *prog under rcu, since it's not ok to dereference it afterwards 3. in a rare case of prog array being swapped between bpf_prog_array_length() and bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user() calls make sure to copy zeros to user space, so the user doesn't walk over uninited prog_ids while kernel reported uattr->query.prog_cnt > 0 Reported-by: syzbot+7dbcd2d3b85f9b608b23@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 468e2f64d220 ("bpf: introduce BPF_PROG_QUERY command") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-02-03 07:14:05 +08:00
if (!ids)
return -ENOMEM;
nospc = bpf_prog_array_copy_core(array, ids, cnt);
bpf: fix bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user() issues 1. move copy_to_user out of rcu section to fix the following issue: ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:302 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section! stack backtrace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4592 rcu_preempt_sleep_check include/linux/rcupdate.h:301 [inline] ___might_sleep+0x385/0x470 kernel/sched/core.c:6079 __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6067 __might_fault+0xab/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4532 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user+0x217/0x4d0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1587 bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0x17b/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1685 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x196/0x280 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:877 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4737 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4757 2. move *prog under rcu, since it's not ok to dereference it afterwards 3. in a rare case of prog array being swapped between bpf_prog_array_length() and bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user() calls make sure to copy zeros to user space, so the user doesn't walk over uninited prog_ids while kernel reported uattr->query.prog_cnt > 0 Reported-by: syzbot+7dbcd2d3b85f9b608b23@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 468e2f64d220 ("bpf: introduce BPF_PROG_QUERY command") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-02-03 07:14:05 +08:00
err = copy_to_user(prog_ids, ids, cnt * sizeof(u32));
kfree(ids);
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
if (nospc)
return -ENOSPC;
return 0;
}
bpf: remove __rcu annotations from bpf_prog_array Drop __rcu annotations and rcu read sections from bpf_prog_array helper functions. They are not needed since all existing callers call those helpers from the rcu update side while holding a mutex. This guarantees that use-after-free could not happen. In the next patches I'll fix the callers with missing rcu_dereference_protected to make sparse/lockdep happy, the proper way to use these helpers is: struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs = ...; struct bpf_prog_array *p; mutex_lock(&mtx); p = rcu_dereference_protected(progs, lockdep_is_held(&mtx)); bpf_prog_array_length(p); bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy_info(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_free(p); mutex_unlock(&mtx); No functional changes! rcu_dereference_protected with lockdep_is_held should catch any cases where we update prog array without a mutex (I've looked at existing call sites and I think we hold a mutex everywhere). Motivation is to fix sparse warnings: kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: expected struct callback_head *head kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: got struct callback_head [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *item kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *[assigned] existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * v2: * remove comment about potential race; that can't happen because all callers are in rcu-update section Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-05-29 05:14:41 +08:00
void bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(struct bpf_prog_array *array,
struct bpf_prog *old_prog)
{
bpf: remove __rcu annotations from bpf_prog_array Drop __rcu annotations and rcu read sections from bpf_prog_array helper functions. They are not needed since all existing callers call those helpers from the rcu update side while holding a mutex. This guarantees that use-after-free could not happen. In the next patches I'll fix the callers with missing rcu_dereference_protected to make sparse/lockdep happy, the proper way to use these helpers is: struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs = ...; struct bpf_prog_array *p; mutex_lock(&mtx); p = rcu_dereference_protected(progs, lockdep_is_held(&mtx)); bpf_prog_array_length(p); bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy_info(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_free(p); mutex_unlock(&mtx); No functional changes! rcu_dereference_protected with lockdep_is_held should catch any cases where we update prog array without a mutex (I've looked at existing call sites and I think we hold a mutex everywhere). Motivation is to fix sparse warnings: kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: expected struct callback_head *head kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: got struct callback_head [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *item kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *[assigned] existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * v2: * remove comment about potential race; that can't happen because all callers are in rcu-update section Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-05-29 05:14:41 +08:00
struct bpf_prog_array_item *item;
bpf: remove __rcu annotations from bpf_prog_array Drop __rcu annotations and rcu read sections from bpf_prog_array helper functions. They are not needed since all existing callers call those helpers from the rcu update side while holding a mutex. This guarantees that use-after-free could not happen. In the next patches I'll fix the callers with missing rcu_dereference_protected to make sparse/lockdep happy, the proper way to use these helpers is: struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs = ...; struct bpf_prog_array *p; mutex_lock(&mtx); p = rcu_dereference_protected(progs, lockdep_is_held(&mtx)); bpf_prog_array_length(p); bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy_info(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_free(p); mutex_unlock(&mtx); No functional changes! rcu_dereference_protected with lockdep_is_held should catch any cases where we update prog array without a mutex (I've looked at existing call sites and I think we hold a mutex everywhere). Motivation is to fix sparse warnings: kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: expected struct callback_head *head kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: got struct callback_head [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *item kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *[assigned] existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * v2: * remove comment about potential race; that can't happen because all callers are in rcu-update section Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-05-29 05:14:41 +08:00
for (item = array->items; item->prog; item++)
if (item->prog == old_prog) {
WRITE_ONCE(item->prog, &dummy_bpf_prog.prog);
break;
}
}
bpf: remove __rcu annotations from bpf_prog_array Drop __rcu annotations and rcu read sections from bpf_prog_array helper functions. They are not needed since all existing callers call those helpers from the rcu update side while holding a mutex. This guarantees that use-after-free could not happen. In the next patches I'll fix the callers with missing rcu_dereference_protected to make sparse/lockdep happy, the proper way to use these helpers is: struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs = ...; struct bpf_prog_array *p; mutex_lock(&mtx); p = rcu_dereference_protected(progs, lockdep_is_held(&mtx)); bpf_prog_array_length(p); bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy_info(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_free(p); mutex_unlock(&mtx); No functional changes! rcu_dereference_protected with lockdep_is_held should catch any cases where we update prog array without a mutex (I've looked at existing call sites and I think we hold a mutex everywhere). Motivation is to fix sparse warnings: kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: expected struct callback_head *head kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: got struct callback_head [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *item kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *[assigned] existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * v2: * remove comment about potential race; that can't happen because all callers are in rcu-update section Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-05-29 05:14:41 +08:00
int bpf_prog_array_copy(struct bpf_prog_array *old_array,
struct bpf_prog *exclude_prog,
struct bpf_prog *include_prog,
struct bpf_prog_array **new_array)
{
int new_prog_cnt, carry_prog_cnt = 0;
struct bpf_prog_array_item *existing;
struct bpf_prog_array *array;
bool found_exclude = false;
int new_prog_idx = 0;
/* Figure out how many existing progs we need to carry over to
* the new array.
*/
if (old_array) {
existing = old_array->items;
for (; existing->prog; existing++) {
if (existing->prog == exclude_prog) {
found_exclude = true;
continue;
}
if (existing->prog != &dummy_bpf_prog.prog)
carry_prog_cnt++;
if (existing->prog == include_prog)
return -EEXIST;
}
}
if (exclude_prog && !found_exclude)
return -ENOENT;
/* How many progs (not NULL) will be in the new array? */
new_prog_cnt = carry_prog_cnt;
if (include_prog)
new_prog_cnt += 1;
/* Do we have any prog (not NULL) in the new array? */
if (!new_prog_cnt) {
*new_array = NULL;
return 0;
}
/* +1 as the end of prog_array is marked with NULL */
array = bpf_prog_array_alloc(new_prog_cnt + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!array)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Fill in the new prog array */
if (carry_prog_cnt) {
existing = old_array->items;
for (; existing->prog; existing++)
if (existing->prog != exclude_prog &&
existing->prog != &dummy_bpf_prog.prog) {
array->items[new_prog_idx++].prog =
existing->prog;
}
}
if (include_prog)
array->items[new_prog_idx++].prog = include_prog;
array->items[new_prog_idx].prog = NULL;
*new_array = array;
return 0;
}
bpf: remove __rcu annotations from bpf_prog_array Drop __rcu annotations and rcu read sections from bpf_prog_array helper functions. They are not needed since all existing callers call those helpers from the rcu update side while holding a mutex. This guarantees that use-after-free could not happen. In the next patches I'll fix the callers with missing rcu_dereference_protected to make sparse/lockdep happy, the proper way to use these helpers is: struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs = ...; struct bpf_prog_array *p; mutex_lock(&mtx); p = rcu_dereference_protected(progs, lockdep_is_held(&mtx)); bpf_prog_array_length(p); bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy_info(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_copy(p, ...); bpf_prog_array_free(p); mutex_unlock(&mtx); No functional changes! rcu_dereference_protected with lockdep_is_held should catch any cases where we update prog array without a mutex (I've looked at existing call sites and I think we hold a mutex everywhere). Motivation is to fix sparse warnings: kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: expected struct callback_head *head kernel/bpf/core.c:1803:9: got struct callback_head [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *item kernel/bpf/core.c:1877:44: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1901:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: expected struct bpf_prog_array_item *[assigned] existing kernel/bpf/core.c:1935:26: got struct bpf_prog_array_item [noderef] <asn:4> * v2: * remove comment about potential race; that can't happen because all callers are in rcu-update section Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-05-29 05:14:41 +08:00
int bpf_prog_array_copy_info(struct bpf_prog_array *array,
bpf/tracing: fix a deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog syzbot reported a possible deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog. The error details: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor7/24531 is trying to acquire lock: (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000008a849b07>] perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 but task is already holding lock: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<0000000038768f87>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x198/0x280 mm/util.c:353 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: __might_fault+0x13a/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4571 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0xf2/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1694 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x1c7/0x2c0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:891 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4750 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4770 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #0 (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 perf_event_free_bpf_prog kernel/events/core.c:8147 [inline] _free_event+0xbdb/0x10f0 kernel/events/core.c:4116 put_event+0x24/0x30 kernel/events/core.c:4204 perf_mmap_close+0x60d/0x1010 kernel/events/core.c:5172 remove_vma+0xb4/0x1b0 mm/mmap.c:172 remove_vma_list mm/mmap.c:2490 [inline] do_munmap+0x82a/0xdf0 mm/mmap.c:2731 mmap_region+0x59e/0x15a0 mm/mmap.c:1646 do_mmap+0x6c0/0xe00 mm/mmap.c:1483 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2223 [inline] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1de/0x280 mm/util.c:355 SYSC_mmap_pgoff mm/mmap.c:1533 [inline] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x462/0x5f0 mm/mmap.c:1491 SYSC_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] SyS_mmap+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** ====================================================== The bug is introduced by Commit f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") where copy_to_user, which requires mm->mmap_sem, is called inside bpf_event_mutex lock. At the same time, during perf_event file descriptor close, mm->mmap_sem is held first and then subsequent perf_event_detach_bpf_prog needs bpf_event_mutex lock. Such a senario caused a deadlock. As suggested by Daniel, moving copy_to_user out of the bpf_event_mutex lock should fix the problem. Fixes: f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") Reported-by: syzbot+dc5ca0e4c9bfafaf2bae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-04-11 00:37:32 +08:00
u32 *prog_ids, u32 request_cnt,
u32 *prog_cnt)
bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp Commit e87c6bc3852b ("bpf: permit multiple bpf attachments for a single perf event") added support to attach multiple bpf programs to a single perf event. Although this provides flexibility, users may want to know what other bpf programs attached to the same tp interface. Besides getting visibility for the underlying bpf system, such information may also help consolidate multiple bpf programs, understand potential performance issues due to a large array, and debug (e.g., one bpf program which overwrites return code may impact subsequent program results). Commit 2541517c32be ("tracing, perf: Implement BPF programs attached to kprobes") utilized the existing perf ioctl interface and added the command PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_BPF to attach a bpf program to a tracepoint. This patch adds a new ioctl command, given a perf event fd, to query the bpf program array attached to the same perf tracepoint event. The new uapi ioctl command: PERF_EVENT_IOC_QUERY_BPF The new uapi/linux/perf_event.h structure: struct perf_event_query_bpf { __u32 ids_len; __u32 prog_cnt; __u32 ids[0]; }; User space provides buffer "ids" for kernel to copy to. When returning from the kernel, the number of available programs in the array is set in "prog_cnt". The usage: struct perf_event_query_bpf *query = malloc(sizeof(*query) + sizeof(u32) * ids_len); query.ids_len = ids_len; err = ioctl(pmu_efd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_QUERY_BPF, query); if (err == 0) { /* query.prog_cnt is the number of available progs, * number of progs in ids: (ids_len == 0) ? 0 : query.prog_cnt */ } else if (errno == ENOSPC) { /* query.ids_len number of progs copied, * query.prog_cnt is the number of available progs */ } else { /* other errors */ } Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2017-12-12 03:39:02 +08:00
{
u32 cnt = 0;
if (array)
cnt = bpf_prog_array_length(array);
bpf/tracing: fix a deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog syzbot reported a possible deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog. The error details: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor7/24531 is trying to acquire lock: (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000008a849b07>] perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 but task is already holding lock: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<0000000038768f87>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x198/0x280 mm/util.c:353 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: __might_fault+0x13a/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4571 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0xf2/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1694 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x1c7/0x2c0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:891 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4750 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4770 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #0 (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 perf_event_free_bpf_prog kernel/events/core.c:8147 [inline] _free_event+0xbdb/0x10f0 kernel/events/core.c:4116 put_event+0x24/0x30 kernel/events/core.c:4204 perf_mmap_close+0x60d/0x1010 kernel/events/core.c:5172 remove_vma+0xb4/0x1b0 mm/mmap.c:172 remove_vma_list mm/mmap.c:2490 [inline] do_munmap+0x82a/0xdf0 mm/mmap.c:2731 mmap_region+0x59e/0x15a0 mm/mmap.c:1646 do_mmap+0x6c0/0xe00 mm/mmap.c:1483 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2223 [inline] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1de/0x280 mm/util.c:355 SYSC_mmap_pgoff mm/mmap.c:1533 [inline] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x462/0x5f0 mm/mmap.c:1491 SYSC_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] SyS_mmap+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** ====================================================== The bug is introduced by Commit f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") where copy_to_user, which requires mm->mmap_sem, is called inside bpf_event_mutex lock. At the same time, during perf_event file descriptor close, mm->mmap_sem is held first and then subsequent perf_event_detach_bpf_prog needs bpf_event_mutex lock. Such a senario caused a deadlock. As suggested by Daniel, moving copy_to_user out of the bpf_event_mutex lock should fix the problem. Fixes: f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") Reported-by: syzbot+dc5ca0e4c9bfafaf2bae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-04-11 00:37:32 +08:00
*prog_cnt = cnt;
bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp Commit e87c6bc3852b ("bpf: permit multiple bpf attachments for a single perf event") added support to attach multiple bpf programs to a single perf event. Although this provides flexibility, users may want to know what other bpf programs attached to the same tp interface. Besides getting visibility for the underlying bpf system, such information may also help consolidate multiple bpf programs, understand potential performance issues due to a large array, and debug (e.g., one bpf program which overwrites return code may impact subsequent program results). Commit 2541517c32be ("tracing, perf: Implement BPF programs attached to kprobes") utilized the existing perf ioctl interface and added the command PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_BPF to attach a bpf program to a tracepoint. This patch adds a new ioctl command, given a perf event fd, to query the bpf program array attached to the same perf tracepoint event. The new uapi ioctl command: PERF_EVENT_IOC_QUERY_BPF The new uapi/linux/perf_event.h structure: struct perf_event_query_bpf { __u32 ids_len; __u32 prog_cnt; __u32 ids[0]; }; User space provides buffer "ids" for kernel to copy to. When returning from the kernel, the number of available programs in the array is set in "prog_cnt". The usage: struct perf_event_query_bpf *query = malloc(sizeof(*query) + sizeof(u32) * ids_len); query.ids_len = ids_len; err = ioctl(pmu_efd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_QUERY_BPF, query); if (err == 0) { /* query.prog_cnt is the number of available progs, * number of progs in ids: (ids_len == 0) ? 0 : query.prog_cnt */ } else if (errno == ENOSPC) { /* query.ids_len number of progs copied, * query.prog_cnt is the number of available progs */ } else { /* other errors */ } Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2017-12-12 03:39:02 +08:00
/* return early if user requested only program count or nothing to copy */
if (!request_cnt || !cnt)
return 0;
bpf/tracing: fix a deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog syzbot reported a possible deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog. The error details: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor7/24531 is trying to acquire lock: (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000008a849b07>] perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 but task is already holding lock: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<0000000038768f87>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x198/0x280 mm/util.c:353 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: __might_fault+0x13a/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4571 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0xf2/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1694 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x1c7/0x2c0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:891 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4750 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4770 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #0 (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 perf_event_free_bpf_prog kernel/events/core.c:8147 [inline] _free_event+0xbdb/0x10f0 kernel/events/core.c:4116 put_event+0x24/0x30 kernel/events/core.c:4204 perf_mmap_close+0x60d/0x1010 kernel/events/core.c:5172 remove_vma+0xb4/0x1b0 mm/mmap.c:172 remove_vma_list mm/mmap.c:2490 [inline] do_munmap+0x82a/0xdf0 mm/mmap.c:2731 mmap_region+0x59e/0x15a0 mm/mmap.c:1646 do_mmap+0x6c0/0xe00 mm/mmap.c:1483 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2223 [inline] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1de/0x280 mm/util.c:355 SYSC_mmap_pgoff mm/mmap.c:1533 [inline] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x462/0x5f0 mm/mmap.c:1491 SYSC_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] SyS_mmap+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** ====================================================== The bug is introduced by Commit f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") where copy_to_user, which requires mm->mmap_sem, is called inside bpf_event_mutex lock. At the same time, during perf_event file descriptor close, mm->mmap_sem is held first and then subsequent perf_event_detach_bpf_prog needs bpf_event_mutex lock. Such a senario caused a deadlock. As suggested by Daniel, moving copy_to_user out of the bpf_event_mutex lock should fix the problem. Fixes: f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") Reported-by: syzbot+dc5ca0e4c9bfafaf2bae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-04-11 00:37:32 +08:00
/* this function is called under trace/bpf_trace.c: bpf_event_mutex */
return bpf_prog_array_copy_core(array, prog_ids, request_cnt) ? -ENOSPC
bpf/tracing: fix a deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog syzbot reported a possible deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog. The error details: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor7/24531 is trying to acquire lock: (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000008a849b07>] perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 but task is already holding lock: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<0000000038768f87>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x198/0x280 mm/util.c:353 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: __might_fault+0x13a/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4571 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0xf2/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1694 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x1c7/0x2c0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:891 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4750 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4770 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 -> #0 (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 perf_event_free_bpf_prog kernel/events/core.c:8147 [inline] _free_event+0xbdb/0x10f0 kernel/events/core.c:4116 put_event+0x24/0x30 kernel/events/core.c:4204 perf_mmap_close+0x60d/0x1010 kernel/events/core.c:5172 remove_vma+0xb4/0x1b0 mm/mmap.c:172 remove_vma_list mm/mmap.c:2490 [inline] do_munmap+0x82a/0xdf0 mm/mmap.c:2731 mmap_region+0x59e/0x15a0 mm/mmap.c:1646 do_mmap+0x6c0/0xe00 mm/mmap.c:1483 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2223 [inline] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1de/0x280 mm/util.c:355 SYSC_mmap_pgoff mm/mmap.c:1533 [inline] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x462/0x5f0 mm/mmap.c:1491 SYSC_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] SyS_mmap+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** ====================================================== The bug is introduced by Commit f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") where copy_to_user, which requires mm->mmap_sem, is called inside bpf_event_mutex lock. At the same time, during perf_event file descriptor close, mm->mmap_sem is held first and then subsequent perf_event_detach_bpf_prog needs bpf_event_mutex lock. Such a senario caused a deadlock. As suggested by Daniel, moving copy_to_user out of the bpf_event_mutex lock should fix the problem. Fixes: f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") Reported-by: syzbot+dc5ca0e4c9bfafaf2bae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-04-11 00:37:32 +08:00
: 0;
bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp Commit e87c6bc3852b ("bpf: permit multiple bpf attachments for a single perf event") added support to attach multiple bpf programs to a single perf event. Although this provides flexibility, users may want to know what other bpf programs attached to the same tp interface. Besides getting visibility for the underlying bpf system, such information may also help consolidate multiple bpf programs, understand potential performance issues due to a large array, and debug (e.g., one bpf program which overwrites return code may impact subsequent program results). Commit 2541517c32be ("tracing, perf: Implement BPF programs attached to kprobes") utilized the existing perf ioctl interface and added the command PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_BPF to attach a bpf program to a tracepoint. This patch adds a new ioctl command, given a perf event fd, to query the bpf program array attached to the same perf tracepoint event. The new uapi ioctl command: PERF_EVENT_IOC_QUERY_BPF The new uapi/linux/perf_event.h structure: struct perf_event_query_bpf { __u32 ids_len; __u32 prog_cnt; __u32 ids[0]; }; User space provides buffer "ids" for kernel to copy to. When returning from the kernel, the number of available programs in the array is set in "prog_cnt". The usage: struct perf_event_query_bpf *query = malloc(sizeof(*query) + sizeof(u32) * ids_len); query.ids_len = ids_len; err = ioctl(pmu_efd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_QUERY_BPF, query); if (err == 0) { /* query.prog_cnt is the number of available progs, * number of progs in ids: (ids_len == 0) ? 0 : query.prog_cnt */ } else if (errno == ENOSPC) { /* query.ids_len number of progs copied, * query.prog_cnt is the number of available progs */ } else { /* other errors */ } Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2017-12-12 03:39:02 +08:00
}
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
static void bpf_prog_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct bpf_prog_aux *aux;
bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs Typical JIT does several passes over bpf instructions to compute total size and relative offsets of jumps and calls. With multitple bpf functions calling each other all relative calls will have invalid offsets intially therefore we need to additional last pass over the program to emit calls with correct offsets. For example in case of three bpf functions: main: call foo call bpf_map_lookup exit foo: call bar exit bar: exit We will call bpf_int_jit_compile() indepedently for main(), foo() and bar() x64 JIT typically does 4-5 passes to converge. After these initial passes the image for these 3 functions will be good except call targets, since start addresses of foo() and bar() are unknown when we were JITing main() (note that call bpf_map_lookup will be resolved properly during initial passes). Once start addresses of 3 functions are known we patch call_insn->imm to point to right functions and call bpf_int_jit_compile() again which needs only one pass. Additional safety checks are done to make sure this last pass doesn't produce image that is larger or smaller than previous pass. When constant blinding is on it's applied to all functions at the first pass, since doing it once again at the last pass can change size of the JITed code. Tested on x64 and arm64 hw with JIT on/off, blinding on/off. x64 jits bpf-to-bpf calls correctly while arm64 falls back to interpreter. All other JITs that support normal BPF_CALL will behave the same way since bpf-to-bpf call is equivalent to bpf-to-kernel call from JITs point of view. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 09:55:15 +08:00
int i;
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
aux = container_of(work, struct bpf_prog_aux, work);
if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(aux))
bpf_prog_offload_destroy(aux->prog);
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
if (aux->prog->has_callchain_buf)
put_callchain_buffers();
#endif
bpf: Introduce BPF trampoline Introduce BPF trampoline concept to allow kernel code to call into BPF programs with practically zero overhead. The trampoline generation logic is architecture dependent. It's converting native calling convention into BPF calling convention. BPF ISA is 64-bit (even on 32-bit architectures). The registers R1 to R5 are used to pass arguments into BPF functions. The main BPF program accepts only single argument "ctx" in R1. Whereas CPU native calling convention is different. x86-64 is passing first 6 arguments in registers and the rest on the stack. x86-32 is passing first 3 arguments in registers. sparc64 is passing first 6 in registers. And so on. The trampolines between BPF and kernel already exist. BPF_CALL_x macros in include/linux/filter.h statically compile trampolines from BPF into kernel helpers. They convert up to five u64 arguments into kernel C pointers and integers. On 64-bit architectures this BPF_to_kernel trampolines are nops. On 32-bit architecture they're meaningful. The opposite job kernel_to_BPF trampolines is done by CAST_TO_U64 macros and __bpf_trace_##call() shim functions in include/trace/bpf_probe.h. They convert kernel function arguments into array of u64s that BPF program consumes via R1=ctx pointer. This patch set is doing the same job as __bpf_trace_##call() static trampolines, but dynamically for any kernel function. There are ~22k global kernel functions that are attachable via nop at function entry. The function arguments and types are described in BTF. The job of btf_distill_func_proto() function is to extract useful information from BTF into "function model" that architecture dependent trampoline generators will use to generate assembly code to cast kernel function arguments into array of u64s. For example the kernel function eth_type_trans has two pointers. They will be casted to u64 and stored into stack of generated trampoline. The pointer to that stack space will be passed into BPF program in R1. On x86-64 such generated trampoline will consume 16 bytes of stack and two stores of %rdi and %rsi into stack. The verifier will make sure that only two u64 are accessed read-only by BPF program. The verifier will also recognize the precise type of the pointers being accessed and will not allow typecasting of the pointer to a different type within BPF program. The tracing use case in the datacenter demonstrated that certain key kernel functions have (like tcp_retransmit_skb) have 2 or more kprobes that are always active. Other functions have both kprobe and kretprobe. So it is essential to keep both kernel code and BPF programs executing at maximum speed. Hence generated BPF trampoline is re-generated every time new program is attached or detached to maintain maximum performance. To avoid the high cost of retpoline the attached BPF programs are called directly. __bpf_prog_enter/exit() are used to support per-program execution stats. In the future this logic will be optimized further by adding support for bpf_stats_enabled_key inside generated assembly code. Introduction of preemptible and sleepable BPF programs will completely remove the need to call to __bpf_prog_enter/exit(). Detach of a BPF program from the trampoline should not fail. To avoid memory allocation in detach path the half of the page is used as a reserve and flipped after each attach/detach. 2k bytes is enough to call 40+ BPF programs directly which is enough for BPF tracing use cases. This limit can be increased in the future. BPF_TRACE_FENTRY programs have access to raw kernel function arguments while BPF_TRACE_FEXIT programs have access to kernel return value as well. Often kprobe BPF program remembers function arguments in a map while kretprobe fetches arguments from a map and analyzes them together with return value. BPF_TRACE_FEXIT accelerates this typical use case. Recursion prevention for kprobe BPF programs is done via per-cpu bpf_prog_active counter. In practice that turned out to be a mistake. It caused programs to randomly skip execution. The tracing tools missed results they were looking for. Hence BPF trampoline doesn't provide builtin recursion prevention. It's a job of BPF program itself and will be addressed in the follow up patches. BPF trampoline is intended to be used beyond tracing and fentry/fexit use cases in the future. For example to remove retpoline cost from XDP programs. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191114185720.1641606-5-ast@kernel.org
2019-11-15 02:57:04 +08:00
bpf_trampoline_put(aux->trampoline);
bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs Typical JIT does several passes over bpf instructions to compute total size and relative offsets of jumps and calls. With multitple bpf functions calling each other all relative calls will have invalid offsets intially therefore we need to additional last pass over the program to emit calls with correct offsets. For example in case of three bpf functions: main: call foo call bpf_map_lookup exit foo: call bar exit bar: exit We will call bpf_int_jit_compile() indepedently for main(), foo() and bar() x64 JIT typically does 4-5 passes to converge. After these initial passes the image for these 3 functions will be good except call targets, since start addresses of foo() and bar() are unknown when we were JITing main() (note that call bpf_map_lookup will be resolved properly during initial passes). Once start addresses of 3 functions are known we patch call_insn->imm to point to right functions and call bpf_int_jit_compile() again which needs only one pass. Additional safety checks are done to make sure this last pass doesn't produce image that is larger or smaller than previous pass. When constant blinding is on it's applied to all functions at the first pass, since doing it once again at the last pass can change size of the JITed code. Tested on x64 and arm64 hw with JIT on/off, blinding on/off. x64 jits bpf-to-bpf calls correctly while arm64 falls back to interpreter. All other JITs that support normal BPF_CALL will behave the same way since bpf-to-bpf call is equivalent to bpf-to-kernel call from JITs point of view. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 09:55:15 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < aux->func_cnt; i++)
bpf_jit_free(aux->func[i]);
if (aux->func_cnt) {
kfree(aux->func);
bpf_prog_unlock_free(aux->prog);
} else {
bpf_jit_free(aux->prog);
}
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
}
/* Free internal BPF program */
net: filter: split 'struct sk_filter' into socket and bpf parts clean up names related to socket filtering and bpf in the following way: - everything that deals with sockets keeps 'sk_*' prefix - everything that is pure BPF is changed to 'bpf_*' prefix split 'struct sk_filter' into struct sk_filter { atomic_t refcnt; struct rcu_head rcu; struct bpf_prog *prog; }; and struct bpf_prog { u32 jited:1, len:31; struct sock_fprog_kern *orig_prog; unsigned int (*bpf_func)(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct bpf_insn *filter); union { struct sock_filter insns[0]; struct bpf_insn insnsi[0]; struct work_struct work; }; }; so that 'struct bpf_prog' can be used independent of sockets and cleans up 'unattached' bpf use cases split SK_RUN_FILTER macro into: SK_RUN_FILTER to be used with 'struct sk_filter *' and BPF_PROG_RUN to be used with 'struct bpf_prog *' __sk_filter_release(struct sk_filter *) gains __bpf_prog_release(struct bpf_prog *) helper function also perform related renames for the functions that work with 'struct bpf_prog *', since they're on the same lines: sk_filter_size -> bpf_prog_size sk_filter_select_runtime -> bpf_prog_select_runtime sk_filter_free -> bpf_prog_free sk_unattached_filter_create -> bpf_prog_create sk_unattached_filter_destroy -> bpf_prog_destroy sk_store_orig_filter -> bpf_prog_store_orig_filter sk_release_orig_filter -> bpf_release_orig_filter __sk_migrate_filter -> bpf_migrate_filter __sk_prepare_filter -> bpf_prepare_filter API for attaching classic BPF to a socket stays the same: sk_attach_filter(prog, struct sock *)/sk_detach_filter(struct sock *) and SK_RUN_FILTER(struct sk_filter *, ctx) to execute a program which is used by sockets, tun, af_packet API for 'unattached' BPF programs becomes: bpf_prog_create(struct bpf_prog **)/bpf_prog_destroy(struct bpf_prog *) and BPF_PROG_RUN(struct bpf_prog *, ctx) to execute a program which is used by isdn, ppp, team, seccomp, ptp, xt_bpf, cls_bpf, test_bpf Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-31 11:34:16 +08:00
void bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = fp->aux;
net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images read-only With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way, hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to read-only pages. In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g. caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea is derived from commit 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks"). This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore. After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT image pointer). Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(), including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no performance penalty. Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea via Twitter during development of this patch. Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-03 04:53:44 +08:00
bpf: Support attaching tracing BPF program to other BPF programs Allow FENTRY/FEXIT BPF programs to attach to other BPF programs of any type including their subprograms. This feature allows snooping on input and output packets in XDP, TC programs including their return values. In order to do that the verifier needs to track types not only of vmlinux, but types of other BPF programs as well. The verifier also needs to translate uapi/linux/bpf.h types used by networking programs into kernel internal BTF types used by FENTRY/FEXIT BPF programs. In some cases LLVM optimizations can remove arguments from BPF subprograms without adjusting BTF info that LLVM backend knows. When BTF info disagrees with actual types that the verifiers sees the BPF trampoline has to fallback to conservative and treat all arguments as u64. The FENTRY/FEXIT program can still attach to such subprograms, but it won't be able to recognize pointer types like 'struct sk_buff *' and it won't be able to pass them to bpf_skb_output() for dumping packets to user space. The FENTRY/FEXIT program would need to use bpf_probe_read_kernel() instead. The BPF_PROG_LOAD command is extended with attach_prog_fd field. When it's set to zero the attach_btf_id is one vmlinux BTF type ids. When attach_prog_fd points to previously loaded BPF program the attach_btf_id is BTF type id of main function or one of its subprograms. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191114185720.1641606-18-ast@kernel.org
2019-11-15 02:57:17 +08:00
if (aux->linked_prog)
bpf_prog_put(aux->linked_prog);
INIT_WORK(&aux->work, bpf_prog_free_deferred);
schedule_work(&aux->work);
}
net: filter: split 'struct sk_filter' into socket and bpf parts clean up names related to socket filtering and bpf in the following way: - everything that deals with sockets keeps 'sk_*' prefix - everything that is pure BPF is changed to 'bpf_*' prefix split 'struct sk_filter' into struct sk_filter { atomic_t refcnt; struct rcu_head rcu; struct bpf_prog *prog; }; and struct bpf_prog { u32 jited:1, len:31; struct sock_fprog_kern *orig_prog; unsigned int (*bpf_func)(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct bpf_insn *filter); union { struct sock_filter insns[0]; struct bpf_insn insnsi[0]; struct work_struct work; }; }; so that 'struct bpf_prog' can be used independent of sockets and cleans up 'unattached' bpf use cases split SK_RUN_FILTER macro into: SK_RUN_FILTER to be used with 'struct sk_filter *' and BPF_PROG_RUN to be used with 'struct bpf_prog *' __sk_filter_release(struct sk_filter *) gains __bpf_prog_release(struct bpf_prog *) helper function also perform related renames for the functions that work with 'struct bpf_prog *', since they're on the same lines: sk_filter_size -> bpf_prog_size sk_filter_select_runtime -> bpf_prog_select_runtime sk_filter_free -> bpf_prog_free sk_unattached_filter_create -> bpf_prog_create sk_unattached_filter_destroy -> bpf_prog_destroy sk_store_orig_filter -> bpf_prog_store_orig_filter sk_release_orig_filter -> bpf_release_orig_filter __sk_migrate_filter -> bpf_migrate_filter __sk_prepare_filter -> bpf_prepare_filter API for attaching classic BPF to a socket stays the same: sk_attach_filter(prog, struct sock *)/sk_detach_filter(struct sock *) and SK_RUN_FILTER(struct sk_filter *, ctx) to execute a program which is used by sockets, tun, af_packet API for 'unattached' BPF programs becomes: bpf_prog_create(struct bpf_prog **)/bpf_prog_destroy(struct bpf_prog *) and BPF_PROG_RUN(struct bpf_prog *, ctx) to execute a program which is used by isdn, ppp, team, seccomp, ptp, xt_bpf, cls_bpf, test_bpf Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-31 11:34:16 +08:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_prog_free);
bpf: split state from prandom_u32() and consolidate {c, e}BPF prngs While recently arguing on a seccomp discussion that raw prandom_u32() access shouldn't be exposed to unpriviledged user space, I forgot the fact that SKF_AD_RANDOM extension actually already does it for some time in cBPF via commit 4cd3675ebf74 ("filter: added BPF random opcode"). Since prandom_u32() is being used in a lot of critical networking code, lets be more conservative and split their states. Furthermore, consolidate eBPF and cBPF prandom handlers to use the new internal PRNG. For eBPF, bpf_get_prandom_u32() was only accessible for priviledged users, but should that change one day, we also don't want to leak raw sequences through things like eBPF maps. One thought was also to have own per bpf_prog states, but due to ABI reasons this is not easily possible, i.e. the program code currently cannot access bpf_prog itself, and copying the rnd_state to/from the stack scratch space whenever a program uses the prng seems not really worth the trouble and seems too hacky. If needed, taus113 could in such cases be implemented within eBPF using a map entry to keep the state space, or get_random_bytes() could become a second helper in cases where performance would not be critical. Both sides can trigger a one-time late init via prandom_init_once() on the shared state. Performance-wise, there should even be a tiny gain as bpf_user_rnd_u32() saves one function call. The PRNG needs to live inside the BPF core since kernels could have a NET-less config as well. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Chema Gonzalez <chema@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 07:20:39 +08:00
/* RNG for unpriviledged user space with separated state from prandom_u32(). */
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, bpf_user_rnd_state);
void bpf_user_rnd_init_once(void)
{
prandom_init_once(&bpf_user_rnd_state);
}
bpf: add BPF_CALL_x macros for declaring helpers This work adds BPF_CALL_<n>() macros and converts all the eBPF helper functions to use them, in a similar fashion like we do with SYSCALL_DEFINE<n>() macros that are used today. Motivation for this is to hide all the register handling and all necessary casts from the user, so that it is done automatically in the background when adding a BPF_CALL_<n>() call. This makes current helpers easier to review, eases to write future helpers, avoids getting the casting mess wrong, and allows for extending all helpers at once (f.e. build time checks, etc). It also helps detecting more easily in code reviews that unused registers are not instrumented in the code by accident, breaking compatibility with existing programs. BPF_CALL_<n>() internals are quite similar to SYSCALL_DEFINE<n>() ones with some fundamental differences, for example, for generating the actual helper function that carries all u64 regs, we need to fill unused regs, so that we always end up with 5 u64 regs as an argument. I reviewed several 0-5 generated BPF_CALL_<n>() variants of the .i results and they look all as expected. No sparse issue spotted. We let this also sit for a few days with Fengguang's kbuild test robot, and there were no issues seen. On s390, it barked on the "uses dynamic stack allocation" notice, which is an old one from bpf_perf_event_output{,_tp}() reappearing here due to the conversion to the call wrapper, just telling that the perf raw record/frag sits on stack (gcc with s390's -mwarn-dynamicstack), but that's all. Did various runtime tests and they were fine as well. All eBPF helpers are now converted to use these macros, getting rid of a good chunk of all the raw castings. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-09 08:45:31 +08:00
BPF_CALL_0(bpf_user_rnd_u32)
bpf: split state from prandom_u32() and consolidate {c, e}BPF prngs While recently arguing on a seccomp discussion that raw prandom_u32() access shouldn't be exposed to unpriviledged user space, I forgot the fact that SKF_AD_RANDOM extension actually already does it for some time in cBPF via commit 4cd3675ebf74 ("filter: added BPF random opcode"). Since prandom_u32() is being used in a lot of critical networking code, lets be more conservative and split their states. Furthermore, consolidate eBPF and cBPF prandom handlers to use the new internal PRNG. For eBPF, bpf_get_prandom_u32() was only accessible for priviledged users, but should that change one day, we also don't want to leak raw sequences through things like eBPF maps. One thought was also to have own per bpf_prog states, but due to ABI reasons this is not easily possible, i.e. the program code currently cannot access bpf_prog itself, and copying the rnd_state to/from the stack scratch space whenever a program uses the prng seems not really worth the trouble and seems too hacky. If needed, taus113 could in such cases be implemented within eBPF using a map entry to keep the state space, or get_random_bytes() could become a second helper in cases where performance would not be critical. Both sides can trigger a one-time late init via prandom_init_once() on the shared state. Performance-wise, there should even be a tiny gain as bpf_user_rnd_u32() saves one function call. The PRNG needs to live inside the BPF core since kernels could have a NET-less config as well. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Chema Gonzalez <chema@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 07:20:39 +08:00
{
/* Should someone ever have the rather unwise idea to use some
* of the registers passed into this function, then note that
* this function is called from native eBPF and classic-to-eBPF
* transformations. Register assignments from both sides are
* different, f.e. classic always sets fn(ctx, A, X) here.
*/
struct rnd_state *state;
u32 res;
state = &get_cpu_var(bpf_user_rnd_state);
res = prandom_u32_state(state);
put_cpu_var(bpf_user_rnd_state);
bpf: split state from prandom_u32() and consolidate {c, e}BPF prngs While recently arguing on a seccomp discussion that raw prandom_u32() access shouldn't be exposed to unpriviledged user space, I forgot the fact that SKF_AD_RANDOM extension actually already does it for some time in cBPF via commit 4cd3675ebf74 ("filter: added BPF random opcode"). Since prandom_u32() is being used in a lot of critical networking code, lets be more conservative and split their states. Furthermore, consolidate eBPF and cBPF prandom handlers to use the new internal PRNG. For eBPF, bpf_get_prandom_u32() was only accessible for priviledged users, but should that change one day, we also don't want to leak raw sequences through things like eBPF maps. One thought was also to have own per bpf_prog states, but due to ABI reasons this is not easily possible, i.e. the program code currently cannot access bpf_prog itself, and copying the rnd_state to/from the stack scratch space whenever a program uses the prng seems not really worth the trouble and seems too hacky. If needed, taus113 could in such cases be implemented within eBPF using a map entry to keep the state space, or get_random_bytes() could become a second helper in cases where performance would not be critical. Both sides can trigger a one-time late init via prandom_init_once() on the shared state. Performance-wise, there should even be a tiny gain as bpf_user_rnd_u32() saves one function call. The PRNG needs to live inside the BPF core since kernels could have a NET-less config as well. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Chema Gonzalez <chema@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 07:20:39 +08:00
return res;
}
/* Weak definitions of helper functions in case we don't have bpf syscall. */
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_lookup_elem_proto __weak;
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_update_elem_proto __weak;
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_delete_elem_proto __weak;
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_push_elem_proto __weak;
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_pop_elem_proto __weak;
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_peek_elem_proto __weak;
bpf: introduce bpf_spin_lock Introduce 'struct bpf_spin_lock' and bpf_spin_lock/unlock() helpers to let bpf program serialize access to other variables. Example: struct hash_elem { int cnt; struct bpf_spin_lock lock; }; struct hash_elem * val = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&hash_map, &key); if (val) { bpf_spin_lock(&val->lock); val->cnt++; bpf_spin_unlock(&val->lock); } Restrictions and safety checks: - bpf_spin_lock is only allowed inside HASH and ARRAY maps. - BTF description of the map is mandatory for safety analysis. - bpf program can take one bpf_spin_lock at a time, since two or more can cause dead locks. - only one 'struct bpf_spin_lock' is allowed per map element. It drastically simplifies implementation yet allows bpf program to use any number of bpf_spin_locks. - when bpf_spin_lock is taken the calls (either bpf2bpf or helpers) are not allowed. - bpf program must bpf_spin_unlock() before return. - bpf program can access 'struct bpf_spin_lock' only via bpf_spin_lock()/bpf_spin_unlock() helpers. - load/store into 'struct bpf_spin_lock lock;' field is not allowed. - to use bpf_spin_lock() helper the BTF description of map value must be a struct and have 'struct bpf_spin_lock anyname;' field at the top level. Nested lock inside another struct is not allowed. - syscall map_lookup doesn't copy bpf_spin_lock field to user space. - syscall map_update and program map_update do not update bpf_spin_lock field. - bpf_spin_lock cannot be on the stack or inside networking packet. bpf_spin_lock can only be inside HASH or ARRAY map value. - bpf_spin_lock is available to root only and to all program types. - bpf_spin_lock is not allowed in inner maps of map-in-map. - ld_abs is not allowed inside spin_lock-ed region. - tracing progs and socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock due to insufficient preemption checks Implementation details: - cgroup-bpf class of programs can nest with xdp/tc programs. Hence bpf_spin_lock is equivalent to spin_lock_irqsave. Other solutions to avoid nested bpf_spin_lock are possible. Like making sure that all networking progs run with softirq disabled. spin_lock_irqsave is the simplest and doesn't add overhead to the programs that don't use it. - arch_spinlock_t is used when its implemented as queued_spin_lock - archs can force their own arch_spinlock_t - on architectures where queued_spin_lock is not available and sizeof(arch_spinlock_t) != sizeof(__u32) trivial lock is used. - presence of bpf_spin_lock inside map value could have been indicated via extra flag during map_create, but specifying it via BTF is cleaner. It provides introspection for map key/value and reduces user mistakes. Next steps: - allow bpf_spin_lock in other map types (like cgroup local storage) - introduce BPF_F_LOCK flag for bpf_map_update() syscall and helper to request kernel to grab bpf_spin_lock before rewriting the value. That will serialize access to map elements. Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-02-01 07:40:04 +08:00
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_spin_lock_proto __weak;
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_spin_unlock_proto __weak;
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_prandom_u32_proto __weak;
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_smp_processor_id_proto __weak;
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_numa_node_id_proto __weak;
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_ktime_get_ns_proto __weak;
bpf: add event output helper for notifications/sampling/logging This patch adds a new helper for cls/act programs that can push events to user space applications. For networking, this can be f.e. for sampling, debugging, logging purposes or pushing of arbitrary wake-up events. The idea is similar to a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") and 39111695b1b8 ("samples: bpf: add bpf_perf_event_output example"). The eBPF program utilizes a perf event array map that user space populates with fds from perf_event_open(), the eBPF program calls into the helper f.e. as skb_event_output(skb, &my_map, BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU, raw, sizeof(raw)) so that the raw data is pushed into the fd f.e. at the map index of the current CPU. User space can poll/mmap/etc on this and has a data channel for receiving events that can be post-processed. The nice thing is that since the eBPF program and user space application making use of it are tightly coupled, they can define their own arbitrary raw data format and what/when they want to push. While f.e. packet headers could be one part of the meta data that is being pushed, this is not a substitute for things like packet sockets as whole packet is not being pushed and push is only done in a single direction. Intention is more of a generically usable, efficient event pipe to applications. Workflow is that tc can pin the map and applications can attach themselves e.g. after cls/act setup to one or multiple map slots, demuxing is done by the eBPF program. Adding this facility is with minimal effort, it reuses the helper introduced in a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") and we get its functionality for free by overloading its BPF_FUNC_ identifier for cls/act programs, ctx is currently unused, but will be made use of in future. Example will be added to iproute2's BPF example files. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-19 03:01:24 +08:00
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_current_pid_tgid_proto __weak;
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_current_uid_gid_proto __weak;
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_current_comm_proto __weak;
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_current_cgroup_id_proto __weak;
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_local_storage_proto __weak;
bpf: add event output helper for notifications/sampling/logging This patch adds a new helper for cls/act programs that can push events to user space applications. For networking, this can be f.e. for sampling, debugging, logging purposes or pushing of arbitrary wake-up events. The idea is similar to a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") and 39111695b1b8 ("samples: bpf: add bpf_perf_event_output example"). The eBPF program utilizes a perf event array map that user space populates with fds from perf_event_open(), the eBPF program calls into the helper f.e. as skb_event_output(skb, &my_map, BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU, raw, sizeof(raw)) so that the raw data is pushed into the fd f.e. at the map index of the current CPU. User space can poll/mmap/etc on this and has a data channel for receiving events that can be post-processed. The nice thing is that since the eBPF program and user space application making use of it are tightly coupled, they can define their own arbitrary raw data format and what/when they want to push. While f.e. packet headers could be one part of the meta data that is being pushed, this is not a substitute for things like packet sockets as whole packet is not being pushed and push is only done in a single direction. Intention is more of a generically usable, efficient event pipe to applications. Workflow is that tc can pin the map and applications can attach themselves e.g. after cls/act setup to one or multiple map slots, demuxing is done by the eBPF program. Adding this facility is with minimal effort, it reuses the helper introduced in a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") and we get its functionality for free by overloading its BPF_FUNC_ identifier for cls/act programs, ctx is currently unused, but will be made use of in future. Example will be added to iproute2's BPF example files. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-19 03:01:24 +08:00
const struct bpf_func_proto * __weak bpf_get_trace_printk_proto(void)
{
return NULL;
}
bpf: avoid stack copy and use skb ctx for event output This work addresses a couple of issues bpf_skb_event_output() helper currently has: i) We need two copies instead of just a single one for the skb data when it should be part of a sample. The data can be non-linear and thus needs to be extracted via bpf_skb_load_bytes() helper first, and then copied once again into the ring buffer slot. ii) Since bpf_skb_load_bytes() currently needs to be used first, the helper needs to see a constant size on the passed stack buffer to make sure BPF verifier can do sanity checks on it during verification time. Thus, just passing skb->len (or any other non-constant value) wouldn't work, but changing bpf_skb_load_bytes() is also not the proper solution, since the two copies are generally still needed. iii) bpf_skb_load_bytes() is just for rather small buffers like headers, since they need to sit on the limited BPF stack anyway. Instead of working around in bpf_skb_load_bytes(), this work improves the bpf_skb_event_output() helper to address all 3 at once. We can make use of the passed in skb context that we have in the helper anyway, and use some of the reserved flag bits as a length argument. The helper will use the new __output_custom() facility from perf side with bpf_skb_copy() as callback helper to walk and extract the data. It will pass the data for setup to bpf_event_output(), which generates and pushes the raw record with an additional frag part. The linear data used in the first frag of the record serves as programmatically defined meta data passed along with the appended sample. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-15 00:08:05 +08:00
u64 __weak
bpf_event_output(struct bpf_map *map, u64 flags, void *meta, u64 meta_size,
void *ctx, u64 ctx_size, bpf_ctx_copy_t ctx_copy)
bpf: add event output helper for notifications/sampling/logging This patch adds a new helper for cls/act programs that can push events to user space applications. For networking, this can be f.e. for sampling, debugging, logging purposes or pushing of arbitrary wake-up events. The idea is similar to a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") and 39111695b1b8 ("samples: bpf: add bpf_perf_event_output example"). The eBPF program utilizes a perf event array map that user space populates with fds from perf_event_open(), the eBPF program calls into the helper f.e. as skb_event_output(skb, &my_map, BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU, raw, sizeof(raw)) so that the raw data is pushed into the fd f.e. at the map index of the current CPU. User space can poll/mmap/etc on this and has a data channel for receiving events that can be post-processed. The nice thing is that since the eBPF program and user space application making use of it are tightly coupled, they can define their own arbitrary raw data format and what/when they want to push. While f.e. packet headers could be one part of the meta data that is being pushed, this is not a substitute for things like packet sockets as whole packet is not being pushed and push is only done in a single direction. Intention is more of a generically usable, efficient event pipe to applications. Workflow is that tc can pin the map and applications can attach themselves e.g. after cls/act setup to one or multiple map slots, demuxing is done by the eBPF program. Adding this facility is with minimal effort, it reuses the helper introduced in a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") and we get its functionality for free by overloading its BPF_FUNC_ identifier for cls/act programs, ctx is currently unused, but will be made use of in future. Example will be added to iproute2's BPF example files. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-19 03:01:24 +08:00
{
bpf: avoid stack copy and use skb ctx for event output This work addresses a couple of issues bpf_skb_event_output() helper currently has: i) We need two copies instead of just a single one for the skb data when it should be part of a sample. The data can be non-linear and thus needs to be extracted via bpf_skb_load_bytes() helper first, and then copied once again into the ring buffer slot. ii) Since bpf_skb_load_bytes() currently needs to be used first, the helper needs to see a constant size on the passed stack buffer to make sure BPF verifier can do sanity checks on it during verification time. Thus, just passing skb->len (or any other non-constant value) wouldn't work, but changing bpf_skb_load_bytes() is also not the proper solution, since the two copies are generally still needed. iii) bpf_skb_load_bytes() is just for rather small buffers like headers, since they need to sit on the limited BPF stack anyway. Instead of working around in bpf_skb_load_bytes(), this work improves the bpf_skb_event_output() helper to address all 3 at once. We can make use of the passed in skb context that we have in the helper anyway, and use some of the reserved flag bits as a length argument. The helper will use the new __output_custom() facility from perf side with bpf_skb_copy() as callback helper to walk and extract the data. It will pass the data for setup to bpf_event_output(), which generates and pushes the raw record with an additional frag part. The linear data used in the first frag of the record serves as programmatically defined meta data passed along with the appended sample. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-15 00:08:05 +08:00
return -ENOTSUPP;
bpf: add event output helper for notifications/sampling/logging This patch adds a new helper for cls/act programs that can push events to user space applications. For networking, this can be f.e. for sampling, debugging, logging purposes or pushing of arbitrary wake-up events. The idea is similar to a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") and 39111695b1b8 ("samples: bpf: add bpf_perf_event_output example"). The eBPF program utilizes a perf event array map that user space populates with fds from perf_event_open(), the eBPF program calls into the helper f.e. as skb_event_output(skb, &my_map, BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU, raw, sizeof(raw)) so that the raw data is pushed into the fd f.e. at the map index of the current CPU. User space can poll/mmap/etc on this and has a data channel for receiving events that can be post-processed. The nice thing is that since the eBPF program and user space application making use of it are tightly coupled, they can define their own arbitrary raw data format and what/when they want to push. While f.e. packet headers could be one part of the meta data that is being pushed, this is not a substitute for things like packet sockets as whole packet is not being pushed and push is only done in a single direction. Intention is more of a generically usable, efficient event pipe to applications. Workflow is that tc can pin the map and applications can attach themselves e.g. after cls/act setup to one or multiple map slots, demuxing is done by the eBPF program. Adding this facility is with minimal effort, it reuses the helper introduced in a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") and we get its functionality for free by overloading its BPF_FUNC_ identifier for cls/act programs, ctx is currently unused, but will be made use of in future. Example will be added to iproute2's BPF example files. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-19 03:01:24 +08:00
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_event_output);
bpf: add event output helper for notifications/sampling/logging This patch adds a new helper for cls/act programs that can push events to user space applications. For networking, this can be f.e. for sampling, debugging, logging purposes or pushing of arbitrary wake-up events. The idea is similar to a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") and 39111695b1b8 ("samples: bpf: add bpf_perf_event_output example"). The eBPF program utilizes a perf event array map that user space populates with fds from perf_event_open(), the eBPF program calls into the helper f.e. as skb_event_output(skb, &my_map, BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU, raw, sizeof(raw)) so that the raw data is pushed into the fd f.e. at the map index of the current CPU. User space can poll/mmap/etc on this and has a data channel for receiving events that can be post-processed. The nice thing is that since the eBPF program and user space application making use of it are tightly coupled, they can define their own arbitrary raw data format and what/when they want to push. While f.e. packet headers could be one part of the meta data that is being pushed, this is not a substitute for things like packet sockets as whole packet is not being pushed and push is only done in a single direction. Intention is more of a generically usable, efficient event pipe to applications. Workflow is that tc can pin the map and applications can attach themselves e.g. after cls/act setup to one or multiple map slots, demuxing is done by the eBPF program. Adding this facility is with minimal effort, it reuses the helper introduced in a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") and we get its functionality for free by overloading its BPF_FUNC_ identifier for cls/act programs, ctx is currently unused, but will be made use of in future. Example will be added to iproute2's BPF example files. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-19 03:01:24 +08:00
/* Always built-in helper functions. */
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_tail_call_proto = {
.func = NULL,
.gpl_only = false,
.ret_type = RET_VOID,
.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
.arg2_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR,
.arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
};
/* Stub for JITs that only support cBPF. eBPF programs are interpreted.
* It is encouraged to implement bpf_int_jit_compile() instead, so that
* eBPF and implicitly also cBPF can get JITed!
*/
struct bpf_prog * __weak bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
return prog;
}
/* Stub for JITs that support eBPF. All cBPF code gets transformed into
* eBPF by the kernel and is later compiled by bpf_int_jit_compile().
*/
void __weak bpf_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
}
bool __weak bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(void *func)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
{
return false;
}
bpf: verifier: insert zero extension according to analysis result After previous patches, verifier will mark a insn if it really needs zero extension on dst_reg. It is then for back-ends to decide how to use such information to eliminate unnecessary zero extension code-gen during JIT compilation. One approach is verifier insert explicit zero extension for those insns that need zero extension in a generic way, JIT back-ends then do not generate zero extension for sub-register write at default. However, only those back-ends which do not have hardware zero extension want this optimization. Back-ends like x86_64 and AArch64 have hardware zero extension support that the insertion should be disabled. This patch introduces new target hook "bpf_jit_needs_zext" which returns false at default, meaning verifier zero extension insertion is disabled at default. A back-end could override this hook to return true if it doesn't have hardware support and want verifier insert zero extension explicitly. Offload targets do not use this native target hook, instead, they could get the optimization results using bpf_prog_offload_ops.finalize. NOTE: arches could have diversified features, it is possible for one arch to have hardware zero extension support for some sub-register write insns but not for all. For example, PowerPC, SPARC have zero extended loads, but not for alu32. So when verifier zero extension insertion enabled, these JIT back-ends need to peephole insns to remove those zero extension inserted for insn that actually has hardware zero extension support. The peephole could be as simple as looking the next insn, if it is a special zero extension insn then it is safe to eliminate it if the current insn has hardware zero extension support. Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-05-25 06:25:15 +08:00
/* Return TRUE if the JIT backend wants verifier to enable sub-register usage
* analysis code and wants explicit zero extension inserted by verifier.
* Otherwise, return FALSE.
*/
bool __weak bpf_jit_needs_zext(void)
{
return false;
}
/* To execute LD_ABS/LD_IND instructions __bpf_prog_run() may call
* skb_copy_bits(), so provide a weak definition of it for NET-less config.
*/
int __weak skb_copy_bits(const struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, void *to,
int len)
{
return -EFAULT;
}
bpf: add initial bpf tracepoints This work adds a number of tracepoints to paths that are either considered slow-path or exception-like states, where monitoring or inspecting them would be desirable. For bpf(2) syscall, tracepoints have been placed for main commands when they succeed. In XDP case, tracepoint is for exceptions, that is, f.e. on abnormal BPF program exit such as unknown or XDP_ABORTED return code, or when error occurs during XDP_TX action and the packet could not be forwarded. Both have been split into separate event headers, and can be further extended. Worst case, if they unexpectedly should get into our way in future, they can also removed [1]. Of course, these tracepoints (like any other) can be analyzed by eBPF itself, etc. Example output: # ./perf record -a -e bpf:* sleep 10 # ./perf script sock_example 6197 [005] 283.980322: bpf:bpf_map_create: map type=ARRAY ufd=4 key=4 val=8 max=256 flags=0 sock_example 6197 [005] 283.980721: bpf:bpf_prog_load: prog=a5ea8fa30ea6849c type=SOCKET_FILTER ufd=5 sock_example 6197 [005] 283.988423: bpf:bpf_prog_get_type: prog=a5ea8fa30ea6849c type=SOCKET_FILTER sock_example 6197 [005] 283.988443: bpf:bpf_map_lookup_elem: map type=ARRAY ufd=4 key=[06 00 00 00] val=[00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00] [...] sock_example 6197 [005] 288.990868: bpf:bpf_map_lookup_elem: map type=ARRAY ufd=4 key=[01 00 00 00] val=[14 00 00 00 00 00 00 00] swapper 0 [005] 289.338243: bpf:bpf_prog_put_rcu: prog=a5ea8fa30ea6849c type=SOCKET_FILTER [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/705270/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-25 09:28:18 +08:00
int __weak bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bpf_text_poke_type t,
void *addr1, void *addr2)
{
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(bpf_stats_enabled_key);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bpf_stats_enabled_key);
bpf: add initial bpf tracepoints This work adds a number of tracepoints to paths that are either considered slow-path or exception-like states, where monitoring or inspecting them would be desirable. For bpf(2) syscall, tracepoints have been placed for main commands when they succeed. In XDP case, tracepoint is for exceptions, that is, f.e. on abnormal BPF program exit such as unknown or XDP_ABORTED return code, or when error occurs during XDP_TX action and the packet could not be forwarded. Both have been split into separate event headers, and can be further extended. Worst case, if they unexpectedly should get into our way in future, they can also removed [1]. Of course, these tracepoints (like any other) can be analyzed by eBPF itself, etc. Example output: # ./perf record -a -e bpf:* sleep 10 # ./perf script sock_example 6197 [005] 283.980322: bpf:bpf_map_create: map type=ARRAY ufd=4 key=4 val=8 max=256 flags=0 sock_example 6197 [005] 283.980721: bpf:bpf_prog_load: prog=a5ea8fa30ea6849c type=SOCKET_FILTER ufd=5 sock_example 6197 [005] 283.988423: bpf:bpf_prog_get_type: prog=a5ea8fa30ea6849c type=SOCKET_FILTER sock_example 6197 [005] 283.988443: bpf:bpf_map_lookup_elem: map type=ARRAY ufd=4 key=[06 00 00 00] val=[00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00] [...] sock_example 6197 [005] 288.990868: bpf:bpf_map_lookup_elem: map type=ARRAY ufd=4 key=[01 00 00 00] val=[14 00 00 00 00 00 00 00] swapper 0 [005] 289.338243: bpf:bpf_prog_put_rcu: prog=a5ea8fa30ea6849c type=SOCKET_FILTER [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/705270/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-25 09:28:18 +08:00
/* All definitions of tracepoints related to BPF. */
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include <linux/bpf_trace.h>
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(xdp_exception);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(xdp_bulk_tx);