linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c

1556 lines
36 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*
* Copyright (c) 2004 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
* Copyright (c) 2012 Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Andy Adamson <andros@citi.umich.edu>
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its
* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
* BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
* NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
* SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
#include <linux/file.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/rpc_pipe_fs.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
#include <linux/nfsd/cld.h>
#include "nfsd.h"
#include "state.h"
#include "vfs.h"
#include "netns.h"
#define NFSDDBG_FACILITY NFSDDBG_PROC
/* Declarations */
struct nfsd4_client_tracking_ops {
int (*init)(struct net *);
void (*exit)(struct net *);
void (*create)(struct nfs4_client *);
void (*remove)(struct nfs4_client *);
int (*check)(struct nfs4_client *);
void (*grace_done)(struct nfsd_net *);
};
/* Globals */
static char user_recovery_dirname[PATH_MAX] = "/var/lib/nfs/v4recovery";
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
static int
nfs4_save_creds(const struct cred **original_creds)
{
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
struct cred *new;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
new->fsuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
new->fsgid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
*original_creds = override_creds(new);
put_cred(new);
return 0;
}
static void
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
nfs4_reset_creds(const struct cred *original)
{
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
revert_creds(original);
}
static void
md5_to_hex(char *out, char *md5)
{
int i;
for (i=0; i<16; i++) {
unsigned char c = md5[i];
*out++ = '0' + ((c&0xf0)>>4) + (c>=0xa0)*('a'-'9'-1);
*out++ = '0' + (c&0x0f) + ((c&0x0f)>=0x0a)*('a'-'9'-1);
}
*out = '\0';
}
static int
nfs4_make_rec_clidname(char *dname, const struct xdr_netobj *clname)
{
struct xdr_netobj cksum;
struct hash_desc desc;
struct scatterlist sg;
int status;
dprintk("NFSD: nfs4_make_rec_clidname for %.*s\n",
clname->len, clname->data);
desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_hash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) {
status = PTR_ERR(desc.tfm);
goto out_no_tfm;
}
cksum.len = crypto_hash_digestsize(desc.tfm);
cksum.data = kmalloc(cksum.len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (cksum.data == NULL) {
status = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
sg_init_one(&sg, clname->data, clname->len);
status = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, &sg, sg.length, cksum.data);
if (status)
goto out;
md5_to_hex(dname, cksum.data);
status = 0;
out:
kfree(cksum.data);
crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
out_no_tfm:
return status;
}
/*
* If we had an error generating the recdir name for the legacy tracker
* then warn the admin. If the error doesn't appear to be transient,
* then disable recovery tracking.
*/
static void
nfsd: fix oops when legacy_recdir_name_error is passed a -ENOENT error Toralf reported the following oops to the linux-nfs mailing list: -----------------[snip]------------------ NFSD: unable to generate recoverydir name (-2). NFSD: disabling legacy clientid tracking. Reboot recovery will not function correctly! BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000003c8 IP: [<f90a3d91>] nfsd4_client_tracking_exit+0x11/0x50 [nfsd] *pdpt = 000000002ba33001 *pde = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop nfsd auth_rpcgss ipt_MASQUERADE xt_owner xt_multiport ipt_REJECT xt_tcpudp xt_recent xt_conntrack nf_conntrack_ftp xt_limit xt_LOG iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables af_packet pppoe pppox ppp_generic slhc bridge stp llc tun arc4 iwldvm mac80211 coretemp kvm_intel uvcvideo sdhci_pci sdhci mmc_core videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops usblp videobuf2_core i915 iwlwifi psmouse videodev cfg80211 kvm fbcon bitblit cfbfillrect acpi_cpufreq mperf evdev softcursor font cfbimgblt i2c_algo_bit cfbcopyarea intel_agp intel_gtt drm_kms_helper snd_hda_codec_conexant drm agpgart fb fbdev tpm_tis thinkpad_acpi tpm nvram e1000e rfkill thermal ptp wmi pps_core tpm_bios 8250_pci processor 8250 ac snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_pcm battery video i2c_i801 snd_page_alloc snd_timer button serial_core i2c_core snd soundcore thermal_sys hwmon aesni_intel ablk_helper cryp td lrw aes_i586 xts gf128mul cbc fuse nfs lockd sunrpc dm_crypt dm_mod hid_monterey hid_microsoft hid_logitech hid_ezkey hid_cypress hid_chicony hid_cherry hid_belkin hid_apple hid_a4tech hid_generic usbhid hid sr_mod cdrom sg [last unloaded: microcode] Pid: 6374, comm: nfsd Not tainted 3.9.1 #6 LENOVO 4180F65/4180F65 EIP: 0060:[<f90a3d91>] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 0 EIP is at nfsd4_client_tracking_exit+0x11/0x50 [nfsd] EAX: 00000000 EBX: fffffffe ECX: 00000007 EDX: 00000007 ESI: eb9dcb00 EDI: eb2991c0 EBP: eb2bde38 ESP: eb2bde34 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 CR0: 80050033 CR2: 000003c8 CR3: 2ba80000 CR4: 000407f0 DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 Process nfsd (pid: 6374, ti=eb2bc000 task=eb2711c0 task.ti=eb2bc000) Stack: fffffffe eb2bde4c f90a3e0c f90a7754 fffffffe eb0a9c00 eb2bdea0 f90a41ed eb2991c0 1b270000 eb2991c0 eb2bde7c f9099ce9 eb2bde98 0129a020 eb29a020 eb2bdecc eb2991c0 eb2bdea8 f9099da5 00000000 eb9dcb00 00000001 67822f08 Call Trace: [<f90a3e0c>] legacy_recdir_name_error+0x3c/0x40 [nfsd] [<f90a41ed>] nfsd4_create_clid_dir+0x15d/0x1c0 [nfsd] [<f9099ce9>] ? nfsd4_lookup_stateid+0x99/0xd0 [nfsd] [<f9099da5>] ? nfs4_preprocess_seqid_op+0x85/0x100 [nfsd] [<f90a4287>] nfsd4_client_record_create+0x37/0x50 [nfsd] [<f909d6ce>] nfsd4_open_confirm+0xfe/0x130 [nfsd] [<f90980b1>] ? nfsd4_encode_operation+0x61/0x90 [nfsd] [<f909d5d0>] ? nfsd4_free_stateid+0xc0/0xc0 [nfsd] [<f908fd0b>] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x41b/0x530 [nfsd] [<f9081b7b>] nfsd_dispatch+0x8b/0x1a0 [nfsd] [<f857b85d>] svc_process+0x3dd/0x640 [sunrpc] [<f908165d>] nfsd+0xad/0x110 [nfsd] [<f90815b0>] ? nfsd_destroy+0x70/0x70 [nfsd] [<c1054824>] kthread+0x94/0xa0 [<c1486937>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x1b/0x28 [<c1054790>] ? flush_kthread_work+0xd0/0xd0 Code: 86 b0 00 00 00 90 c5 0a f9 c7 04 24 70 76 0a f9 e8 74 a9 3d c8 eb ba 8d 76 00 55 89 e5 53 66 66 66 66 90 8b 15 68 c7 0a f9 85 d2 <8b> 88 c8 03 00 00 74 2c 3b 11 77 28 8b 5c 91 08 85 db 74 22 8b EIP: [<f90a3d91>] nfsd4_client_tracking_exit+0x11/0x50 [nfsd] SS:ESP 0068:eb2bde34 CR2: 00000000000003c8 ---[ end trace 09e54015d145c9c6 ]--- The problem appears to be a regression that was introduced in commit 9a9c6478 "nfsd: make NFSv4 recovery client tracking options per net". Prior to that commit, it was safe to pass a NULL net pointer to nfsd4_client_tracking_exit in the legacy recdir case, and legacy_recdir_name_error did so. After that comit, the net pointer must be valid. This patch just fixes legacy_recdir_name_error to pass in a valid net pointer to that function. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+ Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com> Reported-and-tested-by: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
2013-05-09 20:36:23 +08:00
legacy_recdir_name_error(struct nfs4_client *clp, int error)
{
printk(KERN_ERR "NFSD: unable to generate recoverydir "
"name (%d).\n", error);
/*
* if the algorithm just doesn't exist, then disable the recovery
* tracker altogether. The crypto libs will generally return this if
* FIPS is enabled as well.
*/
if (error == -ENOENT) {
printk(KERN_ERR "NFSD: disabling legacy clientid tracking. "
"Reboot recovery will not function correctly!\n");
nfsd: fix oops when legacy_recdir_name_error is passed a -ENOENT error Toralf reported the following oops to the linux-nfs mailing list: -----------------[snip]------------------ NFSD: unable to generate recoverydir name (-2). NFSD: disabling legacy clientid tracking. Reboot recovery will not function correctly! BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000003c8 IP: [<f90a3d91>] nfsd4_client_tracking_exit+0x11/0x50 [nfsd] *pdpt = 000000002ba33001 *pde = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop nfsd auth_rpcgss ipt_MASQUERADE xt_owner xt_multiport ipt_REJECT xt_tcpudp xt_recent xt_conntrack nf_conntrack_ftp xt_limit xt_LOG iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables af_packet pppoe pppox ppp_generic slhc bridge stp llc tun arc4 iwldvm mac80211 coretemp kvm_intel uvcvideo sdhci_pci sdhci mmc_core videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops usblp videobuf2_core i915 iwlwifi psmouse videodev cfg80211 kvm fbcon bitblit cfbfillrect acpi_cpufreq mperf evdev softcursor font cfbimgblt i2c_algo_bit cfbcopyarea intel_agp intel_gtt drm_kms_helper snd_hda_codec_conexant drm agpgart fb fbdev tpm_tis thinkpad_acpi tpm nvram e1000e rfkill thermal ptp wmi pps_core tpm_bios 8250_pci processor 8250 ac snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_pcm battery video i2c_i801 snd_page_alloc snd_timer button serial_core i2c_core snd soundcore thermal_sys hwmon aesni_intel ablk_helper cryp td lrw aes_i586 xts gf128mul cbc fuse nfs lockd sunrpc dm_crypt dm_mod hid_monterey hid_microsoft hid_logitech hid_ezkey hid_cypress hid_chicony hid_cherry hid_belkin hid_apple hid_a4tech hid_generic usbhid hid sr_mod cdrom sg [last unloaded: microcode] Pid: 6374, comm: nfsd Not tainted 3.9.1 #6 LENOVO 4180F65/4180F65 EIP: 0060:[<f90a3d91>] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 0 EIP is at nfsd4_client_tracking_exit+0x11/0x50 [nfsd] EAX: 00000000 EBX: fffffffe ECX: 00000007 EDX: 00000007 ESI: eb9dcb00 EDI: eb2991c0 EBP: eb2bde38 ESP: eb2bde34 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 CR0: 80050033 CR2: 000003c8 CR3: 2ba80000 CR4: 000407f0 DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 Process nfsd (pid: 6374, ti=eb2bc000 task=eb2711c0 task.ti=eb2bc000) Stack: fffffffe eb2bde4c f90a3e0c f90a7754 fffffffe eb0a9c00 eb2bdea0 f90a41ed eb2991c0 1b270000 eb2991c0 eb2bde7c f9099ce9 eb2bde98 0129a020 eb29a020 eb2bdecc eb2991c0 eb2bdea8 f9099da5 00000000 eb9dcb00 00000001 67822f08 Call Trace: [<f90a3e0c>] legacy_recdir_name_error+0x3c/0x40 [nfsd] [<f90a41ed>] nfsd4_create_clid_dir+0x15d/0x1c0 [nfsd] [<f9099ce9>] ? nfsd4_lookup_stateid+0x99/0xd0 [nfsd] [<f9099da5>] ? nfs4_preprocess_seqid_op+0x85/0x100 [nfsd] [<f90a4287>] nfsd4_client_record_create+0x37/0x50 [nfsd] [<f909d6ce>] nfsd4_open_confirm+0xfe/0x130 [nfsd] [<f90980b1>] ? nfsd4_encode_operation+0x61/0x90 [nfsd] [<f909d5d0>] ? nfsd4_free_stateid+0xc0/0xc0 [nfsd] [<f908fd0b>] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x41b/0x530 [nfsd] [<f9081b7b>] nfsd_dispatch+0x8b/0x1a0 [nfsd] [<f857b85d>] svc_process+0x3dd/0x640 [sunrpc] [<f908165d>] nfsd+0xad/0x110 [nfsd] [<f90815b0>] ? nfsd_destroy+0x70/0x70 [nfsd] [<c1054824>] kthread+0x94/0xa0 [<c1486937>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x1b/0x28 [<c1054790>] ? flush_kthread_work+0xd0/0xd0 Code: 86 b0 00 00 00 90 c5 0a f9 c7 04 24 70 76 0a f9 e8 74 a9 3d c8 eb ba 8d 76 00 55 89 e5 53 66 66 66 66 90 8b 15 68 c7 0a f9 85 d2 <8b> 88 c8 03 00 00 74 2c 3b 11 77 28 8b 5c 91 08 85 db 74 22 8b EIP: [<f90a3d91>] nfsd4_client_tracking_exit+0x11/0x50 [nfsd] SS:ESP 0068:eb2bde34 CR2: 00000000000003c8 ---[ end trace 09e54015d145c9c6 ]--- The problem appears to be a regression that was introduced in commit 9a9c6478 "nfsd: make NFSv4 recovery client tracking options per net". Prior to that commit, it was safe to pass a NULL net pointer to nfsd4_client_tracking_exit in the legacy recdir case, and legacy_recdir_name_error did so. After that comit, the net pointer must be valid. This patch just fixes legacy_recdir_name_error to pass in a valid net pointer to that function. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+ Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com> Reported-and-tested-by: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
2013-05-09 20:36:23 +08:00
nfsd4_client_tracking_exit(clp->net);
}
}
static void
nfsd4_create_clid_dir(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
const struct cred *original_cred;
char dname[HEXDIR_LEN];
struct dentry *dir, *dentry;
struct nfs4_client_reclaim *crp;
int status;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(clp->net, nfsd_net_id);
if (test_and_set_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags))
return;
if (!nn->rec_file)
return;
status = nfs4_make_rec_clidname(dname, &clp->cl_name);
if (status)
nfsd: fix oops when legacy_recdir_name_error is passed a -ENOENT error Toralf reported the following oops to the linux-nfs mailing list: -----------------[snip]------------------ NFSD: unable to generate recoverydir name (-2). NFSD: disabling legacy clientid tracking. Reboot recovery will not function correctly! BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000003c8 IP: [<f90a3d91>] nfsd4_client_tracking_exit+0x11/0x50 [nfsd] *pdpt = 000000002ba33001 *pde = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop nfsd auth_rpcgss ipt_MASQUERADE xt_owner xt_multiport ipt_REJECT xt_tcpudp xt_recent xt_conntrack nf_conntrack_ftp xt_limit xt_LOG iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables af_packet pppoe pppox ppp_generic slhc bridge stp llc tun arc4 iwldvm mac80211 coretemp kvm_intel uvcvideo sdhci_pci sdhci mmc_core videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops usblp videobuf2_core i915 iwlwifi psmouse videodev cfg80211 kvm fbcon bitblit cfbfillrect acpi_cpufreq mperf evdev softcursor font cfbimgblt i2c_algo_bit cfbcopyarea intel_agp intel_gtt drm_kms_helper snd_hda_codec_conexant drm agpgart fb fbdev tpm_tis thinkpad_acpi tpm nvram e1000e rfkill thermal ptp wmi pps_core tpm_bios 8250_pci processor 8250 ac snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_pcm battery video i2c_i801 snd_page_alloc snd_timer button serial_core i2c_core snd soundcore thermal_sys hwmon aesni_intel ablk_helper cryp td lrw aes_i586 xts gf128mul cbc fuse nfs lockd sunrpc dm_crypt dm_mod hid_monterey hid_microsoft hid_logitech hid_ezkey hid_cypress hid_chicony hid_cherry hid_belkin hid_apple hid_a4tech hid_generic usbhid hid sr_mod cdrom sg [last unloaded: microcode] Pid: 6374, comm: nfsd Not tainted 3.9.1 #6 LENOVO 4180F65/4180F65 EIP: 0060:[<f90a3d91>] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 0 EIP is at nfsd4_client_tracking_exit+0x11/0x50 [nfsd] EAX: 00000000 EBX: fffffffe ECX: 00000007 EDX: 00000007 ESI: eb9dcb00 EDI: eb2991c0 EBP: eb2bde38 ESP: eb2bde34 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 CR0: 80050033 CR2: 000003c8 CR3: 2ba80000 CR4: 000407f0 DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 Process nfsd (pid: 6374, ti=eb2bc000 task=eb2711c0 task.ti=eb2bc000) Stack: fffffffe eb2bde4c f90a3e0c f90a7754 fffffffe eb0a9c00 eb2bdea0 f90a41ed eb2991c0 1b270000 eb2991c0 eb2bde7c f9099ce9 eb2bde98 0129a020 eb29a020 eb2bdecc eb2991c0 eb2bdea8 f9099da5 00000000 eb9dcb00 00000001 67822f08 Call Trace: [<f90a3e0c>] legacy_recdir_name_error+0x3c/0x40 [nfsd] [<f90a41ed>] nfsd4_create_clid_dir+0x15d/0x1c0 [nfsd] [<f9099ce9>] ? nfsd4_lookup_stateid+0x99/0xd0 [nfsd] [<f9099da5>] ? nfs4_preprocess_seqid_op+0x85/0x100 [nfsd] [<f90a4287>] nfsd4_client_record_create+0x37/0x50 [nfsd] [<f909d6ce>] nfsd4_open_confirm+0xfe/0x130 [nfsd] [<f90980b1>] ? nfsd4_encode_operation+0x61/0x90 [nfsd] [<f909d5d0>] ? nfsd4_free_stateid+0xc0/0xc0 [nfsd] [<f908fd0b>] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x41b/0x530 [nfsd] [<f9081b7b>] nfsd_dispatch+0x8b/0x1a0 [nfsd] [<f857b85d>] svc_process+0x3dd/0x640 [sunrpc] [<f908165d>] nfsd+0xad/0x110 [nfsd] [<f90815b0>] ? nfsd_destroy+0x70/0x70 [nfsd] [<c1054824>] kthread+0x94/0xa0 [<c1486937>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x1b/0x28 [<c1054790>] ? flush_kthread_work+0xd0/0xd0 Code: 86 b0 00 00 00 90 c5 0a f9 c7 04 24 70 76 0a f9 e8 74 a9 3d c8 eb ba 8d 76 00 55 89 e5 53 66 66 66 66 90 8b 15 68 c7 0a f9 85 d2 <8b> 88 c8 03 00 00 74 2c 3b 11 77 28 8b 5c 91 08 85 db 74 22 8b EIP: [<f90a3d91>] nfsd4_client_tracking_exit+0x11/0x50 [nfsd] SS:ESP 0068:eb2bde34 CR2: 00000000000003c8 ---[ end trace 09e54015d145c9c6 ]--- The problem appears to be a regression that was introduced in commit 9a9c6478 "nfsd: make NFSv4 recovery client tracking options per net". Prior to that commit, it was safe to pass a NULL net pointer to nfsd4_client_tracking_exit in the legacy recdir case, and legacy_recdir_name_error did so. After that comit, the net pointer must be valid. This patch just fixes legacy_recdir_name_error to pass in a valid net pointer to that function. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+ Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com> Reported-and-tested-by: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
2013-05-09 20:36:23 +08:00
return legacy_recdir_name_error(clp, status);
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
status = nfs4_save_creds(&original_cred);
if (status < 0)
return;
status = mnt_want_write_file(nn->rec_file);
if (status)
goto out_creds;
dir = nn->rec_file->f_path.dentry;
/* lock the parent */
inode_lock(d_inode(dir));
dentry = lookup_one_len(dname, dir, HEXDIR_LEN-1);
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
status = PTR_ERR(dentry);
goto out_unlock;
}
if (d_really_is_positive(dentry))
/*
* In the 4.1 case, where we're called from
* reclaim_complete(), records from the previous reboot
* may still be left, so this is OK.
*
* In the 4.0 case, we should never get here; but we may
* as well be forgiving and just succeed silently.
*/
goto out_put;
status = vfs_mkdir(d_inode(dir), dentry, S_IRWXU);
out_put:
dput(dentry);
out_unlock:
inode_unlock(d_inode(dir));
if (status == 0) {
if (nn->in_grace) {
crp = nfs4_client_to_reclaim(dname, nn);
if (crp)
crp->cr_clp = clp;
}
vfs_fsync(nn->rec_file, 0);
} else {
printk(KERN_ERR "NFSD: failed to write recovery record"
" (err %d); please check that %s exists"
" and is writeable", status,
user_recovery_dirname);
}
mnt_drop_write_file(nn->rec_file);
out_creds:
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
nfs4_reset_creds(original_cred);
}
typedef int (recdir_func)(struct dentry *, struct dentry *, struct nfsd_net *);
struct name_list {
char name[HEXDIR_LEN];
struct list_head list;
};
struct nfs4_dir_ctx {
struct dir_context ctx;
struct list_head names;
};
static int
nfsd4_build_namelist(struct dir_context *__ctx, const char *name, int namlen,
[PATCH] VFS: Make filldir_t and struct kstat deal in 64-bit inode numbers These patches make the kernel pass 64-bit inode numbers internally when communicating to userspace, even on a 32-bit system. They are required because some filesystems have intrinsic 64-bit inode numbers: NFS3+ and XFS for example. The 64-bit inode numbers are then propagated to userspace automatically where the arch supports it. Problems have been seen with userspace (eg: ld.so) using the 64-bit inode number returned by stat64() or getdents64() to differentiate files, and failing because the 64-bit inode number space was compressed to 32-bits, and so overlaps occur. This patch: Make filldir_t take a 64-bit inode number and struct kstat carry a 64-bit inode number so that 64-bit inode numbers can be passed back to userspace. The stat functions then returns the full 64-bit inode number where available and where possible. If it is not possible to represent the inode number supplied by the filesystem in the field provided by userspace, then error EOVERFLOW will be issued. Similarly, the getdents/readdir functions now pass the full 64-bit inode number to userspace where possible, returning EOVERFLOW instead when a directory entry is encountered that can't be properly represented. Note that this means that some inodes will not be stat'able on a 32-bit system with old libraries where they were before - but it does mean that there will be no ambiguity over what a 32-bit inode number refers to. Note similarly that directory scans may be cut short with an error on a 32-bit system with old libraries where the scan would work before for the same reasons. It is judged unlikely that this situation will occur because modern glibc uses 64-bit capable versions of stat and getdents class functions exclusively, and that older systems are unlikely to encounter unrepresentable inode numbers anyway. [akpm: alpha build fix] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-03 16:13:46 +08:00
loff_t offset, u64 ino, unsigned int d_type)
{
struct nfs4_dir_ctx *ctx =
container_of(__ctx, struct nfs4_dir_ctx, ctx);
struct name_list *entry;
if (namlen != HEXDIR_LEN - 1)
return 0;
entry = kmalloc(sizeof(struct name_list), GFP_KERNEL);
if (entry == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(entry->name, name, HEXDIR_LEN - 1);
entry->name[HEXDIR_LEN - 1] = '\0';
list_add(&entry->list, &ctx->names);
return 0;
}
static int
nfsd4_list_rec_dir(recdir_func *f, struct nfsd_net *nn)
{
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
const struct cred *original_cred;
struct dentry *dir = nn->rec_file->f_path.dentry;
struct nfs4_dir_ctx ctx = {
.ctx.actor = nfsd4_build_namelist,
.names = LIST_HEAD_INIT(ctx.names)
};
struct name_list *entry, *tmp;
int status;
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
status = nfs4_save_creds(&original_cred);
if (status < 0)
return status;
status = vfs_llseek(nn->rec_file, 0, SEEK_SET);
if (status < 0) {
nfs4_reset_creds(original_cred);
return status;
}
status = iterate_dir(nn->rec_file, &ctx.ctx);
inode_lock_nested(d_inode(dir), I_MUTEX_PARENT);
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ctx.names, list) {
if (!status) {
struct dentry *dentry;
dentry = lookup_one_len(entry->name, dir, HEXDIR_LEN-1);
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
status = PTR_ERR(dentry);
break;
}
status = f(dir, dentry, nn);
dput(dentry);
}
list_del(&entry->list);
kfree(entry);
}
inode_unlock(d_inode(dir));
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
nfs4_reset_creds(original_cred);
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ctx.names, list) {
dprintk("NFSD: %s. Left entry %s\n", __func__, entry->name);
list_del(&entry->list);
kfree(entry);
}
return status;
}
static int
nfsd4_unlink_clid_dir(char *name, int namlen, struct nfsd_net *nn)
{
struct dentry *dir, *dentry;
int status;
dprintk("NFSD: nfsd4_unlink_clid_dir. name %.*s\n", namlen, name);
dir = nn->rec_file->f_path.dentry;
inode_lock_nested(d_inode(dir), I_MUTEX_PARENT);
dentry = lookup_one_len(name, dir, namlen);
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
status = PTR_ERR(dentry);
Fix i_mutex vs. readdir handling in nfsd Commit 14f7dd63 ("Copy XFS readdir hack into nfsd code") introduced a bug to generic code which had been extant for a long time in the XFS version -- it started to call through into lookup_one_len() and hence into the file systems' ->lookup() methods without i_mutex held on the directory. This patch fixes it by locking the directory's i_mutex again before calling the filldir functions. The original deadlocks which commit 14f7dd63 was designed to avoid are still avoided, because they were due to fs-internal locking, not i_mutex. While we're at it, fix the return type of nfsd_buffered_readdir() which should be a __be32 not an int -- it's an NFS errno, not a Linux errno. And return nfserrno(-ENOMEM) when allocation fails, not just -ENOMEM. Sparse would have caught that, if it wasn't so busy bitching about __cold__. Commit 05f4f678 ("nfsd4: don't do lookup within readdir in recovery code") introduced a similar problem with calling lookup_one_len() without i_mutex, which this patch also addresses. To fix that, it was necessary to fix the called functions so that they expect i_mutex to be held; that part was done by J. Bruce Fields. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Umm-I-can-live-with-that-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Reported-by: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp> Tested-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> LKML-Reference: <8036.1237474444@jrobl> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-04-21 06:18:37 +08:00
goto out_unlock;
}
status = -ENOENT;
if (d_really_is_negative(dentry))
goto out;
status = vfs_rmdir(d_inode(dir), dentry);
out:
dput(dentry);
Fix i_mutex vs. readdir handling in nfsd Commit 14f7dd63 ("Copy XFS readdir hack into nfsd code") introduced a bug to generic code which had been extant for a long time in the XFS version -- it started to call through into lookup_one_len() and hence into the file systems' ->lookup() methods without i_mutex held on the directory. This patch fixes it by locking the directory's i_mutex again before calling the filldir functions. The original deadlocks which commit 14f7dd63 was designed to avoid are still avoided, because they were due to fs-internal locking, not i_mutex. While we're at it, fix the return type of nfsd_buffered_readdir() which should be a __be32 not an int -- it's an NFS errno, not a Linux errno. And return nfserrno(-ENOMEM) when allocation fails, not just -ENOMEM. Sparse would have caught that, if it wasn't so busy bitching about __cold__. Commit 05f4f678 ("nfsd4: don't do lookup within readdir in recovery code") introduced a similar problem with calling lookup_one_len() without i_mutex, which this patch also addresses. To fix that, it was necessary to fix the called functions so that they expect i_mutex to be held; that part was done by J. Bruce Fields. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Umm-I-can-live-with-that-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Reported-by: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp> Tested-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> LKML-Reference: <8036.1237474444@jrobl> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-04-21 06:18:37 +08:00
out_unlock:
inode_unlock(d_inode(dir));
return status;
}
static void
nfsd4_remove_clid_dir(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
const struct cred *original_cred;
struct nfs4_client_reclaim *crp;
char dname[HEXDIR_LEN];
int status;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(clp->net, nfsd_net_id);
if (!nn->rec_file || !test_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags))
return;
status = nfs4_make_rec_clidname(dname, &clp->cl_name);
if (status)
nfsd: fix oops when legacy_recdir_name_error is passed a -ENOENT error Toralf reported the following oops to the linux-nfs mailing list: -----------------[snip]------------------ NFSD: unable to generate recoverydir name (-2). NFSD: disabling legacy clientid tracking. Reboot recovery will not function correctly! BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000003c8 IP: [<f90a3d91>] nfsd4_client_tracking_exit+0x11/0x50 [nfsd] *pdpt = 000000002ba33001 *pde = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop nfsd auth_rpcgss ipt_MASQUERADE xt_owner xt_multiport ipt_REJECT xt_tcpudp xt_recent xt_conntrack nf_conntrack_ftp xt_limit xt_LOG iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables af_packet pppoe pppox ppp_generic slhc bridge stp llc tun arc4 iwldvm mac80211 coretemp kvm_intel uvcvideo sdhci_pci sdhci mmc_core videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops usblp videobuf2_core i915 iwlwifi psmouse videodev cfg80211 kvm fbcon bitblit cfbfillrect acpi_cpufreq mperf evdev softcursor font cfbimgblt i2c_algo_bit cfbcopyarea intel_agp intel_gtt drm_kms_helper snd_hda_codec_conexant drm agpgart fb fbdev tpm_tis thinkpad_acpi tpm nvram e1000e rfkill thermal ptp wmi pps_core tpm_bios 8250_pci processor 8250 ac snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_pcm battery video i2c_i801 snd_page_alloc snd_timer button serial_core i2c_core snd soundcore thermal_sys hwmon aesni_intel ablk_helper cryp td lrw aes_i586 xts gf128mul cbc fuse nfs lockd sunrpc dm_crypt dm_mod hid_monterey hid_microsoft hid_logitech hid_ezkey hid_cypress hid_chicony hid_cherry hid_belkin hid_apple hid_a4tech hid_generic usbhid hid sr_mod cdrom sg [last unloaded: microcode] Pid: 6374, comm: nfsd Not tainted 3.9.1 #6 LENOVO 4180F65/4180F65 EIP: 0060:[<f90a3d91>] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 0 EIP is at nfsd4_client_tracking_exit+0x11/0x50 [nfsd] EAX: 00000000 EBX: fffffffe ECX: 00000007 EDX: 00000007 ESI: eb9dcb00 EDI: eb2991c0 EBP: eb2bde38 ESP: eb2bde34 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 CR0: 80050033 CR2: 000003c8 CR3: 2ba80000 CR4: 000407f0 DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 Process nfsd (pid: 6374, ti=eb2bc000 task=eb2711c0 task.ti=eb2bc000) Stack: fffffffe eb2bde4c f90a3e0c f90a7754 fffffffe eb0a9c00 eb2bdea0 f90a41ed eb2991c0 1b270000 eb2991c0 eb2bde7c f9099ce9 eb2bde98 0129a020 eb29a020 eb2bdecc eb2991c0 eb2bdea8 f9099da5 00000000 eb9dcb00 00000001 67822f08 Call Trace: [<f90a3e0c>] legacy_recdir_name_error+0x3c/0x40 [nfsd] [<f90a41ed>] nfsd4_create_clid_dir+0x15d/0x1c0 [nfsd] [<f9099ce9>] ? nfsd4_lookup_stateid+0x99/0xd0 [nfsd] [<f9099da5>] ? nfs4_preprocess_seqid_op+0x85/0x100 [nfsd] [<f90a4287>] nfsd4_client_record_create+0x37/0x50 [nfsd] [<f909d6ce>] nfsd4_open_confirm+0xfe/0x130 [nfsd] [<f90980b1>] ? nfsd4_encode_operation+0x61/0x90 [nfsd] [<f909d5d0>] ? nfsd4_free_stateid+0xc0/0xc0 [nfsd] [<f908fd0b>] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x41b/0x530 [nfsd] [<f9081b7b>] nfsd_dispatch+0x8b/0x1a0 [nfsd] [<f857b85d>] svc_process+0x3dd/0x640 [sunrpc] [<f908165d>] nfsd+0xad/0x110 [nfsd] [<f90815b0>] ? nfsd_destroy+0x70/0x70 [nfsd] [<c1054824>] kthread+0x94/0xa0 [<c1486937>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x1b/0x28 [<c1054790>] ? flush_kthread_work+0xd0/0xd0 Code: 86 b0 00 00 00 90 c5 0a f9 c7 04 24 70 76 0a f9 e8 74 a9 3d c8 eb ba 8d 76 00 55 89 e5 53 66 66 66 66 90 8b 15 68 c7 0a f9 85 d2 <8b> 88 c8 03 00 00 74 2c 3b 11 77 28 8b 5c 91 08 85 db 74 22 8b EIP: [<f90a3d91>] nfsd4_client_tracking_exit+0x11/0x50 [nfsd] SS:ESP 0068:eb2bde34 CR2: 00000000000003c8 ---[ end trace 09e54015d145c9c6 ]--- The problem appears to be a regression that was introduced in commit 9a9c6478 "nfsd: make NFSv4 recovery client tracking options per net". Prior to that commit, it was safe to pass a NULL net pointer to nfsd4_client_tracking_exit in the legacy recdir case, and legacy_recdir_name_error did so. After that comit, the net pointer must be valid. This patch just fixes legacy_recdir_name_error to pass in a valid net pointer to that function. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+ Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com> Reported-and-tested-by: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
2013-05-09 20:36:23 +08:00
return legacy_recdir_name_error(clp, status);
status = mnt_want_write_file(nn->rec_file);
if (status)
goto out;
clear_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags);
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
status = nfs4_save_creds(&original_cred);
if (status < 0)
goto out_drop_write;
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
status = nfsd4_unlink_clid_dir(dname, HEXDIR_LEN-1, nn);
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
nfs4_reset_creds(original_cred);
if (status == 0) {
vfs_fsync(nn->rec_file, 0);
if (nn->in_grace) {
/* remove reclaim record */
crp = nfsd4_find_reclaim_client(dname, nn);
if (crp)
nfs4_remove_reclaim_record(crp, nn);
}
}
out_drop_write:
mnt_drop_write_file(nn->rec_file);
out:
if (status)
printk("NFSD: Failed to remove expired client state directory"
" %.*s\n", HEXDIR_LEN, dname);
}
static int
purge_old(struct dentry *parent, struct dentry *child, struct nfsd_net *nn)
{
int status;
if (nfs4_has_reclaimed_state(child->d_name.name, nn))
return 0;
status = vfs_rmdir(d_inode(parent), child);
if (status)
printk("failed to remove client recovery directory %pd\n",
child);
/* Keep trying, success or failure: */
return 0;
}
static void
nfsd4_recdir_purge_old(struct nfsd_net *nn)
{
int status;
nn->in_grace = false;
if (!nn->rec_file)
return;
status = mnt_want_write_file(nn->rec_file);
if (status)
goto out;
status = nfsd4_list_rec_dir(purge_old, nn);
if (status == 0)
vfs_fsync(nn->rec_file, 0);
mnt_drop_write_file(nn->rec_file);
out:
nfs4_release_reclaim(nn);
if (status)
printk("nfsd4: failed to purge old clients from recovery"
" directory %pD\n", nn->rec_file);
}
static int
load_recdir(struct dentry *parent, struct dentry *child, struct nfsd_net *nn)
{
if (child->d_name.len != HEXDIR_LEN - 1) {
printk("nfsd4: illegal name %pd in recovery directory\n",
child);
/* Keep trying; maybe the others are OK: */
return 0;
}
nfs4_client_to_reclaim(child->d_name.name, nn);
return 0;
}
static int
nfsd4_recdir_load(struct net *net) {
int status;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
if (!nn->rec_file)
return 0;
status = nfsd4_list_rec_dir(load_recdir, nn);
if (status)
printk("nfsd4: failed loading clients from recovery"
" directory %pD\n", nn->rec_file);
return status;
}
/*
* Hold reference to the recovery directory.
*/
static int
nfsd4_init_recdir(struct net *net)
{
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
const struct cred *original_cred;
int status;
printk("NFSD: Using %s as the NFSv4 state recovery directory\n",
user_recovery_dirname);
BUG_ON(nn->rec_file);
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
status = nfs4_save_creds(&original_cred);
if (status < 0) {
printk("NFSD: Unable to change credentials to find recovery"
" directory: error %d\n",
status);
return status;
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
}
nn->rec_file = filp_open(user_recovery_dirname, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY, 0);
if (IS_ERR(nn->rec_file)) {
printk("NFSD: unable to find recovery directory %s\n",
user_recovery_dirname);
status = PTR_ERR(nn->rec_file);
nn->rec_file = NULL;
}
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 07:39:23 +08:00
nfs4_reset_creds(original_cred);
if (!status)
nn->in_grace = true;
return status;
}
static void
nfsd4_shutdown_recdir(struct net *net)
{
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
if (!nn->rec_file)
return;
fput(nn->rec_file);
nn->rec_file = NULL;
}
static int
nfs4_legacy_state_init(struct net *net)
{
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
int i;
nn->reclaim_str_hashtbl = kmalloc(sizeof(struct list_head) *
CLIENT_HASH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!nn->reclaim_str_hashtbl)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < CLIENT_HASH_SIZE; i++)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&nn->reclaim_str_hashtbl[i]);
nn->reclaim_str_hashtbl_size = 0;
return 0;
}
static void
nfs4_legacy_state_shutdown(struct net *net)
{
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
kfree(nn->reclaim_str_hashtbl);
}
static int
nfsd4_load_reboot_recovery_data(struct net *net)
{
int status;
status = nfsd4_init_recdir(net);
if (status)
return status;
status = nfsd4_recdir_load(net);
if (status)
nfsd4_shutdown_recdir(net);
return status;
}
static int
nfsd4_legacy_tracking_init(struct net *net)
{
int status;
/* XXX: The legacy code won't work in a container */
if (net != &init_net) {
pr_warn("NFSD: attempt to initialize legacy client tracking in a container ignored.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
status = nfs4_legacy_state_init(net);
if (status)
return status;
status = nfsd4_load_reboot_recovery_data(net);
if (status)
goto err;
return 0;
err:
nfs4_legacy_state_shutdown(net);
return status;
}
static void
nfsd4_legacy_tracking_exit(struct net *net)
{
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
nfs4_release_reclaim(nn);
nfsd4_shutdown_recdir(net);
nfs4_legacy_state_shutdown(net);
}
/*
* Change the NFSv4 recovery directory to recdir.
*/
int
nfs4_reset_recoverydir(char *recdir)
{
int status;
struct path path;
status = kern_path(recdir, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
if (status)
return status;
status = -ENOTDIR;
VFS: (Scripted) Convert S_ISLNK/DIR/REG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_*(dentry) Convert the following where appropriate: (1) S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_symlink(dentry). (2) S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_reg(dentry). (3) S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_dir(dentry). This is actually more complicated than it appears as some calls should be converted to d_can_lookup() instead. The difference is whether the directory in question is a real dir with a ->lookup op or whether it's a fake dir with a ->d_automount op. In some circumstances, we can subsume checks for dentry->d_inode not being NULL into this, provided we the code isn't in a filesystem that expects d_inode to be NULL if the dirent really *is* negative (ie. if we're going to use d_inode() rather than d_backing_inode() to get the inode pointer). Note that the dentry type field may be set to something other than DCACHE_MISS_TYPE when d_inode is NULL in the case of unionmount, where the VFS manages the fall-through from a negative dentry to a lower layer. In such a case, the dentry type of the negative union dentry is set to the same as the type of the lower dentry. However, if you know d_inode is not NULL at the call site, then you can use the d_is_xxx() functions even in a filesystem. There is one further complication: a 0,0 chardev dentry may be labelled DCACHE_WHITEOUT_TYPE rather than DCACHE_SPECIAL_TYPE. Strictly, this was intended for special directory entry types that don't have attached inodes. The following perl+coccinelle script was used: use strict; my @callers; open($fd, 'git grep -l \'S_IS[A-Z].*->d_inode\' |') || die "Can't grep for S_ISDIR and co. callers"; @callers = <$fd>; close($fd); unless (@callers) { print "No matches\n"; exit(0); } my @cocci = ( '@@', 'expression E;', '@@', '', '- S_ISLNK(E->d_inode->i_mode)', '+ d_is_symlink(E)', '', '@@', 'expression E;', '@@', '', '- S_ISDIR(E->d_inode->i_mode)', '+ d_is_dir(E)', '', '@@', 'expression E;', '@@', '', '- S_ISREG(E->d_inode->i_mode)', '+ d_is_reg(E)' ); my $coccifile = "tmp.sp.cocci"; open($fd, ">$coccifile") || die $coccifile; print($fd "$_\n") || die $coccifile foreach (@cocci); close($fd); foreach my $file (@callers) { chomp $file; print "Processing ", $file, "\n"; system("spatch", "--sp-file", $coccifile, $file, "--in-place", "--no-show-diff") == 0 || die "spatch failed"; } [AV: overlayfs parts skipped] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-01-29 20:02:35 +08:00
if (d_is_dir(path.dentry)) {
strcpy(user_recovery_dirname, recdir);
status = 0;
}
path_put(&path);
return status;
}
char *
nfs4_recoverydir(void)
{
return user_recovery_dirname;
}
static int
nfsd4_check_legacy_client(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
int status;
char dname[HEXDIR_LEN];
struct nfs4_client_reclaim *crp;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(clp->net, nfsd_net_id);
/* did we already find that this client is stable? */
if (test_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags))
return 0;
status = nfs4_make_rec_clidname(dname, &clp->cl_name);
if (status) {
nfsd: fix oops when legacy_recdir_name_error is passed a -ENOENT error Toralf reported the following oops to the linux-nfs mailing list: -----------------[snip]------------------ NFSD: unable to generate recoverydir name (-2). NFSD: disabling legacy clientid tracking. Reboot recovery will not function correctly! BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000003c8 IP: [<f90a3d91>] nfsd4_client_tracking_exit+0x11/0x50 [nfsd] *pdpt = 000000002ba33001 *pde = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: loop nfsd auth_rpcgss ipt_MASQUERADE xt_owner xt_multiport ipt_REJECT xt_tcpudp xt_recent xt_conntrack nf_conntrack_ftp xt_limit xt_LOG iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables af_packet pppoe pppox ppp_generic slhc bridge stp llc tun arc4 iwldvm mac80211 coretemp kvm_intel uvcvideo sdhci_pci sdhci mmc_core videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops usblp videobuf2_core i915 iwlwifi psmouse videodev cfg80211 kvm fbcon bitblit cfbfillrect acpi_cpufreq mperf evdev softcursor font cfbimgblt i2c_algo_bit cfbcopyarea intel_agp intel_gtt drm_kms_helper snd_hda_codec_conexant drm agpgart fb fbdev tpm_tis thinkpad_acpi tpm nvram e1000e rfkill thermal ptp wmi pps_core tpm_bios 8250_pci processor 8250 ac snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_pcm battery video i2c_i801 snd_page_alloc snd_timer button serial_core i2c_core snd soundcore thermal_sys hwmon aesni_intel ablk_helper cryp td lrw aes_i586 xts gf128mul cbc fuse nfs lockd sunrpc dm_crypt dm_mod hid_monterey hid_microsoft hid_logitech hid_ezkey hid_cypress hid_chicony hid_cherry hid_belkin hid_apple hid_a4tech hid_generic usbhid hid sr_mod cdrom sg [last unloaded: microcode] Pid: 6374, comm: nfsd Not tainted 3.9.1 #6 LENOVO 4180F65/4180F65 EIP: 0060:[<f90a3d91>] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 0 EIP is at nfsd4_client_tracking_exit+0x11/0x50 [nfsd] EAX: 00000000 EBX: fffffffe ECX: 00000007 EDX: 00000007 ESI: eb9dcb00 EDI: eb2991c0 EBP: eb2bde38 ESP: eb2bde34 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 CR0: 80050033 CR2: 000003c8 CR3: 2ba80000 CR4: 000407f0 DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 Process nfsd (pid: 6374, ti=eb2bc000 task=eb2711c0 task.ti=eb2bc000) Stack: fffffffe eb2bde4c f90a3e0c f90a7754 fffffffe eb0a9c00 eb2bdea0 f90a41ed eb2991c0 1b270000 eb2991c0 eb2bde7c f9099ce9 eb2bde98 0129a020 eb29a020 eb2bdecc eb2991c0 eb2bdea8 f9099da5 00000000 eb9dcb00 00000001 67822f08 Call Trace: [<f90a3e0c>] legacy_recdir_name_error+0x3c/0x40 [nfsd] [<f90a41ed>] nfsd4_create_clid_dir+0x15d/0x1c0 [nfsd] [<f9099ce9>] ? nfsd4_lookup_stateid+0x99/0xd0 [nfsd] [<f9099da5>] ? nfs4_preprocess_seqid_op+0x85/0x100 [nfsd] [<f90a4287>] nfsd4_client_record_create+0x37/0x50 [nfsd] [<f909d6ce>] nfsd4_open_confirm+0xfe/0x130 [nfsd] [<f90980b1>] ? nfsd4_encode_operation+0x61/0x90 [nfsd] [<f909d5d0>] ? nfsd4_free_stateid+0xc0/0xc0 [nfsd] [<f908fd0b>] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x41b/0x530 [nfsd] [<f9081b7b>] nfsd_dispatch+0x8b/0x1a0 [nfsd] [<f857b85d>] svc_process+0x3dd/0x640 [sunrpc] [<f908165d>] nfsd+0xad/0x110 [nfsd] [<f90815b0>] ? nfsd_destroy+0x70/0x70 [nfsd] [<c1054824>] kthread+0x94/0xa0 [<c1486937>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x1b/0x28 [<c1054790>] ? flush_kthread_work+0xd0/0xd0 Code: 86 b0 00 00 00 90 c5 0a f9 c7 04 24 70 76 0a f9 e8 74 a9 3d c8 eb ba 8d 76 00 55 89 e5 53 66 66 66 66 90 8b 15 68 c7 0a f9 85 d2 <8b> 88 c8 03 00 00 74 2c 3b 11 77 28 8b 5c 91 08 85 db 74 22 8b EIP: [<f90a3d91>] nfsd4_client_tracking_exit+0x11/0x50 [nfsd] SS:ESP 0068:eb2bde34 CR2: 00000000000003c8 ---[ end trace 09e54015d145c9c6 ]--- The problem appears to be a regression that was introduced in commit 9a9c6478 "nfsd: make NFSv4 recovery client tracking options per net". Prior to that commit, it was safe to pass a NULL net pointer to nfsd4_client_tracking_exit in the legacy recdir case, and legacy_recdir_name_error did so. After that comit, the net pointer must be valid. This patch just fixes legacy_recdir_name_error to pass in a valid net pointer to that function. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+ Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com> Reported-and-tested-by: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
2013-05-09 20:36:23 +08:00
legacy_recdir_name_error(clp, status);
return status;
}
/* look for it in the reclaim hashtable otherwise */
crp = nfsd4_find_reclaim_client(dname, nn);
if (crp) {
set_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags);
crp->cr_clp = clp;
return 0;
}
return -ENOENT;
}
static const struct nfsd4_client_tracking_ops nfsd4_legacy_tracking_ops = {
.init = nfsd4_legacy_tracking_init,
.exit = nfsd4_legacy_tracking_exit,
.create = nfsd4_create_clid_dir,
.remove = nfsd4_remove_clid_dir,
.check = nfsd4_check_legacy_client,
.grace_done = nfsd4_recdir_purge_old,
};
/* Globals */
#define NFSD_PIPE_DIR "nfsd"
#define NFSD_CLD_PIPE "cld"
/* per-net-ns structure for holding cld upcall info */
struct cld_net {
struct rpc_pipe *cn_pipe;
spinlock_t cn_lock;
struct list_head cn_list;
unsigned int cn_xid;
};
struct cld_upcall {
struct list_head cu_list;
struct cld_net *cu_net;
struct task_struct *cu_task;
struct cld_msg cu_msg;
};
static int
__cld_pipe_upcall(struct rpc_pipe *pipe, struct cld_msg *cmsg)
{
int ret;
struct rpc_pipe_msg msg;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
msg.data = cmsg;
msg.len = sizeof(*cmsg);
/*
* Set task state before we queue the upcall. That prevents
* wake_up_process in the downcall from racing with schedule.
*/
set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
ret = rpc_queue_upcall(pipe, &msg);
if (ret < 0) {
set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
goto out;
}
schedule();
if (msg.errno < 0)
ret = msg.errno;
out:
return ret;
}
static int
cld_pipe_upcall(struct rpc_pipe *pipe, struct cld_msg *cmsg)
{
int ret;
/*
* -EAGAIN occurs when pipe is closed and reopened while there are
* upcalls queued.
*/
do {
ret = __cld_pipe_upcall(pipe, cmsg);
} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
return ret;
}
static ssize_t
cld_pipe_downcall(struct file *filp, const char __user *src, size_t mlen)
{
struct cld_upcall *tmp, *cup;
struct cld_msg __user *cmsg = (struct cld_msg __user *)src;
uint32_t xid;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info,
nfsd_net_id);
struct cld_net *cn = nn->cld_net;
if (mlen != sizeof(*cmsg)) {
dprintk("%s: got %zu bytes, expected %zu\n", __func__, mlen,
sizeof(*cmsg));
return -EINVAL;
}
/* copy just the xid so we can try to find that */
if (copy_from_user(&xid, &cmsg->cm_xid, sizeof(xid)) != 0) {
dprintk("%s: error when copying xid from userspace", __func__);
return -EFAULT;
}
/* walk the list and find corresponding xid */
cup = NULL;
spin_lock(&cn->cn_lock);
list_for_each_entry(tmp, &cn->cn_list, cu_list) {
if (get_unaligned(&tmp->cu_msg.cm_xid) == xid) {
cup = tmp;
list_del_init(&cup->cu_list);
break;
}
}
spin_unlock(&cn->cn_lock);
/* couldn't find upcall? */
if (!cup) {
dprintk("%s: couldn't find upcall -- xid=%u\n", __func__, xid);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_from_user(&cup->cu_msg, src, mlen) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
wake_up_process(cup->cu_task);
return mlen;
}
static void
cld_pipe_destroy_msg(struct rpc_pipe_msg *msg)
{
struct cld_msg *cmsg = msg->data;
struct cld_upcall *cup = container_of(cmsg, struct cld_upcall,
cu_msg);
/* errno >= 0 means we got a downcall */
if (msg->errno >= 0)
return;
wake_up_process(cup->cu_task);
}
static const struct rpc_pipe_ops cld_upcall_ops = {
.upcall = rpc_pipe_generic_upcall,
.downcall = cld_pipe_downcall,
.destroy_msg = cld_pipe_destroy_msg,
};
static struct dentry *
nfsd4_cld_register_sb(struct super_block *sb, struct rpc_pipe *pipe)
{
struct dentry *dir, *dentry;
dir = rpc_d_lookup_sb(sb, NFSD_PIPE_DIR);
if (dir == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
dentry = rpc_mkpipe_dentry(dir, NFSD_CLD_PIPE, NULL, pipe);
dput(dir);
return dentry;
}
static void
nfsd4_cld_unregister_sb(struct rpc_pipe *pipe)
{
if (pipe->dentry)
rpc_unlink(pipe->dentry);
}
static struct dentry *
nfsd4_cld_register_net(struct net *net, struct rpc_pipe *pipe)
{
struct super_block *sb;
struct dentry *dentry;
sb = rpc_get_sb_net(net);
if (!sb)
return NULL;
dentry = nfsd4_cld_register_sb(sb, pipe);
rpc_put_sb_net(net);
return dentry;
}
static void
nfsd4_cld_unregister_net(struct net *net, struct rpc_pipe *pipe)
{
struct super_block *sb;
sb = rpc_get_sb_net(net);
if (sb) {
nfsd4_cld_unregister_sb(pipe);
rpc_put_sb_net(net);
}
}
/* Initialize rpc_pipefs pipe for communication with client tracking daemon */
static int
nfsd4_init_cld_pipe(struct net *net)
{
int ret;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
struct cld_net *cn;
if (nn->cld_net)
return 0;
cn = kzalloc(sizeof(*cn), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cn) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
cn->cn_pipe = rpc_mkpipe_data(&cld_upcall_ops, RPC_PIPE_WAIT_FOR_OPEN);
if (IS_ERR(cn->cn_pipe)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(cn->cn_pipe);
goto err;
}
spin_lock_init(&cn->cn_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cn->cn_list);
dentry = nfsd4_cld_register_net(net, cn->cn_pipe);
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
goto err_destroy_data;
}
cn->cn_pipe->dentry = dentry;
nn->cld_net = cn;
return 0;
err_destroy_data:
rpc_destroy_pipe_data(cn->cn_pipe);
err:
kfree(cn);
printk(KERN_ERR "NFSD: unable to create nfsdcld upcall pipe (%d)\n",
ret);
return ret;
}
static void
nfsd4_remove_cld_pipe(struct net *net)
{
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
struct cld_net *cn = nn->cld_net;
nfsd4_cld_unregister_net(net, cn->cn_pipe);
rpc_destroy_pipe_data(cn->cn_pipe);
kfree(nn->cld_net);
nn->cld_net = NULL;
}
static struct cld_upcall *
alloc_cld_upcall(struct cld_net *cn)
{
struct cld_upcall *new, *tmp;
new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
return new;
/* FIXME: hard cap on number in flight? */
restart_search:
spin_lock(&cn->cn_lock);
list_for_each_entry(tmp, &cn->cn_list, cu_list) {
if (tmp->cu_msg.cm_xid == cn->cn_xid) {
cn->cn_xid++;
spin_unlock(&cn->cn_lock);
goto restart_search;
}
}
new->cu_task = current;
new->cu_msg.cm_vers = CLD_UPCALL_VERSION;
put_unaligned(cn->cn_xid++, &new->cu_msg.cm_xid);
new->cu_net = cn;
list_add(&new->cu_list, &cn->cn_list);
spin_unlock(&cn->cn_lock);
dprintk("%s: allocated xid %u\n", __func__, new->cu_msg.cm_xid);
return new;
}
static void
free_cld_upcall(struct cld_upcall *victim)
{
struct cld_net *cn = victim->cu_net;
spin_lock(&cn->cn_lock);
list_del(&victim->cu_list);
spin_unlock(&cn->cn_lock);
kfree(victim);
}
/* Ask daemon to create a new record */
static void
nfsd4_cld_create(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
int ret;
struct cld_upcall *cup;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(clp->net, nfsd_net_id);
struct cld_net *cn = nn->cld_net;
/* Don't upcall if it's already stored */
if (test_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags))
return;
cup = alloc_cld_upcall(cn);
if (!cup) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
cup->cu_msg.cm_cmd = Cld_Create;
cup->cu_msg.cm_u.cm_name.cn_len = clp->cl_name.len;
memcpy(cup->cu_msg.cm_u.cm_name.cn_id, clp->cl_name.data,
clp->cl_name.len);
ret = cld_pipe_upcall(cn->cn_pipe, &cup->cu_msg);
if (!ret) {
ret = cup->cu_msg.cm_status;
set_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags);
}
free_cld_upcall(cup);
out_err:
if (ret)
printk(KERN_ERR "NFSD: Unable to create client "
"record on stable storage: %d\n", ret);
}
/* Ask daemon to create a new record */
static void
nfsd4_cld_remove(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
int ret;
struct cld_upcall *cup;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(clp->net, nfsd_net_id);
struct cld_net *cn = nn->cld_net;
/* Don't upcall if it's already removed */
if (!test_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags))
return;
cup = alloc_cld_upcall(cn);
if (!cup) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
cup->cu_msg.cm_cmd = Cld_Remove;
cup->cu_msg.cm_u.cm_name.cn_len = clp->cl_name.len;
memcpy(cup->cu_msg.cm_u.cm_name.cn_id, clp->cl_name.data,
clp->cl_name.len);
ret = cld_pipe_upcall(cn->cn_pipe, &cup->cu_msg);
if (!ret) {
ret = cup->cu_msg.cm_status;
clear_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags);
}
free_cld_upcall(cup);
out_err:
if (ret)
printk(KERN_ERR "NFSD: Unable to remove client "
"record from stable storage: %d\n", ret);
}
/* Check for presence of a record, and update its timestamp */
static int
nfsd4_cld_check(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
int ret;
struct cld_upcall *cup;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(clp->net, nfsd_net_id);
struct cld_net *cn = nn->cld_net;
/* Don't upcall if one was already stored during this grace pd */
if (test_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags))
return 0;
cup = alloc_cld_upcall(cn);
if (!cup) {
printk(KERN_ERR "NFSD: Unable to check client record on "
"stable storage: %d\n", -ENOMEM);
return -ENOMEM;
}
cup->cu_msg.cm_cmd = Cld_Check;
cup->cu_msg.cm_u.cm_name.cn_len = clp->cl_name.len;
memcpy(cup->cu_msg.cm_u.cm_name.cn_id, clp->cl_name.data,
clp->cl_name.len);
ret = cld_pipe_upcall(cn->cn_pipe, &cup->cu_msg);
if (!ret) {
ret = cup->cu_msg.cm_status;
set_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags);
}
free_cld_upcall(cup);
return ret;
}
static void
nfsd4_cld_grace_done(struct nfsd_net *nn)
{
int ret;
struct cld_upcall *cup;
struct cld_net *cn = nn->cld_net;
cup = alloc_cld_upcall(cn);
if (!cup) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
cup->cu_msg.cm_cmd = Cld_GraceDone;
cup->cu_msg.cm_u.cm_gracetime = (int64_t)nn->boot_time;
ret = cld_pipe_upcall(cn->cn_pipe, &cup->cu_msg);
if (!ret)
ret = cup->cu_msg.cm_status;
free_cld_upcall(cup);
out_err:
if (ret)
printk(KERN_ERR "NFSD: Unable to end grace period: %d\n", ret);
}
static const struct nfsd4_client_tracking_ops nfsd4_cld_tracking_ops = {
.init = nfsd4_init_cld_pipe,
.exit = nfsd4_remove_cld_pipe,
.create = nfsd4_cld_create,
.remove = nfsd4_cld_remove,
.check = nfsd4_cld_check,
.grace_done = nfsd4_cld_grace_done,
};
/* upcall via usermodehelper */
static char cltrack_prog[PATH_MAX] = "/sbin/nfsdcltrack";
module_param_string(cltrack_prog, cltrack_prog, sizeof(cltrack_prog),
S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(cltrack_prog, "Path to the nfsdcltrack upcall program");
static bool cltrack_legacy_disable;
module_param(cltrack_legacy_disable, bool, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(cltrack_legacy_disable,
"Disable legacy recoverydir conversion. Default: false");
#define LEGACY_TOPDIR_ENV_PREFIX "NFSDCLTRACK_LEGACY_TOPDIR="
#define LEGACY_RECDIR_ENV_PREFIX "NFSDCLTRACK_LEGACY_RECDIR="
#define HAS_SESSION_ENV_PREFIX "NFSDCLTRACK_CLIENT_HAS_SESSION="
#define GRACE_START_ENV_PREFIX "NFSDCLTRACK_GRACE_START="
static char *
nfsd4_cltrack_legacy_topdir(void)
{
int copied;
size_t len;
char *result;
if (cltrack_legacy_disable)
return NULL;
len = strlen(LEGACY_TOPDIR_ENV_PREFIX) +
strlen(nfs4_recoverydir()) + 1;
result = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!result)
return result;
copied = snprintf(result, len, LEGACY_TOPDIR_ENV_PREFIX "%s",
nfs4_recoverydir());
if (copied >= len) {
/* just return nothing if output was truncated */
kfree(result);
return NULL;
}
return result;
}
static char *
nfsd4_cltrack_legacy_recdir(const struct xdr_netobj *name)
{
int copied;
size_t len;
char *result;
if (cltrack_legacy_disable)
return NULL;
/* +1 is for '/' between "topdir" and "recdir" */
len = strlen(LEGACY_RECDIR_ENV_PREFIX) +
strlen(nfs4_recoverydir()) + 1 + HEXDIR_LEN;
result = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!result)
return result;
copied = snprintf(result, len, LEGACY_RECDIR_ENV_PREFIX "%s/",
nfs4_recoverydir());
if (copied > (len - HEXDIR_LEN)) {
/* just return nothing if output will be truncated */
kfree(result);
return NULL;
}
copied = nfs4_make_rec_clidname(result + copied, name);
if (copied) {
kfree(result);
return NULL;
}
return result;
}
static char *
nfsd4_cltrack_client_has_session(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
int copied;
size_t len;
char *result;
/* prefix + Y/N character + terminating NULL */
len = strlen(HAS_SESSION_ENV_PREFIX) + 1 + 1;
result = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!result)
return result;
copied = snprintf(result, len, HAS_SESSION_ENV_PREFIX "%c",
clp->cl_minorversion ? 'Y' : 'N');
if (copied >= len) {
/* just return nothing if output was truncated */
kfree(result);
return NULL;
}
return result;
}
static char *
nfsd4_cltrack_grace_start(time_t grace_start)
{
int copied;
size_t len;
char *result;
/* prefix + max width of int64_t string + terminating NULL */
len = strlen(GRACE_START_ENV_PREFIX) + 22 + 1;
result = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!result)
return result;
copied = snprintf(result, len, GRACE_START_ENV_PREFIX "%ld",
grace_start);
if (copied >= len) {
/* just return nothing if output was truncated */
kfree(result);
return NULL;
}
return result;
}
static int
nfsd4_umh_cltrack_upcall(char *cmd, char *arg, char *env0, char *env1)
{
char *envp[3];
char *argv[4];
int ret;
if (unlikely(!cltrack_prog[0])) {
dprintk("%s: cltrack_prog is disabled\n", __func__);
return -EACCES;
}
dprintk("%s: cmd: %s\n", __func__, cmd);
dprintk("%s: arg: %s\n", __func__, arg ? arg : "(null)");
dprintk("%s: env0: %s\n", __func__, env0 ? env0 : "(null)");
dprintk("%s: env1: %s\n", __func__, env1 ? env1 : "(null)");
envp[0] = env0;
envp[1] = env1;
envp[2] = NULL;
argv[0] = (char *)cltrack_prog;
argv[1] = cmd;
argv[2] = arg;
argv[3] = NULL;
ret = call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, UMH_WAIT_PROC);
/*
* Disable the upcall mechanism if we're getting an ENOENT or EACCES
* error. The admin can re-enable it on the fly by using sysfs
* once the problem has been fixed.
*/
if (ret == -ENOENT || ret == -EACCES) {
dprintk("NFSD: %s was not found or isn't executable (%d). "
"Setting cltrack_prog to blank string!",
cltrack_prog, ret);
cltrack_prog[0] = '\0';
}
dprintk("%s: %s return value: %d\n", __func__, cltrack_prog, ret);
return ret;
}
static char *
bin_to_hex_dup(const unsigned char *src, int srclen)
{
int i;
char *buf, *hex;
/* +1 for terminating NULL */
buf = kmalloc((srclen * 2) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return buf;
hex = buf;
for (i = 0; i < srclen; i++) {
sprintf(hex, "%2.2x", *src++);
hex += 2;
}
return buf;
}
static int
nfsd4_umh_cltrack_init(struct net *net)
{
int ret;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
char *grace_start = nfsd4_cltrack_grace_start(nn->boot_time);
/* XXX: The usermode helper s not working in container yet. */
if (net != &init_net) {
pr_warn("NFSD: attempt to initialize umh client tracking in a container ignored.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = nfsd4_umh_cltrack_upcall("init", NULL, grace_start, NULL);
kfree(grace_start);
return ret;
}
static void
nfsd4_cltrack_upcall_lock(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
wait_on_bit_lock(&clp->cl_flags, NFSD4_CLIENT_UPCALL_LOCK,
TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
}
static void
nfsd4_cltrack_upcall_unlock(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
smp_mb__before_atomic();
clear_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_UPCALL_LOCK, &clp->cl_flags);
smp_mb__after_atomic();
wake_up_bit(&clp->cl_flags, NFSD4_CLIENT_UPCALL_LOCK);
}
static void
nfsd4_umh_cltrack_create(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
char *hexid, *has_session, *grace_start;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(clp->net, nfsd_net_id);
/*
* With v4.0 clients, there's little difference in outcome between a
* create and check operation, and we can end up calling into this
* function multiple times per client (once for each openowner). So,
* for v4.0 clients skip upcalling once the client has been recorded
* on stable storage.
*
* For v4.1+ clients, the outcome of the two operations is different,
* so we must ensure that we upcall for the create operation. v4.1+
* clients call this on RECLAIM_COMPLETE though, so we should only end
* up doing a single create upcall per client.
*/
if (clp->cl_minorversion == 0 &&
test_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags))
return;
hexid = bin_to_hex_dup(clp->cl_name.data, clp->cl_name.len);
if (!hexid) {
dprintk("%s: can't allocate memory for upcall!\n", __func__);
return;
}
has_session = nfsd4_cltrack_client_has_session(clp);
grace_start = nfsd4_cltrack_grace_start(nn->boot_time);
nfsd4_cltrack_upcall_lock(clp);
if (!nfsd4_umh_cltrack_upcall("create", hexid, has_session, grace_start))
set_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags);
nfsd4_cltrack_upcall_unlock(clp);
kfree(has_session);
kfree(grace_start);
kfree(hexid);
}
static void
nfsd4_umh_cltrack_remove(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
char *hexid;
if (!test_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags))
return;
hexid = bin_to_hex_dup(clp->cl_name.data, clp->cl_name.len);
if (!hexid) {
dprintk("%s: can't allocate memory for upcall!\n", __func__);
return;
}
nfsd4_cltrack_upcall_lock(clp);
if (test_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags) &&
nfsd4_umh_cltrack_upcall("remove", hexid, NULL, NULL) == 0)
clear_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags);
nfsd4_cltrack_upcall_unlock(clp);
kfree(hexid);
}
static int
nfsd4_umh_cltrack_check(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
int ret;
char *hexid, *has_session, *legacy;
if (test_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags))
return 0;
hexid = bin_to_hex_dup(clp->cl_name.data, clp->cl_name.len);
if (!hexid) {
dprintk("%s: can't allocate memory for upcall!\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
has_session = nfsd4_cltrack_client_has_session(clp);
legacy = nfsd4_cltrack_legacy_recdir(&clp->cl_name);
nfsd4_cltrack_upcall_lock(clp);
if (test_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags)) {
ret = 0;
} else {
ret = nfsd4_umh_cltrack_upcall("check", hexid, has_session, legacy);
if (ret == 0)
set_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE, &clp->cl_flags);
}
nfsd4_cltrack_upcall_unlock(clp);
kfree(has_session);
kfree(legacy);
kfree(hexid);
return ret;
}
static void
nfsd4_umh_cltrack_grace_done(struct nfsd_net *nn)
{
char *legacy;
char timestr[22]; /* FIXME: better way to determine max size? */
sprintf(timestr, "%ld", nn->boot_time);
legacy = nfsd4_cltrack_legacy_topdir();
nfsd4_umh_cltrack_upcall("gracedone", timestr, legacy, NULL);
kfree(legacy);
}
static const struct nfsd4_client_tracking_ops nfsd4_umh_tracking_ops = {
.init = nfsd4_umh_cltrack_init,
.exit = NULL,
.create = nfsd4_umh_cltrack_create,
.remove = nfsd4_umh_cltrack_remove,
.check = nfsd4_umh_cltrack_check,
.grace_done = nfsd4_umh_cltrack_grace_done,
};
int
nfsd4_client_tracking_init(struct net *net)
{
int status;
struct path path;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
/* just run the init if it the method is already decided */
if (nn->client_tracking_ops)
goto do_init;
/*
* First, try a UMH upcall. It should succeed or fail quickly, so
* there's little harm in trying that first.
*/
nn->client_tracking_ops = &nfsd4_umh_tracking_ops;
status = nn->client_tracking_ops->init(net);
if (!status)
return status;
/*
* See if the recoverydir exists and is a directory. If it is,
* then use the legacy ops.
*/
nn->client_tracking_ops = &nfsd4_legacy_tracking_ops;
status = kern_path(nfs4_recoverydir(), LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
if (!status) {
VFS: (Scripted) Convert S_ISLNK/DIR/REG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_*(dentry) Convert the following where appropriate: (1) S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_symlink(dentry). (2) S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_reg(dentry). (3) S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_dir(dentry). This is actually more complicated than it appears as some calls should be converted to d_can_lookup() instead. The difference is whether the directory in question is a real dir with a ->lookup op or whether it's a fake dir with a ->d_automount op. In some circumstances, we can subsume checks for dentry->d_inode not being NULL into this, provided we the code isn't in a filesystem that expects d_inode to be NULL if the dirent really *is* negative (ie. if we're going to use d_inode() rather than d_backing_inode() to get the inode pointer). Note that the dentry type field may be set to something other than DCACHE_MISS_TYPE when d_inode is NULL in the case of unionmount, where the VFS manages the fall-through from a negative dentry to a lower layer. In such a case, the dentry type of the negative union dentry is set to the same as the type of the lower dentry. However, if you know d_inode is not NULL at the call site, then you can use the d_is_xxx() functions even in a filesystem. There is one further complication: a 0,0 chardev dentry may be labelled DCACHE_WHITEOUT_TYPE rather than DCACHE_SPECIAL_TYPE. Strictly, this was intended for special directory entry types that don't have attached inodes. The following perl+coccinelle script was used: use strict; my @callers; open($fd, 'git grep -l \'S_IS[A-Z].*->d_inode\' |') || die "Can't grep for S_ISDIR and co. callers"; @callers = <$fd>; close($fd); unless (@callers) { print "No matches\n"; exit(0); } my @cocci = ( '@@', 'expression E;', '@@', '', '- S_ISLNK(E->d_inode->i_mode)', '+ d_is_symlink(E)', '', '@@', 'expression E;', '@@', '', '- S_ISDIR(E->d_inode->i_mode)', '+ d_is_dir(E)', '', '@@', 'expression E;', '@@', '', '- S_ISREG(E->d_inode->i_mode)', '+ d_is_reg(E)' ); my $coccifile = "tmp.sp.cocci"; open($fd, ">$coccifile") || die $coccifile; print($fd "$_\n") || die $coccifile foreach (@cocci); close($fd); foreach my $file (@callers) { chomp $file; print "Processing ", $file, "\n"; system("spatch", "--sp-file", $coccifile, $file, "--in-place", "--no-show-diff") == 0 || die "spatch failed"; } [AV: overlayfs parts skipped] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-01-29 20:02:35 +08:00
status = d_is_dir(path.dentry);
path_put(&path);
if (status)
goto do_init;
}
/* Finally, try to use nfsdcld */
nn->client_tracking_ops = &nfsd4_cld_tracking_ops;
printk(KERN_WARNING "NFSD: the nfsdcld client tracking upcall will be "
"removed in 3.10. Please transition to using "
"nfsdcltrack.\n");
do_init:
status = nn->client_tracking_ops->init(net);
if (status) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "NFSD: Unable to initialize client "
"recovery tracking! (%d)\n", status);
nn->client_tracking_ops = NULL;
}
return status;
}
void
nfsd4_client_tracking_exit(struct net *net)
{
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
if (nn->client_tracking_ops) {
if (nn->client_tracking_ops->exit)
nn->client_tracking_ops->exit(net);
nn->client_tracking_ops = NULL;
}
}
void
nfsd4_client_record_create(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(clp->net, nfsd_net_id);
if (nn->client_tracking_ops)
nn->client_tracking_ops->create(clp);
}
void
nfsd4_client_record_remove(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(clp->net, nfsd_net_id);
if (nn->client_tracking_ops)
nn->client_tracking_ops->remove(clp);
}
int
nfsd4_client_record_check(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(clp->net, nfsd_net_id);
if (nn->client_tracking_ops)
return nn->client_tracking_ops->check(clp);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
void
nfsd4_record_grace_done(struct nfsd_net *nn)
{
if (nn->client_tracking_ops)
nn->client_tracking_ops->grace_done(nn);
}
static int
rpc_pipefs_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, void *ptr)
{
struct super_block *sb = ptr;
struct net *net = sb->s_fs_info;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
struct cld_net *cn = nn->cld_net;
struct dentry *dentry;
int ret = 0;
if (!try_module_get(THIS_MODULE))
return 0;
if (!cn) {
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
return 0;
}
switch (event) {
case RPC_PIPEFS_MOUNT:
dentry = nfsd4_cld_register_sb(sb, cn->cn_pipe);
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
break;
}
cn->cn_pipe->dentry = dentry;
break;
case RPC_PIPEFS_UMOUNT:
if (cn->cn_pipe->dentry)
nfsd4_cld_unregister_sb(cn->cn_pipe);
break;
default:
ret = -ENOTSUPP;
break;
}
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
return ret;
}
static struct notifier_block nfsd4_cld_block = {
.notifier_call = rpc_pipefs_event,
};
int
register_cld_notifier(void)
{
return rpc_pipefs_notifier_register(&nfsd4_cld_block);
}
void
unregister_cld_notifier(void)
{
rpc_pipefs_notifier_unregister(&nfsd4_cld_block);
}