linux/security/integrity/digsig.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation
*
* Author:
* Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
*/
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/digsig.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link() Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to __key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not. What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring. Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the trustworthiness of a new key. With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through one of the contained keys. Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could be secondarily linked. To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data. If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted() resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code still works correctly with this as it was previously using KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there is no system keyring against which trust can be determined. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06 23:14:26 +08:00
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include "integrity.h"
static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
#ifndef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
"_evm",
"_ima",
#else
".evm",
".ima",
#endif
".platform",
};
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted
KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link() Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to __key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not. What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring. Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the trustworthiness of a new key. With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through one of the contained keys. Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could be secondarily linked. To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data. If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted() resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code still works correctly with this as it was previously using KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there is no system keyring against which trust can be determined. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06 23:14:26 +08:00
#else
#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link() Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to __key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not. What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring. Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the trustworthiness of a new key. With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through one of the contained keys. Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could be secondarily linked. To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data. If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted() resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code still works correctly with this as it was previously using KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there is no system keyring against which trust can be determined. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06 23:14:26 +08:00
#endif
static struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id(const unsigned int id)
{
if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!keyring[id]) {
keyring[id] =
request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err);
keyring[id] = NULL;
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
}
return keyring[id];
}
int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
const char *digest, int digestlen)
{
struct key *keyring;
if (siglen < 2)
return -EINVAL;
keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(id);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
switch (sig[1]) {
ima: digital signature verification using asymmetric keys Asymmetric keys were introduced in linux-3.7 to verify the signature on signed kernel modules. The asymmetric keys infrastructure abstracts the signature verification from the crypto details. This patch adds IMA/EVM signature verification using asymmetric keys. Support for additional signature verification methods can now be delegated to the asymmetric key infrastructure. Although the module signature header and the IMA/EVM signature header could use the same format, to minimize the signature length and save space in the extended attribute, this patch defines a new IMA/EVM header format. The main difference is that the key identifier is a sha1[12 - 19] hash of the key modulus and exponent, similar to the current implementation. The only purpose of the key identifier is to identify the corresponding key in the kernel keyring. ima-evm-utils was updated to support the new signature format. While asymmetric signature verification functionality supports many different hash algorithms, the hash used in this patch is calculated during the IMA collection phase, based on the configured algorithm. The default algorithm is sha1, but for backwards compatibility md5 is supported. Due to this current limitation, signatures should be generated using a sha1 hash algorithm. Changes in this patch: - Functionality has been moved to separate source file in order to get rid of in source #ifdefs. - keyid is derived according to the RFC 3280. It does not require to assign IMA/EVM specific "description" when loading X509 certificate. Kernel asymmetric key subsystem automatically generate the description. Also loading a certificate does not require using of ima-evm-utils and can be done using keyctl only. - keyid size is reduced to 32 bits to save xattr space. Key search is done using partial match functionality of asymmetric_key_match(). - Kconfig option title was changed Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2013-02-07 06:12:08 +08:00
case 1:
/* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */
return digsig_verify(keyring, sig + 1, siglen - 1, digest,
digestlen);
ima: digital signature verification using asymmetric keys Asymmetric keys were introduced in linux-3.7 to verify the signature on signed kernel modules. The asymmetric keys infrastructure abstracts the signature verification from the crypto details. This patch adds IMA/EVM signature verification using asymmetric keys. Support for additional signature verification methods can now be delegated to the asymmetric key infrastructure. Although the module signature header and the IMA/EVM signature header could use the same format, to minimize the signature length and save space in the extended attribute, this patch defines a new IMA/EVM header format. The main difference is that the key identifier is a sha1[12 - 19] hash of the key modulus and exponent, similar to the current implementation. The only purpose of the key identifier is to identify the corresponding key in the kernel keyring. ima-evm-utils was updated to support the new signature format. While asymmetric signature verification functionality supports many different hash algorithms, the hash used in this patch is calculated during the IMA collection phase, based on the configured algorithm. The default algorithm is sha1, but for backwards compatibility md5 is supported. Due to this current limitation, signatures should be generated using a sha1 hash algorithm. Changes in this patch: - Functionality has been moved to separate source file in order to get rid of in source #ifdefs. - keyid is derived according to the RFC 3280. It does not require to assign IMA/EVM specific "description" when loading X509 certificate. Kernel asymmetric key subsystem automatically generate the description. Also loading a certificate does not require using of ima-evm-utils and can be done using keyctl only. - keyid size is reduced to 32 bits to save xattr space. Key search is done using partial match functionality of asymmetric_key_match(). - Kconfig option title was changed Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2013-02-07 06:12:08 +08:00
case 2:
return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen, digest,
digestlen);
ima: digital signature verification using asymmetric keys Asymmetric keys were introduced in linux-3.7 to verify the signature on signed kernel modules. The asymmetric keys infrastructure abstracts the signature verification from the crypto details. This patch adds IMA/EVM signature verification using asymmetric keys. Support for additional signature verification methods can now be delegated to the asymmetric key infrastructure. Although the module signature header and the IMA/EVM signature header could use the same format, to minimize the signature length and save space in the extended attribute, this patch defines a new IMA/EVM header format. The main difference is that the key identifier is a sha1[12 - 19] hash of the key modulus and exponent, similar to the current implementation. The only purpose of the key identifier is to identify the corresponding key in the kernel keyring. ima-evm-utils was updated to support the new signature format. While asymmetric signature verification functionality supports many different hash algorithms, the hash used in this patch is calculated during the IMA collection phase, based on the configured algorithm. The default algorithm is sha1, but for backwards compatibility md5 is supported. Due to this current limitation, signatures should be generated using a sha1 hash algorithm. Changes in this patch: - Functionality has been moved to separate source file in order to get rid of in source #ifdefs. - keyid is derived according to the RFC 3280. It does not require to assign IMA/EVM specific "description" when loading X509 certificate. Kernel asymmetric key subsystem automatically generate the description. Also loading a certificate does not require using of ima-evm-utils and can be done using keyctl only. - keyid size is reduced to 32 bits to save xattr space. Key search is done using partial match functionality of asymmetric_key_match(). - Kconfig option title was changed Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2013-02-07 06:12:08 +08:00
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
int integrity_modsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const struct modsig *modsig)
{
struct key *keyring;
keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(id);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
return ima_modsig_verify(keyring, modsig);
}
static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id,
key_perm_t perm,
struct key_restriction *restriction)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int err = 0;
keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
KGIDT_INIT(0), cred, perm,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, restriction, NULL);
KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide blacklisting. This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE. To this end: (1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to the vetting function. This is called as: int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *key_type, unsigned long key_flags, const union key_payload *key_payload), where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED. [*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed. The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the link. The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set through keyring_alloc(). Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function is called. (2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the restriction check. (3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted. (4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL. (5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for authoritative keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-04-06 23:14:24 +08:00
if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%d)\n",
keyring_name[id], err);
keyring[id] = NULL;
} else {
if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM)
set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
}
return err;
}
int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
{
struct key_restriction *restriction;
key_perm_t perm;
perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW
| KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH;
if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM) {
restriction = NULL;
goto out;
}
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING))
return 0;
restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!restriction)
return -ENOMEM;
restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;
perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;
out:
return __integrity_init_keyring(id, perm, restriction);
}
int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int id, const void *data,
off_t size, key_perm_t perm)
{
key_ref_t key;
int rc = 0;
if (!keyring[id])
return -EINVAL;
key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring[id], 1), "asymmetric",
NULL, data, size, perm,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(key);
pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate %d\n", rc);
} else {
pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n",
key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
key_ref_put(key);
}
return rc;
}
int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
{
void *data;
loff_t size;
int rc;
key_perm_t perm;
rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0,
READING_X509_CERTIFICATE);
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
return rc;
}
perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ;
pr_info("Loading X.509 certificate: %s\n", path);
rc = integrity_add_key(id, (const void *)data, size, perm);
vfree(data);
return rc;
}
int __init integrity_load_cert(const unsigned int id, const char *source,
const void *data, size_t len, key_perm_t perm)
{
if (!data)
return -EINVAL;
pr_info("Loading X.509 certificate: %s\n", source);
return integrity_add_key(id, data, len, perm);
}