linux/fs/proc/inode.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* linux/fs/proc/inode.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
*/
#include <linux/cache.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/stat.h>
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#include <linux/completion.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/limits.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include "internal.h"
static void proc_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *de;
struct ctl_table_header *head;
mm + fs: store shadow entries in page cache Reclaim will be leaving shadow entries in the page cache radix tree upon evicting the real page. As those pages are found from the LRU, an iput() can lead to the inode being freed concurrently. At this point, reclaim must no longer install shadow pages because the inode freeing code needs to ensure the page tree is really empty. Add an address_space flag, AS_EXITING, that the inode freeing code sets under the tree lock before doing the final truncate. Reclaim will check for this flag before installing shadow pages. Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Luigi Semenzato <semenzato@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Metin Doslu <metin@citusdata.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Ozgun Erdogan <ozgun@citusdata.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-04 05:47:49 +08:00
truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
clear_inode(inode);
/* Stop tracking associated processes */
put_pid(PROC_I(inode)->pid);
/* Let go of any associated proc directory entry */
de = PDE(inode);
if (de)
pde_put(de);
head = PROC_I(inode)->sysctl;
if (head) {
RCU_INIT_POINTER(PROC_I(inode)->sysctl, NULL);
proc_sys_evict_inode(inode, head);
}
}
static struct kmem_cache *proc_inode_cachep __ro_after_init;
static struct kmem_cache *pde_opener_cache __ro_after_init;
static struct inode *proc_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct proc_inode *ei;
ei = kmem_cache_alloc(proc_inode_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ei)
return NULL;
ei->pid = NULL;
ei->fd = 0;
ei->op.proc_get_link = NULL;
ei->pde = NULL;
ei->sysctl = NULL;
ei->sysctl_entry = NULL;
ei->ns_ops = NULL;
return &ei->vfs_inode;
}
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static void proc_i_callback(struct rcu_head *head)
{
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struct inode *inode = container_of(head, struct inode, i_rcu);
kmem_cache_free(proc_inode_cachep, PROC_I(inode));
}
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static void proc_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
call_rcu(&inode->i_rcu, proc_i_callback);
}
static void init_once(void *foo)
{
struct proc_inode *ei = (struct proc_inode *) foo;
inode_init_once(&ei->vfs_inode);
}
void __init proc_init_kmemcache(void)
{
proc_inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create("proc_inode_cache",
sizeof(struct proc_inode),
0, (SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|
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SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_ACCOUNT|
SLAB_PANIC),
init_once);
pde_opener_cache =
kmem_cache_create("pde_opener", sizeof(struct pde_opener), 0,
SLAB_ACCOUNT|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
proc_dir_entry_cache = kmem_cache_create_usercopy(
"proc_dir_entry", SIZEOF_PDE, 0, SLAB_PANIC,
offsetof(struct proc_dir_entry, inline_name),
SIZEOF_PDE_INLINE_NAME, NULL);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct proc_dir_entry) >= SIZEOF_PDE);
}
static int proc_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
{
procfs: add hidepid= and gid= mount options Add support for mount options to restrict access to /proc/PID/ directories. The default backward-compatible "relaxed" behaviour is left untouched. The first mount option is called "hidepid" and its value defines how much info about processes we want to be available for non-owners: hidepid=0 (default) means the old behavior - anybody may read all world-readable /proc/PID/* files. hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/ directories, but their own. Sensitive files like cmdline, sched*, status are now protected against other users. As permission checking done in proc_pid_permission() and files' permissions are left untouched, programs expecting specific files' modes are not confused. hidepid=2 means hidepid=1 plus all /proc/PID/ will be invisible to other users. It doesn't mean that it hides whether a process exists (it can be learned by other means, e.g. by kill -0 $PID), but it hides process' euid and egid. It compicates intruder's task of gathering info about running processes, whether some daemon runs with elevated privileges, whether another user runs some sensitive program, whether other users run any program at all, etc. gid=XXX defines a group that will be able to gather all processes' info (as in hidepid=0 mode). This group should be used instead of putting nonroot user in sudoers file or something. However, untrusted users (like daemons, etc.) which are not supposed to monitor the tasks in the whole system should not be added to the group. hidepid=1 or higher is designed to restrict access to procfs files, which might reveal some sensitive private information like precise keystrokes timings: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/05/3 hidepid=1/2 doesn't break monitoring userspace tools. ps, top, pgrep, and conky gracefully handle EPERM/ENOENT and behave as if the current user is the only user running processes. pstree shows the process subtree which contains "pstree" process. Note: the patch doesn't deal with setuid/setgid issues of keeping preopened descriptors of procfs files (like https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/7/368). We rely on that the leaked information like the scheduling counters of setuid apps doesn't threaten anybody's privacy - only the user started the setuid program may read the counters. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@MIT.EDU> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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struct super_block *sb = root->d_sb;
struct pid_namespace *pid = sb->s_fs_info;
if (!gid_eq(pid->pid_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID))
seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u", from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, pid->pid_gid));
if (pid->hide_pid != HIDEPID_OFF)
procfs: add hidepid= and gid= mount options Add support for mount options to restrict access to /proc/PID/ directories. The default backward-compatible "relaxed" behaviour is left untouched. The first mount option is called "hidepid" and its value defines how much info about processes we want to be available for non-owners: hidepid=0 (default) means the old behavior - anybody may read all world-readable /proc/PID/* files. hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/ directories, but their own. Sensitive files like cmdline, sched*, status are now protected against other users. As permission checking done in proc_pid_permission() and files' permissions are left untouched, programs expecting specific files' modes are not confused. hidepid=2 means hidepid=1 plus all /proc/PID/ will be invisible to other users. It doesn't mean that it hides whether a process exists (it can be learned by other means, e.g. by kill -0 $PID), but it hides process' euid and egid. It compicates intruder's task of gathering info about running processes, whether some daemon runs with elevated privileges, whether another user runs some sensitive program, whether other users run any program at all, etc. gid=XXX defines a group that will be able to gather all processes' info (as in hidepid=0 mode). This group should be used instead of putting nonroot user in sudoers file or something. However, untrusted users (like daemons, etc.) which are not supposed to monitor the tasks in the whole system should not be added to the group. hidepid=1 or higher is designed to restrict access to procfs files, which might reveal some sensitive private information like precise keystrokes timings: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/05/3 hidepid=1/2 doesn't break monitoring userspace tools. ps, top, pgrep, and conky gracefully handle EPERM/ENOENT and behave as if the current user is the only user running processes. pstree shows the process subtree which contains "pstree" process. Note: the patch doesn't deal with setuid/setgid issues of keeping preopened descriptors of procfs files (like https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/7/368). We rely on that the leaked information like the scheduling counters of setuid apps doesn't threaten anybody's privacy - only the user started the setuid program may read the counters. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@MIT.EDU> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-11 07:11:31 +08:00
seq_printf(seq, ",hidepid=%u", pid->hide_pid);
return 0;
}
const struct super_operations proc_sops = {
.alloc_inode = proc_alloc_inode,
.destroy_inode = proc_destroy_inode,
.drop_inode = generic_delete_inode,
.evict_inode = proc_evict_inode,
.statfs = simple_statfs,
.show_options = proc_show_options,
};
enum {BIAS = -1U<<31};
static inline int use_pde(struct proc_dir_entry *pde)
{
return likely(atomic_inc_unless_negative(&pde->in_use));
}
static void unuse_pde(struct proc_dir_entry *pde)
{
if (unlikely(atomic_dec_return(&pde->in_use) == BIAS))
complete(pde->pde_unload_completion);
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}
proc: do less stuff under ->pde_unload_lock Commit ca469f35a8e9ef ("deal with races between remove_proc_entry() and proc_reg_release()") moved too much stuff under ->pde_unload_lock making a problem described at series "[PATCH v5] procfs: Improve Scaling in proc" worse. While RCU is being figured out, move kfree() out of ->pde_unload_lock. On my potato, difference is only 0.5% speedup with concurrent open+read+close of /proc/cmdline, but the effect should be more noticeable on more capable machines. $ perf stat -r 16 -- ./proc-j 16 Performance counter stats for './proc-j 16' (16 runs): 130569.502377 task-clock (msec) # 15.872 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.05% ) 19,169 context-switches # 0.147 K/sec ( +- 0.18% ) 15 cpu-migrations # 0.000 K/sec ( +- 3.27% ) 437 page-faults # 0.003 K/sec ( +- 1.25% ) 300,172,097,675 cycles # 2.299 GHz ( +- 0.05% ) 96,793,267,308 instructions # 0.32 insn per cycle ( +- 0.04% ) 22,798,342,298 branches # 174.607 M/sec ( +- 0.04% ) 111,764,687 branch-misses # 0.49% of all branches ( +- 0.47% ) 8.226574400 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.05% ) ^^^^^^^^^^^ $ perf stat -r 16 -- ./proc-j 16 Performance counter stats for './proc-j 16' (16 runs): 129866.777392 task-clock (msec) # 15.869 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.04% ) 19,154 context-switches # 0.147 K/sec ( +- 0.66% ) 14 cpu-migrations # 0.000 K/sec ( +- 1.73% ) 431 page-faults # 0.003 K/sec ( +- 1.09% ) 298,556,520,546 cycles # 2.299 GHz ( +- 0.04% ) 96,525,366,833 instructions # 0.32 insn per cycle ( +- 0.04% ) 22,730,194,043 branches # 175.027 M/sec ( +- 0.04% ) 111,506,074 branch-misses # 0.49% of all branches ( +- 0.18% ) 8.183629778 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.04% ) ^^^^^^^^^^^ Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180213132911.GA24298@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 07:30:54 +08:00
/* pde is locked on entry, unlocked on exit */
static void close_pdeo(struct proc_dir_entry *pde, struct pde_opener *pdeo)
{
/*
* close() (proc_reg_release()) can't delete an entry and proceed:
* ->release hook needs to be available at the right moment.
*
* rmmod (remove_proc_entry() et al) can't delete an entry and proceed:
* "struct file" needs to be available at the right moment.
*
* Therefore, first process to enter this function does ->release() and
* signals its completion to the other process which does nothing.
*/
if (pdeo->closing) {
/* somebody else is doing that, just wait */
DECLARE_COMPLETION_ONSTACK(c);
pdeo->c = &c;
spin_unlock(&pde->pde_unload_lock);
wait_for_completion(&c);
} else {
struct file *file;
proc: do less stuff under ->pde_unload_lock Commit ca469f35a8e9ef ("deal with races between remove_proc_entry() and proc_reg_release()") moved too much stuff under ->pde_unload_lock making a problem described at series "[PATCH v5] procfs: Improve Scaling in proc" worse. While RCU is being figured out, move kfree() out of ->pde_unload_lock. On my potato, difference is only 0.5% speedup with concurrent open+read+close of /proc/cmdline, but the effect should be more noticeable on more capable machines. $ perf stat -r 16 -- ./proc-j 16 Performance counter stats for './proc-j 16' (16 runs): 130569.502377 task-clock (msec) # 15.872 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.05% ) 19,169 context-switches # 0.147 K/sec ( +- 0.18% ) 15 cpu-migrations # 0.000 K/sec ( +- 3.27% ) 437 page-faults # 0.003 K/sec ( +- 1.25% ) 300,172,097,675 cycles # 2.299 GHz ( +- 0.05% ) 96,793,267,308 instructions # 0.32 insn per cycle ( +- 0.04% ) 22,798,342,298 branches # 174.607 M/sec ( +- 0.04% ) 111,764,687 branch-misses # 0.49% of all branches ( +- 0.47% ) 8.226574400 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.05% ) ^^^^^^^^^^^ $ perf stat -r 16 -- ./proc-j 16 Performance counter stats for './proc-j 16' (16 runs): 129866.777392 task-clock (msec) # 15.869 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.04% ) 19,154 context-switches # 0.147 K/sec ( +- 0.66% ) 14 cpu-migrations # 0.000 K/sec ( +- 1.73% ) 431 page-faults # 0.003 K/sec ( +- 1.09% ) 298,556,520,546 cycles # 2.299 GHz ( +- 0.04% ) 96,525,366,833 instructions # 0.32 insn per cycle ( +- 0.04% ) 22,730,194,043 branches # 175.027 M/sec ( +- 0.04% ) 111,506,074 branch-misses # 0.49% of all branches ( +- 0.18% ) 8.183629778 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.04% ) ^^^^^^^^^^^ Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180213132911.GA24298@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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struct completion *c;
pdeo->closing = true;
spin_unlock(&pde->pde_unload_lock);
file = pdeo->file;
pde->proc_fops->release(file_inode(file), file);
spin_lock(&pde->pde_unload_lock);
/* After ->release. */
list_del(&pdeo->lh);
proc: do less stuff under ->pde_unload_lock Commit ca469f35a8e9ef ("deal with races between remove_proc_entry() and proc_reg_release()") moved too much stuff under ->pde_unload_lock making a problem described at series "[PATCH v5] procfs: Improve Scaling in proc" worse. While RCU is being figured out, move kfree() out of ->pde_unload_lock. On my potato, difference is only 0.5% speedup with concurrent open+read+close of /proc/cmdline, but the effect should be more noticeable on more capable machines. $ perf stat -r 16 -- ./proc-j 16 Performance counter stats for './proc-j 16' (16 runs): 130569.502377 task-clock (msec) # 15.872 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.05% ) 19,169 context-switches # 0.147 K/sec ( +- 0.18% ) 15 cpu-migrations # 0.000 K/sec ( +- 3.27% ) 437 page-faults # 0.003 K/sec ( +- 1.25% ) 300,172,097,675 cycles # 2.299 GHz ( +- 0.05% ) 96,793,267,308 instructions # 0.32 insn per cycle ( +- 0.04% ) 22,798,342,298 branches # 174.607 M/sec ( +- 0.04% ) 111,764,687 branch-misses # 0.49% of all branches ( +- 0.47% ) 8.226574400 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.05% ) ^^^^^^^^^^^ $ perf stat -r 16 -- ./proc-j 16 Performance counter stats for './proc-j 16' (16 runs): 129866.777392 task-clock (msec) # 15.869 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.04% ) 19,154 context-switches # 0.147 K/sec ( +- 0.66% ) 14 cpu-migrations # 0.000 K/sec ( +- 1.73% ) 431 page-faults # 0.003 K/sec ( +- 1.09% ) 298,556,520,546 cycles # 2.299 GHz ( +- 0.04% ) 96,525,366,833 instructions # 0.32 insn per cycle ( +- 0.04% ) 22,730,194,043 branches # 175.027 M/sec ( +- 0.04% ) 111,506,074 branch-misses # 0.49% of all branches ( +- 0.18% ) 8.183629778 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.04% ) ^^^^^^^^^^^ Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180213132911.GA24298@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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c = pdeo->c;
spin_unlock(&pde->pde_unload_lock);
if (unlikely(c))
complete(c);
kmem_cache_free(pde_opener_cache, pdeo);
}
}
void proc_entry_rundown(struct proc_dir_entry *de)
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{
DECLARE_COMPLETION_ONSTACK(c);
/* Wait until all existing callers into module are done. */
de->pde_unload_completion = &c;
if (atomic_add_return(BIAS, &de->in_use) != BIAS)
wait_for_completion(&c);
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/* ->pde_openers list can't grow from now on. */
spin_lock(&de->pde_unload_lock);
while (!list_empty(&de->pde_openers)) {
struct pde_opener *pdeo;
pdeo = list_first_entry(&de->pde_openers, struct pde_opener, lh);
close_pdeo(de, pdeo);
proc: do less stuff under ->pde_unload_lock Commit ca469f35a8e9ef ("deal with races between remove_proc_entry() and proc_reg_release()") moved too much stuff under ->pde_unload_lock making a problem described at series "[PATCH v5] procfs: Improve Scaling in proc" worse. While RCU is being figured out, move kfree() out of ->pde_unload_lock. On my potato, difference is only 0.5% speedup with concurrent open+read+close of /proc/cmdline, but the effect should be more noticeable on more capable machines. $ perf stat -r 16 -- ./proc-j 16 Performance counter stats for './proc-j 16' (16 runs): 130569.502377 task-clock (msec) # 15.872 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.05% ) 19,169 context-switches # 0.147 K/sec ( +- 0.18% ) 15 cpu-migrations # 0.000 K/sec ( +- 3.27% ) 437 page-faults # 0.003 K/sec ( +- 1.25% ) 300,172,097,675 cycles # 2.299 GHz ( +- 0.05% ) 96,793,267,308 instructions # 0.32 insn per cycle ( +- 0.04% ) 22,798,342,298 branches # 174.607 M/sec ( +- 0.04% ) 111,764,687 branch-misses # 0.49% of all branches ( +- 0.47% ) 8.226574400 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.05% ) ^^^^^^^^^^^ $ perf stat -r 16 -- ./proc-j 16 Performance counter stats for './proc-j 16' (16 runs): 129866.777392 task-clock (msec) # 15.869 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.04% ) 19,154 context-switches # 0.147 K/sec ( +- 0.66% ) 14 cpu-migrations # 0.000 K/sec ( +- 1.73% ) 431 page-faults # 0.003 K/sec ( +- 1.09% ) 298,556,520,546 cycles # 2.299 GHz ( +- 0.04% ) 96,525,366,833 instructions # 0.32 insn per cycle ( +- 0.04% ) 22,730,194,043 branches # 175.027 M/sec ( +- 0.04% ) 111,506,074 branch-misses # 0.49% of all branches ( +- 0.18% ) 8.183629778 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.04% ) ^^^^^^^^^^^ Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180213132911.GA24298@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 07:30:54 +08:00
spin_lock(&de->pde_unload_lock);
}
spin_unlock(&de->pde_unload_lock);
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}
static loff_t proc_reg_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *pde = PDE(file_inode(file));
loff_t rv = -EINVAL;
if (use_pde(pde)) {
loff_t (*llseek)(struct file *, loff_t, int);
llseek = pde->proc_fops->llseek;
if (!llseek)
llseek = default_llseek;
rv = llseek(file, offset, whence);
unuse_pde(pde);
}
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return rv;
}
static ssize_t proc_reg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
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{
ssize_t (*read)(struct file *, char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
struct proc_dir_entry *pde = PDE(file_inode(file));
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ssize_t rv = -EIO;
if (use_pde(pde)) {
read = pde->proc_fops->read;
if (read)
rv = read(file, buf, count, ppos);
unuse_pde(pde);
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}
return rv;
}
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static ssize_t proc_reg_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
ssize_t (*write)(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
struct proc_dir_entry *pde = PDE(file_inode(file));
ssize_t rv = -EIO;
if (use_pde(pde)) {
write = pde->proc_fops->write;
if (write)
rv = write(file, buf, count, ppos);
unuse_pde(pde);
}
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return rv;
}
static __poll_t proc_reg_poll(struct file *file, struct poll_table_struct *pts)
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{
struct proc_dir_entry *pde = PDE(file_inode(file));
__poll_t rv = DEFAULT_POLLMASK;
__poll_t (*poll)(struct file *, struct poll_table_struct *);
if (use_pde(pde)) {
poll = pde->proc_fops->poll;
if (poll)
rv = poll(file, pts);
unuse_pde(pde);
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}
return rv;
}
static long proc_reg_unlocked_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *pde = PDE(file_inode(file));
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long rv = -ENOTTY;
long (*ioctl)(struct file *, unsigned int, unsigned long);
if (use_pde(pde)) {
ioctl = pde->proc_fops->unlocked_ioctl;
if (ioctl)
rv = ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
unuse_pde(pde);
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}
return rv;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static long proc_reg_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *pde = PDE(file_inode(file));
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long rv = -ENOTTY;
long (*compat_ioctl)(struct file *, unsigned int, unsigned long);
if (use_pde(pde)) {
compat_ioctl = pde->proc_fops->compat_ioctl;
if (compat_ioctl)
rv = compat_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
unuse_pde(pde);
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}
return rv;
}
#endif
static int proc_reg_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *pde = PDE(file_inode(file));
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int rv = -EIO;
int (*mmap)(struct file *, struct vm_area_struct *);
if (use_pde(pde)) {
mmap = pde->proc_fops->mmap;
if (mmap)
rv = mmap(file, vma);
unuse_pde(pde);
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}
return rv;
}
static unsigned long
proc_reg_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long orig_addr,
unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *pde = PDE(file_inode(file));
unsigned long rv = -EIO;
if (use_pde(pde)) {
typeof(proc_reg_get_unmapped_area) *get_area;
get_area = pde->proc_fops->get_unmapped_area;
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
if (!get_area)
get_area = current->mm->get_unmapped_area;
#endif
if (get_area)
rv = get_area(file, orig_addr, len, pgoff, flags);
else
rv = orig_addr;
unuse_pde(pde);
}
return rv;
}
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static int proc_reg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *pde = PDE(inode);
int rv = 0;
int (*open)(struct inode *, struct file *);
int (*release)(struct inode *, struct file *);
struct pde_opener *pdeo;
/*
* Ensure that
* 1) PDE's ->release hook will be called no matter what
* either normally by close()/->release, or forcefully by
* rmmod/remove_proc_entry.
*
* 2) rmmod isn't blocked by opening file in /proc and sitting on
* the descriptor (including "rmmod foo </proc/foo" scenario).
*
* Save every "struct file" with custom ->release hook.
*/
if (!use_pde(pde))
return -ENOENT;
release = pde->proc_fops->release;
if (release) {
pdeo = kmem_cache_alloc(pde_opener_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pdeo) {
rv = -ENOMEM;
goto out_unuse;
}
}
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open = pde->proc_fops->open;
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if (open)
rv = open(inode, file);
if (release) {
if (rv == 0) {
/* To know what to release. */
pdeo->file = file;
pdeo->closing = false;
pdeo->c = NULL;
spin_lock(&pde->pde_unload_lock);
list_add(&pdeo->lh, &pde->pde_openers);
spin_unlock(&pde->pde_unload_lock);
} else
kmem_cache_free(pde_opener_cache, pdeo);
}
out_unuse:
unuse_pde(pde);
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return rv;
}
static int proc_reg_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *pde = PDE(inode);
struct pde_opener *pdeo;
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spin_lock(&pde->pde_unload_lock);
list_for_each_entry(pdeo, &pde->pde_openers, lh) {
if (pdeo->file == file) {
close_pdeo(pde, pdeo);
proc: do less stuff under ->pde_unload_lock Commit ca469f35a8e9ef ("deal with races between remove_proc_entry() and proc_reg_release()") moved too much stuff under ->pde_unload_lock making a problem described at series "[PATCH v5] procfs: Improve Scaling in proc" worse. While RCU is being figured out, move kfree() out of ->pde_unload_lock. On my potato, difference is only 0.5% speedup with concurrent open+read+close of /proc/cmdline, but the effect should be more noticeable on more capable machines. $ perf stat -r 16 -- ./proc-j 16 Performance counter stats for './proc-j 16' (16 runs): 130569.502377 task-clock (msec) # 15.872 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.05% ) 19,169 context-switches # 0.147 K/sec ( +- 0.18% ) 15 cpu-migrations # 0.000 K/sec ( +- 3.27% ) 437 page-faults # 0.003 K/sec ( +- 1.25% ) 300,172,097,675 cycles # 2.299 GHz ( +- 0.05% ) 96,793,267,308 instructions # 0.32 insn per cycle ( +- 0.04% ) 22,798,342,298 branches # 174.607 M/sec ( +- 0.04% ) 111,764,687 branch-misses # 0.49% of all branches ( +- 0.47% ) 8.226574400 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.05% ) ^^^^^^^^^^^ $ perf stat -r 16 -- ./proc-j 16 Performance counter stats for './proc-j 16' (16 runs): 129866.777392 task-clock (msec) # 15.869 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.04% ) 19,154 context-switches # 0.147 K/sec ( +- 0.66% ) 14 cpu-migrations # 0.000 K/sec ( +- 1.73% ) 431 page-faults # 0.003 K/sec ( +- 1.09% ) 298,556,520,546 cycles # 2.299 GHz ( +- 0.04% ) 96,525,366,833 instructions # 0.32 insn per cycle ( +- 0.04% ) 22,730,194,043 branches # 175.027 M/sec ( +- 0.04% ) 111,506,074 branch-misses # 0.49% of all branches ( +- 0.18% ) 8.183629778 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.04% ) ^^^^^^^^^^^ Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180213132911.GA24298@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 07:30:54 +08:00
return 0;
}
}
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spin_unlock(&pde->pde_unload_lock);
return 0;
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}
static const struct file_operations proc_reg_file_ops = {
.llseek = proc_reg_llseek,
.read = proc_reg_read,
.write = proc_reg_write,
.poll = proc_reg_poll,
.unlocked_ioctl = proc_reg_unlocked_ioctl,
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
.compat_ioctl = proc_reg_compat_ioctl,
#endif
.mmap = proc_reg_mmap,
.get_unmapped_area = proc_reg_get_unmapped_area,
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.open = proc_reg_open,
.release = proc_reg_release,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static const struct file_operations proc_reg_file_ops_no_compat = {
.llseek = proc_reg_llseek,
.read = proc_reg_read,
.write = proc_reg_write,
.poll = proc_reg_poll,
.unlocked_ioctl = proc_reg_unlocked_ioctl,
.mmap = proc_reg_mmap,
.get_unmapped_area = proc_reg_get_unmapped_area,
.open = proc_reg_open,
.release = proc_reg_release,
};
#endif
static void proc_put_link(void *p)
{
unuse_pde(p);
}
static const char *proc_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode,
struct delayed_call *done)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *pde = PDE(inode);
if (!use_pde(pde))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
set_delayed_call(done, proc_put_link, pde);
return pde->data;
}
const struct inode_operations proc_link_inode_operations = {
.get_link = proc_get_link,
};
struct inode *proc_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct proc_dir_entry *de)
{
struct inode *inode = new_inode_pseudo(sb);
if (inode) {
inode->i_ino = de->low_ino;
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
PROC_I(inode)->pde = de;
if (is_empty_pde(de)) {
make_empty_dir_inode(inode);
return inode;
}
if (de->mode) {
inode->i_mode = de->mode;
inode->i_uid = de->uid;
inode->i_gid = de->gid;
}
if (de->size)
inode->i_size = de->size;
if (de->nlink)
set_nlink(inode, de->nlink);
WARN_ON(!de->proc_iops);
inode->i_op = de->proc_iops;
if (de->proc_fops) {
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (!de->proc_fops->compat_ioctl)
inode->i_fop =
&proc_reg_file_ops_no_compat;
else
#endif
inode->i_fop = &proc_reg_file_ops;
} else {
inode->i_fop = de->proc_fops;
}
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}
} else
pde_put(de);
return inode;
}