linux/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug

68 lines
2.3 KiB
Plaintext
Raw Normal View History

# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
config PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR
bool "Write the current PID to the CONTEXTIDR register"
help
Enabling this option causes the kernel to write the current PID to
the CONTEXTIDR register, at the expense of some additional
instructions during context switch. Say Y here only if you are
planning to use hardware trace tools with this kernel.
config ARM64_RANDOMIZE_TEXT_OFFSET
bool "Randomize TEXT_OFFSET at build time"
help
Say Y here if you want the image load offset (AKA TEXT_OFFSET)
of the kernel to be randomized at build-time. When selected,
this option will cause TEXT_OFFSET to be randomized upon any
build of the kernel, and the offset will be reflected in the
text_offset field of the resulting Image. This can be used to
fuzz-test bootloaders which respect text_offset.
This option is intended for bootloader and/or kernel testing
only. Bootloaders must make no assumptions regarding the value
of TEXT_OFFSET and platforms must not require a specific
value.
config DEBUG_WX
bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot"
arm64: mm: convert mm/dump.c to use walk_page_range() Now walk_page_range() can walk kernel page tables, we can switch the arm64 ptdump code over to using it, simplifying the code. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191218162402.45610-22-steven.price@arm.com Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: "Liang, Kan" <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-02-04 09:36:29 +08:00
select PTDUMP_CORE
---help---
Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.
This is useful for discovering cases where the kernel is leaving
W+X mappings after applying NX, as such mappings are a security risk.
This check also includes UXN, which should be set on all kernel
mappings.
Look for a message in dmesg output like this:
arm64/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found.
or like this, if the check failed:
arm64/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, <N> W+X pages found.
Note that even if the check fails, your kernel is possibly
still fine, as W+X mappings are not a security hole in
themselves, what they do is that they make the exploitation
of other unfixed kernel bugs easier.
There is no runtime or memory usage effect of this option
once the kernel has booted up - it's a one time check.
If in doubt, say "Y".
config DEBUG_EFI
depends on EFI && DEBUG_INFO
bool "UEFI debugging"
help
Enable this option to include EFI specific debugging features into
the kernel that are only useful when using a debug build of the
UEFI firmware
config ARM64_RELOC_TEST
depends on m
tristate "Relocation testing module"
source "drivers/hwtracing/coresight/Kconfig"