linux/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c

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/*
* Debug helper to dump the current kernel pagetables of the system
* so that we can see what the various memory ranges are set to.
*
* (C) Copyright 2008 Intel Corporation
*
* Author: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; version 2
* of the License.
*/
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/kasan.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
/*
* The dumper groups pagetable entries of the same type into one, and for
* that it needs to keep some state when walking, and flush this state
* when a "break" in the continuity is found.
*/
struct pg_state {
int level;
pgprot_t current_prot;
unsigned long start_address;
unsigned long current_address;
const struct addr_marker *marker;
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which is not available in 64-bit mode. In checkin: b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work. This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF handler. (Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.) Special thanks to: - Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF. - Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing. - Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments. Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-30 07:46:09 +08:00
unsigned long lines;
bool to_dmesg;
x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings Warn on any residual W+X mappings after setting NX if DEBUG_WX is enabled. Introduce a separate X86_PTDUMP_CORE config that enables the code for dumping the page tables without enabling the debugfs interface, so that DEBUG_WX can be enabled without exposing the debugfs interface. Switch EFI_PGT_DUMP to using X86_PTDUMP_CORE so that it also does not require enabling the debugfs interface. On success it prints this to the kernel log: x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found. On failure it prints a warning and a count of the failed pages: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:226 note_page+0x610/0x7b0() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffffffff81755000/__stop___ex_table+0xfa8/0xabfa8 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff81380a5f>] dump_stack+0x44/0x55 [<ffffffff8109d3f2>] warn_slowpath_common+0x82/0xc0 [<ffffffff8109d48c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0x80 [<ffffffff8106cfc9>] ? note_page+0x5c9/0x7b0 [<ffffffff8106d010>] note_page+0x610/0x7b0 [<ffffffff8106d409>] ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core+0x259/0x3c0 [<ffffffff8106d5a7>] ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx+0x17/0x20 [<ffffffff81063905>] mark_rodata_ro+0xf5/0x100 [<ffffffff817415a0>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff817415bd>] kernel_init+0x1d/0xe0 [<ffffffff8174cd1f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [<ffffffff817415a0>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80 ---[ end trace a1f23a1e42a2ac76 ]--- x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 171 W+X pages found. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1444064120-11450-1-git-send-email-sds@tycho.nsa.gov [ Improved the Kconfig help text and made the new option default-y if CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y, because it already found buggy mappings, so we really want people to have this on by default. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-10-06 00:55:20 +08:00
bool check_wx;
unsigned long wx_pages;
};
struct addr_marker {
unsigned long start_address;
const char *name;
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which is not available in 64-bit mode. In checkin: b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work. This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF handler. (Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.) Special thanks to: - Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF. - Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing. - Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments. Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-30 07:46:09 +08:00
unsigned long max_lines;
};
/* indices for address_markers; keep sync'd w/ address_markers below */
enum address_markers_idx {
USER_SPACE_NR = 0,
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
KERNEL_SPACE_NR,
LOW_KERNEL_NR,
VMALLOC_START_NR,
VMEMMAP_START_NR,
x86/mm/ptdump: Add address marker for KASAN shadow region Annotate the KASAN shadow with address markers in page table dump output: $ cat /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables ... ---[ Vmemmap ]--- 0xffffea0000000000-0xffffea0003000000 48M RW PSE GLB NX pmd 0xffffea0003000000-0xffffea0004000000 16M pmd 0xffffea0004000000-0xffffea0005000000 16M RW PSE GLB NX pmd 0xffffea0005000000-0xffffea0040000000 944M pmd 0xffffea0040000000-0xffffea8000000000 511G pud 0xffffea8000000000-0xffffec0000000000 1536G pgd ---[ KASAN shadow ]--- 0xffffec0000000000-0xffffed0000000000 1T ro GLB NX pte 0xffffed0000000000-0xffffed0018000000 384M RW PSE GLB NX pmd 0xffffed0018000000-0xffffed0020000000 128M pmd 0xffffed0020000000-0xffffed0028200000 130M RW PSE GLB NX pmd 0xffffed0028200000-0xffffed0040000000 382M pmd 0xffffed0040000000-0xffffed8000000000 511G pud 0xffffed8000000000-0xfffff50000000000 7680G pgd 0xfffff50000000000-0xfffffbfff0000000 7339776M ro GLB NX pte 0xfffffbfff0000000-0xfffffbfff0200000 2M pmd 0xfffffbfff0200000-0xfffffbfff0a00000 8M RW PSE GLB NX pmd 0xfffffbfff0a00000-0xfffffbffffe00000 244M pmd 0xfffffbffffe00000-0xfffffc0000000000 2M ro GLB NX pte ---[ KASAN shadow end ]--- 0xfffffc0000000000-0xffffff0000000000 3T pgd ---[ ESPfix Area ]--- ... Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: Tobias Regnery <tobias.regnery@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170214100839.17186-2-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-02-14 18:08:39 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
KASAN_SHADOW_START_NR,
KASAN_SHADOW_END_NR,
#endif
# ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which is not available in 64-bit mode. In checkin: b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work. This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF handler. (Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.) Special thanks to: - Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF. - Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing. - Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments. Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-30 07:46:09 +08:00
ESPFIX_START_NR,
# endif
HIGH_KERNEL_NR,
MODULES_VADDR_NR,
MODULES_END_NR,
#else
KERNEL_SPACE_NR,
VMALLOC_START_NR,
VMALLOC_END_NR,
# ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM
PKMAP_BASE_NR,
# endif
FIXADDR_START_NR,
#endif
};
/* Address space markers hints */
static struct addr_marker address_markers[] = {
{ 0, "User Space" },
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
{ 0x8000000000000000UL, "Kernel Space" },
x86/mm: Implement ASLR for kernel memory regions Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory regions for x86_64. This first patch adds the infrastructure and does not randomize any region. The following patches will randomize the physical memory mapping, vmalloc and vmemmap regions. This security feature mitigates exploits relying on predictable kernel addresses. These addresses can be used to disclose the kernel modules base addresses or corrupt specific structures to elevate privileges bypassing the current implementation of KASLR. This feature can be enabled with the CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY option. The order of each memory region is not changed. The feature looks at the available space for the regions based on different configuration options and randomizes the base and space between each. The size of the physical memory mapping is the available physical memory. No performance impact was detected while testing the feature. Entropy is generated using the KASLR early boot functions now shared in the lib directory (originally written by Kees Cook). Randomization is done on PGD & PUD page table levels to increase possible addresses. The physical memory mapping code was adapted to support PUD level virtual addresses. This implementation on the best configuration provides 30,000 possible virtual addresses in average for each memory region. An additional low memory page is used to ensure each CPU can start with a PGD aligned virtual address (for realmode). x86/dump_pagetable was updated to correctly display each region. Updated documentation on x86_64 memory layout accordingly. Performance data, after all patches in the series: Kernbench shows almost no difference (-+ less than 1%): Before: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.63 (1.2695) User Time 1034.89 (1.18115) System Time 87.056 (0.456416) Percent CPU 1092.9 (13.892) Context Switches 199805 (3455.33) Sleeps 97907.8 (900.636) After: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.489 (1.10636) User Time 1034.86 (1.36053) System Time 87.764 (0.49345) Percent CPU 1095 (12.7715) Context Switches 199036 (4298.1) Sleeps 97681.6 (1031.11) Hackbench shows 0% difference on average (hackbench 90 repeated 10 times): attemp,before,after 1,0.076,0.069 2,0.072,0.069 3,0.066,0.066 4,0.066,0.068 5,0.066,0.067 6,0.066,0.069 7,0.067,0.066 8,0.063,0.067 9,0.067,0.065 10,0.068,0.071 average,0.0677,0.0677 Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-22 08:47:02 +08:00
{ 0/* PAGE_OFFSET */, "Low Kernel Mapping" },
{ 0/* VMALLOC_START */, "vmalloc() Area" },
{ 0/* VMEMMAP_START */, "Vmemmap" },
x86/mm/ptdump: Add address marker for KASAN shadow region Annotate the KASAN shadow with address markers in page table dump output: $ cat /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables ... ---[ Vmemmap ]--- 0xffffea0000000000-0xffffea0003000000 48M RW PSE GLB NX pmd 0xffffea0003000000-0xffffea0004000000 16M pmd 0xffffea0004000000-0xffffea0005000000 16M RW PSE GLB NX pmd 0xffffea0005000000-0xffffea0040000000 944M pmd 0xffffea0040000000-0xffffea8000000000 511G pud 0xffffea8000000000-0xffffec0000000000 1536G pgd ---[ KASAN shadow ]--- 0xffffec0000000000-0xffffed0000000000 1T ro GLB NX pte 0xffffed0000000000-0xffffed0018000000 384M RW PSE GLB NX pmd 0xffffed0018000000-0xffffed0020000000 128M pmd 0xffffed0020000000-0xffffed0028200000 130M RW PSE GLB NX pmd 0xffffed0028200000-0xffffed0040000000 382M pmd 0xffffed0040000000-0xffffed8000000000 511G pud 0xffffed8000000000-0xfffff50000000000 7680G pgd 0xfffff50000000000-0xfffffbfff0000000 7339776M ro GLB NX pte 0xfffffbfff0000000-0xfffffbfff0200000 2M pmd 0xfffffbfff0200000-0xfffffbfff0a00000 8M RW PSE GLB NX pmd 0xfffffbfff0a00000-0xfffffbffffe00000 244M pmd 0xfffffbffffe00000-0xfffffc0000000000 2M ro GLB NX pte ---[ KASAN shadow end ]--- 0xfffffc0000000000-0xffffff0000000000 3T pgd ---[ ESPfix Area ]--- ... Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: Tobias Regnery <tobias.regnery@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170214100839.17186-2-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-02-14 18:08:39 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
{ KASAN_SHADOW_START, "KASAN shadow" },
{ KASAN_SHADOW_END, "KASAN shadow end" },
#endif
# ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which is not available in 64-bit mode. In checkin: b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work. This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF handler. (Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.) Special thanks to: - Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF. - Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing. - Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments. Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-30 07:46:09 +08:00
{ ESPFIX_BASE_ADDR, "ESPfix Area", 16 },
# endif
# ifdef CONFIG_EFI
{ EFI_VA_END, "EFI Runtime Services" },
# endif
{ __START_KERNEL_map, "High Kernel Mapping" },
{ MODULES_VADDR, "Modules" },
{ MODULES_END, "End Modules" },
#else
{ PAGE_OFFSET, "Kernel Mapping" },
{ 0/* VMALLOC_START */, "vmalloc() Area" },
{ 0/*VMALLOC_END*/, "vmalloc() End" },
# ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM
{ 0/*PKMAP_BASE*/, "Persistent kmap() Area" },
# endif
{ 0/*FIXADDR_START*/, "Fixmap Area" },
#endif
{ -1, NULL } /* End of list */
};
/* Multipliers for offsets within the PTEs */
#define PTE_LEVEL_MULT (PAGE_SIZE)
#define PMD_LEVEL_MULT (PTRS_PER_PTE * PTE_LEVEL_MULT)
#define PUD_LEVEL_MULT (PTRS_PER_PMD * PMD_LEVEL_MULT)
#define P4D_LEVEL_MULT (PTRS_PER_PUD * PUD_LEVEL_MULT)
#define PGD_LEVEL_MULT (PTRS_PER_P4D * P4D_LEVEL_MULT)
#define pt_dump_seq_printf(m, to_dmesg, fmt, args...) \
({ \
if (to_dmesg) \
printk(KERN_INFO fmt, ##args); \
else \
if (m) \
seq_printf(m, fmt, ##args); \
})
#define pt_dump_cont_printf(m, to_dmesg, fmt, args...) \
({ \
if (to_dmesg) \
printk(KERN_CONT fmt, ##args); \
else \
if (m) \
seq_printf(m, fmt, ##args); \
})
/*
* Print a readable form of a pgprot_t to the seq_file
*/
static void printk_prot(struct seq_file *m, pgprot_t prot, int level, bool dmsg)
{
pgprotval_t pr = pgprot_val(prot);
static const char * const level_name[] =
{ "cr3", "pgd", "p4d", "pud", "pmd", "pte" };
if (!pgprot_val(prot)) {
/* Not present */
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, " ");
} else {
if (pr & _PAGE_USER)
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, "USR ");
else
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, " ");
if (pr & _PAGE_RW)
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, "RW ");
else
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, "ro ");
if (pr & _PAGE_PWT)
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, "PWT ");
else
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, " ");
if (pr & _PAGE_PCD)
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, "PCD ");
else
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, " ");
/* Bit 7 has a different meaning on level 3 vs 4 */
if (level <= 4 && pr & _PAGE_PSE)
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, "PSE ");
else
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, " ");
if ((level == 5 && pr & _PAGE_PAT) ||
((level == 4 || level == 3) && pr & _PAGE_PAT_LARGE))
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, "PAT ");
else
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, " ");
if (pr & _PAGE_GLOBAL)
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, "GLB ");
else
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, " ");
if (pr & _PAGE_NX)
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, "NX ");
else
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, "x ");
}
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, "%s\n", level_name[level]);
}
/*
* On 64 bits, sign-extend the 48 bit address to 64 bit
*/
static unsigned long normalize_addr(unsigned long u)
{
int shift;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
return u;
shift = 64 - (__VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT + 1);
return (signed long)(u << shift) >> shift;
}
/*
* This function gets called on a break in a continuous series
* of PTE entries; the next one is different so we need to
* print what we collected so far.
*/
static void note_page(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st,
pgprot_t new_prot, int level)
{
pgprotval_t prot, cur;
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which is not available in 64-bit mode. In checkin: b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work. This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF handler. (Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.) Special thanks to: - Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF. - Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing. - Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments. Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-30 07:46:09 +08:00
static const char units[] = "BKMGTPE";
/*
* If we have a "break" in the series, we need to flush the state that
* we have now. "break" is either changing perms, levels or
* address space marker.
*/
prot = pgprot_val(new_prot);
cur = pgprot_val(st->current_prot);
if (!st->level) {
/* First entry */
st->current_prot = new_prot;
st->level = level;
st->marker = address_markers;
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which is not available in 64-bit mode. In checkin: b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work. This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF handler. (Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.) Special thanks to: - Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF. - Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing. - Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments. Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-30 07:46:09 +08:00
st->lines = 0;
pt_dump_seq_printf(m, st->to_dmesg, "---[ %s ]---\n",
st->marker->name);
} else if (prot != cur || level != st->level ||
st->current_address >= st->marker[1].start_address) {
const char *unit = units;
unsigned long delta;
int width = sizeof(unsigned long) * 2;
x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings Warn on any residual W+X mappings after setting NX if DEBUG_WX is enabled. Introduce a separate X86_PTDUMP_CORE config that enables the code for dumping the page tables without enabling the debugfs interface, so that DEBUG_WX can be enabled without exposing the debugfs interface. Switch EFI_PGT_DUMP to using X86_PTDUMP_CORE so that it also does not require enabling the debugfs interface. On success it prints this to the kernel log: x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found. On failure it prints a warning and a count of the failed pages: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:226 note_page+0x610/0x7b0() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffffffff81755000/__stop___ex_table+0xfa8/0xabfa8 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff81380a5f>] dump_stack+0x44/0x55 [<ffffffff8109d3f2>] warn_slowpath_common+0x82/0xc0 [<ffffffff8109d48c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0x80 [<ffffffff8106cfc9>] ? note_page+0x5c9/0x7b0 [<ffffffff8106d010>] note_page+0x610/0x7b0 [<ffffffff8106d409>] ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core+0x259/0x3c0 [<ffffffff8106d5a7>] ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx+0x17/0x20 [<ffffffff81063905>] mark_rodata_ro+0xf5/0x100 [<ffffffff817415a0>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff817415bd>] kernel_init+0x1d/0xe0 [<ffffffff8174cd1f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [<ffffffff817415a0>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80 ---[ end trace a1f23a1e42a2ac76 ]--- x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 171 W+X pages found. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1444064120-11450-1-git-send-email-sds@tycho.nsa.gov [ Improved the Kconfig help text and made the new option default-y if CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y, because it already found buggy mappings, so we really want people to have this on by default. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-10-06 00:55:20 +08:00
pgprotval_t pr = pgprot_val(st->current_prot);
if (st->check_wx && (pr & _PAGE_RW) && !(pr & _PAGE_NX)) {
WARN_ONCE(1,
"x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address %p/%pS\n",
(void *)st->start_address,
(void *)st->start_address);
st->wx_pages += (st->current_address -
st->start_address) / PAGE_SIZE;
}
/*
* Now print the actual finished series
*/
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which is not available in 64-bit mode. In checkin: b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work. This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF handler. (Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.) Special thanks to: - Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF. - Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing. - Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments. Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-30 07:46:09 +08:00
if (!st->marker->max_lines ||
st->lines < st->marker->max_lines) {
pt_dump_seq_printf(m, st->to_dmesg,
"0x%0*lx-0x%0*lx ",
width, st->start_address,
width, st->current_address);
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which is not available in 64-bit mode. In checkin: b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work. This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF handler. (Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.) Special thanks to: - Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF. - Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing. - Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments. Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-30 07:46:09 +08:00
delta = st->current_address - st->start_address;
while (!(delta & 1023) && unit[1]) {
delta >>= 10;
unit++;
}
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, st->to_dmesg, "%9lu%c ",
delta, *unit);
printk_prot(m, st->current_prot, st->level,
st->to_dmesg);
}
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which is not available in 64-bit mode. In checkin: b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work. This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF handler. (Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.) Special thanks to: - Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF. - Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing. - Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments. Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-30 07:46:09 +08:00
st->lines++;
/*
* We print markers for special areas of address space,
* such as the start of vmalloc space etc.
* This helps in the interpretation.
*/
if (st->current_address >= st->marker[1].start_address) {
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which is not available in 64-bit mode. In checkin: b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work. This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF handler. (Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.) Special thanks to: - Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF. - Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing. - Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments. Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-30 07:46:09 +08:00
if (st->marker->max_lines &&
st->lines > st->marker->max_lines) {
unsigned long nskip =
st->lines - st->marker->max_lines;
pt_dump_seq_printf(m, st->to_dmesg,
"... %lu entr%s skipped ... \n",
nskip,
nskip == 1 ? "y" : "ies");
}
st->marker++;
x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which is not available in 64-bit mode. In checkin: b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work. This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF handler. (Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.) Special thanks to: - Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF. - Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing. - Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments. Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
2014-04-30 07:46:09 +08:00
st->lines = 0;
pt_dump_seq_printf(m, st->to_dmesg, "---[ %s ]---\n",
st->marker->name);
}
st->start_address = st->current_address;
st->current_prot = new_prot;
st->level = level;
}
}
static void walk_pte_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, pmd_t addr, unsigned long P)
{
int i;
pte_t *start;
pgprotval_t prot;
start = (pte_t *)pmd_page_vaddr(addr);
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++) {
prot = pte_flags(*start);
st->current_address = normalize_addr(P + i * PTE_LEVEL_MULT);
note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 5);
start++;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
/*
* This is an optimization for KASAN=y case. Since all kasan page tables
* eventually point to the kasan_zero_page we could call note_page()
* right away without walking through lower level page tables. This saves
* us dozens of seconds (minutes for 5-level config) while checking for
* W+X mapping or reading kernel_page_tables debugfs file.
*/
static inline bool kasan_page_table(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st,
void *pt)
{
if (__pa(pt) == __pa(kasan_zero_pmd) ||
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
__pa(pt) == __pa(kasan_zero_p4d) ||
#endif
__pa(pt) == __pa(kasan_zero_pud)) {
pgprotval_t prot = pte_flags(kasan_zero_pte[0]);
note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 5);
return true;
}
return false;
}
#else
static inline bool kasan_page_table(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st,
void *pt)
{
return false;
}
#endif
#if PTRS_PER_PMD > 1
static void walk_pmd_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, pud_t addr, unsigned long P)
{
int i;
pmd_t *start, *pmd_start;
pgprotval_t prot;
pmd_start = start = (pmd_t *)pud_page_vaddr(addr);
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++) {
st->current_address = normalize_addr(P + i * PMD_LEVEL_MULT);
if (!pmd_none(*start)) {
if (pmd_large(*start) || !pmd_present(*start)) {
prot = pmd_flags(*start);
note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 4);
} else if (!kasan_page_table(m, st, pmd_start)) {
walk_pte_level(m, st, *start,
P + i * PMD_LEVEL_MULT);
}
} else
note_page(m, st, __pgprot(0), 4);
start++;
}
}
#else
#define walk_pmd_level(m,s,a,p) walk_pte_level(m,s,__pmd(pud_val(a)),p)
#define pud_large(a) pmd_large(__pmd(pud_val(a)))
#define pud_none(a) pmd_none(__pmd(pud_val(a)))
#endif
#if PTRS_PER_PUD > 1
static void walk_pud_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, p4d_t addr, unsigned long P)
{
int i;
pud_t *start, *pud_start;
pgprotval_t prot;
pud_t *prev_pud = NULL;
pud_start = start = (pud_t *)p4d_page_vaddr(addr);
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PUD; i++) {
st->current_address = normalize_addr(P + i * PUD_LEVEL_MULT);
if (!pud_none(*start)) {
if (pud_large(*start) || !pud_present(*start)) {
prot = pud_flags(*start);
note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 3);
} else if (!kasan_page_table(m, st, pud_start)) {
walk_pmd_level(m, st, *start,
P + i * PUD_LEVEL_MULT);
}
} else
note_page(m, st, __pgprot(0), 3);
prev_pud = start;
start++;
}
}
#else
#define walk_pud_level(m,s,a,p) walk_pmd_level(m,s,__pud(p4d_val(a)),p)
#define p4d_large(a) pud_large(__pud(p4d_val(a)))
#define p4d_none(a) pud_none(__pud(p4d_val(a)))
#endif
#if PTRS_PER_P4D > 1
static void walk_p4d_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, pgd_t addr, unsigned long P)
{
int i;
p4d_t *start, *p4d_start;
pgprotval_t prot;
p4d_start = start = (p4d_t *)pgd_page_vaddr(addr);
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_P4D; i++) {
st->current_address = normalize_addr(P + i * P4D_LEVEL_MULT);
if (!p4d_none(*start)) {
if (p4d_large(*start) || !p4d_present(*start)) {
prot = p4d_flags(*start);
note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 2);
} else if (!kasan_page_table(m, st, p4d_start)) {
walk_pud_level(m, st, *start,
P + i * P4D_LEVEL_MULT);
}
} else
note_page(m, st, __pgprot(0), 2);
start++;
}
}
#else
#define walk_p4d_level(m,s,a,p) walk_pud_level(m,s,__p4d(pgd_val(a)),p)
#define pgd_large(a) p4d_large(__p4d(pgd_val(a)))
#define pgd_none(a) p4d_none(__p4d(pgd_val(a)))
#endif
static inline bool is_hypervisor_range(int idx)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* ffff800000000000 - ffff87ffffffffff is reserved for
* the hypervisor.
*/
return (idx >= pgd_index(__PAGE_OFFSET) - 16) &&
(idx < pgd_index(__PAGE_OFFSET));
#else
return false;
#endif
}
x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings Warn on any residual W+X mappings after setting NX if DEBUG_WX is enabled. Introduce a separate X86_PTDUMP_CORE config that enables the code for dumping the page tables without enabling the debugfs interface, so that DEBUG_WX can be enabled without exposing the debugfs interface. Switch EFI_PGT_DUMP to using X86_PTDUMP_CORE so that it also does not require enabling the debugfs interface. On success it prints this to the kernel log: x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found. On failure it prints a warning and a count of the failed pages: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:226 note_page+0x610/0x7b0() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffffffff81755000/__stop___ex_table+0xfa8/0xabfa8 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff81380a5f>] dump_stack+0x44/0x55 [<ffffffff8109d3f2>] warn_slowpath_common+0x82/0xc0 [<ffffffff8109d48c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0x80 [<ffffffff8106cfc9>] ? note_page+0x5c9/0x7b0 [<ffffffff8106d010>] note_page+0x610/0x7b0 [<ffffffff8106d409>] ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core+0x259/0x3c0 [<ffffffff8106d5a7>] ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx+0x17/0x20 [<ffffffff81063905>] mark_rodata_ro+0xf5/0x100 [<ffffffff817415a0>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff817415bd>] kernel_init+0x1d/0xe0 [<ffffffff8174cd1f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [<ffffffff817415a0>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80 ---[ end trace a1f23a1e42a2ac76 ]--- x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 171 W+X pages found. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1444064120-11450-1-git-send-email-sds@tycho.nsa.gov [ Improved the Kconfig help text and made the new option default-y if CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y, because it already found buggy mappings, so we really want people to have this on by default. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-10-06 00:55:20 +08:00
static void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd,
bool checkwx)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
pgd_t *start = (pgd_t *) &init_top_pgt;
#else
pgd_t *start = swapper_pg_dir;
#endif
pgprotval_t prot;
int i;
struct pg_state st = {};
if (pgd) {
start = pgd;
st.to_dmesg = true;
}
x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings Warn on any residual W+X mappings after setting NX if DEBUG_WX is enabled. Introduce a separate X86_PTDUMP_CORE config that enables the code for dumping the page tables without enabling the debugfs interface, so that DEBUG_WX can be enabled without exposing the debugfs interface. Switch EFI_PGT_DUMP to using X86_PTDUMP_CORE so that it also does not require enabling the debugfs interface. On success it prints this to the kernel log: x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found. On failure it prints a warning and a count of the failed pages: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:226 note_page+0x610/0x7b0() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffffffff81755000/__stop___ex_table+0xfa8/0xabfa8 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff81380a5f>] dump_stack+0x44/0x55 [<ffffffff8109d3f2>] warn_slowpath_common+0x82/0xc0 [<ffffffff8109d48c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0x80 [<ffffffff8106cfc9>] ? note_page+0x5c9/0x7b0 [<ffffffff8106d010>] note_page+0x610/0x7b0 [<ffffffff8106d409>] ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core+0x259/0x3c0 [<ffffffff8106d5a7>] ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx+0x17/0x20 [<ffffffff81063905>] mark_rodata_ro+0xf5/0x100 [<ffffffff817415a0>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff817415bd>] kernel_init+0x1d/0xe0 [<ffffffff8174cd1f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [<ffffffff817415a0>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80 ---[ end trace a1f23a1e42a2ac76 ]--- x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 171 W+X pages found. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1444064120-11450-1-git-send-email-sds@tycho.nsa.gov [ Improved the Kconfig help text and made the new option default-y if CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y, because it already found buggy mappings, so we really want people to have this on by default. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-10-06 00:55:20 +08:00
st.check_wx = checkwx;
if (checkwx)
st.wx_pages = 0;
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PGD; i++) {
st.current_address = normalize_addr(i * PGD_LEVEL_MULT);
if (!pgd_none(*start) && !is_hypervisor_range(i)) {
if (pgd_large(*start) || !pgd_present(*start)) {
prot = pgd_flags(*start);
note_page(m, &st, __pgprot(prot), 1);
} else {
walk_p4d_level(m, &st, *start,
i * PGD_LEVEL_MULT);
}
} else
note_page(m, &st, __pgprot(0), 1);
cond_resched();
start++;
}
/* Flush out the last page */
st.current_address = normalize_addr(PTRS_PER_PGD*PGD_LEVEL_MULT);
note_page(m, &st, __pgprot(0), 0);
x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings Warn on any residual W+X mappings after setting NX if DEBUG_WX is enabled. Introduce a separate X86_PTDUMP_CORE config that enables the code for dumping the page tables without enabling the debugfs interface, so that DEBUG_WX can be enabled without exposing the debugfs interface. Switch EFI_PGT_DUMP to using X86_PTDUMP_CORE so that it also does not require enabling the debugfs interface. On success it prints this to the kernel log: x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found. On failure it prints a warning and a count of the failed pages: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:226 note_page+0x610/0x7b0() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffffffff81755000/__stop___ex_table+0xfa8/0xabfa8 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff81380a5f>] dump_stack+0x44/0x55 [<ffffffff8109d3f2>] warn_slowpath_common+0x82/0xc0 [<ffffffff8109d48c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0x80 [<ffffffff8106cfc9>] ? note_page+0x5c9/0x7b0 [<ffffffff8106d010>] note_page+0x610/0x7b0 [<ffffffff8106d409>] ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core+0x259/0x3c0 [<ffffffff8106d5a7>] ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx+0x17/0x20 [<ffffffff81063905>] mark_rodata_ro+0xf5/0x100 [<ffffffff817415a0>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff817415bd>] kernel_init+0x1d/0xe0 [<ffffffff8174cd1f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [<ffffffff817415a0>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80 ---[ end trace a1f23a1e42a2ac76 ]--- x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 171 W+X pages found. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1444064120-11450-1-git-send-email-sds@tycho.nsa.gov [ Improved the Kconfig help text and made the new option default-y if CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y, because it already found buggy mappings, so we really want people to have this on by default. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-10-06 00:55:20 +08:00
if (!checkwx)
return;
if (st.wx_pages)
pr_info("x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, %lu W+X pages found.\n",
st.wx_pages);
else
pr_info("x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found.\n");
}
void ptdump_walk_pgd_level(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd)
{
ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(m, pgd, false);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ptdump_walk_pgd_level);
x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings Warn on any residual W+X mappings after setting NX if DEBUG_WX is enabled. Introduce a separate X86_PTDUMP_CORE config that enables the code for dumping the page tables without enabling the debugfs interface, so that DEBUG_WX can be enabled without exposing the debugfs interface. Switch EFI_PGT_DUMP to using X86_PTDUMP_CORE so that it also does not require enabling the debugfs interface. On success it prints this to the kernel log: x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found. On failure it prints a warning and a count of the failed pages: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:226 note_page+0x610/0x7b0() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffffffff81755000/__stop___ex_table+0xfa8/0xabfa8 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff81380a5f>] dump_stack+0x44/0x55 [<ffffffff8109d3f2>] warn_slowpath_common+0x82/0xc0 [<ffffffff8109d48c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0x80 [<ffffffff8106cfc9>] ? note_page+0x5c9/0x7b0 [<ffffffff8106d010>] note_page+0x610/0x7b0 [<ffffffff8106d409>] ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core+0x259/0x3c0 [<ffffffff8106d5a7>] ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx+0x17/0x20 [<ffffffff81063905>] mark_rodata_ro+0xf5/0x100 [<ffffffff817415a0>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff817415bd>] kernel_init+0x1d/0xe0 [<ffffffff8174cd1f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [<ffffffff817415a0>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80 ---[ end trace a1f23a1e42a2ac76 ]--- x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 171 W+X pages found. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1444064120-11450-1-git-send-email-sds@tycho.nsa.gov [ Improved the Kconfig help text and made the new option default-y if CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y, because it already found buggy mappings, so we really want people to have this on by default. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-10-06 00:55:20 +08:00
void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx(void)
{
ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(NULL, NULL, true);
}
static int __init pt_dump_init(void)
{
x86/mm: Implement ASLR for kernel memory regions Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory regions for x86_64. This first patch adds the infrastructure and does not randomize any region. The following patches will randomize the physical memory mapping, vmalloc and vmemmap regions. This security feature mitigates exploits relying on predictable kernel addresses. These addresses can be used to disclose the kernel modules base addresses or corrupt specific structures to elevate privileges bypassing the current implementation of KASLR. This feature can be enabled with the CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY option. The order of each memory region is not changed. The feature looks at the available space for the regions based on different configuration options and randomizes the base and space between each. The size of the physical memory mapping is the available physical memory. No performance impact was detected while testing the feature. Entropy is generated using the KASLR early boot functions now shared in the lib directory (originally written by Kees Cook). Randomization is done on PGD & PUD page table levels to increase possible addresses. The physical memory mapping code was adapted to support PUD level virtual addresses. This implementation on the best configuration provides 30,000 possible virtual addresses in average for each memory region. An additional low memory page is used to ensure each CPU can start with a PGD aligned virtual address (for realmode). x86/dump_pagetable was updated to correctly display each region. Updated documentation on x86_64 memory layout accordingly. Performance data, after all patches in the series: Kernbench shows almost no difference (-+ less than 1%): Before: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.63 (1.2695) User Time 1034.89 (1.18115) System Time 87.056 (0.456416) Percent CPU 1092.9 (13.892) Context Switches 199805 (3455.33) Sleeps 97907.8 (900.636) After: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.489 (1.10636) User Time 1034.86 (1.36053) System Time 87.764 (0.49345) Percent CPU 1095 (12.7715) Context Switches 199036 (4298.1) Sleeps 97681.6 (1031.11) Hackbench shows 0% difference on average (hackbench 90 repeated 10 times): attemp,before,after 1,0.076,0.069 2,0.072,0.069 3,0.066,0.066 4,0.066,0.068 5,0.066,0.067 6,0.066,0.069 7,0.067,0.066 8,0.063,0.067 9,0.067,0.065 10,0.068,0.071 average,0.0677,0.0677 Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-22 08:47:02 +08:00
/*
* Various markers are not compile-time constants, so assign them
* here.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
address_markers[LOW_KERNEL_NR].start_address = PAGE_OFFSET;
address_markers[VMALLOC_START_NR].start_address = VMALLOC_START;
address_markers[VMEMMAP_START_NR].start_address = VMEMMAP_START;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
address_markers[VMALLOC_START_NR].start_address = VMALLOC_START;
address_markers[VMALLOC_END_NR].start_address = VMALLOC_END;
# ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM
address_markers[PKMAP_BASE_NR].start_address = PKMAP_BASE;
# endif
address_markers[FIXADDR_START_NR].start_address = FIXADDR_START;
#endif
return 0;
}
__initcall(pt_dump_init);