linux/security/tomoyo/Kconfig

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# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
config SECURITY_TOMOYO
bool "TOMOYO Linux Support"
depends on SECURITY
depends on NET
select SECURITYFS
select SECURITY_PATH
select SECURITY_NETWORK
select SRCU
select BUILD_BIN2C
default n
help
This selects TOMOYO Linux, pathname-based access control.
Required userspace tools and further information may be
found at <http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/>.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config SECURITY_TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY
int "Default maximal count for learning mode"
default 2048
range 0 2147483647
depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO
help
This is the default value for maximal ACL entries
that are automatically appended into policy at "learning mode".
Some programs access thousands of objects, so running
such programs in "learning mode" dulls the system response
and consumes much memory.
This is the safeguard for such programs.
config SECURITY_TOMOYO_MAX_AUDIT_LOG
int "Default maximal count for audit log"
default 1024
range 0 2147483647
depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO
help
This is the default value for maximal entries for
audit logs that the kernel can hold on memory.
You can read the log via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit.
If you don't need audit logs, you may set this value to 0.
config SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER
bool "Activate without calling userspace policy loader."
default n
depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO
---help---
Say Y here if you want to activate access control as soon as built-in
policy was loaded. This option will be useful for systems where
operations which can lead to the hijacking of the boot sequence are
needed before loading the policy. For example, you can activate
immediately after loading the fixed part of policy which will allow
only operations needed for mounting a partition which contains the
variant part of policy and verifying (e.g. running GPG check) and
loading the variant part of policy. Since you can start using
enforcing mode from the beginning, you can reduce the possibility of
hijacking the boot sequence.
config SECURITY_TOMOYO_POLICY_LOADER
string "Location of userspace policy loader"
default "/sbin/tomoyo-init"
depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO
depends on !SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER
---help---
This is the default pathname of policy loader which is called before
activation. You can override this setting via TOMOYO_loader= kernel
command line option.
config SECURITY_TOMOYO_ACTIVATION_TRIGGER
string "Trigger for calling userspace policy loader"
default "/sbin/init"
depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO
depends on !SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER
---help---
This is the default pathname of activation trigger.
You can override this setting via TOMOYO_trigger= kernel command line
option. For example, if you pass init=/bin/systemd option, you may
want to also pass TOMOYO_trigger=/bin/systemd option.
config SECURITY_TOMOYO_INSECURE_BUILTIN_SETTING
bool "Use insecure built-in settings for fuzzing tests."
default n
depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO
select SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER
help
Enabling this option forces minimal built-in policy and disables
domain/program checks for run-time policy modifications. Please enable
this option only if this kernel is built for doing fuzzing tests.