linux/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* x86_64 specific EFI support functions
* Based on Extensible Firmware Interface Specification version 1.0
*
* Copyright (C) 2005-2008 Intel Co.
* Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
* Bibo Mao <bibo.mao@intel.com>
* Chandramouli Narayanan <mouli@linux.intel.com>
* Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
*
* Code to convert EFI to E820 map has been implemented in elilo bootloader
* based on a EFI patch by Edgar Hucek. Based on the E820 map, the page table
* is setup appropriately for EFI runtime code.
* - mouli 06/14/2007.
*
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "efi: " fmt
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/bootmem.h>
#include <linux/ioport.h>
#include <linux/mc146818rtc.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/ucs2_string.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/proto.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
#include <asm/realmode.h>
#include <asm/time.h>
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:34 +08:00
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
/*
* We allocate runtime services regions top-down, starting from -4G, i.e.
* 0xffff_ffff_0000_0000 and limit EFI VA mapping space to 64G.
*/
static u64 efi_va = EFI_VA_START;
x86/efi: Hoist page table switching code into efi_call_virt() This change is a prerequisite for pending patches that switch to a dedicated EFI page table, instead of using 'trampoline_pgd' which shares PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. The pending patches make it impossible to dereference the runtime service function pointer without first switching %cr3. It's true that we now have duplicated switching code in efi_call_virt() and efi_call_phys_{prolog,epilog}() but we are sacrificing code duplication for a little more clarity and the ease of writing the page table switching code in C instead of asm. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-5-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:33 +08:00
struct efi_scratch efi_scratch;
static void __init early_code_mapping_set_exec(int executable)
{
efi_memory_desc_t *md;
if (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX))
return;
x86, efi: Retain boot service code until after switching to virtual mode UEFI stands for "Unified Extensible Firmware Interface", where "Firmware" is an ancient African word meaning "Why do something right when you can do it so wrong that children will weep and brave adults will cower before you", and "UEI" is Celtic for "We missed DOS so we burned it into your ROMs". The UEFI specification provides for runtime services (ie, another way for the operating system to be forced to depend on the firmware) and we rely on these for certain trivial tasks such as setting up the bootloader. But some hardware fails to work if we attempt to use these runtime services from physical mode, and so we have to switch into virtual mode. So far so dreadful. The specification makes it clear that the operating system is free to do whatever it wants with boot services code after ExitBootServices() has been called. SetVirtualAddressMap() can't be called until ExitBootServices() has been. So, obviously, a whole bunch of EFI implementations call into boot services code when we do that. Since we've been charmingly naive and trusted that the specification may be somehow relevant to the real world, we've already stuffed a picture of a penguin or something in that address space. And just to make things more entertaining, we've also marked it non-executable. This patch allocates the boot services regions during EFI init and makes sure that they're executable. Then, after SetVirtualAddressMap(), it discards them and everyone lives happily ever after. Except for the ones who have to work on EFI, who live sad lives haunted by the knowledge that someone's eventually going to write yet another firmware specification. [ hpa: adding this to urgent with a stable tag since it fixes currently-broken hardware. However, I do not know what the dependencies are and so I do not know which -stable versions this may be a candidate for. ] Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1306331593-28715-1-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
2011-05-25 21:53:13 +08:00
/* Make EFI service code area executable */
for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) {
x86, efi: Retain boot service code until after switching to virtual mode UEFI stands for "Unified Extensible Firmware Interface", where "Firmware" is an ancient African word meaning "Why do something right when you can do it so wrong that children will weep and brave adults will cower before you", and "UEI" is Celtic for "We missed DOS so we burned it into your ROMs". The UEFI specification provides for runtime services (ie, another way for the operating system to be forced to depend on the firmware) and we rely on these for certain trivial tasks such as setting up the bootloader. But some hardware fails to work if we attempt to use these runtime services from physical mode, and so we have to switch into virtual mode. So far so dreadful. The specification makes it clear that the operating system is free to do whatever it wants with boot services code after ExitBootServices() has been called. SetVirtualAddressMap() can't be called until ExitBootServices() has been. So, obviously, a whole bunch of EFI implementations call into boot services code when we do that. Since we've been charmingly naive and trusted that the specification may be somehow relevant to the real world, we've already stuffed a picture of a penguin or something in that address space. And just to make things more entertaining, we've also marked it non-executable. This patch allocates the boot services regions during EFI init and makes sure that they're executable. Then, after SetVirtualAddressMap(), it discards them and everyone lives happily ever after. Except for the ones who have to work on EFI, who live sad lives haunted by the knowledge that someone's eventually going to write yet another firmware specification. [ hpa: adding this to urgent with a stable tag since it fixes currently-broken hardware. However, I do not know what the dependencies are and so I do not know which -stable versions this may be a candidate for. ] Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1306331593-28715-1-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
2011-05-25 21:53:13 +08:00
if (md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE ||
md->type == EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE)
efi_set_executable(md, executable);
}
}
pgd_t * __init efi_call_phys_prolog(void)
{
x86/efi: Correct EFI identity mapping under 'efi=old_map' when KASLR is enabled For EFI with the 'efi=old_map' kernel option specified, the kernel will panic when KASLR is enabled: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000007febd57e IP: 0x7febd57e PGD 1025a067 PUD 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP Call Trace: efi_enter_virtual_mode() start_kernel() x86_64_start_reservations() x86_64_start_kernel() start_cpu() The root cause is that the identity mapping is not built correctly in the 'efi=old_map' case. On 'nokaslr' kernels, PAGE_OFFSET is 0xffff880000000000 which is PGDIR_SIZE aligned. We can borrow the PUD table from the direct mappings safely. Given a physical address X, we have pud_index(X) == pud_index(__va(X)). However, on KASLR kernels, PAGE_OFFSET is PUD_SIZE aligned. For a given physical address X, pud_index(X) != pud_index(__va(X)). We can't just copy the PGD entry from direct mapping to build identity mapping, instead we need to copy the PUD entries one by one from the direct mapping. Fix it. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Frank Ramsay <frank.ramsay@hpe.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Russ Anderson <rja@sgi.com> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526113652.21339-5-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk [ Fixed and reworded the changelog and code comments to be more readable. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-05-26 19:36:50 +08:00
unsigned long vaddr, addr_pgd, addr_p4d, addr_pud;
pgd_t *save_pgd, *pgd_k, *pgd_efi;
p4d_t *p4d, *p4d_k, *p4d_efi;
pud_t *pud;
efi, x86: Pass a proper identity mapping in efi_call_phys_prelog Update efi_call_phys_prelog to install an identity mapping of all available memory. This corrects a bug on very large systems with more then 512 GB in which bios would not be able to access addresses above not in the mapping. The result is a crash that looks much like this. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000effd870020 IP: [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU 0 Pid: 0, comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 3.8.0-rc1-next-20121224-medusa_ntz+ #2 Intel Corp. Stoutland Platform RIP: 0010:[<0000000078bce331>] [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 RSP: 0000:ffffffff81601d28 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000078b80e18 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: 0000000078bcf958 RSI: 0000000000002400 RDI: 8000000000000000 RBP: 0000000078bcf760 R08: 000000effd870000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000000c3 R12: 0000000000000030 R13: 000000effd870000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88effd870000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88effe400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000effd870020 CR3: 000000000160c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, threadinfo ffffffff81600000, task ffffffff81614400) Stack: 0000000078b80d18 0000000000000004 0000000078bced7b ffff880078b81fff 0000000000000000 0000000000000082 0000000078bce3a8 0000000000002400 0000000060000202 0000000078b80da0 0000000078bce45d ffffffff8107cb5a Call Trace: [<ffffffff8107cb5a>] ? on_each_cpu+0x77/0x83 [<ffffffff8102f4eb>] ? change_page_attr_set_clr+0x32f/0x3ed [<ffffffff81035946>] ? efi_call4+0x46/0x80 [<ffffffff816c5abb>] ? efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1f5/0x305 [<ffffffff816aeb24>] ? start_kernel+0x34a/0x3d2 [<ffffffff816ae5ed>] ? repair_env_string+0x60/0x60 [<ffffffff816ae2be>] ? x86_64_start_reservations+0xba/0xc1 [<ffffffff816ae120>] ? early_idt_handlers+0x120/0x120 [<ffffffff816ae419>] ? x86_64_start_kernel+0x154/0x163 Code: Bad RIP value. RIP [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 RSP <ffffffff81601d28> CR2: 000000effd870020 ---[ end trace ead828934fef5eab ]--- Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Nathan Zimmer <nzimmer@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2013-01-08 23:02:43 +08:00
int pgd;
x86/efi: Correct EFI identity mapping under 'efi=old_map' when KASLR is enabled For EFI with the 'efi=old_map' kernel option specified, the kernel will panic when KASLR is enabled: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000007febd57e IP: 0x7febd57e PGD 1025a067 PUD 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP Call Trace: efi_enter_virtual_mode() start_kernel() x86_64_start_reservations() x86_64_start_kernel() start_cpu() The root cause is that the identity mapping is not built correctly in the 'efi=old_map' case. On 'nokaslr' kernels, PAGE_OFFSET is 0xffff880000000000 which is PGDIR_SIZE aligned. We can borrow the PUD table from the direct mappings safely. Given a physical address X, we have pud_index(X) == pud_index(__va(X)). However, on KASLR kernels, PAGE_OFFSET is PUD_SIZE aligned. For a given physical address X, pud_index(X) != pud_index(__va(X)). We can't just copy the PGD entry from direct mapping to build identity mapping, instead we need to copy the PUD entries one by one from the direct mapping. Fix it. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Frank Ramsay <frank.ramsay@hpe.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Russ Anderson <rja@sgi.com> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526113652.21339-5-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk [ Fixed and reworded the changelog and code comments to be more readable. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-05-26 19:36:50 +08:00
int n_pgds, i, j;
x86/efi: Hoist page table switching code into efi_call_virt() This change is a prerequisite for pending patches that switch to a dedicated EFI page table, instead of using 'trampoline_pgd' which shares PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. The pending patches make it impossible to dereference the runtime service function pointer without first switching %cr3. It's true that we now have duplicated switching code in efi_call_virt() and efi_call_phys_{prolog,epilog}() but we are sacrificing code duplication for a little more clarity and the ease of writing the page table switching code in C instead of asm. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-5-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:33 +08:00
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) {
save_pgd = (pgd_t *)__read_cr3();
x86/efi: Hoist page table switching code into efi_call_virt() This change is a prerequisite for pending patches that switch to a dedicated EFI page table, instead of using 'trampoline_pgd' which shares PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. The pending patches make it impossible to dereference the runtime service function pointer without first switching %cr3. It's true that we now have duplicated switching code in efi_call_virt() and efi_call_phys_{prolog,epilog}() but we are sacrificing code duplication for a little more clarity and the ease of writing the page table switching code in C instead of asm. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-5-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:33 +08:00
write_cr3((unsigned long)efi_scratch.efi_pgt);
goto out;
}
early_code_mapping_set_exec(1);
efi, x86: Pass a proper identity mapping in efi_call_phys_prelog Update efi_call_phys_prelog to install an identity mapping of all available memory. This corrects a bug on very large systems with more then 512 GB in which bios would not be able to access addresses above not in the mapping. The result is a crash that looks much like this. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000effd870020 IP: [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU 0 Pid: 0, comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 3.8.0-rc1-next-20121224-medusa_ntz+ #2 Intel Corp. Stoutland Platform RIP: 0010:[<0000000078bce331>] [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 RSP: 0000:ffffffff81601d28 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000078b80e18 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: 0000000078bcf958 RSI: 0000000000002400 RDI: 8000000000000000 RBP: 0000000078bcf760 R08: 000000effd870000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000000c3 R12: 0000000000000030 R13: 000000effd870000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88effd870000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88effe400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000effd870020 CR3: 000000000160c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, threadinfo ffffffff81600000, task ffffffff81614400) Stack: 0000000078b80d18 0000000000000004 0000000078bced7b ffff880078b81fff 0000000000000000 0000000000000082 0000000078bce3a8 0000000000002400 0000000060000202 0000000078b80da0 0000000078bce45d ffffffff8107cb5a Call Trace: [<ffffffff8107cb5a>] ? on_each_cpu+0x77/0x83 [<ffffffff8102f4eb>] ? change_page_attr_set_clr+0x32f/0x3ed [<ffffffff81035946>] ? efi_call4+0x46/0x80 [<ffffffff816c5abb>] ? efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1f5/0x305 [<ffffffff816aeb24>] ? start_kernel+0x34a/0x3d2 [<ffffffff816ae5ed>] ? repair_env_string+0x60/0x60 [<ffffffff816ae2be>] ? x86_64_start_reservations+0xba/0xc1 [<ffffffff816ae120>] ? early_idt_handlers+0x120/0x120 [<ffffffff816ae419>] ? x86_64_start_kernel+0x154/0x163 Code: Bad RIP value. RIP [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 RSP <ffffffff81601d28> CR2: 000000effd870020 ---[ end trace ead828934fef5eab ]--- Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Nathan Zimmer <nzimmer@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2013-01-08 23:02:43 +08:00
n_pgds = DIV_ROUND_UP((max_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT), PGDIR_SIZE);
save_pgd = kmalloc_array(n_pgds, sizeof(*save_pgd), GFP_KERNEL);
efi, x86: Pass a proper identity mapping in efi_call_phys_prelog Update efi_call_phys_prelog to install an identity mapping of all available memory. This corrects a bug on very large systems with more then 512 GB in which bios would not be able to access addresses above not in the mapping. The result is a crash that looks much like this. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000effd870020 IP: [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU 0 Pid: 0, comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 3.8.0-rc1-next-20121224-medusa_ntz+ #2 Intel Corp. Stoutland Platform RIP: 0010:[<0000000078bce331>] [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 RSP: 0000:ffffffff81601d28 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000078b80e18 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: 0000000078bcf958 RSI: 0000000000002400 RDI: 8000000000000000 RBP: 0000000078bcf760 R08: 000000effd870000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000000c3 R12: 0000000000000030 R13: 000000effd870000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88effd870000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88effe400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000effd870020 CR3: 000000000160c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, threadinfo ffffffff81600000, task ffffffff81614400) Stack: 0000000078b80d18 0000000000000004 0000000078bced7b ffff880078b81fff 0000000000000000 0000000000000082 0000000078bce3a8 0000000000002400 0000000060000202 0000000078b80da0 0000000078bce45d ffffffff8107cb5a Call Trace: [<ffffffff8107cb5a>] ? on_each_cpu+0x77/0x83 [<ffffffff8102f4eb>] ? change_page_attr_set_clr+0x32f/0x3ed [<ffffffff81035946>] ? efi_call4+0x46/0x80 [<ffffffff816c5abb>] ? efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1f5/0x305 [<ffffffff816aeb24>] ? start_kernel+0x34a/0x3d2 [<ffffffff816ae5ed>] ? repair_env_string+0x60/0x60 [<ffffffff816ae2be>] ? x86_64_start_reservations+0xba/0xc1 [<ffffffff816ae120>] ? early_idt_handlers+0x120/0x120 [<ffffffff816ae419>] ? x86_64_start_kernel+0x154/0x163 Code: Bad RIP value. RIP [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 RSP <ffffffff81601d28> CR2: 000000effd870020 ---[ end trace ead828934fef5eab ]--- Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Nathan Zimmer <nzimmer@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2013-01-08 23:02:43 +08:00
x86/efi: Correct EFI identity mapping under 'efi=old_map' when KASLR is enabled For EFI with the 'efi=old_map' kernel option specified, the kernel will panic when KASLR is enabled: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000007febd57e IP: 0x7febd57e PGD 1025a067 PUD 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP Call Trace: efi_enter_virtual_mode() start_kernel() x86_64_start_reservations() x86_64_start_kernel() start_cpu() The root cause is that the identity mapping is not built correctly in the 'efi=old_map' case. On 'nokaslr' kernels, PAGE_OFFSET is 0xffff880000000000 which is PGDIR_SIZE aligned. We can borrow the PUD table from the direct mappings safely. Given a physical address X, we have pud_index(X) == pud_index(__va(X)). However, on KASLR kernels, PAGE_OFFSET is PUD_SIZE aligned. For a given physical address X, pud_index(X) != pud_index(__va(X)). We can't just copy the PGD entry from direct mapping to build identity mapping, instead we need to copy the PUD entries one by one from the direct mapping. Fix it. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Frank Ramsay <frank.ramsay@hpe.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Russ Anderson <rja@sgi.com> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526113652.21339-5-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk [ Fixed and reworded the changelog and code comments to be more readable. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-05-26 19:36:50 +08:00
/*
* Build 1:1 identity mapping for efi=old_map usage. Note that
* PAGE_OFFSET is PGDIR_SIZE aligned when KASLR is disabled, while
* it is PUD_SIZE ALIGNED with KASLR enabled. So for a given physical
* address X, the pud_index(X) != pud_index(__va(X)), we can only copy
* PUD entry of __va(X) to fill in pud entry of X to build 1:1 mapping.
* This means here we can only reuse the PMD tables of the direct mapping.
*/
efi, x86: Pass a proper identity mapping in efi_call_phys_prelog Update efi_call_phys_prelog to install an identity mapping of all available memory. This corrects a bug on very large systems with more then 512 GB in which bios would not be able to access addresses above not in the mapping. The result is a crash that looks much like this. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000effd870020 IP: [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU 0 Pid: 0, comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 3.8.0-rc1-next-20121224-medusa_ntz+ #2 Intel Corp. Stoutland Platform RIP: 0010:[<0000000078bce331>] [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 RSP: 0000:ffffffff81601d28 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000078b80e18 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: 0000000078bcf958 RSI: 0000000000002400 RDI: 8000000000000000 RBP: 0000000078bcf760 R08: 000000effd870000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000000c3 R12: 0000000000000030 R13: 000000effd870000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88effd870000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88effe400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000effd870020 CR3: 000000000160c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, threadinfo ffffffff81600000, task ffffffff81614400) Stack: 0000000078b80d18 0000000000000004 0000000078bced7b ffff880078b81fff 0000000000000000 0000000000000082 0000000078bce3a8 0000000000002400 0000000060000202 0000000078b80da0 0000000078bce45d ffffffff8107cb5a Call Trace: [<ffffffff8107cb5a>] ? on_each_cpu+0x77/0x83 [<ffffffff8102f4eb>] ? change_page_attr_set_clr+0x32f/0x3ed [<ffffffff81035946>] ? efi_call4+0x46/0x80 [<ffffffff816c5abb>] ? efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1f5/0x305 [<ffffffff816aeb24>] ? start_kernel+0x34a/0x3d2 [<ffffffff816ae5ed>] ? repair_env_string+0x60/0x60 [<ffffffff816ae2be>] ? x86_64_start_reservations+0xba/0xc1 [<ffffffff816ae120>] ? early_idt_handlers+0x120/0x120 [<ffffffff816ae419>] ? x86_64_start_kernel+0x154/0x163 Code: Bad RIP value. RIP [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 RSP <ffffffff81601d28> CR2: 000000effd870020 ---[ end trace ead828934fef5eab ]--- Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Nathan Zimmer <nzimmer@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2013-01-08 23:02:43 +08:00
for (pgd = 0; pgd < n_pgds; pgd++) {
x86/efi: Correct EFI identity mapping under 'efi=old_map' when KASLR is enabled For EFI with the 'efi=old_map' kernel option specified, the kernel will panic when KASLR is enabled: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000007febd57e IP: 0x7febd57e PGD 1025a067 PUD 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP Call Trace: efi_enter_virtual_mode() start_kernel() x86_64_start_reservations() x86_64_start_kernel() start_cpu() The root cause is that the identity mapping is not built correctly in the 'efi=old_map' case. On 'nokaslr' kernels, PAGE_OFFSET is 0xffff880000000000 which is PGDIR_SIZE aligned. We can borrow the PUD table from the direct mappings safely. Given a physical address X, we have pud_index(X) == pud_index(__va(X)). However, on KASLR kernels, PAGE_OFFSET is PUD_SIZE aligned. For a given physical address X, pud_index(X) != pud_index(__va(X)). We can't just copy the PGD entry from direct mapping to build identity mapping, instead we need to copy the PUD entries one by one from the direct mapping. Fix it. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Frank Ramsay <frank.ramsay@hpe.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Russ Anderson <rja@sgi.com> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526113652.21339-5-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk [ Fixed and reworded the changelog and code comments to be more readable. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-05-26 19:36:50 +08:00
addr_pgd = (unsigned long)(pgd * PGDIR_SIZE);
vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(pgd * PGDIR_SIZE);
pgd_efi = pgd_offset_k(addr_pgd);
save_pgd[pgd] = *pgd_efi;
p4d = p4d_alloc(&init_mm, pgd_efi, addr_pgd);
if (!p4d) {
pr_err("Failed to allocate p4d table!\n");
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_P4D; i++) {
addr_p4d = addr_pgd + i * P4D_SIZE;
p4d_efi = p4d + p4d_index(addr_p4d);
pud = pud_alloc(&init_mm, p4d_efi, addr_p4d);
if (!pud) {
pr_err("Failed to allocate pud table!\n");
goto out;
}
for (j = 0; j < PTRS_PER_PUD; j++) {
addr_pud = addr_p4d + j * PUD_SIZE;
if (addr_pud > (max_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT))
break;
vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(addr_pud);
pgd_k = pgd_offset_k(vaddr);
p4d_k = p4d_offset(pgd_k, vaddr);
pud[j] = *pud_offset(p4d_k, vaddr);
}
}
pgd_offset_k(pgd * PGDIR_SIZE)->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
efi, x86: Pass a proper identity mapping in efi_call_phys_prelog Update efi_call_phys_prelog to install an identity mapping of all available memory. This corrects a bug on very large systems with more then 512 GB in which bios would not be able to access addresses above not in the mapping. The result is a crash that looks much like this. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000effd870020 IP: [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU 0 Pid: 0, comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 3.8.0-rc1-next-20121224-medusa_ntz+ #2 Intel Corp. Stoutland Platform RIP: 0010:[<0000000078bce331>] [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 RSP: 0000:ffffffff81601d28 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000078b80e18 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: 0000000078bcf958 RSI: 0000000000002400 RDI: 8000000000000000 RBP: 0000000078bcf760 R08: 000000effd870000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000000c3 R12: 0000000000000030 R13: 000000effd870000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88effd870000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88effe400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000effd870020 CR3: 000000000160c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, threadinfo ffffffff81600000, task ffffffff81614400) Stack: 0000000078b80d18 0000000000000004 0000000078bced7b ffff880078b81fff 0000000000000000 0000000000000082 0000000078bce3a8 0000000000002400 0000000060000202 0000000078b80da0 0000000078bce45d ffffffff8107cb5a Call Trace: [<ffffffff8107cb5a>] ? on_each_cpu+0x77/0x83 [<ffffffff8102f4eb>] ? change_page_attr_set_clr+0x32f/0x3ed [<ffffffff81035946>] ? efi_call4+0x46/0x80 [<ffffffff816c5abb>] ? efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1f5/0x305 [<ffffffff816aeb24>] ? start_kernel+0x34a/0x3d2 [<ffffffff816ae5ed>] ? repair_env_string+0x60/0x60 [<ffffffff816ae2be>] ? x86_64_start_reservations+0xba/0xc1 [<ffffffff816ae120>] ? early_idt_handlers+0x120/0x120 [<ffffffff816ae419>] ? x86_64_start_kernel+0x154/0x163 Code: Bad RIP value. RIP [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 RSP <ffffffff81601d28> CR2: 000000effd870020 ---[ end trace ead828934fef5eab ]--- Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Nathan Zimmer <nzimmer@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2013-01-08 23:02:43 +08:00
}
x86/efi: Hoist page table switching code into efi_call_virt() This change is a prerequisite for pending patches that switch to a dedicated EFI page table, instead of using 'trampoline_pgd' which shares PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. The pending patches make it impossible to dereference the runtime service function pointer without first switching %cr3. It's true that we now have duplicated switching code in efi_call_virt() and efi_call_phys_{prolog,epilog}() but we are sacrificing code duplication for a little more clarity and the ease of writing the page table switching code in C instead of asm. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-5-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:33 +08:00
out:
__flush_tlb_all();
return save_pgd;
}
void __init efi_call_phys_epilog(pgd_t *save_pgd)
{
/*
* After the lock is released, the original page table is restored.
*/
x86/efi: Correct EFI identity mapping under 'efi=old_map' when KASLR is enabled For EFI with the 'efi=old_map' kernel option specified, the kernel will panic when KASLR is enabled: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000007febd57e IP: 0x7febd57e PGD 1025a067 PUD 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP Call Trace: efi_enter_virtual_mode() start_kernel() x86_64_start_reservations() x86_64_start_kernel() start_cpu() The root cause is that the identity mapping is not built correctly in the 'efi=old_map' case. On 'nokaslr' kernels, PAGE_OFFSET is 0xffff880000000000 which is PGDIR_SIZE aligned. We can borrow the PUD table from the direct mappings safely. Given a physical address X, we have pud_index(X) == pud_index(__va(X)). However, on KASLR kernels, PAGE_OFFSET is PUD_SIZE aligned. For a given physical address X, pud_index(X) != pud_index(__va(X)). We can't just copy the PGD entry from direct mapping to build identity mapping, instead we need to copy the PUD entries one by one from the direct mapping. Fix it. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Frank Ramsay <frank.ramsay@hpe.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Russ Anderson <rja@sgi.com> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526113652.21339-5-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk [ Fixed and reworded the changelog and code comments to be more readable. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-05-26 19:36:50 +08:00
int pgd_idx, i;
int nr_pgds;
x86/efi: Correct EFI identity mapping under 'efi=old_map' when KASLR is enabled For EFI with the 'efi=old_map' kernel option specified, the kernel will panic when KASLR is enabled: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000007febd57e IP: 0x7febd57e PGD 1025a067 PUD 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP Call Trace: efi_enter_virtual_mode() start_kernel() x86_64_start_reservations() x86_64_start_kernel() start_cpu() The root cause is that the identity mapping is not built correctly in the 'efi=old_map' case. On 'nokaslr' kernels, PAGE_OFFSET is 0xffff880000000000 which is PGDIR_SIZE aligned. We can borrow the PUD table from the direct mappings safely. Given a physical address X, we have pud_index(X) == pud_index(__va(X)). However, on KASLR kernels, PAGE_OFFSET is PUD_SIZE aligned. For a given physical address X, pud_index(X) != pud_index(__va(X)). We can't just copy the PGD entry from direct mapping to build identity mapping, instead we need to copy the PUD entries one by one from the direct mapping. Fix it. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Frank Ramsay <frank.ramsay@hpe.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Russ Anderson <rja@sgi.com> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526113652.21339-5-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk [ Fixed and reworded the changelog and code comments to be more readable. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-05-26 19:36:50 +08:00
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
pud_t *pud;
x86/efi: Hoist page table switching code into efi_call_virt() This change is a prerequisite for pending patches that switch to a dedicated EFI page table, instead of using 'trampoline_pgd' which shares PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. The pending patches make it impossible to dereference the runtime service function pointer without first switching %cr3. It's true that we now have duplicated switching code in efi_call_virt() and efi_call_phys_{prolog,epilog}() but we are sacrificing code duplication for a little more clarity and the ease of writing the page table switching code in C instead of asm. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-5-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:33 +08:00
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) {
write_cr3((unsigned long)save_pgd);
__flush_tlb_all();
return;
x86/efi: Hoist page table switching code into efi_call_virt() This change is a prerequisite for pending patches that switch to a dedicated EFI page table, instead of using 'trampoline_pgd' which shares PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. The pending patches make it impossible to dereference the runtime service function pointer without first switching %cr3. It's true that we now have duplicated switching code in efi_call_virt() and efi_call_phys_{prolog,epilog}() but we are sacrificing code duplication for a little more clarity and the ease of writing the page table switching code in C instead of asm. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-5-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:33 +08:00
}
nr_pgds = DIV_ROUND_UP((max_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) , PGDIR_SIZE);
x86/efi: Correct EFI identity mapping under 'efi=old_map' when KASLR is enabled For EFI with the 'efi=old_map' kernel option specified, the kernel will panic when KASLR is enabled: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000007febd57e IP: 0x7febd57e PGD 1025a067 PUD 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP Call Trace: efi_enter_virtual_mode() start_kernel() x86_64_start_reservations() x86_64_start_kernel() start_cpu() The root cause is that the identity mapping is not built correctly in the 'efi=old_map' case. On 'nokaslr' kernels, PAGE_OFFSET is 0xffff880000000000 which is PGDIR_SIZE aligned. We can borrow the PUD table from the direct mappings safely. Given a physical address X, we have pud_index(X) == pud_index(__va(X)). However, on KASLR kernels, PAGE_OFFSET is PUD_SIZE aligned. For a given physical address X, pud_index(X) != pud_index(__va(X)). We can't just copy the PGD entry from direct mapping to build identity mapping, instead we need to copy the PUD entries one by one from the direct mapping. Fix it. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Frank Ramsay <frank.ramsay@hpe.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Russ Anderson <rja@sgi.com> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526113652.21339-5-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk [ Fixed and reworded the changelog and code comments to be more readable. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-05-26 19:36:50 +08:00
for (pgd_idx = 0; pgd_idx < nr_pgds; pgd_idx++) {
pgd = pgd_offset_k(pgd_idx * PGDIR_SIZE);
set_pgd(pgd_offset_k(pgd_idx * PGDIR_SIZE), save_pgd[pgd_idx]);
x86/efi: Correct EFI identity mapping under 'efi=old_map' when KASLR is enabled For EFI with the 'efi=old_map' kernel option specified, the kernel will panic when KASLR is enabled: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000007febd57e IP: 0x7febd57e PGD 1025a067 PUD 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP Call Trace: efi_enter_virtual_mode() start_kernel() x86_64_start_reservations() x86_64_start_kernel() start_cpu() The root cause is that the identity mapping is not built correctly in the 'efi=old_map' case. On 'nokaslr' kernels, PAGE_OFFSET is 0xffff880000000000 which is PGDIR_SIZE aligned. We can borrow the PUD table from the direct mappings safely. Given a physical address X, we have pud_index(X) == pud_index(__va(X)). However, on KASLR kernels, PAGE_OFFSET is PUD_SIZE aligned. For a given physical address X, pud_index(X) != pud_index(__va(X)). We can't just copy the PGD entry from direct mapping to build identity mapping, instead we need to copy the PUD entries one by one from the direct mapping. Fix it. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Frank Ramsay <frank.ramsay@hpe.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Russ Anderson <rja@sgi.com> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526113652.21339-5-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk [ Fixed and reworded the changelog and code comments to be more readable. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-05-26 19:36:50 +08:00
if (!(pgd_val(*pgd) & _PAGE_PRESENT))
continue;
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_P4D; i++) {
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd,
pgd_idx * PGDIR_SIZE + i * P4D_SIZE);
if (!(p4d_val(*p4d) & _PAGE_PRESENT))
continue;
pud = (pud_t *)p4d_page_vaddr(*p4d);
pud_free(&init_mm, pud);
}
p4d = (p4d_t *)pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd);
p4d_free(&init_mm, p4d);
}
efi, x86: Pass a proper identity mapping in efi_call_phys_prelog Update efi_call_phys_prelog to install an identity mapping of all available memory. This corrects a bug on very large systems with more then 512 GB in which bios would not be able to access addresses above not in the mapping. The result is a crash that looks much like this. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000effd870020 IP: [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU 0 Pid: 0, comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 3.8.0-rc1-next-20121224-medusa_ntz+ #2 Intel Corp. Stoutland Platform RIP: 0010:[<0000000078bce331>] [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 RSP: 0000:ffffffff81601d28 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000078b80e18 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: 0000000078bcf958 RSI: 0000000000002400 RDI: 8000000000000000 RBP: 0000000078bcf760 R08: 000000effd870000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000000c3 R12: 0000000000000030 R13: 000000effd870000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88effd870000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88effe400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000effd870020 CR3: 000000000160c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, threadinfo ffffffff81600000, task ffffffff81614400) Stack: 0000000078b80d18 0000000000000004 0000000078bced7b ffff880078b81fff 0000000000000000 0000000000000082 0000000078bce3a8 0000000000002400 0000000060000202 0000000078b80da0 0000000078bce45d ffffffff8107cb5a Call Trace: [<ffffffff8107cb5a>] ? on_each_cpu+0x77/0x83 [<ffffffff8102f4eb>] ? change_page_attr_set_clr+0x32f/0x3ed [<ffffffff81035946>] ? efi_call4+0x46/0x80 [<ffffffff816c5abb>] ? efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1f5/0x305 [<ffffffff816aeb24>] ? start_kernel+0x34a/0x3d2 [<ffffffff816ae5ed>] ? repair_env_string+0x60/0x60 [<ffffffff816ae2be>] ? x86_64_start_reservations+0xba/0xc1 [<ffffffff816ae120>] ? early_idt_handlers+0x120/0x120 [<ffffffff816ae419>] ? x86_64_start_kernel+0x154/0x163 Code: Bad RIP value. RIP [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330 RSP <ffffffff81601d28> CR2: 000000effd870020 ---[ end trace ead828934fef5eab ]--- Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Nathan Zimmer <nzimmer@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2013-01-08 23:02:43 +08:00
kfree(save_pgd);
__flush_tlb_all();
early_code_mapping_set_exec(0);
}
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:34 +08:00
static pgd_t *efi_pgd;
/*
* We need our own copy of the higher levels of the page tables
* because we want to avoid inserting EFI region mappings (EFI_VA_END
* to EFI_VA_START) into the standard kernel page tables. Everything
* else can be shared, see efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings().
*
* We don't want the pgd on the pgd_list and cannot use pgd_alloc() for the
* allocation.
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:34 +08:00
*/
int __init efi_alloc_page_tables(void)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:34 +08:00
pud_t *pud;
gfp_t gfp_mask;
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
return 0;
gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO;
efi_pgd = (pgd_t *)__get_free_pages(gfp_mask, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER);
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:34 +08:00
if (!efi_pgd)
return -ENOMEM;
pgd = efi_pgd + pgd_index(EFI_VA_END);
p4d = p4d_alloc(&init_mm, pgd, EFI_VA_END);
if (!p4d) {
free_page((unsigned long)efi_pgd);
return -ENOMEM;
}
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:34 +08:00
pud = pud_alloc(&init_mm, p4d, EFI_VA_END);
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:34 +08:00
if (!pud) {
if (CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 4)
free_page((unsigned long) pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd));
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:34 +08:00
free_page((unsigned long)efi_pgd);
return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Add low kernel mappings for passing arguments to EFI functions.
*/
void efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(void)
{
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:34 +08:00
unsigned num_entries;
pgd_t *pgd_k, *pgd_efi;
p4d_t *p4d_k, *p4d_efi;
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:34 +08:00
pud_t *pud_k, *pud_efi;
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
return;
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:34 +08:00
/*
* We can share all PGD entries apart from the one entry that
* covers the EFI runtime mapping space.
*
* Make sure the EFI runtime region mappings are guaranteed to
* only span a single PGD entry and that the entry also maps
* other important kernel regions.
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(pgd_index(EFI_VA_END) != pgd_index(MODULES_END));
BUILD_BUG_ON((EFI_VA_START & PGDIR_MASK) !=
(EFI_VA_END & PGDIR_MASK));
pgd_efi = efi_pgd + pgd_index(PAGE_OFFSET);
pgd_k = pgd_offset_k(PAGE_OFFSET);
num_entries = pgd_index(EFI_VA_END) - pgd_index(PAGE_OFFSET);
memcpy(pgd_efi, pgd_k, sizeof(pgd_t) * num_entries);
/*
* As with PGDs, we share all P4D entries apart from the one entry
* that covers the EFI runtime mapping space.
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(p4d_index(EFI_VA_END) != p4d_index(MODULES_END));
BUILD_BUG_ON((EFI_VA_START & P4D_MASK) != (EFI_VA_END & P4D_MASK));
pgd_efi = efi_pgd + pgd_index(EFI_VA_END);
pgd_k = pgd_offset_k(EFI_VA_END);
p4d_efi = p4d_offset(pgd_efi, 0);
p4d_k = p4d_offset(pgd_k, 0);
num_entries = p4d_index(EFI_VA_END);
memcpy(p4d_efi, p4d_k, sizeof(p4d_t) * num_entries);
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:34 +08:00
/*
* We share all the PUD entries apart from those that map the
* EFI regions. Copy around them.
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON((EFI_VA_START & ~PUD_MASK) != 0);
BUILD_BUG_ON((EFI_VA_END & ~PUD_MASK) != 0);
p4d_efi = p4d_offset(pgd_efi, EFI_VA_END);
p4d_k = p4d_offset(pgd_k, EFI_VA_END);
pud_efi = pud_offset(p4d_efi, 0);
pud_k = pud_offset(p4d_k, 0);
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:34 +08:00
num_entries = pud_index(EFI_VA_END);
memcpy(pud_efi, pud_k, sizeof(pud_t) * num_entries);
pud_efi = pud_offset(p4d_efi, EFI_VA_START);
pud_k = pud_offset(p4d_k, EFI_VA_START);
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:34 +08:00
num_entries = PTRS_PER_PUD - pud_index(EFI_VA_START);
memcpy(pud_efi, pud_k, sizeof(pud_t) * num_entries);
}
/*
* Wrapper for slow_virt_to_phys() that handles NULL addresses.
*/
static inline phys_addr_t
virt_to_phys_or_null_size(void *va, unsigned long size)
{
bool bad_size;
if (!va)
return 0;
if (virt_addr_valid(va))
return virt_to_phys(va);
/*
* A fully aligned variable on the stack is guaranteed not to
* cross a page bounary. Try to catch strings on the stack by
* checking that 'size' is a power of two.
*/
bad_size = size > PAGE_SIZE || !is_power_of_2(size);
WARN_ON(!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)va, size) || bad_size);
return slow_virt_to_phys(va);
}
#define virt_to_phys_or_null(addr) \
virt_to_phys_or_null_size((addr), sizeof(*(addr)))
int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
{
x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME When SME is active, pagetable entries created for EFI need to have the encryption mask set as necessary. When the new pagetable pages are allocated they are mapped encrypted. So, update the efi_pgt value that will be used in CR3 to include the encryption mask so that the PGD table can be read successfully. The pagetable mapping as well as the kernel are also added to the pagetable mapping as encrypted. All other EFI mappings are mapped decrypted (tables, etc.). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9a8f4c502db4a84b09e2f0a1555bb75aa8b69785.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 05:10:15 +08:00
unsigned long pfn, text, pf;
struct page *page;
unsigned npages;
pgd_t *pgd;
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
return 0;
x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME When SME is active, pagetable entries created for EFI need to have the encryption mask set as necessary. When the new pagetable pages are allocated they are mapped encrypted. So, update the efi_pgt value that will be used in CR3 to include the encryption mask so that the PGD table can be read successfully. The pagetable mapping as well as the kernel are also added to the pagetable mapping as encrypted. All other EFI mappings are mapped decrypted (tables, etc.). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9a8f4c502db4a84b09e2f0a1555bb75aa8b69785.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 05:10:15 +08:00
/*
* Since the PGD is encrypted, set the encryption mask so that when
* this value is loaded into cr3 the PGD will be decrypted during
* the pagetable walk.
*/
efi_scratch.efi_pgt = (pgd_t *)__sme_pa(efi_pgd);
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:34 +08:00
pgd = efi_pgd;
/*
* It can happen that the physical address of new_memmap lands in memory
* which is not mapped in the EFI page table. Therefore we need to go
* and ident-map those pages containing the map before calling
* phys_efi_set_virtual_address_map().
*/
2015-11-28 05:09:31 +08:00
pfn = pa_memmap >> PAGE_SHIFT;
x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME When SME is active, pagetable entries created for EFI need to have the encryption mask set as necessary. When the new pagetable pages are allocated they are mapped encrypted. So, update the efi_pgt value that will be used in CR3 to include the encryption mask so that the PGD table can be read successfully. The pagetable mapping as well as the kernel are also added to the pagetable mapping as encrypted. All other EFI mappings are mapped decrypted (tables, etc.). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9a8f4c502db4a84b09e2f0a1555bb75aa8b69785.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 05:10:15 +08:00
pf = _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ENC;
if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, pa_memmap, num_pages, pf)) {
pr_err("Error ident-mapping new memmap (0x%lx)!\n", pa_memmap);
return 1;
}
efi_scratch.use_pgd = true;
x86/efi: Always map the first physical page into the EFI pagetables Commit: 129766708 ("x86/efi: Only map RAM into EFI page tables if in mixed-mode") stopped creating 1:1 mappings for all RAM, when running in native 64-bit mode. It turns out though that there are 64-bit EFI implementations in the wild (this particular problem has been reported on a Lenovo Yoga 710-11IKB), which still make use of the first physical page for their own private use, even though they explicitly mark it EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY in the memory map. In case there is no mapping for this particular frame in the EFI pagetables, as soon as firmware tries to make use of it, a triple fault occurs and the system reboots (in case of the Yoga 710-11IKB this is very early during bootup). Fix that by always mapping the first page of physical memory into the EFI pagetables. We're free to hand this page to the BIOS, as trim_bios_range() will reserve the first page and isolate it away from memory allocators anyway. Note that just reverting 129766708 alone is not enough on v4.9-rc1+ to fix the regression on affected hardware, as this commit: ab72a27da ("x86/efi: Consolidate region mapping logic") later made the first physical frame not to be mapped anyway. Reported-by: Hanka Pavlikova <hanka@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@ucw.cz> Cc: Waiman Long <waiman.long@hpe.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@kernel.org # v4.8+ Fixes: 129766708 ("x86/efi: Only map RAM into EFI page tables if in mixed-mode") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170127222552.22336-1-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk [ Tidied up the changelog and the comment. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-28 06:25:52 +08:00
/*
* Certain firmware versions are way too sentimential and still believe
* they are exclusive and unquestionable owners of the first physical page,
* even though they explicitly mark it as EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY
* (but then write-access it later during SetVirtualAddressMap()).
*
* Create a 1:1 mapping for this page, to avoid triple faults during early
* boot with such firmware. We are free to hand this page to the BIOS,
* as trim_bios_range() will reserve the first page and isolate it away
* from memory allocators anyway.
*/
pf = _PAGE_RW;
if (sev_active())
pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, 0x0, 0x0, 1, pf)) {
x86/efi: Always map the first physical page into the EFI pagetables Commit: 129766708 ("x86/efi: Only map RAM into EFI page tables if in mixed-mode") stopped creating 1:1 mappings for all RAM, when running in native 64-bit mode. It turns out though that there are 64-bit EFI implementations in the wild (this particular problem has been reported on a Lenovo Yoga 710-11IKB), which still make use of the first physical page for their own private use, even though they explicitly mark it EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY in the memory map. In case there is no mapping for this particular frame in the EFI pagetables, as soon as firmware tries to make use of it, a triple fault occurs and the system reboots (in case of the Yoga 710-11IKB this is very early during bootup). Fix that by always mapping the first page of physical memory into the EFI pagetables. We're free to hand this page to the BIOS, as trim_bios_range() will reserve the first page and isolate it away from memory allocators anyway. Note that just reverting 129766708 alone is not enough on v4.9-rc1+ to fix the regression on affected hardware, as this commit: ab72a27da ("x86/efi: Consolidate region mapping logic") later made the first physical frame not to be mapped anyway. Reported-by: Hanka Pavlikova <hanka@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@ucw.cz> Cc: Waiman Long <waiman.long@hpe.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@kernel.org # v4.8+ Fixes: 129766708 ("x86/efi: Only map RAM into EFI page tables if in mixed-mode") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170127222552.22336-1-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk [ Tidied up the changelog and the comment. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-28 06:25:52 +08:00
pr_err("Failed to create 1:1 mapping for the first page!\n");
return 1;
}
/*
* When making calls to the firmware everything needs to be 1:1
* mapped and addressable with 32-bit pointers. Map the kernel
* text and allocate a new stack because we can't rely on the
* stack pointer being < 4GB.
*/
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) || efi_is_native())
return 0;
page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_DMA32);
if (!page)
panic("Unable to allocate EFI runtime stack < 4GB\n");
efi_scratch.phys_stack = virt_to_phys(page_address(page));
efi_scratch.phys_stack += PAGE_SIZE; /* stack grows down */
npages = (_etext - _text) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
text = __pa(_text);
2015-11-28 05:09:31 +08:00
pfn = text >> PAGE_SHIFT;
x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME When SME is active, pagetable entries created for EFI need to have the encryption mask set as necessary. When the new pagetable pages are allocated they are mapped encrypted. So, update the efi_pgt value that will be used in CR3 to include the encryption mask so that the PGD table can be read successfully. The pagetable mapping as well as the kernel are also added to the pagetable mapping as encrypted. All other EFI mappings are mapped decrypted (tables, etc.). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9a8f4c502db4a84b09e2f0a1555bb75aa8b69785.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 05:10:15 +08:00
pf = _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ENC;
if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, text, npages, pf)) {
pr_err("Failed to map kernel text 1:1\n");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
{
unsigned long flags = _PAGE_RW;
2015-11-28 05:09:31 +08:00
unsigned long pfn;
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-28 05:09:34 +08:00
pgd_t *pgd = efi_pgd;
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
2015-11-28 05:09:31 +08:00
flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
if (sev_active())
flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
2015-11-28 05:09:31 +08:00
pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, va, md->num_pages, flags))
pr_warn("Error mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
md->phys_addr, va);
}
void __init efi_map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
{
unsigned long size = md->num_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
u64 pa = md->phys_addr;
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
return old_map_region(md);
/*
* Make sure the 1:1 mappings are present as a catch-all for b0rked
* firmware which doesn't update all internal pointers after switching
* to virtual mode and would otherwise crap on us.
*/
__map_region(md, md->phys_addr);
/*
* Enforce the 1:1 mapping as the default virtual address when
* booting in EFI mixed mode, because even though we may be
* running a 64-bit kernel, the firmware may only be 32-bit.
*/
if (!efi_is_native () && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED)) {
md->virt_addr = md->phys_addr;
return;
}
efi_va -= size;
/* Is PA 2M-aligned? */
if (!(pa & (PMD_SIZE - 1))) {
efi_va &= PMD_MASK;
} else {
u64 pa_offset = pa & (PMD_SIZE - 1);
u64 prev_va = efi_va;
/* get us the same offset within this 2M page */
efi_va = (efi_va & PMD_MASK) + pa_offset;
if (efi_va > prev_va)
efi_va -= PMD_SIZE;
}
if (efi_va < EFI_VA_END) {
pr_warn(FW_WARN "VA address range overflow!\n");
return;
}
/* Do the VA map */
__map_region(md, efi_va);
md->virt_addr = efi_va;
}
/*
* kexec kernel will use efi_map_region_fixed to map efi runtime memory ranges.
* md->virt_addr is the original virtual address which had been mapped in kexec
* 1st kernel.
*/
void __init efi_map_region_fixed(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
{
__map_region(md, md->phys_addr);
__map_region(md, md->virt_addr);
}
void __iomem *__init efi_ioremap(unsigned long phys_addr, unsigned long size,
x86/efi: Fix oops caused by incorrect set_memory_uc() usage Calling __pa() with an ioremap'd address is invalid. If we encounter an efi_memory_desc_t without EFI_MEMORY_WB set in ->attribute we currently call set_memory_uc(), which in turn calls __pa() on a potentially ioremap'd address. On CONFIG_X86_32 this results in the following oops: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at f7f22280 IP: [<c10257b9>] reserve_ram_pages_type+0x89/0x210 *pdpt = 0000000001978001 *pde = 0000000001ffb067 *pte = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 3.0.0-acpi-efi-0805 #3 EIP: 0060:[<c10257b9>] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 0 EIP is at reserve_ram_pages_type+0x89/0x210 EAX: 0070e280 EBX: 38714000 ECX: f7814000 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00000000 EDI: 38715000 EBP: c189fef0 ESP: c189fea8 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 Process swapper (pid: 0, ti=c189e000 task=c18bbe60 task.ti=c189e000) Stack: 80000200 ff108000 00000000 c189ff00 00038714 00000000 00000000 c189fed0 c104f8ca 00038714 00000000 00038715 00000000 00000000 00038715 00000000 00000010 38715000 c189ff48 c1025aff 38715000 00000000 00000010 00000000 Call Trace: [<c104f8ca>] ? page_is_ram+0x1a/0x40 [<c1025aff>] reserve_memtype+0xdf/0x2f0 [<c1024dc9>] set_memory_uc+0x49/0xa0 [<c19334d0>] efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1c2/0x3aa [<c19216d4>] start_kernel+0x291/0x2f2 [<c19211c7>] ? loglevel+0x1b/0x1b [<c19210bf>] i386_start_kernel+0xbf/0xc8 The only time we can call set_memory_uc() for a memory region is when it is part of the direct kernel mapping. For the case where we ioremap a memory region we must leave it alone. This patch reimplements the fix from e8c7106280a3 ("x86, efi: Calling __pa() with an ioremap()ed address is invalid") which was reverted in e1ad783b12ec because it caused a regression on some MacBooks (they hung at boot). The regression was caused because the commit only marked EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA as E820_RESERVED_EFI, when it should have marked all regions that have the EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute. Despite first impressions, it's not possible to use ioremap_cache() to map all cached memory regions on CONFIG_X86_64 because of the way that the memory map might be configured as detailed in the following bug report, https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=748516 e.g. some of the EFI memory regions *need* to be mapped as part of the direct kernel mapping. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Cc: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Huang Ying <huang.ying.caritas@gmail.com> Cc: Keith Packard <keithp@keithp.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1350649546-23541-1-git-send-email-matt@console-pimps.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2012-10-19 20:25:46 +08:00
u32 type, u64 attribute)
{
unsigned long last_map_pfn;
if (type == EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
return ioremap(phys_addr, size);
last_map_pfn = init_memory_mapping(phys_addr, phys_addr + size);
if ((last_map_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) < phys_addr + size) {
unsigned long top = last_map_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
x86/efi: Fix oops caused by incorrect set_memory_uc() usage Calling __pa() with an ioremap'd address is invalid. If we encounter an efi_memory_desc_t without EFI_MEMORY_WB set in ->attribute we currently call set_memory_uc(), which in turn calls __pa() on a potentially ioremap'd address. On CONFIG_X86_32 this results in the following oops: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at f7f22280 IP: [<c10257b9>] reserve_ram_pages_type+0x89/0x210 *pdpt = 0000000001978001 *pde = 0000000001ffb067 *pte = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 3.0.0-acpi-efi-0805 #3 EIP: 0060:[<c10257b9>] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 0 EIP is at reserve_ram_pages_type+0x89/0x210 EAX: 0070e280 EBX: 38714000 ECX: f7814000 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00000000 EDI: 38715000 EBP: c189fef0 ESP: c189fea8 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 Process swapper (pid: 0, ti=c189e000 task=c18bbe60 task.ti=c189e000) Stack: 80000200 ff108000 00000000 c189ff00 00038714 00000000 00000000 c189fed0 c104f8ca 00038714 00000000 00038715 00000000 00000000 00038715 00000000 00000010 38715000 c189ff48 c1025aff 38715000 00000000 00000010 00000000 Call Trace: [<c104f8ca>] ? page_is_ram+0x1a/0x40 [<c1025aff>] reserve_memtype+0xdf/0x2f0 [<c1024dc9>] set_memory_uc+0x49/0xa0 [<c19334d0>] efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1c2/0x3aa [<c19216d4>] start_kernel+0x291/0x2f2 [<c19211c7>] ? loglevel+0x1b/0x1b [<c19210bf>] i386_start_kernel+0xbf/0xc8 The only time we can call set_memory_uc() for a memory region is when it is part of the direct kernel mapping. For the case where we ioremap a memory region we must leave it alone. This patch reimplements the fix from e8c7106280a3 ("x86, efi: Calling __pa() with an ioremap()ed address is invalid") which was reverted in e1ad783b12ec because it caused a regression on some MacBooks (they hung at boot). The regression was caused because the commit only marked EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA as E820_RESERVED_EFI, when it should have marked all regions that have the EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute. Despite first impressions, it's not possible to use ioremap_cache() to map all cached memory regions on CONFIG_X86_64 because of the way that the memory map might be configured as detailed in the following bug report, https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=748516 e.g. some of the EFI memory regions *need* to be mapped as part of the direct kernel mapping. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Cc: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Huang Ying <huang.ying.caritas@gmail.com> Cc: Keith Packard <keithp@keithp.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1350649546-23541-1-git-send-email-matt@console-pimps.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2012-10-19 20:25:46 +08:00
efi_ioremap(top, size - (top - phys_addr), type, attribute);
}
x86/efi: Fix oops caused by incorrect set_memory_uc() usage Calling __pa() with an ioremap'd address is invalid. If we encounter an efi_memory_desc_t without EFI_MEMORY_WB set in ->attribute we currently call set_memory_uc(), which in turn calls __pa() on a potentially ioremap'd address. On CONFIG_X86_32 this results in the following oops: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at f7f22280 IP: [<c10257b9>] reserve_ram_pages_type+0x89/0x210 *pdpt = 0000000001978001 *pde = 0000000001ffb067 *pte = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 3.0.0-acpi-efi-0805 #3 EIP: 0060:[<c10257b9>] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 0 EIP is at reserve_ram_pages_type+0x89/0x210 EAX: 0070e280 EBX: 38714000 ECX: f7814000 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00000000 EDI: 38715000 EBP: c189fef0 ESP: c189fea8 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 Process swapper (pid: 0, ti=c189e000 task=c18bbe60 task.ti=c189e000) Stack: 80000200 ff108000 00000000 c189ff00 00038714 00000000 00000000 c189fed0 c104f8ca 00038714 00000000 00038715 00000000 00000000 00038715 00000000 00000010 38715000 c189ff48 c1025aff 38715000 00000000 00000010 00000000 Call Trace: [<c104f8ca>] ? page_is_ram+0x1a/0x40 [<c1025aff>] reserve_memtype+0xdf/0x2f0 [<c1024dc9>] set_memory_uc+0x49/0xa0 [<c19334d0>] efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1c2/0x3aa [<c19216d4>] start_kernel+0x291/0x2f2 [<c19211c7>] ? loglevel+0x1b/0x1b [<c19210bf>] i386_start_kernel+0xbf/0xc8 The only time we can call set_memory_uc() for a memory region is when it is part of the direct kernel mapping. For the case where we ioremap a memory region we must leave it alone. This patch reimplements the fix from e8c7106280a3 ("x86, efi: Calling __pa() with an ioremap()ed address is invalid") which was reverted in e1ad783b12ec because it caused a regression on some MacBooks (they hung at boot). The regression was caused because the commit only marked EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA as E820_RESERVED_EFI, when it should have marked all regions that have the EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute. Despite first impressions, it's not possible to use ioremap_cache() to map all cached memory regions on CONFIG_X86_64 because of the way that the memory map might be configured as detailed in the following bug report, https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=748516 e.g. some of the EFI memory regions *need* to be mapped as part of the direct kernel mapping. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Cc: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Huang Ying <huang.ying.caritas@gmail.com> Cc: Keith Packard <keithp@keithp.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1350649546-23541-1-git-send-email-matt@console-pimps.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2012-10-19 20:25:46 +08:00
if (!(attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
efi_memory_uc((u64)(unsigned long)__va(phys_addr), size);
return (void __iomem *)__va(phys_addr);
}
void __init parse_efi_setup(u64 phys_addr, u32 data_len)
{
efi_setup = phys_addr + sizeof(struct setup_data);
}
x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE UEFI v2.6 introduces EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE which describes memory protections that may be applied to the EFI Runtime code and data regions by the kernel. This enables the kernel to map these regions more strictly thereby increasing security. Presently, the only valid bits for the attribute field of a memory descriptor are EFI_MEMORY_RO and EFI_MEMORY_XP, hence use these bits to update the mappings in efi_pgd. The UEFI specification recommends to use this feature instead of EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE and hence while updating EFI mappings we first check for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE and if it's present we update the mappings according to this table and hence disregarding EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE even if it's published by the firmware. We consider EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE only when EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is absent. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485868902-20401-6-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-31 21:21:37 +08:00
static int __init efi_update_mappings(efi_memory_desc_t *md, unsigned long pf)
{
x86/efi: Map EFI_MEMORY_{XP,RO} memory region bits to EFI page tables Now that we have EFI memory region bits that indicate which regions do not need execute permission or read/write permission in the page tables, let's use them. We also check for EFI_NX_PE_DATA and only enforce the restrictive mappings if it's present (to allow us to ignore buggy firmware that sets bits it didn't mean to and to preserve backwards compatibility). Instead of assuming that firmware would set appropriate attributes in memory descriptor like EFI_MEMORY_RO for code and EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, we can expect some firmware out there which might only set *type* in memory descriptor to be EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE or EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA leaving away attribute. This will lead to improper mappings of EFI runtime regions. In order to avoid it, we check attribute and type of memory descriptor to update mappings and moreover Windows works this way. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455712566-16727-13-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-17 20:36:05 +08:00
unsigned long pfn;
pgd_t *pgd = efi_pgd;
x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE UEFI v2.6 introduces EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE which describes memory protections that may be applied to the EFI Runtime code and data regions by the kernel. This enables the kernel to map these regions more strictly thereby increasing security. Presently, the only valid bits for the attribute field of a memory descriptor are EFI_MEMORY_RO and EFI_MEMORY_XP, hence use these bits to update the mappings in efi_pgd. The UEFI specification recommends to use this feature instead of EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE and hence while updating EFI mappings we first check for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE and if it's present we update the mappings according to this table and hence disregarding EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE even if it's published by the firmware. We consider EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE only when EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is absent. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485868902-20401-6-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-31 21:21:37 +08:00
int err1, err2;
/* Update the 1:1 mapping */
pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
err1 = kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->phys_addr, md->num_pages, pf);
if (err1) {
pr_err("Error while updating 1:1 mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr);
}
err2 = kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->virt_addr, md->num_pages, pf);
if (err2) {
pr_err("Error while updating VA mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr);
}
return err1 || err2;
}
static int __init efi_update_mem_attr(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md)
{
unsigned long pf = 0;
if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_XP)
pf |= _PAGE_NX;
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO))
pf |= _PAGE_RW;
if (sev_active())
pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE UEFI v2.6 introduces EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE which describes memory protections that may be applied to the EFI Runtime code and data regions by the kernel. This enables the kernel to map these regions more strictly thereby increasing security. Presently, the only valid bits for the attribute field of a memory descriptor are EFI_MEMORY_RO and EFI_MEMORY_XP, hence use these bits to update the mappings in efi_pgd. The UEFI specification recommends to use this feature instead of EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE and hence while updating EFI mappings we first check for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE and if it's present we update the mappings according to this table and hence disregarding EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE even if it's published by the firmware. We consider EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE only when EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is absent. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485868902-20401-6-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-31 21:21:37 +08:00
return efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
}
void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
{
x86/efi: Map EFI_MEMORY_{XP,RO} memory region bits to EFI page tables Now that we have EFI memory region bits that indicate which regions do not need execute permission or read/write permission in the page tables, let's use them. We also check for EFI_NX_PE_DATA and only enforce the restrictive mappings if it's present (to allow us to ignore buggy firmware that sets bits it didn't mean to and to preserve backwards compatibility). Instead of assuming that firmware would set appropriate attributes in memory descriptor like EFI_MEMORY_RO for code and EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, we can expect some firmware out there which might only set *type* in memory descriptor to be EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE or EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA leaving away attribute. This will lead to improper mappings of EFI runtime regions. In order to avoid it, we check attribute and type of memory descriptor to update mappings and moreover Windows works this way. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455712566-16727-13-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-17 20:36:05 +08:00
efi_memory_desc_t *md;
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) {
if (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)
runtime_code_page_mkexec();
return;
}
x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE UEFI v2.6 introduces EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE which describes memory protections that may be applied to the EFI Runtime code and data regions by the kernel. This enables the kernel to map these regions more strictly thereby increasing security. Presently, the only valid bits for the attribute field of a memory descriptor are EFI_MEMORY_RO and EFI_MEMORY_XP, hence use these bits to update the mappings in efi_pgd. The UEFI specification recommends to use this feature instead of EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE and hence while updating EFI mappings we first check for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE and if it's present we update the mappings according to this table and hence disregarding EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE even if it's published by the firmware. We consider EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE only when EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is absent. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485868902-20401-6-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-31 21:21:37 +08:00
/*
* Use the EFI Memory Attribute Table for mapping permissions if it
* exists, since it is intended to supersede EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE.
*/
if (efi_enabled(EFI_MEM_ATTR)) {
efi_memattr_apply_permissions(NULL, efi_update_mem_attr);
return;
}
/*
* EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is intended to replace
* EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE. So, use EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE to update
* permissions only if EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is not
* published by the firmware. Even if we find a buggy implementation of
* EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE, don't fall back to
* EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE, because of the same reason.
*/
x86/efi: Map EFI_MEMORY_{XP,RO} memory region bits to EFI page tables Now that we have EFI memory region bits that indicate which regions do not need execute permission or read/write permission in the page tables, let's use them. We also check for EFI_NX_PE_DATA and only enforce the restrictive mappings if it's present (to allow us to ignore buggy firmware that sets bits it didn't mean to and to preserve backwards compatibility). Instead of assuming that firmware would set appropriate attributes in memory descriptor like EFI_MEMORY_RO for code and EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, we can expect some firmware out there which might only set *type* in memory descriptor to be EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE or EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA leaving away attribute. This will lead to improper mappings of EFI runtime regions. In order to avoid it, we check attribute and type of memory descriptor to update mappings and moreover Windows works this way. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455712566-16727-13-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-17 20:36:05 +08:00
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_NX_PE_DATA))
return;
for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) {
x86/efi: Map EFI_MEMORY_{XP,RO} memory region bits to EFI page tables Now that we have EFI memory region bits that indicate which regions do not need execute permission or read/write permission in the page tables, let's use them. We also check for EFI_NX_PE_DATA and only enforce the restrictive mappings if it's present (to allow us to ignore buggy firmware that sets bits it didn't mean to and to preserve backwards compatibility). Instead of assuming that firmware would set appropriate attributes in memory descriptor like EFI_MEMORY_RO for code and EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, we can expect some firmware out there which might only set *type* in memory descriptor to be EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE or EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA leaving away attribute. This will lead to improper mappings of EFI runtime regions. In order to avoid it, we check attribute and type of memory descriptor to update mappings and moreover Windows works this way. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455712566-16727-13-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-17 20:36:05 +08:00
unsigned long pf = 0;
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME))
continue;
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
pf |= _PAGE_PCD;
if ((md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_XP) ||
(md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA))
pf |= _PAGE_NX;
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO) &&
(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE))
pf |= _PAGE_RW;
if (sev_active())
pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE UEFI v2.6 introduces EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE which describes memory protections that may be applied to the EFI Runtime code and data regions by the kernel. This enables the kernel to map these regions more strictly thereby increasing security. Presently, the only valid bits for the attribute field of a memory descriptor are EFI_MEMORY_RO and EFI_MEMORY_XP, hence use these bits to update the mappings in efi_pgd. The UEFI specification recommends to use this feature instead of EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE and hence while updating EFI mappings we first check for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE and if it's present we update the mappings according to this table and hence disregarding EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE even if it's published by the firmware. We consider EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE only when EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is absent. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485868902-20401-6-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-31 21:21:37 +08:00
efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
x86/efi: Map EFI_MEMORY_{XP,RO} memory region bits to EFI page tables Now that we have EFI memory region bits that indicate which regions do not need execute permission or read/write permission in the page tables, let's use them. We also check for EFI_NX_PE_DATA and only enforce the restrictive mappings if it's present (to allow us to ignore buggy firmware that sets bits it didn't mean to and to preserve backwards compatibility). Instead of assuming that firmware would set appropriate attributes in memory descriptor like EFI_MEMORY_RO for code and EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, we can expect some firmware out there which might only set *type* in memory descriptor to be EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE or EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA leaving away attribute. This will lead to improper mappings of EFI runtime regions. In order to avoid it, we check attribute and type of memory descriptor to update mappings and moreover Windows works this way. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455712566-16727-13-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-17 20:36:05 +08:00
}
}
void __init efi_dump_pagetable(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_PGT_DUMP
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
ptdump_walk_pgd_level(NULL, swapper_pg_dir);
else
ptdump_walk_pgd_level(NULL, efi_pgd);
#endif
}
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_MIXED
extern efi_status_t efi64_thunk(u32, ...);
#define runtime_service32(func) \
({ \
u32 table = (u32)(unsigned long)efi.systab; \
u32 *rt, *___f; \
\
rt = (u32 *)(table + offsetof(efi_system_table_32_t, runtime)); \
___f = (u32 *)(*rt + offsetof(efi_runtime_services_32_t, func)); \
*___f; \
})
/*
* Switch to the EFI page tables early so that we can access the 1:1
* runtime services mappings which are not mapped in any other page
* tables. This function must be called before runtime_service32().
*
* Also, disable interrupts because the IDT points to 64-bit handlers,
* which aren't going to function correctly when we switch to 32-bit.
*/
#define efi_thunk(f, ...) \
({ \
efi_status_t __s; \
unsigned long __flags; \
u32 __func; \
\
local_irq_save(__flags); \
arch_efi_call_virt_setup(); \
\
__func = runtime_service32(f); \
__s = efi64_thunk(__func, __VA_ARGS__); \
\
arch_efi_call_virt_teardown(); \
local_irq_restore(__flags); \
\
__s; \
})
efi_status_t efi_thunk_set_virtual_address_map(
void *phys_set_virtual_address_map,
unsigned long memory_map_size,
unsigned long descriptor_size,
u32 descriptor_version,
efi_memory_desc_t *virtual_map)
{
efi_status_t status;
unsigned long flags;
u32 func;
efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings();
local_irq_save(flags);
efi_scratch.prev_cr3 = __read_cr3();
write_cr3((unsigned long)efi_scratch.efi_pgt);
__flush_tlb_all();
func = (u32)(unsigned long)phys_set_virtual_address_map;
status = efi64_thunk(func, memory_map_size, descriptor_size,
descriptor_version, virtual_map);
write_cr3(efi_scratch.prev_cr3);
__flush_tlb_all();
local_irq_restore(flags);
return status;
}
static efi_status_t efi_thunk_get_time(efi_time_t *tm, efi_time_cap_t *tc)
{
efi_status_t status;
u32 phys_tm, phys_tc;
spin_lock(&rtc_lock);
phys_tm = virt_to_phys_or_null(tm);
phys_tc = virt_to_phys_or_null(tc);
status = efi_thunk(get_time, phys_tm, phys_tc);
spin_unlock(&rtc_lock);
return status;
}
static efi_status_t efi_thunk_set_time(efi_time_t *tm)
{
efi_status_t status;
u32 phys_tm;
spin_lock(&rtc_lock);
phys_tm = virt_to_phys_or_null(tm);
status = efi_thunk(set_time, phys_tm);
spin_unlock(&rtc_lock);
return status;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_get_wakeup_time(efi_bool_t *enabled, efi_bool_t *pending,
efi_time_t *tm)
{
efi_status_t status;
u32 phys_enabled, phys_pending, phys_tm;
spin_lock(&rtc_lock);
phys_enabled = virt_to_phys_or_null(enabled);
phys_pending = virt_to_phys_or_null(pending);
phys_tm = virt_to_phys_or_null(tm);
status = efi_thunk(get_wakeup_time, phys_enabled,
phys_pending, phys_tm);
spin_unlock(&rtc_lock);
return status;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_set_wakeup_time(efi_bool_t enabled, efi_time_t *tm)
{
efi_status_t status;
u32 phys_tm;
spin_lock(&rtc_lock);
phys_tm = virt_to_phys_or_null(tm);
status = efi_thunk(set_wakeup_time, enabled, phys_tm);
spin_unlock(&rtc_lock);
return status;
}
static unsigned long efi_name_size(efi_char16_t *name)
{
return ucs2_strsize(name, EFI_VAR_NAME_LEN) + 1;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_get_variable(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *vendor,
u32 *attr, unsigned long *data_size, void *data)
{
efi_status_t status;
u32 phys_name, phys_vendor, phys_attr;
u32 phys_data_size, phys_data;
phys_data_size = virt_to_phys_or_null(data_size);
phys_vendor = virt_to_phys_or_null(vendor);
phys_name = virt_to_phys_or_null_size(name, efi_name_size(name));
phys_attr = virt_to_phys_or_null(attr);
phys_data = virt_to_phys_or_null_size(data, *data_size);
status = efi_thunk(get_variable, phys_name, phys_vendor,
phys_attr, phys_data_size, phys_data);
return status;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_set_variable(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *vendor,
u32 attr, unsigned long data_size, void *data)
{
u32 phys_name, phys_vendor, phys_data;
efi_status_t status;
phys_name = virt_to_phys_or_null_size(name, efi_name_size(name));
phys_vendor = virt_to_phys_or_null(vendor);
phys_data = virt_to_phys_or_null_size(data, data_size);
/* If data_size is > sizeof(u32) we've got problems */
status = efi_thunk(set_variable, phys_name, phys_vendor,
attr, data_size, phys_data);
return status;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_get_next_variable(unsigned long *name_size,
efi_char16_t *name,
efi_guid_t *vendor)
{
efi_status_t status;
u32 phys_name_size, phys_name, phys_vendor;
phys_name_size = virt_to_phys_or_null(name_size);
phys_vendor = virt_to_phys_or_null(vendor);
phys_name = virt_to_phys_or_null_size(name, *name_size);
status = efi_thunk(get_next_variable, phys_name_size,
phys_name, phys_vendor);
return status;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_get_next_high_mono_count(u32 *count)
{
efi_status_t status;
u32 phys_count;
phys_count = virt_to_phys_or_null(count);
status = efi_thunk(get_next_high_mono_count, phys_count);
return status;
}
static void
efi_thunk_reset_system(int reset_type, efi_status_t status,
unsigned long data_size, efi_char16_t *data)
{
u32 phys_data;
phys_data = virt_to_phys_or_null_size(data, data_size);
efi_thunk(reset_system, reset_type, status, data_size, phys_data);
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_update_capsule(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
unsigned long count, unsigned long sg_list)
{
/*
* To properly support this function we would need to repackage
* 'capsules' because the firmware doesn't understand 64-bit
* pointers.
*/
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_query_variable_info(u32 attr, u64 *storage_space,
u64 *remaining_space,
u64 *max_variable_size)
{
efi_status_t status;
u32 phys_storage, phys_remaining, phys_max;
if (efi.runtime_version < EFI_2_00_SYSTEM_TABLE_REVISION)
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
phys_storage = virt_to_phys_or_null(storage_space);
phys_remaining = virt_to_phys_or_null(remaining_space);
phys_max = virt_to_phys_or_null(max_variable_size);
status = efi_thunk(query_variable_info, attr, phys_storage,
phys_remaining, phys_max);
return status;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_query_capsule_caps(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
unsigned long count, u64 *max_size,
int *reset_type)
{
/*
* To properly support this function we would need to repackage
* 'capsules' because the firmware doesn't understand 64-bit
* pointers.
*/
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
void efi_thunk_runtime_setup(void)
{
efi.get_time = efi_thunk_get_time;
efi.set_time = efi_thunk_set_time;
efi.get_wakeup_time = efi_thunk_get_wakeup_time;
efi.set_wakeup_time = efi_thunk_set_wakeup_time;
efi.get_variable = efi_thunk_get_variable;
efi.get_next_variable = efi_thunk_get_next_variable;
efi.set_variable = efi_thunk_set_variable;
efi.get_next_high_mono_count = efi_thunk_get_next_high_mono_count;
efi.reset_system = efi_thunk_reset_system;
efi.query_variable_info = efi_thunk_query_variable_info;
efi.update_capsule = efi_thunk_update_capsule;
efi.query_capsule_caps = efi_thunk_query_capsule_caps;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_MIXED */