linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c

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/*
* Testsuite for eBPF verifier
*
* Copyright (c) 2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stddef.h>
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <sched.h>
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <linux/unistd.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/bpf_perf_event.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include "../../../include/linux/filter.h"
#include "bpf_sys.h"
#ifndef ARRAY_SIZE
# define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0]))
#endif
#define MAX_INSNS 512
#define MAX_FIXUPS 8
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
struct bpf_test {
const char *descr;
struct bpf_insn insns[MAX_INSNS];
int fixup_map1[MAX_FIXUPS];
int fixup_map2[MAX_FIXUPS];
int fixup_prog[MAX_FIXUPS];
const char *errstr;
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
const char *errstr_unpriv;
enum {
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
UNDEF,
ACCEPT,
REJECT
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
} result, result_unpriv;
enum bpf_prog_type prog_type;
};
/* Note we want this to be 64 bit aligned so that the end of our array is
* actually the end of the structure.
*/
#define MAX_ENTRIES 11
struct test_val {
unsigned int index;
int foo[MAX_ENTRIES];
};
static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
{
"add+sub+mul",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 1),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 2),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 3),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -1),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, BPF_REG_1, 3),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"unreachable",
.insns = {
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "unreachable",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"unreachable2",
.insns = {
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "unreachable",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"out of range jump",
.insns = {
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "jump out of range",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"out of range jump2",
.insns = {
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -2),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "jump out of range",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"test1 ld_imm64",
.insns = {
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 0, 1),
BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 1),
BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 1),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 2),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn",
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer comparison",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"test2 ld_imm64",
.insns = {
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 0, 1),
BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 1),
BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn",
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer comparison",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"test3 ld_imm64",
.insns = {
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 0, 1),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW, 0, 0, 0, 0),
BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 1),
BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"test4 ld_imm64",
.insns = {
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW, 0, 0, 0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"test5 ld_imm64",
.insns = {
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW, 0, 0, 0, 0),
},
.errstr = "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"no bpf_exit",
.insns = {
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
},
.errstr = "jump out of range",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"loop (back-edge)",
.insns = {
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "back-edge",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"loop2 (back-edge)",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -4),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "back-edge",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"conditional loop",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 0, -3),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "back-edge",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"read uninitialized register",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "R2 !read_ok",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"read invalid register",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, -1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "R15 is invalid",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"program doesn't init R0 before exit",
.insns = {
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "R0 !read_ok",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"program doesn't init R0 before exit in all branches",
.insns = {
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, 2),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "R0 !read_ok",
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer comparison",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"stack out of bounds",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, 8, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid stack",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"invalid call insn1",
.insns = {
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL | BPF_X, 0, 0, 0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "BPF_CALL uses reserved",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"invalid call insn2",
.insns = {
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 1, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "BPF_CALL uses reserved",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"invalid function call",
.insns = {
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, 1234567),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid func 1234567",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"uninitialized stack1",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 2 },
.errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"uninitialized stack2",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid read from stack",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"invalid argument register",
.insns = {
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_get_cgroup_classid),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_get_cgroup_classid),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "R1 !read_ok",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"non-invalid argument register",
.insns = {
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_get_cgroup_classid),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_get_cgroup_classid),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"check valid spill/fill",
.insns = {
/* spill R1(ctx) into stack */
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_1, -8),
/* fill it back into R2 */
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10, -8),
/* should be able to access R0 = *(R2 + 8) */
/* BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 8), */
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 leaks addr",
.result = ACCEPT,
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
},
{
"check valid spill/fill, skb mark",
.insns = {
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10, -8),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.result_unpriv = ACCEPT,
},
{
"check corrupted spill/fill",
.insns = {
/* spill R1(ctx) into stack */
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_1, -8),
/* mess up with R1 pointer on stack */
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_10, -7, 0x23),
/* fill back into R0 should fail */
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10, -8),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "attempt to corrupt spilled",
.errstr = "corrupted spill",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"invalid src register in STX",
.insns = {
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_10, -1, -1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "R15 is invalid",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"invalid dst register in STX",
.insns = {
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_B, 14, BPF_REG_10, -1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "R14 is invalid",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"invalid dst register in ST",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_B, 14, -1, -1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "R14 is invalid",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"invalid src register in LDX",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, 12, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "R12 is invalid",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"invalid dst register in LDX",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, 11, BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "R11 is invalid",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"junk insn",
.insns = {
BPF_RAW_INSN(0, 0, 0, 0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid BPF_LD_IMM",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"junk insn2",
.insns = {
BPF_RAW_INSN(1, 0, 0, 0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"junk insn3",
.insns = {
BPF_RAW_INSN(-1, 0, 0, 0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid BPF_ALU opcode f0",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"junk insn4",
.insns = {
BPF_RAW_INSN(-1, -1, -1, -1, -1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid BPF_ALU opcode f0",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"junk insn5",
.insns = {
BPF_RAW_INSN(0x7f, -1, -1, -1, -1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"misaligned read from stack",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, -4),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "misaligned access",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"invalid map_fd for function call",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "fd 0 is not pointing to valid bpf_map",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"don't check return value before access",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
.errstr = "R0 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"access memory with incorrect alignment",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
.errstr = "misaligned access",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"sometimes access memory with incorrect alignment",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
.errstr = "R0 invalid mem access",
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 leaks addr",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"jump test 1",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -8),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 0, 1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -8, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 1, 1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -16, 1),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 2, 1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -8, 2),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 3, 1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -16, 3),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 4, 1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -8, 4),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 5, 1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -32, 5),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer comparison",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"jump test 2",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -8, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 14),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 1, 2),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -16, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 11),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 2, 2),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -32, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 8),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 3, 2),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -40, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 5),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 4, 2),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -48, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 2),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 5, 1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -56, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer comparison",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"jump test 3",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 0, 3),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -8, 0),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 19),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 1, 3),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -16, 0),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -16),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 15),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 2, 3),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -32, 0),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -32),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 11),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 3, 3),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -40, 0),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -40),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 7),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 4, 3),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -48, 0),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -48),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 3),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 5, 0),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, -56, 0),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -56),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 24 },
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer comparison",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"jump test 4",
.insns = {
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 1),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 2),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 3),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 4),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 1),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 2),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 3),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 4),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 1),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 2),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 3),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 4),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 1),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 2),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 3),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 4),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 1),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 2),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 3),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 4),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 1),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 2),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 3),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 4),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 1),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 2),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 3),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 4),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 1),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 2),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 3),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 4),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 1),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 2),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 3),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 4),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer comparison",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"jump test 5",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, -8),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 2),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, -8),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 2),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, -8),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 2),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, -8),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 2),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, -8),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 2),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer comparison",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"access skb fields ok",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, len)),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type)),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, queue_mapping)),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, protocol)),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, vlan_present)),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, vlan_tci)),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"access skb fields bad1",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -4),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid bpf_context access",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"access skb fields bad2",
.insns = {
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 9),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 4 },
.errstr = "different pointers",
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer comparison",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"access skb fields bad3",
.insns = {
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -12),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 6 },
.errstr = "different pointers",
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer comparison",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"access skb fields bad4",
.insns = {
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 3),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, len)),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -13),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 7 },
.errstr = "different pointers",
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer comparison",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"check skb->mark is not writeable by sockets",
.insns = {
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid bpf_context access",
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 leaks addr",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"check skb->tc_index is not writeable by sockets",
.insns = {
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, tc_index)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid bpf_context access",
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 leaks addr",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"check non-u32 access to cb",
.insns = {
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, cb[0])),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid bpf_context access",
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 leaks addr",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"check out of range skb->cb access",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, cb[0]) + 256),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid bpf_context access",
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT,
},
{
"write skb fields from socket prog",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, cb[4])),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, tc_index)),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, cb[0])),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, cb[2])),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 leaks addr",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
},
{
"write skb fields from tc_cls_act prog",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, cb[0])),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, tc_index)),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, tc_index)),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, cb[3])),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"PTR_TO_STACK store/load",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -10),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, 2, 0xfaceb00c),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, 2),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"PTR_TO_STACK store/load - bad alignment on off",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -8),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, 2, 0xfaceb00c),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, 2),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "misaligned access off -6 size 8",
},
{
"PTR_TO_STACK store/load - bad alignment on reg",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -10),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, 8, 0xfaceb00c),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, 8),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "misaligned access off -2 size 8",
},
{
"PTR_TO_STACK store/load - out of bounds low",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -80000),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, 8, 0xfaceb00c),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, 8),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid stack off=-79992 size=8",
},
{
"PTR_TO_STACK store/load - out of bounds high",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -8),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, 8, 0xfaceb00c),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, 8),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid stack off=0 size=8",
},
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
{
"unpriv: return pointer",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 leaks addr",
},
{
"unpriv: add const to pointer",
.insns = {
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 8),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer arithmetic",
},
{
"unpriv: add pointer to pointer",
.insns = {
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer arithmetic",
},
{
"unpriv: neg pointer",
.insns = {
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer arithmetic",
},
{
"unpriv: cmp pointer with const",
.insns = {
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 0, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer comparison",
},
{
"unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer",
.insns = {
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.errstr_unpriv = "R10 pointer comparison",
},
{
"unpriv: check that printk is disallowed",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -8),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 8),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_trace_printk),
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "unknown func 6",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"unpriv: pass pointer to helper function",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem),
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R4 leaks addr",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function",
.insns = {
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_10, -8),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack off -8+0 size 8",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1",
.insns = {
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_10, -8),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "attempt to corrupt spilled",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2",
.insns = {
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_10, -8),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_10, -1, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "attempt to corrupt spilled",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks",
.insns = {
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_10, -8),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10, -8),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid size",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"unpriv: write pointer into ctx",
.insns = {
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 leaks addr",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid bpf_context access",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"unpriv: spill/fill of ctx",
.insns = {
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"unpriv: spill/fill of ctx 2",
.insns = {
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_get_hash_recalc),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"unpriv: spill/fill of ctx 3",
.insns = {
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10, 0),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_get_hash_recalc),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "R1 type=fp expected=ctx",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"unpriv: spill/fill of ctx 4",
.insns = {
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10,
BPF_REG_0, -8, 0),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_get_hash_recalc),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "R1 type=inv expected=ctx",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"unpriv: spill/fill of different pointers stx",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 42),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 0, 3),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -16),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 1),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_3,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "same insn cannot be used with different pointers",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"unpriv: spill/fill of different pointers ldx",
.insns = {
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 0, 3),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2,
-(__s32)offsetof(struct bpf_perf_event_data,
sample_period) - 8),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 1),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct bpf_perf_event_data,
sample_period)),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "same insn cannot be used with different pointers",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT,
},
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
{
"unpriv: write pointer into map elem value",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 3 },
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 leaks addr",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"unpriv: partial copy of pointer",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV32_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R10 partial copy",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_tail_call),
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_prog = { 1 },
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R3 leaks addr into helper",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 0, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 1 },
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 pointer comparison",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"unpriv: write into frame pointer",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "frame pointer is read only",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"unpriv: spill/fill frame pointer",
.insns = {
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10, 0),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "frame pointer is read only",
.result = REJECT,
},
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
{
"unpriv: cmp of frame pointer",
.insns = {
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_10, 0, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R10 pointer comparison",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"unpriv: cmp of stack pointer",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R2 pointer comparison",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R2 pointer arithmetic",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"raw_stack: no skb_load_bytes",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 8),
/* Call to skb_load_bytes() omitted. */
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid read from stack off -8+0 size 8",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, negative len",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, -8),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid stack type R3",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, negative len 2",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, ~0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid stack type R3",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, zero len",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid stack type R3",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, no init",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 8),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, init",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, 0, 0xcafe),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 8),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, spilled regs around bounds",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -16),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, -8),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, 8),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 8),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_6, 8),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_2,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, priority)),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, spilled regs corruption",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 8),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv'",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, spilled regs corruption 2",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -16),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, -8),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, 8),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 8),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_6, 8),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_2,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, priority)),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_3,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type)),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_3),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "R3 invalid mem access 'inv'",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, spilled regs + data",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -16),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, -8),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, 8),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 8),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, -8),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_6, 8),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_2,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, priority)),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_3),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 1",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -513),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 8),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid stack type R3 off=-513 access_size=8",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 2",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -1),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 8),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid stack type R3 off=-1 access_size=8",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 3",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, 0xffffffff),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0xffffffff),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid stack type R3 off=-1 access_size=-1",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 4",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -1),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0x7fffffff),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid stack type R3 off=-1 access_size=2147483647",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 5",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -512),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0x7fffffff),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid stack type R3 off=-512 access_size=2147483647",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 6",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -512),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid stack type R3 off=-512 access_size=0",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, large access",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, -512),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 512),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"direct packet access: test1",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, 8),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_3, 1),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"direct packet access: test2",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_3),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_5, 14),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_4, 15),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_3, 7),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_3, 12),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, BPF_REG_4, 14),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_2, 48),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_2, 48),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, 8),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 1),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_3, 4),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"direct packet access: test3",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid bpf_context access off=76",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER,
},
{
"direct packet access: test4 (write)",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, 8),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_3, 1),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
bpf: fix range propagation on direct packet access LLVM can generate code that tests for direct packet access via skb->data/data_end in a way that currently gets rejected by the verifier, example: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) invalid access to packet, off=20 size=1, R9(id=0,off=0,r=0) The reason why this gets rejected despite a proper test is that we currently call find_good_pkt_pointers() only in case where we detect tests like rX > pkt_end, where rX is of type pkt(id=Y,off=Z,r=0) and derived, for example, from a register of type pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=0) pointing to skb->data. find_good_pkt_pointers() then fills the range in the current branch to pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) on success. For above case, we need to extend that to recognize pkt_end >= rX pattern and mark the other branch that is taken on success with the appropriate pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) type via find_good_pkt_pointers(). Since eBPF operates on BPF_JGT (>) and BPF_JGE (>=), these are the only two practical options to test for from what LLVM could have generated, since there's no such thing as BPF_JLT (<) or BPF_JLE (<=) that we would need to take into account as well. After the fix: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=54) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) 29: (bf) r1 = r8 30: (25) if r8 > 0x3c goto pc+47 R1=inv56 R2=imm40 R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R8=inv56 R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 31: (b7) r1 = 1 [...] Verifier test cases are also added in this work, one that demonstrates the mentioned example here and one that tries a bad packet access for the current/fall-through branch (the one with types pkt(id=X,off=Y,r=0), pkt(id=X,off=0,r=0)), then a case with good and bad accesses, and two with both test variants (>, >=). Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-08 07:03:42 +08:00
{
"direct packet access: test5 (pkt_end >= reg, good access)",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, 8),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 2),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"direct packet access: test6 (pkt_end >= reg, bad access)",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, 8),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 3),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid access to packet",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"direct packet access: test7 (pkt_end >= reg, both accesses)",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, 8),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 3),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid access to packet",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"direct packet access: test8 (double test, variant 1)",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, 8),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 4),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_3, 1),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"direct packet access: test9 (double test, variant 2)",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, 8),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 2),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_3, 1),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"direct packet access: test10 (write invalid)",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, 8),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_3, 2),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr = "invalid access to packet",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test1, valid packet_ptr range",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct xdp_md, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct xdp_md, data_end)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 8),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_3, 5),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 5 },
.result_unpriv = ACCEPT,
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test2, unchecked packet_ptr",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct xdp_md, data)),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 1 },
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid access to packet",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test3, variable add",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct xdp_md, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct xdp_md, data_end)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_4, 8),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_3, 10),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_4),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_5, 8),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_3, 4),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_4),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 11 },
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test4, packet_ptr with bad range",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct xdp_md, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct xdp_md, data_end)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_4, 4),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_3, 2),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 7 },
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid access to packet",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test5, packet_ptr with too short range",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct xdp_md, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct xdp_md, data_end)),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, 1),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_4, 7),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_3, 3),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 6 },
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid access to packet",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test6, cls valid packet_ptr range",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 8),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_3, 5),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 5 },
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test7, cls unchecked packet_ptr",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 1 },
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid access to packet",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test8, cls variable add",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_4, 8),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_3, 10),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_4),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_5, 8),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_3, 4),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_4),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 11 },
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test9, cls packet_ptr with bad range",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_4, 4),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_3, 2),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 7 },
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid access to packet",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test10, cls packet_ptr with too short range",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, 1),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_4, 7),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_3, 3),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 6 },
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid access to packet",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test11, cls unsuitable helper 1",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, 1),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, 7),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_7, 4),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 42),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_store_bytes),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "helper access to the packet",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test12, cls unsuitable helper 2",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, 8),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_7, 3),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 4),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "helper access to the packet",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test13, cls helper ok",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, 1),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 7),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_7, 6),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_csum_diff),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test14, cls helper fail sub",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, 1),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 7),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_7, 6),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_1, 4),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_csum_diff),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "type=inv expected=fp",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test15, cls helper fail range 1",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, 1),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 7),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_7, 6),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 8),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_csum_diff),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid access to packet",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test16, cls helper fail range 2",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, 1),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 7),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_7, 6),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, -9),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_csum_diff),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid access to packet",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test17, cls helper fail range 3",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, 1),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 7),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_7, 6),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, ~0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_csum_diff),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid access to packet",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test18, cls helper fail range zero",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, 1),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 7),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_7, 6),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_csum_diff),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid access to packet",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test19, pkt end as input",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, 1),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 7),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_7, 6),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_7),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_csum_diff),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "R1 type=pkt_end expected=fp",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"helper access to packet: test20, wrong reg",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_1,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, 1),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 7),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_7, 6),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 4),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_csum_diff),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid access to packet",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
"valid map access into an array with a constant",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0,
offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map2 = { 3 },
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 leaks addr",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"valid map access into an array with a register",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 4),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 4),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_1, 2),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0,
offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map2 = { 3 },
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 pointer arithmetic prohibited",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"valid map access into an array with a variable",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 5),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_1, MAX_ENTRIES, 3),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_1, 2),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0,
offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map2 = { 3 },
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 pointer arithmetic prohibited",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"valid map access into an array with a signed variable",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 9),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_1, 0xffffffff, 1),
BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_2, MAX_ENTRIES),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 1),
BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_1, 2),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0,
offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map2 = { 3 },
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 pointer arithmetic prohibited",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"invalid map access into an array with a constant",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, (MAX_ENTRIES + 1) << 2,
offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map2 = { 3 },
.errstr = "invalid access to map value, value_size=48 off=48 size=8",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"invalid map access into an array with a register",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 4),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, MAX_ENTRIES + 1),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_1, 2),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0,
offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map2 = { 3 },
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 pointer arithmetic prohibited",
.errstr = "R0 min value is outside of the array range",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"invalid map access into an array with a variable",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 4),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_1, 2),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0,
offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map2 = { 3 },
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 pointer arithmetic prohibited",
.errstr = "R0 min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"invalid map access into an array with no floor check",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 7),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_2, MAX_ENTRIES),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 1),
BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_1, 2),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0,
offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map2 = { 3 },
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 pointer arithmetic prohibited",
.errstr = "R0 min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"invalid map access into an array with a invalid max check",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 7),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_2, MAX_ENTRIES + 1),
BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 1),
BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_1, 2),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0,
offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map2 = { 3 },
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 pointer arithmetic prohibited",
.errstr = "invalid access to map value, value_size=48 off=44 size=8",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"invalid map access into an array with a invalid max check",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 10),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_8),
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0,
offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map2 = { 3, 11 },
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 pointer arithmetic prohibited",
.errstr = "R0 min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"multiple registers share map_lookup_elem result",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 10),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_1, -8),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_4, 0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 4 },
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS
},
{
"invalid memory access with multiple map_lookup_elem calls",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 10),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_1, -8),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_8),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_7),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_4, 0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 4 },
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "R4 !read_ok",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS
},
{
"valid indirect map_lookup_elem access with 2nd lookup in branch",
.insns = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 10),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_1, -8),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 10),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_2, 0, 3),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_8),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_7),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_4, 0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map1 = { 4 },
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS
},
};
static int probe_filter_length(const struct bpf_insn *fp)
{
int len;
for (len = MAX_INSNS - 1; len > 0; --len)
if (fp[len].code != 0 || fp[len].imm != 0)
break;
return len + 1;
}
static int create_map(uint32_t size_value, uint32_t max_elem)
{
int fd;
fd = bpf_map_create(BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH, sizeof(long long),
size_value, max_elem, BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC);
if (fd < 0)
printf("Failed to create hash map '%s'!\n", strerror(errno));
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
return fd;
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
}
static int create_prog_array(void)
{
int fd;
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
fd = bpf_map_create(BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY, sizeof(int),
sizeof(int), 4, 0);
if (fd < 0)
printf("Failed to create prog array '%s'!\n", strerror(errno));
return fd;
}
static char bpf_vlog[32768];
static void do_test_fixup(struct bpf_test *test, struct bpf_insn *prog,
int *fd_f1, int *fd_f2, int *fd_f3)
{
int *fixup_map1 = test->fixup_map1;
int *fixup_map2 = test->fixup_map2;
int *fixup_prog = test->fixup_prog;
/* Allocating HTs with 1 elem is fine here, since we only test
* for verifier and not do a runtime lookup, so the only thing
* that really matters is value size in this case.
*/
if (*fixup_map1) {
*fd_f1 = create_map(sizeof(long long), 1);
do {
prog[*fixup_map1].imm = *fd_f1;
fixup_map1++;
} while (*fixup_map1);
}
if (*fixup_map2) {
*fd_f2 = create_map(sizeof(struct test_val), 1);
do {
prog[*fixup_map2].imm = *fd_f2;
fixup_map2++;
} while (*fixup_map2);
}
if (*fixup_prog) {
*fd_f3 = create_prog_array();
do {
prog[*fixup_prog].imm = *fd_f3;
fixup_prog++;
} while (*fixup_prog);
}
}
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
static void do_test_single(struct bpf_test *test, bool unpriv,
int *passes, int *errors)
{
struct bpf_insn *prog = test->insns;
int prog_len = probe_filter_length(prog);
int prog_type = test->prog_type;
int fd_f1 = -1, fd_f2 = -1, fd_f3 = -1;
int fd_prog, expected_ret;
const char *expected_err;
do_test_fixup(test, prog, &fd_f1, &fd_f2, &fd_f3);
fd_prog = bpf_prog_load(prog_type ? : BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER,
prog, prog_len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn),
"GPL", bpf_vlog, sizeof(bpf_vlog));
expected_ret = unpriv && test->result_unpriv != UNDEF ?
test->result_unpriv : test->result;
expected_err = unpriv && test->errstr_unpriv ?
test->errstr_unpriv : test->errstr;
if (expected_ret == ACCEPT) {
if (fd_prog < 0) {
printf("FAIL\nFailed to load prog '%s'!\n",
strerror(errno));
goto fail_log;
}
} else {
if (fd_prog >= 0) {
printf("FAIL\nUnexpected success to load!\n");
goto fail_log;
}
if (!strstr(bpf_vlog, expected_err)) {
printf("FAIL\nUnexpected error message!\n");
goto fail_log;
}
}
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
(*passes)++;
printf("OK\n");
close_fds:
close(fd_prog);
close(fd_f1);
close(fd_f2);
close(fd_f3);
sched_yield();
return;
fail_log:
(*errors)++;
printf("%s", bpf_vlog);
goto close_fds;
}
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
static int do_test(bool unpriv, unsigned int from, unsigned int to)
{
int i, passes = 0, errors = 0;
for (i = from; i < to; i++) {
struct bpf_test *test = &tests[i];
/* Program types that are not supported by non-root we
* skip right away.
*/
if (unpriv && test->prog_type)
continue;
printf("#%d %s ", i, test->descr);
do_test_single(test, unpriv, &passes, &errors);
}
printf("Summary: %d PASSED, %d FAILED\n", passes, errors);
return errors ? -errors : 0;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct rlimit rinf = { RLIM_INFINITY, RLIM_INFINITY };
struct rlimit rlim = { 1 << 20, 1 << 20 };
unsigned int from = 0, to = ARRAY_SIZE(tests);
bool unpriv = geteuid() != 0;
if (argc == 3) {
unsigned int l = atoi(argv[argc - 2]);
unsigned int u = atoi(argv[argc - 1]);
if (l < to && u < to) {
from = l;
to = u + 1;
}
} else if (argc == 2) {
unsigned int t = atoi(argv[argc - 1]);
if (t < to) {
from = t;
to = t + 1;
}
}
bpf: add unprivileged bpf tests Add new tests samples/bpf/test_verifier: unpriv: return pointer checks that pointer cannot be returned from the eBPF program unpriv: add const to pointer unpriv: add pointer to pointer unpriv: neg pointer checks that pointer arithmetic is disallowed unpriv: cmp pointer with const unpriv: cmp pointer with pointer checks that comparison of pointers is disallowed Only one case allowed 'void *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(..); if (value == 0) ...' unpriv: check that printk is disallowed since bpf_trace_printk is not available to unprivileged unpriv: pass pointer to helper function checks that pointers cannot be passed to functions that expect integers If function expects a pointer the verifier allows only that type of pointer. Like 1st argument of bpf_map_lookup_elem() must be pointer to map. (applies to non-root as well) unpriv: indirectly pass pointer on stack to helper function checks that pointer stored into stack cannot be used as part of key passed into bpf_map_lookup_elem() unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 1 unpriv: mangle pointer on stack 2 checks that writing into stack slot that already contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: read pointer from stack in small chunks checks that < 8 byte read from stack slot that contains a pointer is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into ctx checks that storing pointers into skb->fields is disallowed unpriv: write pointer into map elem value checks that storing pointers into element values is disallowed For example: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 key = 0; u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key); if (value) *value = (u64) skb; } will be rejected. unpriv: partial copy of pointer checks that doing 32-bit register mov from register containing a pointer is disallowed unpriv: pass pointer to tail_call checks that passing pointer as an index into bpf_tail_call is disallowed unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero checks that comparing map pointer with constant is disallowed unpriv: write into frame pointer checks that frame pointer is read-only (applies to root too) unpriv: cmp of frame pointer checks that R10 cannot be using in comparison unpriv: cmp of stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but comparing Rx is not unpriv: obfuscate stack pointer checks that Rx = R10 - imm is ok, but Rx -= imm is not Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:23 +08:00
setrlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, unpriv ? &rlim : &rinf);
return do_test(unpriv, from, to);
}