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linux/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h

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[LSM-IPSec]: Per-packet access control. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the SELinux LSM to create, deallocate, and use security contexts for policies (xfrm_policy) and security associations (xfrm_state) that enable control of a socket's ability to send and receive packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable the SELinux LSM to implement access control on individual packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones in SELinux based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the SELinux can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The patch's main function is to authorize a socket's access to a IPSec policy based on their security contexts. Since the communication is implemented by a security association, the patch ensures that the security association's negotiated and used have the same security context. The patch enables allocation and deallocation of such security contexts for policies and security associations. It also enables copying of the security context when policies are cloned. Lastly, the patch ensures that packets that are sent without using a IPSec security assocation with a security context are allowed to be sent in that manner. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: The function which authorizes a socket to perform a requested operation (send/receive) on a IPSec policy (xfrm_policy) is selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup. The Netfilter and rcv_skb hooks ensure that if a IPSec SA with a securit y association has not been used, then the socket is allowed to send or receive the packet, respectively. The patch implements SELinux function for allocating security contexts when policies (xfrm_policy) are created via the pfkey or xfrm_user interfaces via selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc. When a security association is built, SELinux allocates the security context designated by the XFRM subsystem which is based on that of the authorized policy via selinux_xfrm_state_alloc. When a xfrm_policy is cloned, the security context of that policy, if any, is copied to the clone via selinux_xfrm_policy_clone. When a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state is freed, its security context, if any is also freed at selinux_xfrm_policy_free or selinux_xfrm_state_free. Testing: The SELinux authorization function is tested using ipsec-tools. We created policies and security associations with particular security contexts and added SELinux access control policy entries to verify the authorization decision. We also made sure that packets for which no security context was supplied (which either did or did not use security associations) were authorized using an unlabelled context. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 15:12:40 +08:00
/*
* SELinux support for the XFRM LSM hooks
*
* Author : Trent Jaeger, <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
*/
#ifndef _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
#define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new);
void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir);
/*
* Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket)
*/
static inline struct inode_security_struct *get_sock_isec(struct sock *sk)
{
if (!sk->sk_socket)
return NULL;
return SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_security;
}
static inline u32 selinux_no_sk_sid(struct flowi *fl)
{
/* NOTE: no sock occurs on ICMP reply, forwards, ... */
/* icmp_reply: authorize as kernel packet */
if (fl && fl->proto == IPPROTO_ICMP) {
return SECINITSID_KERNEL;
}
return SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
#else
static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
#endif
#endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */