2011-03-10 03:13:22 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2009-2010 IBM Corporation
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Authors:
|
|
|
|
|
* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
|
|
|
|
|
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
|
|
|
|
|
* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
|
|
|
|
|
* License.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/types.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/integrity.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <crypto/sha.h>
|
2013-02-07 06:12:08 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/key.h>
|
2011-03-10 03:13:22 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2012-09-13 01:51:32 +08:00
|
|
|
/* iint action cache flags */
|
2012-12-05 22:29:09 +08:00
|
|
|
#define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_MEASURED 0x00000002
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_APPRAISE 0x00000004
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_APPRAISED 0x00000008
|
|
|
|
|
/*#define IMA_COLLECT 0x00000010 do not use this flag */
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_COLLECTED 0x00000020
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_AUDIT 0x00000040
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_AUDITED 0x00000080
|
ima: support new "hash" and "dont_hash" policy actions
The builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy, which is specified on the boot
command line, can be replaced with a custom policy, normally early in
the boot process. Custom policies can be more restrictive in some ways,
like requiring file signatures, but can be less restrictive in other
ways, like not appraising mutable files. With a less restrictive policy
in place, files in the builtin policy might not be hashed and labeled
with a security.ima hash. On reboot, files which should be labeled in
the ima_appraise_tcb are not labeled, possibly preventing the system
from booting properly.
To resolve this problem, this patch extends the existing IMA policy
actions "measure", "dont_measure", "appraise", "dont_appraise", and
"audit" with "hash" and "dont_hash". The new "hash" action will write
the file hash as security.ima, but without requiring the file to be
appraised as well.
For example, the builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy includes the rule,
"appraise fowner=0". Adding the "hash fowner=0" rule to a custom
policy, will cause the needed file hashes to be calculated and written
as security.ima xattrs.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-09-29 22:04:52 +08:00
|
|
|
#define IMA_HASH 0x00000100
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_HASHED 0x00000200
|
2012-09-13 01:51:32 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-03-10 03:13:22 +08:00
|
|
|
/* iint cache flags */
|
2012-12-05 22:29:09 +08:00
|
|
|
#define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000
|
ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock
Before IMA appraisal was introduced, IMA was using own integrity cache
lock along with i_mutex. process_measurement and ima_file_free took
the iint->mutex first and then the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and
chown took the locks in reverse order. To resolve the potential deadlock,
i_mutex was moved to protect entire IMA functionality and the redundant
iint->mutex was eliminated.
Solution was based on the assumption that filesystem code does not take
i_mutex further. But when file is opened with O_DIRECT flag, direct-io
implementation takes i_mutex and produces deadlock. Furthermore, certain
other filesystem operations, such as llseek, also take i_mutex.
More recently some filesystems have replaced their filesystem specific
lock with the global i_rwsem to read a file. As a result, when IMA
attempts to calculate the file hash, reading the file attempts to take
the i_rwsem again.
To resolve O_DIRECT related deadlock problem, this patch re-introduces
iint->mutex. But to eliminate the original chmod() related deadlock
problem, this patch eliminates the requirement for chmod hooks to take
the iint->mutex by introducing additional atomic iint->attr_flags to
indicate calling of the hooks. The allowed locking order is to take
the iint->mutex first and then the i_rwsem.
Original flags were cleared in chmod(), setxattr() or removwxattr()
hooks and tested when file was closed or opened again. New atomic flags
are set or cleared in those hooks and tested to clear iint->flags on
close or on open.
Atomic flags are following:
* IMA_CHANGE_ATTR - indicates that chATTR() was called (chmod, chown,
chgrp) and file attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA
to clear iint->flags to re-evaluate policy and perform IMA functions
again.
* IMA_CHANGE_XATTR - indicates that setxattr or removexattr was called
and extended attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to
clear iint->flags IMA_DONE_MASK to re-appraise.
* IMA_UPDATE_XATTR - indicates that security.ima needs to be updated.
It is cleared if file policy changes and no update is needed.
* IMA_DIGSIG - indicates that file security.ima has signature and file
security.ima must not update to file has on file close.
* IMA_MUST_MEASURE - indicates the file is in the measurement policy.
Fixes: Commit 6552321831dc ("xfs: remove i_iolock and use i_rwsem in
the VFS inode instead")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-12-06 03:06:34 +08:00
|
|
|
#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x01000000
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x02000000
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000
|
|
|
|
|
#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG 0x08000000
|
2018-02-22 00:36:32 +08:00
|
|
|
#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000
|
2012-09-13 01:51:32 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2012-12-04 06:08:11 +08:00
|
|
|
#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
|
ima: support new "hash" and "dont_hash" policy actions
The builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy, which is specified on the boot
command line, can be replaced with a custom policy, normally early in
the boot process. Custom policies can be more restrictive in some ways,
like requiring file signatures, but can be less restrictive in other
ways, like not appraising mutable files. With a less restrictive policy
in place, files in the builtin policy might not be hashed and labeled
with a security.ima hash. On reboot, files which should be labeled in
the ima_appraise_tcb are not labeled, possibly preventing the system
from booting properly.
To resolve this problem, this patch extends the existing IMA policy
actions "measure", "dont_measure", "appraise", "dont_appraise", and
"audit" with "hash" and "dont_hash". The new "hash" action will write
the file hash as security.ima, but without requiring the file to be
appraised as well.
For example, the builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy includes the rule,
"appraise fowner=0". Adding the "hash fowner=0" rule to a custom
policy, will cause the needed file hashes to be calculated and written
as security.ima xattrs.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-09-29 22:04:52 +08:00
|
|
|
IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
|
2012-12-04 06:08:11 +08:00
|
|
|
#define IMA_DONE_MASK (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \
|
ima: support new "hash" and "dont_hash" policy actions
The builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy, which is specified on the boot
command line, can be replaced with a custom policy, normally early in
the boot process. Custom policies can be more restrictive in some ways,
like requiring file signatures, but can be less restrictive in other
ways, like not appraising mutable files. With a less restrictive policy
in place, files in the builtin policy might not be hashed and labeled
with a security.ima hash. On reboot, files which should be labeled in
the ima_appraise_tcb are not labeled, possibly preventing the system
from booting properly.
To resolve this problem, this patch extends the existing IMA policy
actions "measure", "dont_measure", "appraise", "dont_appraise", and
"audit" with "hash" and "dont_hash". The new "hash" action will write
the file hash as security.ima, but without requiring the file to be
appraised as well.
For example, the builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy includes the rule,
"appraise fowner=0". Adding the "hash fowner=0" rule to a custom
policy, will cause the needed file hashes to be calculated and written
as security.ima xattrs.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-09-29 22:04:52 +08:00
|
|
|
IMA_HASHED | IMA_COLLECTED | \
|
|
|
|
|
IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK)
|
2012-12-04 06:08:11 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* iint subaction appraise cache flags */
|
ima: support new "hash" and "dont_hash" policy actions
The builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy, which is specified on the boot
command line, can be replaced with a custom policy, normally early in
the boot process. Custom policies can be more restrictive in some ways,
like requiring file signatures, but can be less restrictive in other
ways, like not appraising mutable files. With a less restrictive policy
in place, files in the builtin policy might not be hashed and labeled
with a security.ima hash. On reboot, files which should be labeled in
the ima_appraise_tcb are not labeled, possibly preventing the system
from booting properly.
To resolve this problem, this patch extends the existing IMA policy
actions "measure", "dont_measure", "appraise", "dont_appraise", and
"audit" with "hash" and "dont_hash". The new "hash" action will write
the file hash as security.ima, but without requiring the file to be
appraised as well.
For example, the builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy includes the rule,
"appraise fowner=0". Adding the "hash fowner=0" rule to a custom
policy, will cause the needed file hashes to be calculated and written
as security.ima xattrs.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-09-29 22:04:52 +08:00
|
|
|
#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE 0x00001000
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED 0x00002000
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE 0x00004000
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED 0x00008000
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE 0x00010000
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00020000
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE 0x00040000
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED 0x00080000
|
2018-01-09 05:36:20 +08:00
|
|
|
#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE 0x00100000
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED 0x00200000
|
2012-12-04 06:08:11 +08:00
|
|
|
#define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
|
2018-01-09 05:36:20 +08:00
|
|
|
IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE | \
|
|
|
|
|
IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE)
|
2012-12-04 06:08:11 +08:00
|
|
|
#define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
|
2018-01-09 05:36:20 +08:00
|
|
|
IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED | \
|
|
|
|
|
IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED)
|
2011-03-10 03:13:22 +08:00
|
|
|
|
ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock
Before IMA appraisal was introduced, IMA was using own integrity cache
lock along with i_mutex. process_measurement and ima_file_free took
the iint->mutex first and then the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and
chown took the locks in reverse order. To resolve the potential deadlock,
i_mutex was moved to protect entire IMA functionality and the redundant
iint->mutex was eliminated.
Solution was based on the assumption that filesystem code does not take
i_mutex further. But when file is opened with O_DIRECT flag, direct-io
implementation takes i_mutex and produces deadlock. Furthermore, certain
other filesystem operations, such as llseek, also take i_mutex.
More recently some filesystems have replaced their filesystem specific
lock with the global i_rwsem to read a file. As a result, when IMA
attempts to calculate the file hash, reading the file attempts to take
the i_rwsem again.
To resolve O_DIRECT related deadlock problem, this patch re-introduces
iint->mutex. But to eliminate the original chmod() related deadlock
problem, this patch eliminates the requirement for chmod hooks to take
the iint->mutex by introducing additional atomic iint->attr_flags to
indicate calling of the hooks. The allowed locking order is to take
the iint->mutex first and then the i_rwsem.
Original flags were cleared in chmod(), setxattr() or removwxattr()
hooks and tested when file was closed or opened again. New atomic flags
are set or cleared in those hooks and tested to clear iint->flags on
close or on open.
Atomic flags are following:
* IMA_CHANGE_ATTR - indicates that chATTR() was called (chmod, chown,
chgrp) and file attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA
to clear iint->flags to re-evaluate policy and perform IMA functions
again.
* IMA_CHANGE_XATTR - indicates that setxattr or removexattr was called
and extended attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to
clear iint->flags IMA_DONE_MASK to re-appraise.
* IMA_UPDATE_XATTR - indicates that security.ima needs to be updated.
It is cleared if file policy changes and no update is needed.
* IMA_DIGSIG - indicates that file security.ima has signature and file
security.ima must not update to file has on file close.
* IMA_MUST_MEASURE - indicates the file is in the measurement policy.
Fixes: Commit 6552321831dc ("xfs: remove i_iolock and use i_rwsem in
the VFS inode instead")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-12-06 03:06:34 +08:00
|
|
|
/* iint cache atomic_flags */
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_CHANGE_XATTR 0
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_UPDATE_XATTR 1
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR 2
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_DIGSIG 3
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_MUST_MEASURE 4
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-10 03:28:20 +08:00
|
|
|
enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
|
|
|
|
|
IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
|
|
|
|
|
EVM_XATTR_HMAC,
|
|
|
|
|
EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG,
|
2013-08-12 16:22:51 +08:00
|
|
|
IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG,
|
2017-11-07 23:17:42 +08:00
|
|
|
EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG,
|
2014-10-28 19:31:22 +08:00
|
|
|
IMA_XATTR_LAST
|
2011-03-10 03:28:20 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct evm_ima_xattr_data {
|
|
|
|
|
u8 type;
|
|
|
|
|
u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
|
2013-04-25 15:43:56 +08:00
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct ima_digest_data {
|
|
|
|
|
u8 algo;
|
|
|
|
|
u8 length;
|
2013-08-12 16:22:51 +08:00
|
|
|
union {
|
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
|
u8 unused;
|
|
|
|
|
u8 type;
|
|
|
|
|
} sha1;
|
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
|
u8 type;
|
|
|
|
|
u8 algo;
|
|
|
|
|
} ng;
|
|
|
|
|
u8 data[2];
|
|
|
|
|
} xattr;
|
2013-04-25 15:44:04 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 digest[0];
|
2013-04-25 15:43:56 +08:00
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
2011-03-10 03:28:20 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2013-04-25 15:44:04 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
struct signature_v2_hdr {
|
2013-10-10 15:12:03 +08:00
|
|
|
uint8_t type; /* xattr type */
|
2013-04-25 15:44:04 +08:00
|
|
|
uint8_t version; /* signature format version */
|
2016-03-04 05:49:27 +08:00
|
|
|
uint8_t hash_algo; /* Digest algorithm [enum hash_algo] */
|
2017-06-08 09:49:10 +08:00
|
|
|
__be32 keyid; /* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific */
|
|
|
|
|
__be16 sig_size; /* signature size */
|
2013-04-25 15:44:04 +08:00
|
|
|
uint8_t sig[0]; /* signature payload */
|
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-10 03:13:22 +08:00
|
|
|
/* integrity data associated with an inode */
|
|
|
|
|
struct integrity_iint_cache {
|
2013-04-25 15:43:56 +08:00
|
|
|
struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
|
ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock
Before IMA appraisal was introduced, IMA was using own integrity cache
lock along with i_mutex. process_measurement and ima_file_free took
the iint->mutex first and then the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and
chown took the locks in reverse order. To resolve the potential deadlock,
i_mutex was moved to protect entire IMA functionality and the redundant
iint->mutex was eliminated.
Solution was based on the assumption that filesystem code does not take
i_mutex further. But when file is opened with O_DIRECT flag, direct-io
implementation takes i_mutex and produces deadlock. Furthermore, certain
other filesystem operations, such as llseek, also take i_mutex.
More recently some filesystems have replaced their filesystem specific
lock with the global i_rwsem to read a file. As a result, when IMA
attempts to calculate the file hash, reading the file attempts to take
the i_rwsem again.
To resolve O_DIRECT related deadlock problem, this patch re-introduces
iint->mutex. But to eliminate the original chmod() related deadlock
problem, this patch eliminates the requirement for chmod hooks to take
the iint->mutex by introducing additional atomic iint->attr_flags to
indicate calling of the hooks. The allowed locking order is to take
the iint->mutex first and then the i_rwsem.
Original flags were cleared in chmod(), setxattr() or removwxattr()
hooks and tested when file was closed or opened again. New atomic flags
are set or cleared in those hooks and tested to clear iint->flags on
close or on open.
Atomic flags are following:
* IMA_CHANGE_ATTR - indicates that chATTR() was called (chmod, chown,
chgrp) and file attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA
to clear iint->flags to re-evaluate policy and perform IMA functions
again.
* IMA_CHANGE_XATTR - indicates that setxattr or removexattr was called
and extended attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to
clear iint->flags IMA_DONE_MASK to re-appraise.
* IMA_UPDATE_XATTR - indicates that security.ima needs to be updated.
It is cleared if file policy changes and no update is needed.
* IMA_DIGSIG - indicates that file security.ima has signature and file
security.ima must not update to file has on file close.
* IMA_MUST_MEASURE - indicates the file is in the measurement policy.
Fixes: Commit 6552321831dc ("xfs: remove i_iolock and use i_rwsem in
the VFS inode instead")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-12-06 03:06:34 +08:00
|
|
|
struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */
|
2011-03-10 03:13:22 +08:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */
|
|
|
|
|
u64 version; /* track inode changes */
|
2012-12-05 22:29:09 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
2016-06-02 02:14:00 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long measured_pcrs;
|
ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock
Before IMA appraisal was introduced, IMA was using own integrity cache
lock along with i_mutex. process_measurement and ima_file_free took
the iint->mutex first and then the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and
chown took the locks in reverse order. To resolve the potential deadlock,
i_mutex was moved to protect entire IMA functionality and the redundant
iint->mutex was eliminated.
Solution was based on the assumption that filesystem code does not take
i_mutex further. But when file is opened with O_DIRECT flag, direct-io
implementation takes i_mutex and produces deadlock. Furthermore, certain
other filesystem operations, such as llseek, also take i_mutex.
More recently some filesystems have replaced their filesystem specific
lock with the global i_rwsem to read a file. As a result, when IMA
attempts to calculate the file hash, reading the file attempts to take
the i_rwsem again.
To resolve O_DIRECT related deadlock problem, this patch re-introduces
iint->mutex. But to eliminate the original chmod() related deadlock
problem, this patch eliminates the requirement for chmod hooks to take
the iint->mutex by introducing additional atomic iint->attr_flags to
indicate calling of the hooks. The allowed locking order is to take
the iint->mutex first and then the i_rwsem.
Original flags were cleared in chmod(), setxattr() or removwxattr()
hooks and tested when file was closed or opened again. New atomic flags
are set or cleared in those hooks and tested to clear iint->flags on
close or on open.
Atomic flags are following:
* IMA_CHANGE_ATTR - indicates that chATTR() was called (chmod, chown,
chgrp) and file attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA
to clear iint->flags to re-evaluate policy and perform IMA functions
again.
* IMA_CHANGE_XATTR - indicates that setxattr or removexattr was called
and extended attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to
clear iint->flags IMA_DONE_MASK to re-appraise.
* IMA_UPDATE_XATTR - indicates that security.ima needs to be updated.
It is cleared if file policy changes and no update is needed.
* IMA_DIGSIG - indicates that file security.ima has signature and file
security.ima must not update to file has on file close.
* IMA_MUST_MEASURE - indicates the file is in the measurement policy.
Fixes: Commit 6552321831dc ("xfs: remove i_iolock and use i_rwsem in
the VFS inode instead")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-12-06 03:06:34 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long atomic_flags;
|
2012-12-04 06:08:11 +08:00
|
|
|
enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
|
|
|
|
|
enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
|
|
|
|
|
enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
|
2016-01-15 06:57:47 +08:00
|
|
|
enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4;
|
2018-01-09 05:36:20 +08:00
|
|
|
enum integrity_status ima_creds_status:4;
|
2012-09-21 22:00:43 +08:00
|
|
|
enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
|
2013-04-25 15:44:04 +08:00
|
|
|
struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
|
2011-03-10 03:13:22 +08:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
|
|
|
|
|
* integrity data associated with an inode.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
|
2011-08-17 08:34:33 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-05 23:01:12 +08:00
|
|
|
int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
|
2017-06-08 09:49:10 +08:00
|
|
|
void *addr, unsigned long count);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-10-05 16:54:46 +08:00
|
|
|
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM 0
|
2015-10-23 02:26:10 +08:00
|
|
|
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA 1
|
|
|
|
|
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE 2
|
2011-10-05 16:54:46 +08:00
|
|
|
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX 3
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-01-17 23:12:07 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
|
2011-10-05 16:54:46 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
|
2013-10-10 14:56:13 +08:00
|
|
|
const char *digest, int digestlen);
|
2011-10-05 16:54:46 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-10-02 02:43:07 +08:00
|
|
|
int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
|
2014-11-26 22:55:00 +08:00
|
|
|
int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path);
|
2011-10-05 16:54:46 +08:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
|
|
|
|
|
const char *sig, int siglen,
|
|
|
|
|
const char *digest, int digestlen)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-13 20:47:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-01-17 23:12:07 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */
|
2011-10-05 16:54:46 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-07 06:12:08 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
|
|
|
|
|
int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
|
|
|
|
|
int siglen, const char *data, int datalen);
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
|
|
|
|
|
int siglen, const char *data, int datalen)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-05 23:01:14 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
|
|
|
|
|
void __init ima_load_x509(void);
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void ima_load_x509(void)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-23 02:26:21 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509
|
|
|
|
|
void __init evm_load_x509(void);
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void evm_load_x509(void)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-03-19 02:48:02 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT
|
|
|
|
|
/* declarations */
|
|
|
|
|
void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
|
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
|
|
|
|
|
const char *cause, int result, int info);
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
|
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *fname,
|
|
|
|
|
const char *op, const char *cause,
|
|
|
|
|
int result, int info)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|