linux/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h

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/*
BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
Copyright (c) 2000-2001, 2010, Code Aurora Forum. All rights reserved.
Written 2000,2001 by Maxim Krasnyansky <maxk@qualcomm.com>
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
published by the Free Software Foundation;
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
*/
#ifndef __HCI_CORE_H
#define __HCI_CORE_H
#include <linux/leds.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/hci.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/hci_sock.h>
/* HCI priority */
#define HCI_PRIO_MAX 7
/* HCI Core structures */
struct inquiry_data {
bdaddr_t bdaddr;
__u8 pscan_rep_mode;
__u8 pscan_period_mode;
__u8 pscan_mode;
__u8 dev_class[3];
__le16 clock_offset;
__s8 rssi;
__u8 ssp_mode;
};
struct inquiry_entry {
struct list_head all; /* inq_cache.all */
struct list_head list; /* unknown or resolve */
enum {
NAME_NOT_KNOWN,
NAME_NEEDED,
NAME_PENDING,
NAME_KNOWN,
} name_state;
__u32 timestamp;
struct inquiry_data data;
};
struct discovery_state {
int type;
enum {
DISCOVERY_STOPPED,
DISCOVERY_STARTING,
DISCOVERY_FINDING,
DISCOVERY_RESOLVING,
DISCOVERY_STOPPING,
} state;
struct list_head all; /* All devices found during inquiry */
struct list_head unknown; /* Name state not known */
struct list_head resolve; /* Name needs to be resolved */
__u32 timestamp;
bdaddr_t last_adv_addr;
u8 last_adv_addr_type;
s8 last_adv_rssi;
u32 last_adv_flags;
u8 last_adv_data[HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH];
u8 last_adv_data_len;
bool report_invalid_rssi;
bool result_filtering;
bool limited;
s8 rssi;
u16 uuid_count;
u8 (*uuids)[16];
unsigned long scan_start;
unsigned long scan_duration;
};
struct hci_conn_hash {
struct list_head list;
unsigned int acl_num;
unsigned int amp_num;
unsigned int sco_num;
unsigned int le_num;
unsigned int le_num_slave;
};
struct bdaddr_list {
struct list_head list;
bdaddr_t bdaddr;
u8 bdaddr_type;
};
struct bt_uuid {
struct list_head list;
u8 uuid[16];
u8 size;
u8 svc_hint;
};
struct smp_csrk {
bdaddr_t bdaddr;
u8 bdaddr_type;
u8 type;
u8 val[16];
};
struct smp_ltk {
struct list_head list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
bdaddr_t bdaddr;
u8 bdaddr_type;
u8 authenticated;
u8 type;
u8 enc_size;
__le16 ediv;
__le64 rand;
u8 val[16];
};
struct smp_irk {
struct list_head list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
bdaddr_t rpa;
bdaddr_t bdaddr;
u8 addr_type;
u8 val[16];
};
struct link_key {
struct list_head list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
bdaddr_t bdaddr;
u8 type;
u8 val[HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE];
u8 pin_len;
};
struct oob_data {
struct list_head list;
bdaddr_t bdaddr;
u8 bdaddr_type;
u8 present;
u8 hash192[16];
u8 rand192[16];
u8 hash256[16];
u8 rand256[16];
};
struct adv_info {
struct list_head list;
bool pending;
__u8 instance;
__u32 flags;
__u16 timeout;
__u16 remaining_time;
__u16 duration;
__u16 adv_data_len;
__u8 adv_data[HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH];
__u16 scan_rsp_len;
__u8 scan_rsp_data[HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH];
};
#define HCI_MAX_ADV_INSTANCES 5
#define HCI_DEFAULT_ADV_DURATION 2
#define HCI_MAX_SHORT_NAME_LENGTH 10
/* Default LE RPA expiry time, 15 minutes */
#define HCI_DEFAULT_RPA_TIMEOUT (15 * 60)
/* Default min/max age of connection information (1s/3s) */
#define DEFAULT_CONN_INFO_MIN_AGE 1000
#define DEFAULT_CONN_INFO_MAX_AGE 3000
struct amp_assoc {
__u16 len;
__u16 offset;
__u16 rem_len;
__u16 len_so_far;
__u8 data[HCI_MAX_AMP_ASSOC_SIZE];
};
#define HCI_MAX_PAGES 3
struct hci_dev {
struct list_head list;
struct mutex lock;
char name[8];
unsigned long flags;
__u16 id;
__u8 bus;
__u8 dev_type;
bdaddr_t bdaddr;
bdaddr_t setup_addr;
bdaddr_t public_addr;
bdaddr_t random_addr;
bdaddr_t static_addr;
__u8 adv_addr_type;
__u8 dev_name[HCI_MAX_NAME_LENGTH];
__u8 short_name[HCI_MAX_SHORT_NAME_LENGTH];
__u8 eir[HCI_MAX_EIR_LENGTH];
__u16 appearance;
__u8 dev_class[3];
__u8 major_class;
__u8 minor_class;
__u8 max_page;
__u8 features[HCI_MAX_PAGES][8];
__u8 le_features[8];
__u8 le_white_list_size;
__u8 le_states[8];
__u8 commands[64];
__u8 hci_ver;
__u16 hci_rev;
__u8 lmp_ver;
__u16 manufacturer;
__u16 lmp_subver;
__u16 voice_setting;
__u8 num_iac;
__u8 stored_max_keys;
__u8 stored_num_keys;
__u8 io_capability;
__s8 inq_tx_power;
__u16 page_scan_interval;
__u16 page_scan_window;
__u8 page_scan_type;
__u8 le_adv_channel_map;
__u16 le_adv_min_interval;
__u16 le_adv_max_interval;
__u8 le_scan_type;
__u16 le_scan_interval;
__u16 le_scan_window;
__u16 le_conn_min_interval;
__u16 le_conn_max_interval;
__u16 le_conn_latency;
__u16 le_supv_timeout;
__u16 le_def_tx_len;
__u16 le_def_tx_time;
__u16 le_max_tx_len;
__u16 le_max_tx_time;
__u16 le_max_rx_len;
__u16 le_max_rx_time;
__u16 discov_interleaved_timeout;
__u16 conn_info_min_age;
__u16 conn_info_max_age;
__u8 ssp_debug_mode;
__u8 hw_error_code;
__u32 clock;
__u16 devid_source;
__u16 devid_vendor;
__u16 devid_product;
__u16 devid_version;
__u16 pkt_type;
__u16 esco_type;
__u16 link_policy;
__u16 link_mode;
__u32 idle_timeout;
__u16 sniff_min_interval;
__u16 sniff_max_interval;
__u8 amp_status;
__u32 amp_total_bw;
__u32 amp_max_bw;
__u32 amp_min_latency;
__u32 amp_max_pdu;
__u8 amp_type;
__u16 amp_pal_cap;
__u16 amp_assoc_size;
__u32 amp_max_flush_to;
__u32 amp_be_flush_to;
struct amp_assoc loc_assoc;
__u8 flow_ctl_mode;
unsigned int auto_accept_delay;
unsigned long quirks;
atomic_t cmd_cnt;
unsigned int acl_cnt;
unsigned int sco_cnt;
unsigned int le_cnt;
unsigned int acl_mtu;
unsigned int sco_mtu;
unsigned int le_mtu;
unsigned int acl_pkts;
unsigned int sco_pkts;
unsigned int le_pkts;
__u16 block_len;
__u16 block_mtu;
__u16 num_blocks;
__u16 block_cnt;
unsigned long acl_last_tx;
unsigned long sco_last_tx;
unsigned long le_last_tx;
struct workqueue_struct *workqueue;
struct workqueue_struct *req_workqueue;
struct work_struct power_on;
struct delayed_work power_off;
struct work_struct error_reset;
__u16 discov_timeout;
struct delayed_work discov_off;
struct delayed_work service_cache;
struct delayed_work cmd_timer;
struct work_struct rx_work;
struct work_struct cmd_work;
struct work_struct tx_work;
struct work_struct discov_update;
struct work_struct bg_scan_update;
struct work_struct scan_update;
struct work_struct connectable_update;
struct work_struct discoverable_update;
struct delayed_work le_scan_disable;
struct delayed_work le_scan_restart;
struct sk_buff_head rx_q;
struct sk_buff_head raw_q;
struct sk_buff_head cmd_q;
struct sk_buff *sent_cmd;
struct mutex req_lock;
wait_queue_head_t req_wait_q;
__u32 req_status;
__u32 req_result;
struct sk_buff *req_skb;
void *smp_data;
void *smp_bredr_data;
struct discovery_state discovery;
struct hci_conn_hash conn_hash;
struct list_head mgmt_pending;
struct list_head blacklist;
struct list_head whitelist;
struct list_head uuids;
struct list_head link_keys;
struct list_head long_term_keys;
struct list_head identity_resolving_keys;
struct list_head remote_oob_data;
struct list_head le_white_list;
struct list_head le_conn_params;
struct list_head pend_le_conns;
struct list_head pend_le_reports;
struct hci_dev_stats stat;
atomic_t promisc;
const char *hw_info;
const char *fw_info;
struct dentry *debugfs;
struct device dev;
struct rfkill *rfkill;
DECLARE_BITMAP(dev_flags, __HCI_NUM_FLAGS);
__s8 adv_tx_power;
__u8 adv_data[HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH];
__u8 adv_data_len;
__u8 scan_rsp_data[HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH];
__u8 scan_rsp_data_len;
struct list_head adv_instances;
unsigned int adv_instance_cnt;
__u8 cur_adv_instance;
__u16 adv_instance_timeout;
struct delayed_work adv_instance_expire;
__u8 irk[16];
__u32 rpa_timeout;
struct delayed_work rpa_expired;
bdaddr_t rpa;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_LEDS)
struct led_trigger *power_led;
#endif
int (*open)(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int (*close)(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int (*flush)(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int (*setup)(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int (*shutdown)(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int (*send)(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb);
void (*notify)(struct hci_dev *hdev, unsigned int evt);
void (*hw_error)(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 code);
int (*post_init)(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int (*set_diag)(struct hci_dev *hdev, bool enable);
int (*set_bdaddr)(struct hci_dev *hdev, const bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
};
#define HCI_PHY_HANDLE(handle) (handle & 0xff)
struct hci_conn {
struct list_head list;
atomic_t refcnt;
bdaddr_t dst;
__u8 dst_type;
bdaddr_t src;
__u8 src_type;
bdaddr_t init_addr;
__u8 init_addr_type;
bdaddr_t resp_addr;
__u8 resp_addr_type;
__u16 handle;
__u16 state;
__u8 mode;
__u8 type;
__u8 role;
bool out;
__u8 attempt;
__u8 dev_class[3];
__u8 features[HCI_MAX_PAGES][8];
__u16 pkt_type;
__u16 link_policy;
__u8 key_type;
__u8 auth_type;
__u8 sec_level;
__u8 pending_sec_level;
__u8 pin_length;
__u8 enc_key_size;
__u8 io_capability;
__u32 passkey_notify;
__u8 passkey_entered;
__u16 disc_timeout;
__u16 conn_timeout;
__u16 setting;
__u16 le_conn_min_interval;
__u16 le_conn_max_interval;
__u16 le_conn_interval;
__u16 le_conn_latency;
__u16 le_supv_timeout;
__u8 le_adv_data[HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH];
__u8 le_adv_data_len;
__s8 rssi;
__s8 tx_power;
__s8 max_tx_power;
unsigned long flags;
__u32 clock;
__u16 clock_accuracy;
unsigned long conn_info_timestamp;
__u8 remote_cap;
__u8 remote_auth;
__u8 remote_id;
unsigned int sent;
struct sk_buff_head data_q;
struct list_head chan_list;
struct delayed_work disc_work;
struct delayed_work auto_accept_work;
struct delayed_work idle_work;
struct delayed_work le_conn_timeout;
Bluetooth: Fix missing hdev locking for LE scan cleanup The hci_conn objects don't have a dedicated lock themselves but rely on the caller to hold the hci_dev lock for most types of access. The hci_conn_timeout() function has so far sent certain HCI commands based on the hci_conn state which has been possible without holding the hci_dev lock. The recent changes to do LE scanning before connect attempts added even more operations to hci_conn and hci_dev from hci_conn_timeout, thereby exposing potential race conditions with the hci_dev and hci_conn states. As an example of such a race, here there's a timeout but an l2cap_sock_connect() call manages to race with the cleanup routine: [Oct21 08:14] l2cap_chan_timeout: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000004] l2cap_chan_close: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000002] l2cap_chan_del: chan ee4b12c0, conn f3141580, err 111, state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000002] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb: chan ee4b12c0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000005] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b12c0 orig refcnt 4 [ +0.000010] hci_conn_drop: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000013] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b12c0 orig refcnt 3 [ +0.000063] hci_conn_timeout: hcon f53d56e0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000049] hci_conn_params_del: addr ee:0d:30:09:53:1f (type 1) [ +0.000002] hci_chan_list_flush: hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000001] hci_chan_del: hci0 hcon f53d56e0 chan f4e7ccc0 [ +0.004528] l2cap_sock_create: sock e708fc00 [ +0.000023] l2cap_chan_create: chan ee4b1770 [ +0.000001] l2cap_chan_hold: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000002] l2cap_sock_init: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000029] l2cap_sock_bind: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000010] l2cap_sock_setsockopt: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000037] l2cap_sock_connect: sk ee4b3390 [ +0.000002] l2cap_chan_connect: 00:02:72:d9:e5:8b -> ee:0d:30:09:53:1f (type 2) psm 0x00 [ +0.000002] hci_get_route: 00:02:72:d9:e5:8b -> ee:0d:30:09:53:1f [ +0.000001] hci_dev_hold: hci0 orig refcnt 8 [ +0.000003] hci_conn_hold: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 0 Above the l2cap_chan_connect() shouldn't have been able to reach the hci_conn f53d56e0 anymore but since hci_conn_timeout didn't do proper locking that's not the case. The end result is a reference to hci_conn that's not in the conn_hash list, resulting in list corruption when trying to remove it later: [Oct21 08:15] l2cap_chan_timeout: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000004] l2cap_chan_close: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000003] l2cap_chan_del: chan ee4b1770, conn f3141580, err 111, state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000001] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb: chan ee4b1770 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000005] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 4 [ +0.000002] hci_conn_drop: hcon f53d56e0 orig refcnt 1 [ +0.000015] l2cap_chan_put: chan ee4b1770 orig refcnt 3 [ +0.000038] hci_conn_timeout: hcon f53d56e0 state BT_CONNECT [ +0.000003] hci_chan_list_flush: hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000002] hci_conn_hash_del: hci0 hcon f53d56e0 [ +0.000001] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ +0.000461] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1782 at lib/list_debug.c:56 __list_del_entry+0x3f/0x71() [ +0.000839] list_del corruption, f53d56e0->prev is LIST_POISON2 (00000200) The necessary fix is unfortunately more complicated than just adding hci_dev_lock/unlock calls to the hci_conn_timeout() call path. Particularly, the hci_conn_del() API, which expects the hci_dev lock to be held, performs a cancel_delayed_work_sync(&hcon->disc_work) which would lead to a deadlock if the hci_conn_timeout() call path tries to acquire the same lock. This patch solves the problem by deferring the cleanup work to a separate work callback. To protect against the hci_dev or hci_conn going away meanwhile temporary references are taken with the help of hci_dev_hold() and hci_conn_get(). Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3
2015-10-21 20:21:31 +08:00
struct work_struct le_scan_cleanup;
struct device dev;
struct dentry *debugfs;
struct hci_dev *hdev;
void *l2cap_data;
void *sco_data;
struct amp_mgr *amp_mgr;
struct hci_conn *link;
void (*connect_cfm_cb) (struct hci_conn *conn, u8 status);
void (*security_cfm_cb) (struct hci_conn *conn, u8 status);
void (*disconn_cfm_cb) (struct hci_conn *conn, u8 reason);
};
struct hci_chan {
struct list_head list;
__u16 handle;
struct hci_conn *conn;
struct sk_buff_head data_q;
unsigned int sent;
__u8 state;
};
struct hci_conn_params {
struct list_head list;
struct list_head action;
bdaddr_t addr;
u8 addr_type;
u16 conn_min_interval;
u16 conn_max_interval;
u16 conn_latency;
u16 supervision_timeout;
enum {
HCI_AUTO_CONN_DISABLED,
HCI_AUTO_CONN_REPORT,
HCI_AUTO_CONN_DIRECT,
HCI_AUTO_CONN_ALWAYS,
HCI_AUTO_CONN_LINK_LOSS,
HCI_AUTO_CONN_EXPLICIT,
} auto_connect;
struct hci_conn *conn;
bool explicit_connect;
};
extern struct list_head hci_dev_list;
extern struct list_head hci_cb_list;
extern rwlock_t hci_dev_list_lock;
extern struct mutex hci_cb_list_lock;
#define hci_dev_set_flag(hdev, nr) set_bit((nr), (hdev)->dev_flags)
#define hci_dev_clear_flag(hdev, nr) clear_bit((nr), (hdev)->dev_flags)
#define hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, nr) change_bit((nr), (hdev)->dev_flags)
#define hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, nr) test_bit((nr), (hdev)->dev_flags)
#define hci_dev_test_and_set_flag(hdev, nr) test_and_set_bit((nr), (hdev)->dev_flags)
#define hci_dev_test_and_clear_flag(hdev, nr) test_and_clear_bit((nr), (hdev)->dev_flags)
#define hci_dev_test_and_change_flag(hdev, nr) test_and_change_bit((nr), (hdev)->dev_flags)
#define hci_dev_clear_volatile_flags(hdev) \
do { \
hci_dev_clear_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_SCAN); \
hci_dev_clear_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ADV); \
hci_dev_clear_flag(hdev, HCI_PERIODIC_INQ); \
} while (0)
/* ----- HCI interface to upper protocols ----- */
int l2cap_connect_ind(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
int l2cap_disconn_ind(struct hci_conn *hcon);
void l2cap_recv_acldata(struct hci_conn *hcon, struct sk_buff *skb, u16 flags);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_BREDR)
int sco_connect_ind(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, __u8 *flags);
void sco_recv_scodata(struct hci_conn *hcon, struct sk_buff *skb);
#else
static inline int sco_connect_ind(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
__u8 *flags)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void sco_recv_scodata(struct hci_conn *hcon, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
}
#endif
/* ----- Inquiry cache ----- */
#define INQUIRY_CACHE_AGE_MAX (HZ*30) /* 30 seconds */
#define INQUIRY_ENTRY_AGE_MAX (HZ*60) /* 60 seconds */
static inline void discovery_init(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
hdev->discovery.state = DISCOVERY_STOPPED;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hdev->discovery.all);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hdev->discovery.unknown);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hdev->discovery.resolve);
hdev->discovery.report_invalid_rssi = true;
hdev->discovery.rssi = HCI_RSSI_INVALID;
}
static inline void hci_discovery_filter_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
hdev->discovery.result_filtering = false;
hdev->discovery.report_invalid_rssi = true;
hdev->discovery.rssi = HCI_RSSI_INVALID;
hdev->discovery.uuid_count = 0;
kfree(hdev->discovery.uuids);
hdev->discovery.uuids = NULL;
hdev->discovery.scan_start = 0;
hdev->discovery.scan_duration = 0;
}
bool hci_discovery_active(struct hci_dev *hdev);
void hci_discovery_set_state(struct hci_dev *hdev, int state);
static inline int inquiry_cache_empty(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
return list_empty(&hdev->discovery.all);
}
static inline long inquiry_cache_age(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
struct discovery_state *c = &hdev->discovery;
return jiffies - c->timestamp;
}
static inline long inquiry_entry_age(struct inquiry_entry *e)
{
return jiffies - e->timestamp;
}
struct inquiry_entry *hci_inquiry_cache_lookup(struct hci_dev *hdev,
bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
struct inquiry_entry *hci_inquiry_cache_lookup_unknown(struct hci_dev *hdev,
bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
struct inquiry_entry *hci_inquiry_cache_lookup_resolve(struct hci_dev *hdev,
bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
int state);
void hci_inquiry_cache_update_resolve(struct hci_dev *hdev,
struct inquiry_entry *ie);
u32 hci_inquiry_cache_update(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct inquiry_data *data,
bool name_known);
void hci_inquiry_cache_flush(struct hci_dev *hdev);
/* ----- HCI Connections ----- */
enum {
HCI_CONN_AUTH_PEND,
HCI_CONN_REAUTH_PEND,
HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND,
HCI_CONN_RSWITCH_PEND,
HCI_CONN_MODE_CHANGE_PEND,
HCI_CONN_SCO_SETUP_PEND,
HCI_CONN_MGMT_CONNECTED,
HCI_CONN_SSP_ENABLED,
HCI_CONN_SC_ENABLED,
HCI_CONN_AES_CCM,
HCI_CONN_POWER_SAVE,
HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY,
HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT,
HCI_CONN_AUTH,
HCI_CONN_SECURE,
HCI_CONN_FIPS,
HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT,
HCI_CONN_AUTH_INITIATOR,
HCI_CONN_DROP,
HCI_CONN_PARAM_REMOVAL_PEND,
HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY,
HCI_CONN_SCANNING,
Bluetooth: Add Authentication Failed reason to Disconnected Mgmt event If link is disconnected due to Authentication Failure (PIN or Key Missing status) userspace will be notified about this with proper error code. Many LE profiles define "PIN or Key Missing" status as indication of remote lost bond so this allows userspace to take action on this. @ Device Connected: 88:63:DF:88:0E:83 (1) flags 0x0000 02 01 1a 05 03 0a 18 0d 18 0b 09 48 65 61 72 74 ...........Heart 20 52 61 74 65 Rate > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 LE Read Remote Used Features (0x08|0x0016) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > ACL Data RX: Handle 3585 flags 0x02 dlen 11 ATT: Read By Group Type Request (0x10) len 6 Handle range: 0x0001-0xffff Attribute group type: Primary Service (0x2800) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 12 LE Read Remote Used Features (0x04) Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 3585 Features: 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 LE Encryption < HCI Command: LE Start Encryption (0x08|0x0019) plen 28 Handle: 3585 Random number: 0x0000000000000000 Encrypted diversifier: 0x0000 Long term key: 26201cd479a0921b6f949f0b1fa8dc82 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 LE Start Encryption (0x08|0x0019) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4 Status: PIN or Key Missing (0x06) Handle: 3585 Encryption: Disabled (0x00) < HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3 Handle: 3585 Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: Disconnect Complete (0x05) plen 4 Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 3585 Reason: Connection Terminated By Local Host (0x16) @ Device Disconnected: 88:63:DF:88:0E:83 (1) reason 4 @ Device Connected: C4:43:8F:A3:4D:83 (0) flags 0x0000 08 09 4e 65 78 75 73 20 35 ..Nexus 5 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 Authentication Requested (0x01|0x0011) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: Link Key Request (0x17) plen 6 Address: C4:43:8F:A3:4D:83 (LG Electronics) < HCI Command: Link Key Request Reply (0x01|0x000b) plen 22 Address: C4:43:8F:A3:4D:83 (LG Electronics) Link key: 080812e4aa97a863d11826f71f65a933 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 10 Link Key Request Reply (0x01|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Address: C4:43:8F:A3:4D:83 (LG Electronics) > HCI Event: Auth Complete (0x06) plen 3 Status: PIN or Key Missing (0x06) Handle: 75 @ Authentication Failed: C4:43:8F:A3:4D:83 (0) status 0x05 < HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3 Handle: 75 Reason: Remote User Terminated Connection (0x13) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: Disconnect Complete (0x05) plen 4 Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 75 Reason: Connection Terminated By Local Host (0x16) @ Device Disconnected: C4:43:8F:A3:4D:83 (0) reason 4 Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
2016-07-12 08:12:16 +08:00
HCI_CONN_AUTH_FAILURE,
};
static inline bool hci_conn_ssp_enabled(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
return hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED) &&
test_bit(HCI_CONN_SSP_ENABLED, &conn->flags);
}
static inline bool hci_conn_sc_enabled(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
return hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) &&
test_bit(HCI_CONN_SC_ENABLED, &conn->flags);
}
static inline void hci_conn_hash_add(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *c)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
list_add_rcu(&c->list, &h->list);
switch (c->type) {
case ACL_LINK:
h->acl_num++;
break;
case AMP_LINK:
h->amp_num++;
break;
case LE_LINK:
h->le_num++;
if (c->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
h->le_num_slave++;
break;
case SCO_LINK:
case ESCO_LINK:
h->sco_num++;
break;
}
}
static inline void hci_conn_hash_del(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *c)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
list_del_rcu(&c->list);
synchronize_rcu();
switch (c->type) {
case ACL_LINK:
h->acl_num--;
break;
case AMP_LINK:
h->amp_num--;
break;
case LE_LINK:
h->le_num--;
if (c->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
h->le_num_slave--;
break;
case SCO_LINK:
case ESCO_LINK:
h->sco_num--;
break;
}
}
static inline unsigned int hci_conn_num(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u8 type)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
switch (type) {
case ACL_LINK:
return h->acl_num;
case AMP_LINK:
return h->amp_num;
case LE_LINK:
return h->le_num;
case SCO_LINK:
case ESCO_LINK:
return h->sco_num;
default:
return 0;
}
}
static inline unsigned int hci_conn_count(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *c = &hdev->conn_hash;
return c->acl_num + c->amp_num + c->sco_num + c->le_num;
}
static inline __u8 hci_conn_lookup_type(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 handle)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
struct hci_conn *c;
__u8 type = INVALID_LINK;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) {
if (c->handle == handle) {
type = c->type;
break;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return type;
}
static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_hash_lookup_handle(struct hci_dev *hdev,
__u16 handle)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
struct hci_conn *c;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) {
if (c->handle == handle) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return c;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return NULL;
}
static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(struct hci_dev *hdev,
__u8 type, bdaddr_t *ba)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
struct hci_conn *c;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) {
if (c->type == type && !bacmp(&c->dst, ba)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return c;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return NULL;
}
static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_hash_lookup_le(struct hci_dev *hdev,
bdaddr_t *ba,
__u8 ba_type)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
struct hci_conn *c;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) {
if (c->type != LE_LINK)
continue;
if (ba_type == c->dst_type && !bacmp(&c->dst, ba)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return c;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return NULL;
}
static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_hash_lookup_state(struct hci_dev *hdev,
__u8 type, __u16 state)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
struct hci_conn *c;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) {
if (c->type == type && c->state == state) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return c;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return NULL;
}
static inline struct hci_conn *hci_lookup_le_connect(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
struct hci_conn *c;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) {
if (c->type == LE_LINK && c->state == BT_CONNECT &&
!test_bit(HCI_CONN_SCANNING, &c->flags)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return c;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return NULL;
}
int hci_disconnect(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 reason);
bool hci_setup_sync(struct hci_conn *conn, __u16 handle);
void hci_sco_setup(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status);
struct hci_conn *hci_conn_add(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst,
u8 role);
int hci_conn_del(struct hci_conn *conn);
void hci_conn_hash_flush(struct hci_dev *hdev);
void hci_conn_check_pending(struct hci_dev *hdev);
struct hci_chan *hci_chan_create(struct hci_conn *conn);
void hci_chan_del(struct hci_chan *chan);
void hci_chan_list_flush(struct hci_conn *conn);
struct hci_chan *hci_chan_lookup_handle(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 handle);
struct hci_conn *hci_connect_le_scan(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst,
u8 dst_type, u8 sec_level,
u16 conn_timeout);
struct hci_conn *hci_connect_le(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst,
u8 dst_type, u8 sec_level, u16 conn_timeout,
u8 role);
struct hci_conn *hci_connect_acl(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst,
u8 sec_level, u8 auth_type);
struct hci_conn *hci_connect_sco(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst,
__u16 setting);
int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_conn *conn);
int hci_conn_check_secure(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level);
int hci_conn_security(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level, __u8 auth_type,
bool initiator);
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 04:58:04 +08:00
int hci_conn_switch_role(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 role);
void hci_conn_enter_active_mode(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 force_active);
void hci_le_conn_failed(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 status);
Bluetooth: introduce hci_conn ref-counting We currently do not allow using hci_conn from outside of HCI-core. However, several other users could make great use of it. This includes HIDP, rfcomm and all other sub-protocols that rely on an active connection. Hence, we now introduce hci_conn ref-counting. We currently never call get_device(). put_device() is exclusively used in hci_conn_del_sysfs(). Hence, we currently never have a greater device-refcnt than 1. Therefore, it is safe to move the put_device() call from hci_conn_del_sysfs() to hci_conn_del() (it's the only caller). In fact, this even fixes a "use-after-free" bug as we access hci_conn after calling hci_conn_del_sysfs() in hci_conn_del(). From now on we can add references to hci_conn objects in other layers (like l2cap_sock, HIDP, rfcomm, ...) and grab a reference via hci_conn_get(). This does _not_ guarantee, that the connection is still alive. But, this isn't what we want. We can simply lock the hci_conn device and use "device_is_registered(hci_conn->dev)" to test that. However, this is hardly necessary as outside users should never rely on the HCI connection to be alive, anyway. Instead, they should solely rely on the device-object to be available. But if sub-devices want the hci_conn object as sysfs parent, they need to be notified when the connection drops. This will be introduced in later patches with l2cap_users. Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
2013-04-07 02:28:39 +08:00
/*
* hci_conn_get() and hci_conn_put() are used to control the life-time of an
* "hci_conn" object. They do not guarantee that the hci_conn object is running,
* working or anything else. They just guarantee that the object is available
* and can be dereferenced. So you can use its locks, local variables and any
* other constant data.
* Before accessing runtime data, you _must_ lock the object and then check that
* it is still running. As soon as you release the locks, the connection might
* get dropped, though.
*
* On the other hand, hci_conn_hold() and hci_conn_drop() are used to control
* how long the underlying connection is held. So every channel that runs on the
* hci_conn object calls this to prevent the connection from disappearing. As
* long as you hold a device, you must also guarantee that you have a valid
* reference to the device via hci_conn_get() (or the initial reference from
* hci_conn_add()).
* The hold()/drop() ref-count is known to drop below 0 sometimes, which doesn't
* break because nobody cares for that. But this means, we cannot use
* _get()/_drop() in it, but require the caller to have a valid ref (FIXME).
*/
static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_get(struct hci_conn *conn)
Bluetooth: introduce hci_conn ref-counting We currently do not allow using hci_conn from outside of HCI-core. However, several other users could make great use of it. This includes HIDP, rfcomm and all other sub-protocols that rely on an active connection. Hence, we now introduce hci_conn ref-counting. We currently never call get_device(). put_device() is exclusively used in hci_conn_del_sysfs(). Hence, we currently never have a greater device-refcnt than 1. Therefore, it is safe to move the put_device() call from hci_conn_del_sysfs() to hci_conn_del() (it's the only caller). In fact, this even fixes a "use-after-free" bug as we access hci_conn after calling hci_conn_del_sysfs() in hci_conn_del(). From now on we can add references to hci_conn objects in other layers (like l2cap_sock, HIDP, rfcomm, ...) and grab a reference via hci_conn_get(). This does _not_ guarantee, that the connection is still alive. But, this isn't what we want. We can simply lock the hci_conn device and use "device_is_registered(hci_conn->dev)" to test that. However, this is hardly necessary as outside users should never rely on the HCI connection to be alive, anyway. Instead, they should solely rely on the device-object to be available. But if sub-devices want the hci_conn object as sysfs parent, they need to be notified when the connection drops. This will be introduced in later patches with l2cap_users. Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
2013-04-07 02:28:39 +08:00
{
get_device(&conn->dev);
return conn;
Bluetooth: introduce hci_conn ref-counting We currently do not allow using hci_conn from outside of HCI-core. However, several other users could make great use of it. This includes HIDP, rfcomm and all other sub-protocols that rely on an active connection. Hence, we now introduce hci_conn ref-counting. We currently never call get_device(). put_device() is exclusively used in hci_conn_del_sysfs(). Hence, we currently never have a greater device-refcnt than 1. Therefore, it is safe to move the put_device() call from hci_conn_del_sysfs() to hci_conn_del() (it's the only caller). In fact, this even fixes a "use-after-free" bug as we access hci_conn after calling hci_conn_del_sysfs() in hci_conn_del(). From now on we can add references to hci_conn objects in other layers (like l2cap_sock, HIDP, rfcomm, ...) and grab a reference via hci_conn_get(). This does _not_ guarantee, that the connection is still alive. But, this isn't what we want. We can simply lock the hci_conn device and use "device_is_registered(hci_conn->dev)" to test that. However, this is hardly necessary as outside users should never rely on the HCI connection to be alive, anyway. Instead, they should solely rely on the device-object to be available. But if sub-devices want the hci_conn object as sysfs parent, they need to be notified when the connection drops. This will be introduced in later patches with l2cap_users. Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
2013-04-07 02:28:39 +08:00
}
static inline void hci_conn_put(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
put_device(&conn->dev);
}
static inline void hci_conn_hold(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p orig refcnt %d", conn, atomic_read(&conn->refcnt));
atomic_inc(&conn->refcnt);
Bluetooth: Fix potential deadlock We don't need to use the _sync variant in hci_conn_hold and hci_conn_put to cancel conn->disc_work delayed work. This way we avoid potential deadlocks like this one reported by lockdep. ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.2.0+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- kworker/u:1/17 is trying to acquire lock: (&hdev->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0041155>] hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] but task is already holding lock: ((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81035751>] process_one_work+0x11a/0x2bf which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 ((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)){+.+...}: [<ffffffff81057444>] lock_acquire+0x8a/0xa7 [<ffffffff81034ed1>] wait_on_work+0x3d/0xaa [<ffffffff81035b54>] __cancel_work_timer+0xac/0xef [<ffffffff81035ba4>] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0xd/0xf [<ffffffffa00554b0>] smp_chan_create+0xde/0xe6 [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0056160>] smp_conn_security+0xa3/0x12d [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0053640>] l2cap_connect_cfm+0x237/0x2e8 [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa004239c>] hci_proto_connect_cfm+0x2d/0x6f [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0046ea5>] hci_event_packet+0x29d1/0x2d60 [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa003dde3>] hci_rx_work+0xd0/0x2e1 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff810357af>] process_one_work+0x178/0x2bf [<ffffffff81036178>] worker_thread+0xce/0x152 [<ffffffff81039a03>] kthread+0x95/0x9d [<ffffffff812e7754>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 -> #1 (slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP){+.+...}: [<ffffffff81057444>] lock_acquire+0x8a/0xa7 [<ffffffff812e553a>] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x36/0x6a [<ffffffff81244d56>] lock_sock_nested+0x24/0x7f [<ffffffffa004d96f>] lock_sock+0xb/0xd [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0052906>] l2cap_chan_connect+0xa9/0x26f [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa00545f8>] l2cap_sock_connect+0xb3/0xff [bluetooth] [<ffffffff81243b48>] sys_connect+0x69/0x8a [<ffffffff812e6579>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffff81056d06>] __lock_acquire+0xa80/0xd74 [<ffffffff81057444>] lock_acquire+0x8a/0xa7 [<ffffffff812e3870>] __mutex_lock_common+0x48/0x38e [<ffffffff812e3c75>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2a/0x31 [<ffffffffa0041155>] hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff810357af>] process_one_work+0x178/0x2bf [<ffffffff81036178>] worker_thread+0xce/0x152 [<ffffffff81039a03>] kthread+0x95/0x9d [<ffffffff812e7754>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &hdev->lock --> slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP --> (&(&conn->disc_work)->work) Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)); lock(slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP); lock((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)); lock(&hdev->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by kworker/u:1/17: #0: (hdev->name){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81035751>] process_one_work+0x11a/0x2bf #1: ((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81035751>] process_one_work+0x11a/0x2bf stack backtrace: Pid: 17, comm: kworker/u:1 Not tainted 3.2.0+ #1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff812e06c6>] print_circular_bug+0x1f8/0x209 [<ffffffff81056d06>] __lock_acquire+0xa80/0xd74 [<ffffffff81021ef2>] ? arch_local_irq_restore+0x6/0xd [<ffffffff81022bc7>] ? vprintk+0x3f9/0x41e [<ffffffff81057444>] lock_acquire+0x8a/0xa7 [<ffffffffa0041155>] ? hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff812e3870>] __mutex_lock_common+0x48/0x38e [<ffffffffa0041155>] ? hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff81190fd6>] ? __dynamic_pr_debug+0x6d/0x6f [<ffffffffa0041155>] ? hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff8105320f>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0xf [<ffffffff812e3c75>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2a/0x31 [<ffffffffa0041155>] hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff810357af>] process_one_work+0x178/0x2bf [<ffffffff81035751>] ? process_one_work+0x11a/0x2bf [<ffffffff81055af3>] ? lock_acquired+0x1d0/0x1df [<ffffffffa00410f3>] ? hci_acl_disconn+0x65/0x65 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff81036178>] worker_thread+0xce/0x152 [<ffffffff810407ed>] ? finish_task_switch+0x45/0xc5 [<ffffffff810360aa>] ? manage_workers.isra.25+0x16a/0x16a [<ffffffff81039a03>] kthread+0x95/0x9d [<ffffffff812e7754>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 [<ffffffff812e5db4>] ? retint_restore_args+0x13/0x13 [<ffffffff8103996e>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x55/0x55 [<ffffffff812e7750>] ? gs_change+0x13/0x13 Signed-off-by: Andre Guedes <andre.guedes@openbossa.org> Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> Reviewed-by: Ulisses Furquim <ulisses@profusion.mobi> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
2012-01-28 06:42:02 +08:00
cancel_delayed_work(&conn->disc_work);
}
static inline void hci_conn_drop(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p orig refcnt %d", conn, atomic_read(&conn->refcnt));
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&conn->refcnt)) {
unsigned long timeo;
switch (conn->type) {
case ACL_LINK:
case LE_LINK:
cancel_delayed_work(&conn->idle_work);
if (conn->state == BT_CONNECTED) {
timeo = conn->disc_timeout;
if (!conn->out)
Bluetooth: Add different pairing timeout for Legacy Pairing The Bluetooth stack uses a reference counting for all established ACL links and if no user (L2CAP connection) is present, the link will be terminated to save power. The problem part is the dedicated pairing when using Legacy Pairing (Bluetooth 2.0 and before). At that point no user is present and pairing attempts will be disconnected within 10 seconds or less. In previous kernel version this was not a problem since the disconnect timeout wasn't triggered on incoming connections for the first time. However this caused issues with broken host stacks that kept the connections around after dedicated pairing. When the support for Simple Pairing got added, the link establishment procedure needed to be changed and now causes issues when using Legacy Pairing When using Simple Pairing it is possible to do a proper reference counting of ACL link users. With Legacy Pairing this is not possible since the specification is unclear in some areas and too many broken Bluetooth devices have already been deployed. So instead of trying to deal with all the broken devices, a special pairing timeout will be introduced that increases the timeout to 60 seconds when pairing is triggered. If a broken devices now puts the stack into an unforeseen state, the worst that happens is the disconnect timeout triggers after 120 seconds instead of 4 seconds. This allows successful pairings with legacy and broken devices now. Based on a report by Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-04-27 02:01:22 +08:00
timeo *= 2;
} else {
timeo = 0;
}
break;
case AMP_LINK:
timeo = conn->disc_timeout;
break;
default:
timeo = 0;
break;
}
Bluetooth: Fix potential deadlock We don't need to use the _sync variant in hci_conn_hold and hci_conn_put to cancel conn->disc_work delayed work. This way we avoid potential deadlocks like this one reported by lockdep. ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.2.0+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- kworker/u:1/17 is trying to acquire lock: (&hdev->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0041155>] hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] but task is already holding lock: ((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81035751>] process_one_work+0x11a/0x2bf which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 ((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)){+.+...}: [<ffffffff81057444>] lock_acquire+0x8a/0xa7 [<ffffffff81034ed1>] wait_on_work+0x3d/0xaa [<ffffffff81035b54>] __cancel_work_timer+0xac/0xef [<ffffffff81035ba4>] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0xd/0xf [<ffffffffa00554b0>] smp_chan_create+0xde/0xe6 [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0056160>] smp_conn_security+0xa3/0x12d [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0053640>] l2cap_connect_cfm+0x237/0x2e8 [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa004239c>] hci_proto_connect_cfm+0x2d/0x6f [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0046ea5>] hci_event_packet+0x29d1/0x2d60 [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa003dde3>] hci_rx_work+0xd0/0x2e1 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff810357af>] process_one_work+0x178/0x2bf [<ffffffff81036178>] worker_thread+0xce/0x152 [<ffffffff81039a03>] kthread+0x95/0x9d [<ffffffff812e7754>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 -> #1 (slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP){+.+...}: [<ffffffff81057444>] lock_acquire+0x8a/0xa7 [<ffffffff812e553a>] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x36/0x6a [<ffffffff81244d56>] lock_sock_nested+0x24/0x7f [<ffffffffa004d96f>] lock_sock+0xb/0xd [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa0052906>] l2cap_chan_connect+0xa9/0x26f [bluetooth] [<ffffffffa00545f8>] l2cap_sock_connect+0xb3/0xff [bluetooth] [<ffffffff81243b48>] sys_connect+0x69/0x8a [<ffffffff812e6579>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffff81056d06>] __lock_acquire+0xa80/0xd74 [<ffffffff81057444>] lock_acquire+0x8a/0xa7 [<ffffffff812e3870>] __mutex_lock_common+0x48/0x38e [<ffffffff812e3c75>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2a/0x31 [<ffffffffa0041155>] hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff810357af>] process_one_work+0x178/0x2bf [<ffffffff81036178>] worker_thread+0xce/0x152 [<ffffffff81039a03>] kthread+0x95/0x9d [<ffffffff812e7754>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &hdev->lock --> slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP --> (&(&conn->disc_work)->work) Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)); lock(slock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP); lock((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)); lock(&hdev->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by kworker/u:1/17: #0: (hdev->name){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81035751>] process_one_work+0x11a/0x2bf #1: ((&(&conn->disc_work)->work)){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81035751>] process_one_work+0x11a/0x2bf stack backtrace: Pid: 17, comm: kworker/u:1 Not tainted 3.2.0+ #1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff812e06c6>] print_circular_bug+0x1f8/0x209 [<ffffffff81056d06>] __lock_acquire+0xa80/0xd74 [<ffffffff81021ef2>] ? arch_local_irq_restore+0x6/0xd [<ffffffff81022bc7>] ? vprintk+0x3f9/0x41e [<ffffffff81057444>] lock_acquire+0x8a/0xa7 [<ffffffffa0041155>] ? hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff812e3870>] __mutex_lock_common+0x48/0x38e [<ffffffffa0041155>] ? hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff81190fd6>] ? __dynamic_pr_debug+0x6d/0x6f [<ffffffffa0041155>] ? hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff8105320f>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0xf [<ffffffff812e3c75>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2a/0x31 [<ffffffffa0041155>] hci_conn_timeout+0x62/0x158 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff810357af>] process_one_work+0x178/0x2bf [<ffffffff81035751>] ? process_one_work+0x11a/0x2bf [<ffffffff81055af3>] ? lock_acquired+0x1d0/0x1df [<ffffffffa00410f3>] ? hci_acl_disconn+0x65/0x65 [bluetooth] [<ffffffff81036178>] worker_thread+0xce/0x152 [<ffffffff810407ed>] ? finish_task_switch+0x45/0xc5 [<ffffffff810360aa>] ? manage_workers.isra.25+0x16a/0x16a [<ffffffff81039a03>] kthread+0x95/0x9d [<ffffffff812e7754>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 [<ffffffff812e5db4>] ? retint_restore_args+0x13/0x13 [<ffffffff8103996e>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x55/0x55 [<ffffffff812e7750>] ? gs_change+0x13/0x13 Signed-off-by: Andre Guedes <andre.guedes@openbossa.org> Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> Reviewed-by: Ulisses Furquim <ulisses@profusion.mobi> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
2012-01-28 06:42:02 +08:00
cancel_delayed_work(&conn->disc_work);
queue_delayed_work(conn->hdev->workqueue,
&conn->disc_work, timeo);
}
}
/* ----- HCI Devices ----- */
static inline void hci_dev_put(struct hci_dev *d)
{
BT_DBG("%s orig refcnt %d", d->name,
atomic_read(&d->dev.kobj.kref.refcount));
put_device(&d->dev);
}
static inline struct hci_dev *hci_dev_hold(struct hci_dev *d)
{
BT_DBG("%s orig refcnt %d", d->name,
atomic_read(&d->dev.kobj.kref.refcount));
get_device(&d->dev);
return d;
}
#define hci_dev_lock(d) mutex_lock(&d->lock)
#define hci_dev_unlock(d) mutex_unlock(&d->lock)
#define to_hci_dev(d) container_of(d, struct hci_dev, dev)
#define to_hci_conn(c) container_of(c, struct hci_conn, dev)
static inline void *hci_get_drvdata(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
return dev_get_drvdata(&hdev->dev);
}
static inline void hci_set_drvdata(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data)
{
dev_set_drvdata(&hdev->dev, data);
}
struct hci_dev *hci_dev_get(int index);
struct hci_dev *hci_get_route(bdaddr_t *dst, bdaddr_t *src);
struct hci_dev *hci_alloc_dev(void);
void hci_free_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int hci_register_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev);
void hci_unregister_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int hci_suspend_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int hci_resume_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int hci_reset_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int hci_recv_frame(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb);
int hci_recv_diag(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb);
__printf(2, 3) void hci_set_hw_info(struct hci_dev *hdev, const char *fmt, ...);
__printf(2, 3) void hci_set_fw_info(struct hci_dev *hdev, const char *fmt, ...);
int hci_dev_open(__u16 dev);
int hci_dev_close(__u16 dev);
int hci_dev_do_close(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int hci_dev_reset(__u16 dev);
int hci_dev_reset_stat(__u16 dev);
int hci_dev_cmd(unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg);
int hci_get_dev_list(void __user *arg);
int hci_get_dev_info(void __user *arg);
int hci_get_conn_list(void __user *arg);
int hci_get_conn_info(struct hci_dev *hdev, void __user *arg);
int hci_get_auth_info(struct hci_dev *hdev, void __user *arg);
int hci_inquiry(void __user *arg);
struct bdaddr_list *hci_bdaddr_list_lookup(struct list_head *list,
bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 type);
int hci_bdaddr_list_add(struct list_head *list, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 type);
int hci_bdaddr_list_del(struct list_head *list, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 type);
void hci_bdaddr_list_clear(struct list_head *list);
struct hci_conn_params *hci_conn_params_lookup(struct hci_dev *hdev,
bdaddr_t *addr, u8 addr_type);
struct hci_conn_params *hci_conn_params_add(struct hci_dev *hdev,
bdaddr_t *addr, u8 addr_type);
void hci_conn_params_del(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *addr, u8 addr_type);
void hci_conn_params_clear_disabled(struct hci_dev *hdev);
struct hci_conn_params *hci_pend_le_action_lookup(struct list_head *list,
bdaddr_t *addr,
u8 addr_type);
void hci_uuids_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev);
void hci_link_keys_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev);
struct link_key *hci_find_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
struct link_key *hci_add_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn,
bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 *val, u8 type,
u8 pin_len, bool *persistent);
struct smp_ltk *hci_add_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 addr_type, u8 type, u8 authenticated,
u8 tk[16], u8 enc_size, __le16 ediv, __le64 rand);
struct smp_ltk *hci_find_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 addr_type, u8 role);
int hci_remove_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 bdaddr_type);
void hci_smp_ltks_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int hci_remove_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
struct smp_irk *hci_find_irk_by_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *rpa);
struct smp_irk *hci_find_irk_by_addr(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 addr_type);
struct smp_irk *hci_add_irk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 addr_type, u8 val[16], bdaddr_t *rpa);
void hci_remove_irk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 addr_type);
void hci_smp_irks_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev);
bool hci_bdaddr_is_paired(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 type);
void hci_remote_oob_data_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev);
struct oob_data *hci_find_remote_oob_data(struct hci_dev *hdev,
bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 bdaddr_type);
int hci_add_remote_oob_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 bdaddr_type, u8 *hash192, u8 *rand192,
u8 *hash256, u8 *rand256);
int hci_remove_remote_oob_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 bdaddr_type);
void hci_adv_instances_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev);
struct adv_info *hci_find_adv_instance(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance);
struct adv_info *hci_get_next_instance(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance);
int hci_add_adv_instance(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u32 flags,
u16 adv_data_len, u8 *adv_data,
u16 scan_rsp_len, u8 *scan_rsp_data,
u16 timeout, u16 duration);
int hci_remove_adv_instance(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance);
void hci_event_packet(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb);
void hci_init_sysfs(struct hci_dev *hdev);
Bluetooth: Fix issue with sysfs handling for connections Due to a semantic changes in flush_workqueue() the current approach of synchronizing the sysfs handling for connections doesn't work anymore. The whole approach is actually fully broken and based on assumptions that are no longer valid. With the introduction of Simple Pairing support, the creation of low-level ACL links got changed. This change invalidates the reason why in the past two independent work queues have been used for adding/removing sysfs devices. The adding of the actual sysfs device is now postponed until the host controller successfully assigns an unique handle to that link. So the real synchronization happens inside the controller and not the host. The only left-over problem is that some internals of the sysfs device handling are not initialized ahead of time. This leaves potential access to invalid data and can cause various NULL pointer dereferences. To fix this a new function makes sure that all sysfs details are initialized when an connection attempt is made. The actual sysfs device is only registered when the connection has been successfully established. To avoid a race condition with the registration, the check if a device is registered has been moved into the removal work. As an extra protection two flush_work() calls are left in place to make sure a previous add/del work has been completed first. Based on a report by Marc Pignat <marc.pignat@hevs.ch> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Tested-by: Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com> Tested-by: Roger Quadros <ext-roger.quadros@nokia.com> Tested-by: Marc Pignat <marc.pignat@hevs.ch>
2009-05-03 09:24:06 +08:00
void hci_conn_init_sysfs(struct hci_conn *conn);
void hci_conn_add_sysfs(struct hci_conn *conn);
void hci_conn_del_sysfs(struct hci_conn *conn);
#define SET_HCIDEV_DEV(hdev, pdev) ((hdev)->dev.parent = (pdev))
/* ----- LMP capabilities ----- */
#define lmp_encrypt_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][0] & LMP_ENCRYPT)
#define lmp_rswitch_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][0] & LMP_RSWITCH)
#define lmp_hold_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][0] & LMP_HOLD)
#define lmp_sniff_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][0] & LMP_SNIFF)
#define lmp_park_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][1] & LMP_PARK)
#define lmp_inq_rssi_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][3] & LMP_RSSI_INQ)
#define lmp_esco_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][3] & LMP_ESCO)
#define lmp_bredr_capable(dev) (!((dev)->features[0][4] & LMP_NO_BREDR))
#define lmp_le_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][4] & LMP_LE)
#define lmp_sniffsubr_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][5] & LMP_SNIFF_SUBR)
#define lmp_pause_enc_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][5] & LMP_PAUSE_ENC)
#define lmp_ext_inq_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][6] & LMP_EXT_INQ)
#define lmp_le_br_capable(dev) (!!((dev)->features[0][6] & LMP_SIMUL_LE_BR))
#define lmp_ssp_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][6] & LMP_SIMPLE_PAIR)
#define lmp_no_flush_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][6] & LMP_NO_FLUSH)
#define lmp_lsto_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][7] & LMP_LSTO)
#define lmp_inq_tx_pwr_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][7] & LMP_INQ_TX_PWR)
#define lmp_ext_feat_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][7] & LMP_EXTFEATURES)
#define lmp_transp_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][2] & LMP_TRANSPARENT)
/* ----- Extended LMP capabilities ----- */
#define lmp_csb_master_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[2][0] & LMP_CSB_MASTER)
#define lmp_csb_slave_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[2][0] & LMP_CSB_SLAVE)
#define lmp_sync_train_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[2][0] & LMP_SYNC_TRAIN)
#define lmp_sync_scan_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[2][0] & LMP_SYNC_SCAN)
#define lmp_sc_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[2][1] & LMP_SC)
#define lmp_ping_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[2][1] & LMP_PING)
/* ----- Host capabilities ----- */
#define lmp_host_ssp_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[1][0] & LMP_HOST_SSP)
#define lmp_host_sc_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[1][0] & LMP_HOST_SC)
#define lmp_host_le_capable(dev) (!!((dev)->features[1][0] & LMP_HOST_LE))
#define lmp_host_le_br_capable(dev) (!!((dev)->features[1][0] & LMP_HOST_LE_BREDR))
#define hdev_is_powered(dev) (test_bit(HCI_UP, &(dev)->flags) && \
!hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_AUTO_OFF))
#define bredr_sc_enabled(dev) (lmp_sc_capable(dev) && \
hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
/* ----- HCI protocols ----- */
#define HCI_PROTO_DEFER 0x01
static inline int hci_proto_connect_ind(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
__u8 type, __u8 *flags)
{
switch (type) {
case ACL_LINK:
return l2cap_connect_ind(hdev, bdaddr);
case SCO_LINK:
case ESCO_LINK:
return sco_connect_ind(hdev, bdaddr, flags);
default:
BT_ERR("unknown link type %d", type);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Bluetooth: Ask upper layers for HCI disconnect reason Some of the qualification tests demand that in case of failures in L2CAP the HCI disconnect should indicate a reason why L2CAP fails. This is a bluntly layer violation since multiple L2CAP connections could be using the same ACL and thus forcing a disconnect reason is not a good idea. To comply with the Bluetooth test specification, the disconnect reason is now stored in the L2CAP connection structure and every time a new L2CAP channel is added it will set back to its default. So only in the case where the L2CAP channel with the disconnect reason is really the last one, it will propagated to the HCI layer. The HCI layer has been extended with a disconnect indication that allows it to ask upper layers for a disconnect reason. The upper layer must not support this callback and in that case it will nicely default to the existing behavior. If an upper layer like L2CAP can provide a disconnect reason that one will be used to disconnect the ACL or SCO link. No modification to the ACL disconnect timeout have been made. So in case of Linux to Linux connection the initiator will disconnect the ACL link before the acceptor side can signal the specific disconnect reason. That is perfectly fine since Linux doesn't make use of this value anyway. The L2CAP layer has a perfect valid error code for rejecting connection due to a security violation. It is unclear why the Bluetooth specification insists on having specific HCI disconnect reason. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-02-12 21:02:50 +08:00
static inline int hci_proto_disconn_ind(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
if (conn->type != ACL_LINK && conn->type != LE_LINK)
return HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM;
return l2cap_disconn_ind(conn);
Bluetooth: Ask upper layers for HCI disconnect reason Some of the qualification tests demand that in case of failures in L2CAP the HCI disconnect should indicate a reason why L2CAP fails. This is a bluntly layer violation since multiple L2CAP connections could be using the same ACL and thus forcing a disconnect reason is not a good idea. To comply with the Bluetooth test specification, the disconnect reason is now stored in the L2CAP connection structure and every time a new L2CAP channel is added it will set back to its default. So only in the case where the L2CAP channel with the disconnect reason is really the last one, it will propagated to the HCI layer. The HCI layer has been extended with a disconnect indication that allows it to ask upper layers for a disconnect reason. The upper layer must not support this callback and in that case it will nicely default to the existing behavior. If an upper layer like L2CAP can provide a disconnect reason that one will be used to disconnect the ACL or SCO link. No modification to the ACL disconnect timeout have been made. So in case of Linux to Linux connection the initiator will disconnect the ACL link before the acceptor side can signal the specific disconnect reason. That is perfectly fine since Linux doesn't make use of this value anyway. The L2CAP layer has a perfect valid error code for rejecting connection due to a security violation. It is unclear why the Bluetooth specification insists on having specific HCI disconnect reason. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-02-12 21:02:50 +08:00
}
/* ----- HCI callbacks ----- */
struct hci_cb {
struct list_head list;
char *name;
void (*connect_cfm) (struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status);
void (*disconn_cfm) (struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status);
void (*security_cfm) (struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status,
__u8 encrypt);
void (*key_change_cfm) (struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status);
void (*role_switch_cfm) (struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status, __u8 role);
};
static inline void hci_connect_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
{
struct hci_cb *cb;
mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) {
if (cb->connect_cfm)
cb->connect_cfm(conn, status);
}
mutex_unlock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
if (conn->connect_cfm_cb)
conn->connect_cfm_cb(conn, status);
}
static inline void hci_disconn_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 reason)
{
struct hci_cb *cb;
mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) {
if (cb->disconn_cfm)
cb->disconn_cfm(conn, reason);
}
mutex_unlock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
if (conn->disconn_cfm_cb)
conn->disconn_cfm_cb(conn, reason);
}
static inline void hci_auth_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
{
struct hci_cb *cb;
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 04:58:04 +08:00
__u8 encrypt;
if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags))
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 04:58:04 +08:00
return;
encrypt = test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags) ? 0x01 : 0x00;
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 04:58:04 +08:00
mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) {
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 04:58:04 +08:00
if (cb->security_cfm)
cb->security_cfm(conn, status, encrypt);
}
mutex_unlock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
if (conn->security_cfm_cb)
conn->security_cfm_cb(conn, status);
}
static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status,
__u8 encrypt)
{
struct hci_cb *cb;
if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level)
conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) {
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-16 04:58:04 +08:00
if (cb->security_cfm)
cb->security_cfm(conn, status, encrypt);
}
mutex_unlock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
if (conn->security_cfm_cb)
conn->security_cfm_cb(conn, status);
}
static inline void hci_key_change_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
{
struct hci_cb *cb;
mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) {
if (cb->key_change_cfm)
cb->key_change_cfm(conn, status);
}
mutex_unlock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
}
static inline void hci_role_switch_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status,
__u8 role)
{
struct hci_cb *cb;
mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) {
if (cb->role_switch_cfm)
cb->role_switch_cfm(conn, status, role);
}
mutex_unlock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
}
static inline void *eir_get_data(u8 *eir, size_t eir_len, u8 type,
size_t *data_len)
{
size_t parsed = 0;
if (eir_len < 2)
return NULL;
while (parsed < eir_len - 1) {
u8 field_len = eir[0];
if (field_len == 0)
break;
parsed += field_len + 1;
if (parsed > eir_len)
break;
if (eir[1] != type) {
eir += field_len + 1;
continue;
}
/* Zero length data */
if (field_len == 1)
return NULL;
if (data_len)
*data_len = field_len - 1;
return &eir[2];
}
return NULL;
}
static inline bool hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 addr_type)
{
if (addr_type != ADDR_LE_DEV_RANDOM)
return false;
if ((bdaddr->b[5] & 0xc0) == 0x40)
return true;
return false;
}
static inline bool hci_is_identity_address(bdaddr_t *addr, u8 addr_type)
{
if (addr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
return true;
/* Check for Random Static address type */
if ((addr->b[5] & 0xc0) == 0xc0)
return true;
return false;
}
static inline struct smp_irk *hci_get_irk(struct hci_dev *hdev,
bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 addr_type)
{
if (!hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(bdaddr, addr_type))
return NULL;
return hci_find_irk_by_rpa(hdev, bdaddr);
}
static inline int hci_check_conn_params(u16 min, u16 max, u16 latency,
u16 to_multiplier)
{
u16 max_latency;
if (min > max || min < 6 || max > 3200)
return -EINVAL;
if (to_multiplier < 10 || to_multiplier > 3200)
return -EINVAL;
if (max >= to_multiplier * 8)
return -EINVAL;
max_latency = (to_multiplier * 4 / max) - 1;
if (latency > 499 || latency > max_latency)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
int hci_register_cb(struct hci_cb *hcb);
int hci_unregister_cb(struct hci_cb *hcb);
struct sk_buff *__hci_cmd_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 opcode, u32 plen,
const void *param, u32 timeout);
struct sk_buff *__hci_cmd_sync_ev(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 opcode, u32 plen,
const void *param, u8 event, u32 timeout);
int hci_send_cmd(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 opcode, __u32 plen,
const void *param);
void hci_send_acl(struct hci_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 flags);
void hci_send_sco(struct hci_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb);
void *hci_sent_cmd_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 opcode);
struct sk_buff *hci_cmd_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 opcode, u32 plen,
const void *param, u32 timeout);
/* ----- HCI Sockets ----- */
void hci_send_to_sock(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb);
void hci_send_to_channel(unsigned short channel, struct sk_buff *skb,
int flag, struct sock *skip_sk);
void hci_send_to_monitor(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb);
void hci_send_monitor_ctrl_event(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 event,
void *data, u16 data_len, ktime_t tstamp,
int flag, struct sock *skip_sk);
void hci_sock_dev_event(struct hci_dev *hdev, int event);
#define HCI_MGMT_VAR_LEN BIT(0)
#define HCI_MGMT_NO_HDEV BIT(1)
#define HCI_MGMT_UNTRUSTED BIT(2)
#define HCI_MGMT_UNCONFIGURED BIT(3)
struct hci_mgmt_handler {
int (*func) (struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
u16 data_len);
size_t data_len;
unsigned long flags;
};
struct hci_mgmt_chan {
struct list_head list;
unsigned short channel;
size_t handler_count;
const struct hci_mgmt_handler *handlers;
void (*hdev_init) (struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev);
};
int hci_mgmt_chan_register(struct hci_mgmt_chan *c);
void hci_mgmt_chan_unregister(struct hci_mgmt_chan *c);
/* Management interface */
#define DISCOV_TYPE_BREDR (BIT(BDADDR_BREDR))
#define DISCOV_TYPE_LE (BIT(BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC) | \
BIT(BDADDR_LE_RANDOM))
#define DISCOV_TYPE_INTERLEAVED (BIT(BDADDR_BREDR) | \
BIT(BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC) | \
BIT(BDADDR_LE_RANDOM))
/* These LE scan and inquiry parameters were chosen according to LE General
* Discovery Procedure specification.
*/
#define DISCOV_LE_SCAN_WIN 0x12
#define DISCOV_LE_SCAN_INT 0x12
#define DISCOV_LE_TIMEOUT 10240 /* msec */
#define DISCOV_INTERLEAVED_TIMEOUT 5120 /* msec */
#define DISCOV_INTERLEAVED_INQUIRY_LEN 0x04
#define DISCOV_BREDR_INQUIRY_LEN 0x08
#define DISCOV_LE_RESTART_DELAY msecs_to_jiffies(200) /* msec */
void mgmt_fill_version_info(void *ver);
int mgmt_new_settings(struct hci_dev *hdev);
void mgmt_index_added(struct hci_dev *hdev);
void mgmt_index_removed(struct hci_dev *hdev);
void mgmt_set_powered_failed(struct hci_dev *hdev, int err);
void mgmt_power_on(struct hci_dev *hdev, int err);
void __mgmt_power_off(struct hci_dev *hdev);
void mgmt_new_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct link_key *key,
bool persistent);
void mgmt_device_connected(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn,
u32 flags, u8 *name, u8 name_len);
void mgmt_device_disconnected(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u8 reason,
bool mgmt_connected);
void mgmt_disconnect_failed(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u8 status);
void mgmt_connect_failed(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type,
u8 addr_type, u8 status);
void mgmt_pin_code_request(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 secure);
void mgmt_pin_code_reply_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 status);
void mgmt_pin_code_neg_reply_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 status);
int mgmt_user_confirm_request(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u32 value,
u8 confirm_hint);
int mgmt_user_confirm_reply_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u8 status);
int mgmt_user_confirm_neg_reply_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u8 status);
int mgmt_user_passkey_request(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 link_type, u8 addr_type);
int mgmt_user_passkey_reply_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u8 status);
int mgmt_user_passkey_neg_reply_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u8 status);
int mgmt_user_passkey_notify(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u32 passkey,
u8 entered);
void mgmt_auth_failed(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 status);
void mgmt_auth_enable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status);
void mgmt_ssp_enable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 enable, u8 status);
void mgmt_set_class_of_dev_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 *dev_class,
u8 status);
void mgmt_set_local_name_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 *name, u8 status);
void mgmt_start_discovery_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status);
void mgmt_stop_discovery_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status);
void mgmt_device_found(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type,
u8 addr_type, u8 *dev_class, s8 rssi, u32 flags,
u8 *eir, u16 eir_len, u8 *scan_rsp, u8 scan_rsp_len);
void mgmt_remote_name(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type,
u8 addr_type, s8 rssi, u8 *name, u8 name_len);
void mgmt_discovering(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 discovering);
bool mgmt_powering_down(struct hci_dev *hdev);
void mgmt_new_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct smp_ltk *key, bool persistent);
void mgmt_new_irk(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct smp_irk *irk, bool persistent);
void mgmt_new_csrk(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct smp_csrk *csrk,
bool persistent);
void mgmt_new_conn_param(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 bdaddr_type, u8 store_hint, u16 min_interval,
u16 max_interval, u16 latency, u16 timeout);
void mgmt_smp_complete(struct hci_conn *conn, bool complete);
bool mgmt_get_connectable(struct hci_dev *hdev);
void mgmt_set_connectable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status);
void mgmt_set_discoverable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status);
u8 mgmt_get_adv_discov_flags(struct hci_dev *hdev);
void mgmt_advertising_added(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
u8 instance);
void mgmt_advertising_removed(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
u8 instance);
u8 hci_le_conn_update(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 min, u16 max, u16 latency,
u16 to_multiplier);
void hci_le_start_enc(struct hci_conn *conn, __le16 ediv, __le64 rand,
__u8 ltk[16], __u8 key_size);
void hci_copy_identity_address(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 *bdaddr_type);
#define SCO_AIRMODE_MASK 0x0003
#define SCO_AIRMODE_CVSD 0x0000
#define SCO_AIRMODE_TRANSP 0x0003
#endif /* __HCI_CORE_H */