2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
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/*
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* AppArmor security module
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*
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* This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
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* Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
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* License.
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*/
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include <linux/namei.h>
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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#include <linux/ctype.h>
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#include <linux/sysctl.h>
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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userns: security: make capabilities relative to the user namespace
- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default
user namespace.
- Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default
user namespace.
The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new
namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with
only potential uid confusion issues left.
I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I
think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals.
Changelog:
11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor
12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces
Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have
capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we
were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps
he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether
he was the creator. Reverse those checks.
12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case
01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper
01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion
02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of
init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to
it! Fix the check in cap_capable().
02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable,
fixing a compile failure.
02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some
couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare
them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add
a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h
without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations
together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use
kernel-doc format.
02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable().
02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable.
(Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version
acked by him)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs]
[serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-24 07:43:17 +08:00
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
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#include <net/sock.h>
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#include "include/apparmor.h"
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#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
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#include "include/audit.h"
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#include "include/capability.h"
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#include "include/context.h"
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#include "include/file.h"
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#include "include/ipc.h"
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#include "include/path.h"
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#include "include/policy.h"
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#include "include/procattr.h"
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/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
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int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
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/*
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* LSM hook functions
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*/
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/*
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* free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles
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*/
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static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
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{
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2013-02-27 19:43:40 +08:00
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aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
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cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
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2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
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}
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/*
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* allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
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*/
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static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
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{
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/* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
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struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
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if (!cxt)
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return -ENOMEM;
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2013-02-27 19:43:40 +08:00
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cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
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2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block
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*/
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static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
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gfp_t gfp)
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{
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/* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
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struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
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if (!cxt)
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return -ENOMEM;
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2013-02-27 19:43:40 +08:00
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aa_dup_task_context(cxt, cred_cxt(old));
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cred_cxt(new) = cxt;
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2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
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*/
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static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
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{
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2013-02-27 19:43:40 +08:00
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const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = cred_cxt(old);
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struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(new);
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2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
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aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
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}
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static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
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unsigned int mode)
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{
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int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
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if (error)
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return error;
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return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
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}
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static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
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{
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int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
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if (error)
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return error;
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return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
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}
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/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
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static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
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kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
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{
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struct aa_profile *profile;
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const struct cred *cred;
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rcu_read_lock();
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cred = __task_cred(target);
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profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
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*effective = cred->cap_effective;
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*inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
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*permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
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2011-06-25 23:57:07 +08:00
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if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
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2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
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*effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
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*permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
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}
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return 0;
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}
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2012-01-04 01:25:14 +08:00
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static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
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int cap, int audit)
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2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
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{
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struct aa_profile *profile;
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/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
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2012-01-04 01:25:14 +08:00
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int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
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2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
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if (!error) {
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profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
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if (!unconfined(profile))
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2013-10-08 20:37:18 +08:00
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error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
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2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
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}
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return error;
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}
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/**
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* common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
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* @op: operation being checked
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* @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL)
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* @mask: requested permissions mask
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* @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
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*
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* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
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*/
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static int common_perm(int op, struct path *path, u32 mask,
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struct path_cond *cond)
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{
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struct aa_profile *profile;
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int error = 0;
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profile = __aa_current_profile();
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if (!unconfined(profile))
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error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond);
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return error;
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}
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/**
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* common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
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* @op: operation being checked
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* @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL)
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* @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
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* @mask: requested permissions mask
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* @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
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*
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* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
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*/
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static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, struct path *dir,
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struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
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struct path_cond *cond)
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{
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struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry };
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return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
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}
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/**
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* common_perm_mnt_dentry - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry
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* @op: operation being checked
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* @mnt: mount point of dentry (NOT NULL)
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* @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
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* @mask: requested permissions mask
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*
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* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
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*/
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static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt,
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struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
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{
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struct path path = { mnt, dentry };
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struct path_cond cond = { dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
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dentry->d_inode->i_mode
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};
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return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond);
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}
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/**
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* common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
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* @op: operation being checked
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* @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL)
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* @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL)
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* @mask: requested permission mask
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*
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* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
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*/
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static int common_perm_rm(int op, struct path *dir,
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struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
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{
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struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
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struct path_cond cond = { };
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if (!inode || !dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(inode))
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return 0;
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cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
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cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
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return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
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}
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/**
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* common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
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* @op: operation being checked
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* @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL)
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* @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL)
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* @mask: request permission mask
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* @mode: created file mode
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*
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* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
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*/
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static int common_perm_create(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
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u32 mask, umode_t mode)
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{
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struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
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if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry->d_inode))
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return 0;
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return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
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}
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static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
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{
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return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
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}
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static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
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2011-11-22 03:56:21 +08:00
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umode_t mode)
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2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
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{
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return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
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S_IFDIR);
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}
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static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
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{
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return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
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}
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static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
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2011-11-22 03:58:38 +08:00
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umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
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2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
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{
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return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
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}
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2010-07-30 07:02:04 +08:00
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static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path)
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2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
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{
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struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
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path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
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};
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if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
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return 0;
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return common_perm(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE,
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&cond);
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}
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static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
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const char *old_name)
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{
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return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
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S_IFLNK);
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}
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static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
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struct dentry *new_dentry)
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{
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struct aa_profile *profile;
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int error = 0;
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if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode))
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return 0;
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profile = aa_current_profile();
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if (!unconfined(profile))
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error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
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return error;
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}
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static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
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struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
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{
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struct aa_profile *profile;
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int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
profile = aa_current_profile();
|
|
|
|
if (!unconfined(profile)) {
|
|
|
|
struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
|
|
|
|
struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
|
|
|
|
struct path_cond cond = { old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
|
|
|
|
old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0,
|
|
|
|
MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE |
|
|
|
|
AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE,
|
|
|
|
&cond);
|
|
|
|
if (!error)
|
|
|
|
error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path,
|
|
|
|
0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE |
|
|
|
|
AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-12-08 23:51:53 +08:00
|
|
|
static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-12-08 23:51:53 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-12-08 23:51:53 +08:00
|
|
|
return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, path->mnt, path->dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-06-02 06:14:19 +08:00
|
|
|
static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
|
|
|
|
path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_GETATTR, mnt, dentry,
|
|
|
|
AA_MAY_META_READ);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-05 01:45:40 +08:00
|
|
|
static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
|
|
|
|
struct aa_profile *profile;
|
|
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-24 06:07:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!mediated_filesystem(file_inode(file)))
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
|
|
|
|
* Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
|
|
|
|
* implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
|
|
|
|
* actually execute the image.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (current->in_execve) {
|
|
|
|
fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
|
|
|
|
if (!unconfined(profile)) {
|
2013-01-24 06:07:38 +08:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
|
|
|
|
aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
|
|
|
|
/* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
|
|
|
|
fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
|
|
|
|
file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!file->f_security)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
aa_free_file_context(cxt);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
|
|
|
|
struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred);
|
|
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(!fprofile);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!file->f_path.mnt ||
|
2013-01-24 06:07:38 +08:00
|
|
|
!mediated_filesystem(file_inode(file)))
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
profile = __aa_current_profile();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred
|
|
|
|
* doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than
|
|
|
|
* was granted.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file
|
|
|
|
* delegation from unconfined tasks
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) &&
|
|
|
|
((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow)))
|
|
|
|
error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
|
|
|
|
mask |= MAY_WRITE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int mask = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!file || !file->f_security)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (prot & PROT_READ)
|
|
|
|
mask |= MAY_READ;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
|
|
|
|
* write back to the files
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
|
|
|
|
mask |= MAY_WRITE;
|
|
|
|
if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
|
|
|
|
mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-05-31 01:30:51 +08:00
|
|
|
static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
|
|
|
|
!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
|
|
|
|
char **value)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int error = -ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
/* released below */
|
|
|
|
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
|
2013-02-27 19:43:40 +08:00
|
|
|
struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
|
2013-07-11 12:07:43 +08:00
|
|
|
struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
|
2013-07-11 12:07:43 +08:00
|
|
|
profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile);
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous)
|
2013-07-11 12:07:43 +08:00
|
|
|
profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous);
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec)
|
2013-07-11 12:07:43 +08:00
|
|
|
profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
error = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-11 12:07:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (profile)
|
|
|
|
error = aa_getprocattr(profile, value);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
aa_put_profile(profile);
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
put_cred(cred);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
|
|
|
|
void *value, size_t size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-02-27 19:44:40 +08:00
|
|
|
struct common_audit_data sa;
|
|
|
|
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
char *command, *args = value;
|
|
|
|
size_t arg_size;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (size == 0)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that
|
|
|
|
* the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1
|
|
|
|
* so that AppArmor can null terminate them
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
|
|
|
|
if (size == PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
args[size] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* task can only write its own attributes */
|
|
|
|
if (current != task)
|
|
|
|
return -EACCES;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
args = value;
|
|
|
|
args = strim(args);
|
|
|
|
command = strsep(&args, " ");
|
|
|
|
if (!args)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
args = skip_spaces(args);
|
|
|
|
if (!*args)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
|
|
|
|
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
|
|
|
|
!AA_DO_TEST);
|
|
|
|
} else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
|
|
|
|
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
|
|
|
|
AA_DO_TEST);
|
|
|
|
} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
|
|
|
|
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
|
|
|
|
!AA_DO_TEST);
|
|
|
|
} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
|
|
|
|
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
|
|
|
|
AA_DO_TEST);
|
2013-02-27 19:44:40 +08:00
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
|
2013-02-27 19:44:40 +08:00
|
|
|
if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
|
|
|
|
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
|
|
|
|
!AA_DO_TEST);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2013-02-27 19:44:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!error)
|
|
|
|
error = size;
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
2013-02-27 19:44:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
|
|
|
sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
|
|
|
|
sa.aad = &aad;
|
|
|
|
aad.profile = aa_current_profile();
|
|
|
|
aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
|
|
|
|
aad.info = name;
|
|
|
|
aad.error = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-08-11 17:28:02 +08:00
|
|
|
static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-06-09 06:07:47 +08:00
|
|
|
struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!unconfined(profile))
|
2010-09-07 01:10:20 +08:00
|
|
|
error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, task, resource, new_rlim);
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
|
|
|
|
.name = "apparmor",
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.ptrace_access_check = apparmor_ptrace_access_check,
|
|
|
|
.ptrace_traceme = apparmor_ptrace_traceme,
|
|
|
|
.capget = apparmor_capget,
|
|
|
|
.capable = apparmor_capable,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.path_link = apparmor_path_link,
|
|
|
|
.path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink,
|
|
|
|
.path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink,
|
|
|
|
.path_mkdir = apparmor_path_mkdir,
|
|
|
|
.path_rmdir = apparmor_path_rmdir,
|
|
|
|
.path_mknod = apparmor_path_mknod,
|
|
|
|
.path_rename = apparmor_path_rename,
|
|
|
|
.path_chmod = apparmor_path_chmod,
|
|
|
|
.path_chown = apparmor_path_chown,
|
|
|
|
.path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate,
|
|
|
|
.inode_getattr = apparmor_inode_getattr,
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-05 01:45:40 +08:00
|
|
|
.file_open = apparmor_file_open,
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
.file_permission = apparmor_file_permission,
|
|
|
|
.file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security,
|
|
|
|
.file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security,
|
2012-05-31 01:30:51 +08:00
|
|
|
.mmap_file = apparmor_mmap_file,
|
|
|
|
.mmap_addr = cap_mmap_addr,
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
.file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect,
|
|
|
|
.file_lock = apparmor_file_lock,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr,
|
|
|
|
.setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
|
|
|
|
.cred_free = apparmor_cred_free,
|
|
|
|
.cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare,
|
|
|
|
.cred_transfer = apparmor_cred_transfer,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.bprm_set_creds = apparmor_bprm_set_creds,
|
|
|
|
.bprm_committing_creds = apparmor_bprm_committing_creds,
|
|
|
|
.bprm_committed_creds = apparmor_bprm_committed_creds,
|
|
|
|
.bprm_secureexec = apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.task_setrlimit = apparmor_task_setrlimit,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* AppArmor sysfs module parameters
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2010-08-02 10:00:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
|
|
static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
2011-12-15 11:11:32 +08:00
|
|
|
#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
|
2010-08-02 10:00:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
|
2013-08-20 14:03:20 +08:00
|
|
|
.flags = KERNEL_PARAM_FL_NOARG,
|
2010-08-02 10:00:43 +08:00
|
|
|
.set = param_set_aabool,
|
|
|
|
.get = param_get_aabool
|
|
|
|
};
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2010-08-02 10:00:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
|
|
static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
2011-12-15 11:11:32 +08:00
|
|
|
#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
|
2010-08-02 10:00:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
|
|
|
|
.set = param_set_aauint,
|
|
|
|
.get = param_get_aauint
|
|
|
|
};
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2010-08-02 10:00:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
|
|
static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
2011-12-15 11:11:32 +08:00
|
|
|
#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
|
2010-08-02 10:00:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
|
2013-08-20 14:03:20 +08:00
|
|
|
.flags = KERNEL_PARAM_FL_NOARG,
|
2010-08-02 10:00:43 +08:00
|
|
|
.set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
|
|
|
|
.get = param_get_aalockpolicy
|
|
|
|
};
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
|
|
static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
|
|
static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
|
|
|
|
* We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
|
|
|
|
enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
|
|
|
|
module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
|
|
|
|
&aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Debug mode */
|
2012-01-13 07:02:20 +08:00
|
|
|
bool aa_g_debug;
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Audit mode */
|
|
|
|
enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
|
|
|
|
module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
|
|
|
|
&aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
|
|
|
|
* provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-01-13 07:02:20 +08:00
|
|
|
bool aa_g_audit_header = 1;
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
|
|
|
|
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* lock out loading/removal of policy
|
|
|
|
* TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
|
|
|
|
* load policy, if lock_policy is set
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-01-13 07:02:20 +08:00
|
|
|
bool aa_g_lock_policy;
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
|
|
|
|
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Syscall logging mode */
|
2012-01-13 07:02:20 +08:00
|
|
|
bool aa_g_logsyscall;
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
|
|
|
|
unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
|
|
|
|
module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
|
|
|
|
* on the loaded policy is done.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-01-13 07:02:20 +08:00
|
|
|
bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool,
|
|
|
|
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Boot time disable flag */
|
2012-01-13 07:02:20 +08:00
|
|
|
static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
|
2013-07-11 12:03:43 +08:00
|
|
|
module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long enabled;
|
2014-02-05 14:13:14 +08:00
|
|
|
int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!error)
|
|
|
|
apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
|
2010-08-02 10:00:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
if (aa_g_lock_policy)
|
|
|
|
return -EACCES;
|
|
|
|
return param_set_bool(val, kp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-08-02 10:00:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-08-02 10:00:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
return param_set_bool(val, kp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-08-02 10:00:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-08-02 10:00:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
return param_set_uint(val, kp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-08-02 10:00:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!val)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
aa_g_audit = i;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-11 12:13:43 +08:00
|
|
|
return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!val)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-11 12:13:43 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(val, aa_profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
aa_g_profile_mode = i;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* AppArmor init functions
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
|
|
|
|
struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!cxt)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
|
2013-02-27 19:43:40 +08:00
|
|
|
cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init apparmor_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) {
|
|
|
|
aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
|
|
|
|
apparmor_enabled = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
|
|
AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
|
|
|
|
goto alloc_out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = set_init_cxt();
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
|
|
AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
|
|
|
|
goto register_security_out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
2013-02-22 05:25:44 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
|
2013-02-27 19:43:40 +08:00
|
|
|
aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
|
|
|
|
cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
|
2013-02-22 05:25:44 +08:00
|
|
|
goto register_security_out;
|
2010-07-30 05:48:07 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
|
|
|
|
apparmor_initialized = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
|
|
|
|
aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
|
|
|
|
else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
|
|
|
|
aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
register_security_out:
|
|
|
|
aa_free_root_ns();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
alloc_out:
|
|
|
|
aa_destroy_aafs();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
apparmor_enabled = 0;
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
security_initcall(apparmor_init);
|