linux/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c

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11 KiB
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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* key management facility for FS encryption support.
*
* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
*
* This contains encryption key functions.
*
* Written by Michael Halcrow, Ildar Muslukhov, and Uday Savagaonkar, 2015.
*/
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
static struct crypto_shash *essiv_hash_tfm;
/*
* Key derivation function. This generates the derived key by encrypting the
* master key with AES-128-ECB using the inode's nonce as the AES key.
*
* The master key must be at least as long as the derived key. If the master
* key is longer, then only the first 'derived_keysize' bytes are used.
*/
static int derive_key_aes(const u8 *master_key,
const struct fscrypt_context *ctx,
u8 *derived_key, unsigned int derived_keysize)
{
int res = 0;
Merge tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim: "New Features: - uplift filesystem encryption into fs/crypto/ - give sysfs entries to control memroy consumption Enhancements: - aio performance by preallocating blocks in ->write_iter - use writepages lock for only WB_SYNC_ALL - avoid redundant inline_data conversion - enhance forground GC - use wait_for_stable_page as possible - speed up SEEK_DATA and fiiemap Bug Fixes: - corner case in terms of -ENOSPC for inline_data - hung task caused by long latency in shrinker - corruption between atomic write and f2fs_trace_pid - avoid garbage lengths in dentries - revoke atomicly written pages if an error occurs In addition, there are various minor bug fixes and clean-ups" * tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (81 commits) f2fs: submit node page write bios when really required f2fs: add missing argument to f2fs_setxattr stub f2fs: fix to avoid unneeded unlock_new_inode f2fs: clean up opened code with f2fs_update_dentry f2fs: declare static functions f2fs: use cryptoapi crc32 functions f2fs: modify the readahead method in ra_node_page() f2fs crypto: sync ext4_lookup and ext4_file_open fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto f2fs: mutex can't be used by down_write_nest_lock() f2fs: recovery missing dot dentries in root directory f2fs: fix to avoid deadlock when merging inline data f2fs: introduce f2fs_flush_merged_bios for cleanup f2fs: introduce f2fs_update_data_blkaddr for cleanup f2fs crypto: fix incorrect positioning for GCing encrypted data page f2fs: fix incorrect upper bound when iterating inode mapping tree f2fs: avoid hungtask problem caused by losing wake_up f2fs: trace old block address for CoWed page f2fs: try to flush inode after merging inline data f2fs: show more info about superblock recovery ...
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
Merge tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim: "New Features: - uplift filesystem encryption into fs/crypto/ - give sysfs entries to control memroy consumption Enhancements: - aio performance by preallocating blocks in ->write_iter - use writepages lock for only WB_SYNC_ALL - avoid redundant inline_data conversion - enhance forground GC - use wait_for_stable_page as possible - speed up SEEK_DATA and fiiemap Bug Fixes: - corner case in terms of -ENOSPC for inline_data - hung task caused by long latency in shrinker - corruption between atomic write and f2fs_trace_pid - avoid garbage lengths in dentries - revoke atomicly written pages if an error occurs In addition, there are various minor bug fixes and clean-ups" * tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (81 commits) f2fs: submit node page write bios when really required f2fs: add missing argument to f2fs_setxattr stub f2fs: fix to avoid unneeded unlock_new_inode f2fs: clean up opened code with f2fs_update_dentry f2fs: declare static functions f2fs: use cryptoapi crc32 functions f2fs: modify the readahead method in ra_node_page() f2fs crypto: sync ext4_lookup and ext4_file_open fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto f2fs: mutex can't be used by down_write_nest_lock() f2fs: recovery missing dot dentries in root directory f2fs: fix to avoid deadlock when merging inline data f2fs: introduce f2fs_flush_merged_bios for cleanup f2fs: introduce f2fs_update_data_blkaddr for cleanup f2fs crypto: fix incorrect positioning for GCing encrypted data page f2fs: fix incorrect upper bound when iterating inode mapping tree f2fs: avoid hungtask problem caused by losing wake_up f2fs: trace old block address for CoWed page f2fs: try to flush inode after merging inline data f2fs: show more info about superblock recovery ...
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
res = PTR_ERR(tfm);
tfm = NULL;
goto out;
}
Merge tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim: "New Features: - uplift filesystem encryption into fs/crypto/ - give sysfs entries to control memroy consumption Enhancements: - aio performance by preallocating blocks in ->write_iter - use writepages lock for only WB_SYNC_ALL - avoid redundant inline_data conversion - enhance forground GC - use wait_for_stable_page as possible - speed up SEEK_DATA and fiiemap Bug Fixes: - corner case in terms of -ENOSPC for inline_data - hung task caused by long latency in shrinker - corruption between atomic write and f2fs_trace_pid - avoid garbage lengths in dentries - revoke atomicly written pages if an error occurs In addition, there are various minor bug fixes and clean-ups" * tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (81 commits) f2fs: submit node page write bios when really required f2fs: add missing argument to f2fs_setxattr stub f2fs: fix to avoid unneeded unlock_new_inode f2fs: clean up opened code with f2fs_update_dentry f2fs: declare static functions f2fs: use cryptoapi crc32 functions f2fs: modify the readahead method in ra_node_page() f2fs crypto: sync ext4_lookup and ext4_file_open fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto f2fs: mutex can't be used by down_write_nest_lock() f2fs: recovery missing dot dentries in root directory f2fs: fix to avoid deadlock when merging inline data f2fs: introduce f2fs_flush_merged_bios for cleanup f2fs: introduce f2fs_update_data_blkaddr for cleanup f2fs crypto: fix incorrect positioning for GCing encrypted data page f2fs: fix incorrect upper bound when iterating inode mapping tree f2fs: avoid hungtask problem caused by losing wake_up f2fs: trace old block address for CoWed page f2fs: try to flush inode after merging inline data f2fs: show more info about superblock recovery ...
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
if (!req) {
res = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
Merge tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim: "New Features: - uplift filesystem encryption into fs/crypto/ - give sysfs entries to control memroy consumption Enhancements: - aio performance by preallocating blocks in ->write_iter - use writepages lock for only WB_SYNC_ALL - avoid redundant inline_data conversion - enhance forground GC - use wait_for_stable_page as possible - speed up SEEK_DATA and fiiemap Bug Fixes: - corner case in terms of -ENOSPC for inline_data - hung task caused by long latency in shrinker - corruption between atomic write and f2fs_trace_pid - avoid garbage lengths in dentries - revoke atomicly written pages if an error occurs In addition, there are various minor bug fixes and clean-ups" * tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (81 commits) f2fs: submit node page write bios when really required f2fs: add missing argument to f2fs_setxattr stub f2fs: fix to avoid unneeded unlock_new_inode f2fs: clean up opened code with f2fs_update_dentry f2fs: declare static functions f2fs: use cryptoapi crc32 functions f2fs: modify the readahead method in ra_node_page() f2fs crypto: sync ext4_lookup and ext4_file_open fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto f2fs: mutex can't be used by down_write_nest_lock() f2fs: recovery missing dot dentries in root directory f2fs: fix to avoid deadlock when merging inline data f2fs: introduce f2fs_flush_merged_bios for cleanup f2fs: introduce f2fs_update_data_blkaddr for cleanup f2fs crypto: fix incorrect positioning for GCing encrypted data page f2fs: fix incorrect upper bound when iterating inode mapping tree f2fs: avoid hungtask problem caused by losing wake_up f2fs: trace old block address for CoWed page f2fs: try to flush inode after merging inline data f2fs: show more info about superblock recovery ...
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
skcipher_request_set_callback(req,
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
crypto_req_done, &wait);
res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, ctx->nonce, sizeof(ctx->nonce));
if (res < 0)
goto out;
sg_init_one(&src_sg, master_key, derived_keysize);
sg_init_one(&dst_sg, derived_key, derived_keysize);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, derived_keysize,
NULL);
res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
out:
Merge tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim: "New Features: - uplift filesystem encryption into fs/crypto/ - give sysfs entries to control memroy consumption Enhancements: - aio performance by preallocating blocks in ->write_iter - use writepages lock for only WB_SYNC_ALL - avoid redundant inline_data conversion - enhance forground GC - use wait_for_stable_page as possible - speed up SEEK_DATA and fiiemap Bug Fixes: - corner case in terms of -ENOSPC for inline_data - hung task caused by long latency in shrinker - corruption between atomic write and f2fs_trace_pid - avoid garbage lengths in dentries - revoke atomicly written pages if an error occurs In addition, there are various minor bug fixes and clean-ups" * tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (81 commits) f2fs: submit node page write bios when really required f2fs: add missing argument to f2fs_setxattr stub f2fs: fix to avoid unneeded unlock_new_inode f2fs: clean up opened code with f2fs_update_dentry f2fs: declare static functions f2fs: use cryptoapi crc32 functions f2fs: modify the readahead method in ra_node_page() f2fs crypto: sync ext4_lookup and ext4_file_open fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto f2fs: mutex can't be used by down_write_nest_lock() f2fs: recovery missing dot dentries in root directory f2fs: fix to avoid deadlock when merging inline data f2fs: introduce f2fs_flush_merged_bios for cleanup f2fs: introduce f2fs_update_data_blkaddr for cleanup f2fs crypto: fix incorrect positioning for GCing encrypted data page f2fs: fix incorrect upper bound when iterating inode mapping tree f2fs: avoid hungtask problem caused by losing wake_up f2fs: trace old block address for CoWed page f2fs: try to flush inode after merging inline data f2fs: show more info about superblock recovery ...
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
skcipher_request_free(req);
crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
return res;
}
/*
* Search the current task's subscribed keyrings for a "logon" key with
* description prefix:descriptor, and if found acquire a read lock on it and
* return a pointer to its validated payload in *payload_ret.
*/
static struct key *
find_and_lock_process_key(const char *prefix,
const u8 descriptor[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE],
unsigned int min_keysize,
const struct fscrypt_key **payload_ret)
{
char *description;
struct key *key;
const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
const struct fscrypt_key *payload;
description = kasprintf(GFP_NOFS, "%s%*phN", prefix,
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE, descriptor);
if (!description)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
key = request_key(&key_type_logon, description, NULL);
kfree(description);
if (IS_ERR(key))
return key;
down_read(&key->sem);
ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
if (!ukp) /* was the key revoked before we acquired its semaphore? */
goto invalid;
payload = (const struct fscrypt_key *)ukp->data;
if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct fscrypt_key) ||
payload->size < 1 || payload->size > FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
fscrypt_warn(NULL,
"key with description '%s' has invalid payload",
key->description);
goto invalid;
}
if (payload->size < min_keysize) {
fscrypt_warn(NULL,
"key with description '%s' is too short (got %u bytes, need %u+ bytes)",
key->description, payload->size, min_keysize);
goto invalid;
}
*payload_ret = payload;
return key;
invalid:
up_read(&key->sem);
key_put(key);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
}
/* Find the master key, then derive the inode's actual encryption key */
static int find_and_derive_key(const struct inode *inode,
const struct fscrypt_context *ctx,
u8 *derived_key, unsigned int derived_keysize)
{
struct key *key;
const struct fscrypt_key *payload;
int err;
key = find_and_lock_process_key(FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX,
ctx->master_key_descriptor,
derived_keysize, &payload);
if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) && inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix) {
key = find_and_lock_process_key(inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix,
ctx->master_key_descriptor,
derived_keysize, &payload);
}
if (IS_ERR(key))
return PTR_ERR(key);
err = derive_key_aes(payload->raw, ctx, derived_key, derived_keysize);
up_read(&key->sem);
key_put(key);
return err;
}
static struct fscrypt_mode {
const char *friendly_name;
const char *cipher_str;
int keysize;
bool logged_impl_name;
} available_modes[] = {
[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS] = {
.friendly_name = "AES-256-XTS",
.cipher_str = "xts(aes)",
.keysize = 64,
},
[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS] = {
.friendly_name = "AES-256-CTS-CBC",
.cipher_str = "cts(cbc(aes))",
.keysize = 32,
},
[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC] = {
.friendly_name = "AES-128-CBC",
.cipher_str = "cbc(aes)",
.keysize = 16,
},
[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CTS] = {
.friendly_name = "AES-128-CTS-CBC",
.cipher_str = "cts(cbc(aes))",
.keysize = 16,
},
};
static struct fscrypt_mode *
select_encryption_mode(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, const struct inode *inode)
{
if (!fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(ci->ci_data_mode, ci->ci_filename_mode)) {
fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
"inode %lu uses unsupported encryption modes (contents mode %d, filenames mode %d)",
inode->i_ino, ci->ci_data_mode,
ci->ci_filename_mode);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return &available_modes[ci->ci_data_mode];
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
return &available_modes[ci->ci_filename_mode];
WARN_ONCE(1, "fscrypt: filesystem tried to load encryption info for inode %lu, which is not encryptable (file type %d)\n",
inode->i_ino, (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT));
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
{
if (!ci)
return;
Merge tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim: "New Features: - uplift filesystem encryption into fs/crypto/ - give sysfs entries to control memroy consumption Enhancements: - aio performance by preallocating blocks in ->write_iter - use writepages lock for only WB_SYNC_ALL - avoid redundant inline_data conversion - enhance forground GC - use wait_for_stable_page as possible - speed up SEEK_DATA and fiiemap Bug Fixes: - corner case in terms of -ENOSPC for inline_data - hung task caused by long latency in shrinker - corruption between atomic write and f2fs_trace_pid - avoid garbage lengths in dentries - revoke atomicly written pages if an error occurs In addition, there are various minor bug fixes and clean-ups" * tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (81 commits) f2fs: submit node page write bios when really required f2fs: add missing argument to f2fs_setxattr stub f2fs: fix to avoid unneeded unlock_new_inode f2fs: clean up opened code with f2fs_update_dentry f2fs: declare static functions f2fs: use cryptoapi crc32 functions f2fs: modify the readahead method in ra_node_page() f2fs crypto: sync ext4_lookup and ext4_file_open fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto f2fs: mutex can't be used by down_write_nest_lock() f2fs: recovery missing dot dentries in root directory f2fs: fix to avoid deadlock when merging inline data f2fs: introduce f2fs_flush_merged_bios for cleanup f2fs: introduce f2fs_update_data_blkaddr for cleanup f2fs crypto: fix incorrect positioning for GCing encrypted data page f2fs: fix incorrect upper bound when iterating inode mapping tree f2fs: avoid hungtask problem caused by losing wake_up f2fs: trace old block address for CoWed page f2fs: try to flush inode after merging inline data f2fs: show more info about superblock recovery ...
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
crypto_free_cipher(ci->ci_essiv_tfm);
kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci);
}
static int derive_essiv_salt(const u8 *key, int keysize, u8 *salt)
{
struct crypto_shash *tfm = READ_ONCE(essiv_hash_tfm);
/* init hash transform on demand */
if (unlikely(!tfm)) {
struct crypto_shash *prev_tfm;
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
fscrypt_warn(NULL,
"error allocating SHA-256 transform: %ld",
PTR_ERR(tfm));
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
}
prev_tfm = cmpxchg(&essiv_hash_tfm, NULL, tfm);
if (prev_tfm) {
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
tfm = prev_tfm;
}
}
{
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
desc->tfm = tfm;
desc->flags = 0;
return crypto_shash_digest(desc, key, keysize, salt);
}
}
static int init_essiv_generator(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key,
int keysize)
{
int err;
struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
u8 salt[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm))
return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
ci->ci_essiv_tfm = essiv_tfm;
err = derive_essiv_salt(raw_key, keysize, salt);
if (err)
goto out;
/*
* Using SHA256 to derive the salt/key will result in AES-256 being
* used for IV generation. File contents encryption will still use the
* configured keysize (AES-128) nevertheless.
*/
err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, sizeof(salt));
if (err)
goto out;
out:
memzero_explicit(salt, sizeof(salt));
return err;
}
void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void)
{
crypto_free_shash(essiv_hash_tfm);
}
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become "locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently. This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse. This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead, an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely. This change is not expected to break any applications. In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations --- waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations, and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed. This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them. Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
2017-02-22 07:07:11 +08:00
int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
{
struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info;
struct fscrypt_context ctx;
Merge tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim: "New Features: - uplift filesystem encryption into fs/crypto/ - give sysfs entries to control memroy consumption Enhancements: - aio performance by preallocating blocks in ->write_iter - use writepages lock for only WB_SYNC_ALL - avoid redundant inline_data conversion - enhance forground GC - use wait_for_stable_page as possible - speed up SEEK_DATA and fiiemap Bug Fixes: - corner case in terms of -ENOSPC for inline_data - hung task caused by long latency in shrinker - corruption between atomic write and f2fs_trace_pid - avoid garbage lengths in dentries - revoke atomicly written pages if an error occurs In addition, there are various minor bug fixes and clean-ups" * tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (81 commits) f2fs: submit node page write bios when really required f2fs: add missing argument to f2fs_setxattr stub f2fs: fix to avoid unneeded unlock_new_inode f2fs: clean up opened code with f2fs_update_dentry f2fs: declare static functions f2fs: use cryptoapi crc32 functions f2fs: modify the readahead method in ra_node_page() f2fs crypto: sync ext4_lookup and ext4_file_open fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto f2fs: mutex can't be used by down_write_nest_lock() f2fs: recovery missing dot dentries in root directory f2fs: fix to avoid deadlock when merging inline data f2fs: introduce f2fs_flush_merged_bios for cleanup f2fs: introduce f2fs_update_data_blkaddr for cleanup f2fs crypto: fix incorrect positioning for GCing encrypted data page f2fs: fix incorrect upper bound when iterating inode mapping tree f2fs: avoid hungtask problem caused by losing wake_up f2fs: trace old block address for CoWed page f2fs: try to flush inode after merging inline data f2fs: show more info about superblock recovery ...
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm;
struct fscrypt_mode *mode;
u8 *raw_key = NULL;
int res;
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become "locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently. This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse. This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead, an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely. This change is not expected to break any applications. In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations --- waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations, and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed. This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them. Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
2017-02-22 07:07:11 +08:00
if (inode->i_crypt_info)
return 0;
res = fscrypt_initialize(inode->i_sb->s_cop->flags);
if (res)
return res;
res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
if (res < 0) {
if (!fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled(inode) ||
IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))
return res;
/* Fake up a context for an unencrypted directory */
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
ctx.contents_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS;
memset(ctx.master_key_descriptor, 0x42, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
} else if (res != sizeof(ctx)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (ctx.format != FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1)
return -EINVAL;
if (ctx.flags & ~FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID)
return -EINVAL;
crypt_info = kmem_cache_alloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
if (!crypt_info)
return -ENOMEM;
crypt_info->ci_flags = ctx.flags;
crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL;
crypt_info->ci_essiv_tfm = NULL;
memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key));
mode = select_encryption_mode(crypt_info, inode);
if (IS_ERR(mode)) {
res = PTR_ERR(mode);
goto out;
}
/*
* This cannot be a stack buffer because it is passed to the scatterlist
* crypto API as part of key derivation.
*/
res = -ENOMEM;
raw_key = kmalloc(mode->keysize, GFP_NOFS);
if (!raw_key)
goto out;
res = find_and_derive_key(inode, &ctx, raw_key, mode->keysize);
if (res)
goto out;
ctfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(mode->cipher_str, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(ctfm)) {
res = PTR_ERR(ctfm);
fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
"error allocating '%s' transform for inode %lu: %d",
mode->cipher_str, inode->i_ino, res);
goto out;
}
if (unlikely(!mode->logged_impl_name)) {
/*
* fscrypt performance can vary greatly depending on which
* crypto algorithm implementation is used. Help people debug
* performance problems by logging the ->cra_driver_name the
* first time a mode is used. Note that multiple threads can
* race here, but it doesn't really matter.
*/
mode->logged_impl_name = true;
pr_info("fscrypt: %s using implementation \"%s\"\n",
mode->friendly_name,
crypto_skcipher_alg(ctfm)->base.cra_driver_name);
}
crypt_info->ci_ctfm = ctfm;
Merge tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim: "New Features: - uplift filesystem encryption into fs/crypto/ - give sysfs entries to control memroy consumption Enhancements: - aio performance by preallocating blocks in ->write_iter - use writepages lock for only WB_SYNC_ALL - avoid redundant inline_data conversion - enhance forground GC - use wait_for_stable_page as possible - speed up SEEK_DATA and fiiemap Bug Fixes: - corner case in terms of -ENOSPC for inline_data - hung task caused by long latency in shrinker - corruption between atomic write and f2fs_trace_pid - avoid garbage lengths in dentries - revoke atomicly written pages if an error occurs In addition, there are various minor bug fixes and clean-ups" * tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (81 commits) f2fs: submit node page write bios when really required f2fs: add missing argument to f2fs_setxattr stub f2fs: fix to avoid unneeded unlock_new_inode f2fs: clean up opened code with f2fs_update_dentry f2fs: declare static functions f2fs: use cryptoapi crc32 functions f2fs: modify the readahead method in ra_node_page() f2fs crypto: sync ext4_lookup and ext4_file_open fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto f2fs: mutex can't be used by down_write_nest_lock() f2fs: recovery missing dot dentries in root directory f2fs: fix to avoid deadlock when merging inline data f2fs: introduce f2fs_flush_merged_bios for cleanup f2fs: introduce f2fs_update_data_blkaddr for cleanup f2fs crypto: fix incorrect positioning for GCing encrypted data page f2fs: fix incorrect upper bound when iterating inode mapping tree f2fs: avoid hungtask problem caused by losing wake_up f2fs: trace old block address for CoWed page f2fs: try to flush inode after merging inline data f2fs: show more info about superblock recovery ...
2016-03-22 02:03:02 +08:00
crypto_skcipher_set_flags(ctfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(ctfm, raw_key, mode->keysize);
if (res)
goto out;
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
crypt_info->ci_data_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC) {
res = init_essiv_generator(crypt_info, raw_key, mode->keysize);
if (res) {
fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
"error initializing ESSIV generator for inode %lu: %d",
inode->i_ino, res);
goto out;
}
}
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become "locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently. This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse. This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead, an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely. This change is not expected to break any applications. In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations --- waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations, and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed. This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them. Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
2017-02-22 07:07:11 +08:00
if (cmpxchg(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL)
crypt_info = NULL;
out:
if (res == -ENOKEY)
res = 0;
put_crypt_info(crypt_info);
kzfree(raw_key);
return res;
}
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become "locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently. This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse. This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead, an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely. This change is not expected to break any applications. In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations --- waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations, and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed. This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them. Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
2017-02-22 07:07:11 +08:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_get_encryption_info);
void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
{
put_crypt_info(inode->i_crypt_info);
inode->i_crypt_info = NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_put_encryption_info);