License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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2008-10-23 13:26:29 +08:00
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#ifndef _ASM_X86_UACCESS_H
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#define _ASM_X86_UACCESS_H
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2008-06-14 01:39:25 +08:00
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/*
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* User space memory access functions
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*/
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#include <linux/compiler.h>
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2016-05-21 07:59:31 +08:00
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#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
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2008-06-14 01:39:25 +08:00
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <asm/asm.h>
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#include <asm/page.h>
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2012-09-22 03:43:12 +08:00
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#include <asm/smap.h>
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2016-09-05 23:32:44 +08:00
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#include <asm/extable.h>
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2008-06-14 01:39:25 +08:00
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/*
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* The fs value determines whether argument validity checking should be
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* performed or not. If get_fs() == USER_DS, checking is performed, with
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* get_fs() == KERNEL_DS, checking is bypassed.
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*
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* For historical reasons, these macros are grossly misnamed.
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*/
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#define MAKE_MM_SEG(s) ((mm_segment_t) { (s) })
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#define KERNEL_DS MAKE_MM_SEG(-1UL)
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x86, 64-bit: Clean up user address masking
The discussion about using "access_ok()" in get_user_pages_fast() (see
commit 7f8189068726492950bf1a2dcfd9b51314560abf: "x86: don't use
'access_ok()' as a range check in get_user_pages_fast()" for details and
end result), made us notice that x86-64 was really being very sloppy
about virtual address checking.
So be way more careful and straightforward about masking x86-64 virtual
addresses:
- All the VIRTUAL_MASK* variants now cover half of the address
space, it's not like we can use the full mask on a signed
integer, and the larger mask just invites mistakes when
applying it to either half of the 48-bit address space.
- /proc/kcore's kc_offset_to_vaddr() becomes a lot more
obvious when it transforms a file offset into a
(kernel-half) virtual address.
- Unify/simplify the 32-bit and 64-bit USER_DS definition to
be based on TASK_SIZE_MAX.
This cleanup and more careful/obvious user virtual address checking also
uncovered a buglet in the x86-64 implementation of strnlen_user(): it
would do an "access_ok()" check on the whole potential area, even if the
string itself was much shorter, and thus return an error even for valid
strings. Our sloppy checking had hidden this.
So this fixes 'strnlen_user()' to do this properly, the same way we
already handled user strings in 'strncpy_from_user()'. Namely by just
checking the first byte, and then relying on fault handling for the
rest. That always works, since we impose a guard page that cannot be
mapped at the end of the user space address space (and even if we
didn't, we'd have the address space hole).
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-06-21 06:40:00 +08:00
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#define USER_DS MAKE_MM_SEG(TASK_SIZE_MAX)
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2008-06-14 01:39:25 +08:00
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2016-07-15 04:22:57 +08:00
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#define get_fs() (current->thread.addr_limit)
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2017-06-15 09:12:01 +08:00
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static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
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{
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current->thread.addr_limit = fs;
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/* On user-mode return, check fs is correct */
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set_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK);
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}
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2008-06-14 01:39:25 +08:00
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#define segment_eq(a, b) ((a).seg == (b).seg)
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2016-07-15 04:22:57 +08:00
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#define user_addr_max() (current->thread.addr_limit.seg)
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2008-06-25 22:08:51 +08:00
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2008-06-14 01:39:25 +08:00
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/*
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* Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
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* Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
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*/
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2013-12-28 08:52:47 +08:00
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static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, unsigned long limit)
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2013-12-28 07:30:58 +08:00
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{
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/*
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* If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
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* we know it won't overflow the limit (but
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* it might overflow the 'addr', so it's
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* important to subtract the size from the
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* limit, not add it to the address).
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*/
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if (__builtin_constant_p(size))
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2015-10-06 08:47:50 +08:00
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return unlikely(addr > limit - size);
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2013-12-28 07:30:58 +08:00
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/* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
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addr += size;
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2015-10-06 08:47:50 +08:00
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if (unlikely(addr < size))
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2013-12-28 08:52:47 +08:00
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return true;
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2015-10-06 08:47:50 +08:00
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return unlikely(addr > limit);
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2013-12-28 07:30:58 +08:00
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}
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2008-06-14 01:39:25 +08:00
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2012-04-21 06:41:35 +08:00
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#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit) \
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2008-06-14 01:39:25 +08:00
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({ \
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__chk_user_ptr(addr); \
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2013-12-28 07:30:58 +08:00
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__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size, limit); \
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2008-06-14 01:39:25 +08:00
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})
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2016-11-22 17:57:15 +08:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
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2019-05-15 13:38:06 +08:00
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static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
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# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() \
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WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_task() && !pagefault_disabled())
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2016-11-22 17:57:15 +08:00
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#else
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# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ()
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#endif
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2008-06-14 01:39:25 +08:00
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/**
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2019-03-06 07:48:39 +08:00
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* access_ok - Checks if a user space pointer is valid
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2008-06-14 01:39:25 +08:00
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* @addr: User space pointer to start of block to check
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* @size: Size of block to check
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*
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2015-05-11 23:52:08 +08:00
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* Context: User context only. This function may sleep if pagefaults are
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* enabled.
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2008-06-14 01:39:25 +08:00
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*
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* Checks if a pointer to a block of memory in user space is valid.
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*
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* Note that, depending on architecture, this function probably just
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* checks that the pointer is in the user space range - after calling
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* this function, memory access functions may still return -EFAULT.
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2019-03-06 07:48:39 +08:00
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*
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* Return: true (nonzero) if the memory block may be valid, false (zero)
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* if it is definitely invalid.
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2008-06-14 01:39:25 +08:00
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*/
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Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
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#define access_ok(addr, size) \
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2016-11-22 17:57:15 +08:00
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({ \
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WARN_ON_IN_IRQ(); \
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likely(!__range_not_ok(addr, size, user_addr_max())); \
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})
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2008-06-14 01:39:25 +08:00
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/*
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* These are the main single-value transfer routines. They automatically
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* use the right size if we just have the right pointer type.
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*
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* This gets kind of ugly. We want to return _two_ values in "get_user()"
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* and yet we don't want to do any pointers, because that is too much
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* of a performance impact. Thus we have a few rather ugly macros here,
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* and hide all the ugliness from the user.
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*
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* The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions are versions that
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* do not verify the address space, that must have been done previously
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* with a separate "access_ok()" call (this is used when we do multiple
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* accesses to the same area of user memory).
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*/
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extern int __get_user_1(void);
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extern int __get_user_2(void);
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extern int __get_user_4(void);
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extern int __get_user_8(void);
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extern int __get_user_bad(void);
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2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
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#define __uaccess_begin() stac()
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#define __uaccess_end() clac()
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2018-01-30 09:02:39 +08:00
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#define __uaccess_begin_nospec() \
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({ \
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stac(); \
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barrier_nospec(); \
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})
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2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
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2013-02-13 03:47:31 +08:00
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/*
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* This is a type: either unsigned long, if the argument fits into
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* that type, or otherwise unsigned long long.
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*/
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#define __inttype(x) \
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__typeof__(__builtin_choose_expr(sizeof(x) > sizeof(0UL), 0ULL, 0UL))
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2008-06-25 22:05:11 +08:00
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/**
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2019-03-06 07:48:39 +08:00
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* get_user - Get a simple variable from user space.
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2008-06-25 22:05:11 +08:00
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* @x: Variable to store result.
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* @ptr: Source address, in user space.
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*
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2015-05-11 23:52:08 +08:00
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* Context: User context only. This function may sleep if pagefaults are
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* enabled.
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2008-06-25 22:05:11 +08:00
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*
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* This macro copies a single simple variable from user space to kernel
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* space. It supports simple types like char and int, but not larger
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* data types like structures or arrays.
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*
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* @ptr must have pointer-to-simple-variable type, and the result of
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* dereferencing @ptr must be assignable to @x without a cast.
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*
|
2019-03-06 07:48:39 +08:00
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* Return: zero on success, or -EFAULT on error.
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2008-06-25 22:05:11 +08:00
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* On error, the variable @x is set to zero.
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2013-02-13 07:37:02 +08:00
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*/
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/*
|
2013-02-13 03:47:31 +08:00
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* Careful: we have to cast the result to the type of the pointer
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* for sign reasons.
|
2013-02-13 07:37:02 +08:00
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*
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2013-08-30 04:34:50 +08:00
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* The use of _ASM_DX as the register specifier is a bit of a
|
2013-02-13 07:37:02 +08:00
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* simplification, as gcc only cares about it as the starting point
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* and not size: for a 64-bit value it will use %ecx:%edx on 32 bits
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* (%ecx being the next register in gcc's x86 register sequence), and
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* %rdx on 64 bits.
|
2013-08-30 04:34:50 +08:00
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*
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* Clang/LLVM cares about the size of the register, but still wants
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* the base register for something that ends up being a pair.
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2008-06-25 22:05:11 +08:00
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*/
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#define get_user(x, ptr) \
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({ \
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int __ret_gu; \
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2013-08-30 03:13:05 +08:00
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register __inttype(*(ptr)) __val_gu asm("%"_ASM_DX); \
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2008-06-25 22:05:11 +08:00
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__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
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2008-09-10 19:37:17 +08:00
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might_fault(); \
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2016-01-22 06:49:25 +08:00
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asm volatile("call __get_user_%P4" \
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x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang
For inline asm statements which have a CALL instruction, we list the
stack pointer as a constraint to convince GCC to ensure the frame
pointer is set up first:
static inline void foo()
{
register void *__sp asm(_ASM_SP);
asm("call bar" : "+r" (__sp))
}
Unfortunately, that pattern causes Clang to corrupt the stack pointer.
The fix is easy: convert the stack pointer register variable to a global
variable.
It should be noted that the end result is different based on the GCC
version. With GCC 6.4, this patch has exactly the same result as
before:
defconfig defconfig-nofp distro distro-nofp
before 9820389 9491555 8816046 8516940
after 9820389 9491555 8816046 8516940
With GCC 7.2, however, GCC's behavior has changed. It now changes its
behavior based on the conversion of the register variable to a global.
That somehow convinces it to *always* set up the frame pointer before
inserting *any* inline asm. (Therefore, listing the variable as an
output constraint is a no-op and is no longer necessary.) It's a bit
overkill, but the performance impact should be negligible. And in fact,
there's a nice improvement with frame pointers disabled:
defconfig defconfig-nofp distro distro-nofp
before 9796316 9468236 9076191 8790305
after 9796957 9464267 9076381 8785949
So in summary, while listing the stack pointer as an output constraint
is no longer necessary for newer versions of GCC, it's still needed for
older versions.
Suggested-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin <miguel.bernal.marin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3db862e970c432ae823cf515c52b54fec8270e0e.1505942196.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-21 05:24:33 +08:00
|
|
|
: "=a" (__ret_gu), "=r" (__val_gu), \
|
|
|
|
ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT \
|
2013-02-13 03:47:31 +08:00
|
|
|
: "0" (ptr), "i" (sizeof(*(ptr)))); \
|
2014-12-12 07:56:04 +08:00
|
|
|
(x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr))) __val_gu; \
|
2015-10-06 08:47:49 +08:00
|
|
|
__builtin_expect(__ret_gu, 0); \
|
2008-06-25 22:05:11 +08:00
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-26 00:17:43 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __put_user_x(size, x, ptr, __ret_pu) \
|
|
|
|
asm volatile("call __put_user_" #size : "=a" (__ret_pu) \
|
2009-01-20 08:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
: "0" ((typeof(*(ptr)))(x)), "c" (ptr) : "ebx")
|
2008-06-26 00:17:43 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-25 22:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
|
Use __put_user_goto in __put_user_size() and unsafe_put_user()
This actually enables the __put_user_goto() functionality in
unsafe_put_user().
For an example of the effect of this, this is the code generated for the
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
in the waitid() system call:
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_2]
It's just one single store instruction, along with generating an
exception table entry pointing to the Efault label case in case that
instruction faults.
Before, we would generate this:
xorl %edx, %edx
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_3]
testl %edx, %edx
jne .L309
with the exception table generated for that 'mov' instruction causing us
to jump to a stub that set %edx to -EFAULT and then jumped back to the
'testl' instruction.
So not only do we now get rid of the extra code in the normal sequence,
we also avoid unnecessarily keeping that extra error register live
across it all.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-22 12:55:19 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __put_user_goto_u64(x, addr, label) \
|
|
|
|
asm_volatile_goto("\n" \
|
|
|
|
"1: movl %%eax,0(%1)\n" \
|
|
|
|
"2: movl %%edx,4(%1)\n" \
|
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, %l2) \
|
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(2b, %l2) \
|
|
|
|
: : "A" (x), "r" (addr) \
|
|
|
|
: : label)
|
2008-06-26 00:17:43 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __put_user_asm_ex_u64(x, addr) \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
asm volatile("\n" \
|
2012-09-22 03:43:12 +08:00
|
|
|
"1: movl %%eax,0(%1)\n" \
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
"2: movl %%edx,4(%1)\n" \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
"3:" \
|
2012-04-21 07:57:35 +08:00
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_EX(1b, 2b) \
|
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_EX(2b, 3b) \
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
: : "A" (x), "r" (addr))
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-26 00:17:43 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __put_user_x8(x, ptr, __ret_pu) \
|
|
|
|
asm volatile("call __put_user_8" : "=a" (__ret_pu) \
|
|
|
|
: "A" ((typeof(*(ptr)))(x)), "c" (ptr) : "ebx")
|
2008-06-25 22:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
#else
|
Use __put_user_goto in __put_user_size() and unsafe_put_user()
This actually enables the __put_user_goto() functionality in
unsafe_put_user().
For an example of the effect of this, this is the code generated for the
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
in the waitid() system call:
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_2]
It's just one single store instruction, along with generating an
exception table entry pointing to the Efault label case in case that
instruction faults.
Before, we would generate this:
xorl %edx, %edx
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_3]
testl %edx, %edx
jne .L309
with the exception table generated for that 'mov' instruction causing us
to jump to a stub that set %edx to -EFAULT and then jumped back to the
'testl' instruction.
So not only do we now get rid of the extra code in the normal sequence,
we also avoid unnecessarily keeping that extra error register live
across it all.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-22 12:55:19 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __put_user_goto_u64(x, ptr, label) \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_goto(x, ptr, "q", "", "er", label)
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __put_user_asm_ex_u64(x, addr) \
|
2009-07-21 14:27:39 +08:00
|
|
|
__put_user_asm_ex(x, addr, "q", "", "er")
|
2008-06-26 00:17:43 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __put_user_x8(x, ptr, __ret_pu) __put_user_x(8, x, ptr, __ret_pu)
|
2008-06-25 22:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-26 00:17:43 +08:00
|
|
|
extern void __put_user_bad(void);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Strange magic calling convention: pointer in %ecx,
|
|
|
|
* value in %eax(:%edx), return value in %eax. clobbers %rbx
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
extern void __put_user_1(void);
|
|
|
|
extern void __put_user_2(void);
|
|
|
|
extern void __put_user_4(void);
|
|
|
|
extern void __put_user_8(void);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2019-03-06 07:48:39 +08:00
|
|
|
* put_user - Write a simple value into user space.
|
2008-06-26 00:17:43 +08:00
|
|
|
* @x: Value to copy to user space.
|
|
|
|
* @ptr: Destination address, in user space.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2015-05-11 23:52:08 +08:00
|
|
|
* Context: User context only. This function may sleep if pagefaults are
|
|
|
|
* enabled.
|
2008-06-26 00:17:43 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This macro copies a single simple value from kernel space to user
|
|
|
|
* space. It supports simple types like char and int, but not larger
|
|
|
|
* data types like structures or arrays.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @ptr must have pointer-to-simple-variable type, and @x must be assignable
|
|
|
|
* to the result of dereferencing @ptr.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2019-03-06 07:48:39 +08:00
|
|
|
* Return: zero on success, or -EFAULT on error.
|
2008-06-26 00:17:43 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define put_user(x, ptr) \
|
|
|
|
({ \
|
|
|
|
int __ret_pu; \
|
|
|
|
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __pu_val; \
|
|
|
|
__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
|
2008-09-10 19:37:17 +08:00
|
|
|
might_fault(); \
|
2008-06-26 00:17:43 +08:00
|
|
|
__pu_val = x; \
|
|
|
|
switch (sizeof(*(ptr))) { \
|
|
|
|
case 1: \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_x(1, __pu_val, ptr, __ret_pu); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
case 2: \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_x(2, __pu_val, ptr, __ret_pu); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
case 4: \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_x(4, __pu_val, ptr, __ret_pu); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
case 8: \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_x8(__pu_val, ptr, __ret_pu); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
default: \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_x(X, __pu_val, ptr, __ret_pu); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
2015-10-06 08:47:49 +08:00
|
|
|
__builtin_expect(__ret_pu, 0); \
|
2008-06-26 00:17:43 +08:00
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
Use __put_user_goto in __put_user_size() and unsafe_put_user()
This actually enables the __put_user_goto() functionality in
unsafe_put_user().
For an example of the effect of this, this is the code generated for the
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
in the waitid() system call:
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_2]
It's just one single store instruction, along with generating an
exception table entry pointing to the Efault label case in case that
instruction faults.
Before, we would generate this:
xorl %edx, %edx
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_3]
testl %edx, %edx
jne .L309
with the exception table generated for that 'mov' instruction causing us
to jump to a stub that set %edx to -EFAULT and then jumped back to the
'testl' instruction.
So not only do we now get rid of the extra code in the normal sequence,
we also avoid unnecessarily keeping that extra error register live
across it all.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-22 12:55:19 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __put_user_size(x, ptr, size, label) \
|
2008-06-25 22:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
do { \
|
|
|
|
__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
|
|
|
|
switch (size) { \
|
|
|
|
case 1: \
|
Use __put_user_goto in __put_user_size() and unsafe_put_user()
This actually enables the __put_user_goto() functionality in
unsafe_put_user().
For an example of the effect of this, this is the code generated for the
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
in the waitid() system call:
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_2]
It's just one single store instruction, along with generating an
exception table entry pointing to the Efault label case in case that
instruction faults.
Before, we would generate this:
xorl %edx, %edx
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_3]
testl %edx, %edx
jne .L309
with the exception table generated for that 'mov' instruction causing us
to jump to a stub that set %edx to -EFAULT and then jumped back to the
'testl' instruction.
So not only do we now get rid of the extra code in the normal sequence,
we also avoid unnecessarily keeping that extra error register live
across it all.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-22 12:55:19 +08:00
|
|
|
__put_user_goto(x, ptr, "b", "b", "iq", label); \
|
2008-06-25 22:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
case 2: \
|
Use __put_user_goto in __put_user_size() and unsafe_put_user()
This actually enables the __put_user_goto() functionality in
unsafe_put_user().
For an example of the effect of this, this is the code generated for the
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
in the waitid() system call:
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_2]
It's just one single store instruction, along with generating an
exception table entry pointing to the Efault label case in case that
instruction faults.
Before, we would generate this:
xorl %edx, %edx
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_3]
testl %edx, %edx
jne .L309
with the exception table generated for that 'mov' instruction causing us
to jump to a stub that set %edx to -EFAULT and then jumped back to the
'testl' instruction.
So not only do we now get rid of the extra code in the normal sequence,
we also avoid unnecessarily keeping that extra error register live
across it all.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-22 12:55:19 +08:00
|
|
|
__put_user_goto(x, ptr, "w", "w", "ir", label); \
|
2008-06-25 22:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
case 4: \
|
Use __put_user_goto in __put_user_size() and unsafe_put_user()
This actually enables the __put_user_goto() functionality in
unsafe_put_user().
For an example of the effect of this, this is the code generated for the
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
in the waitid() system call:
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_2]
It's just one single store instruction, along with generating an
exception table entry pointing to the Efault label case in case that
instruction faults.
Before, we would generate this:
xorl %edx, %edx
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_3]
testl %edx, %edx
jne .L309
with the exception table generated for that 'mov' instruction causing us
to jump to a stub that set %edx to -EFAULT and then jumped back to the
'testl' instruction.
So not only do we now get rid of the extra code in the normal sequence,
we also avoid unnecessarily keeping that extra error register live
across it all.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-22 12:55:19 +08:00
|
|
|
__put_user_goto(x, ptr, "l", "k", "ir", label); \
|
2008-06-25 22:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
case 8: \
|
2019-02-23 09:17:04 +08:00
|
|
|
__put_user_goto_u64(x, ptr, label); \
|
2008-06-25 22:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
default: \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_bad(); \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
|
|
|
} while (0)
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This doesn't do __uaccess_begin/end - the exception handling
|
|
|
|
* around it must do that.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __put_user_size_ex(x, ptr, size) \
|
|
|
|
do { \
|
|
|
|
__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
|
|
|
|
switch (size) { \
|
|
|
|
case 1: \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_asm_ex(x, ptr, "b", "b", "iq"); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
case 2: \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_asm_ex(x, ptr, "w", "w", "ir"); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
case 4: \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_asm_ex(x, ptr, "l", "k", "ir"); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
case 8: \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_asm_ex_u64((__typeof__(*ptr))(x), ptr); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
default: \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_bad(); \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
|
|
|
} while (0)
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-25 23:48:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
|
2016-03-10 04:05:56 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __get_user_asm_u64(x, ptr, retval, errret) \
|
|
|
|
({ \
|
|
|
|
__typeof__(ptr) __ptr = (ptr); \
|
x86: fix 32-bit case of __get_user_asm_u64()
The code to fetch a 64-bit value from user space was entirely buggered,
and has been since the code was merged in early 2016 in commit
b2f680380ddf ("x86/mm/32: Add support for 64-bit __get_user() on 32-bit
kernels").
Happily the buggered routine is almost certainly entirely unused, since
the normal way to access user space memory is just with the non-inlined
"get_user()", and the inlined version didn't even historically exist.
The normal "get_user()" case is handled by external hand-written asm in
arch/x86/lib/getuser.S that doesn't have either of these issues.
There were two independent bugs in __get_user_asm_u64():
- it still did the STAC/CLAC user space access marking, even though
that is now done by the wrapper macros, see commit 11f1a4b9755f
("x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses").
This didn't result in a semantic error, it just means that the
inlined optimized version was hugely less efficient than the
allegedly slower standard version, since the CLAC/STAC overhead is
quite high on modern Intel CPU's.
- the double register %eax/%edx was marked as an output, but the %eax
part of it was touched early in the asm, and could thus clobber other
inputs to the asm that gcc didn't expect it to touch.
In particular, that meant that the generated code could look like
this:
mov (%eax),%eax
mov 0x4(%eax),%edx
where the load of %edx obviously was _supposed_ to be from the 32-bit
word that followed the source of %eax, but because %eax was
overwritten by the first instruction, the source of %edx was
basically random garbage.
The fixes are trivial: remove the extraneous STAC/CLAC entries, and mark
the 64-bit output as early-clobber to let gcc know that no inputs should
alias with the output register.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v4.8+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-05-22 09:26:54 +08:00
|
|
|
asm volatile("\n" \
|
2016-03-10 04:05:56 +08:00
|
|
|
"1: movl %2,%%eax\n" \
|
|
|
|
"2: movl %3,%%edx\n" \
|
x86: fix 32-bit case of __get_user_asm_u64()
The code to fetch a 64-bit value from user space was entirely buggered,
and has been since the code was merged in early 2016 in commit
b2f680380ddf ("x86/mm/32: Add support for 64-bit __get_user() on 32-bit
kernels").
Happily the buggered routine is almost certainly entirely unused, since
the normal way to access user space memory is just with the non-inlined
"get_user()", and the inlined version didn't even historically exist.
The normal "get_user()" case is handled by external hand-written asm in
arch/x86/lib/getuser.S that doesn't have either of these issues.
There were two independent bugs in __get_user_asm_u64():
- it still did the STAC/CLAC user space access marking, even though
that is now done by the wrapper macros, see commit 11f1a4b9755f
("x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses").
This didn't result in a semantic error, it just means that the
inlined optimized version was hugely less efficient than the
allegedly slower standard version, since the CLAC/STAC overhead is
quite high on modern Intel CPU's.
- the double register %eax/%edx was marked as an output, but the %eax
part of it was touched early in the asm, and could thus clobber other
inputs to the asm that gcc didn't expect it to touch.
In particular, that meant that the generated code could look like
this:
mov (%eax),%eax
mov 0x4(%eax),%edx
where the load of %edx obviously was _supposed_ to be from the 32-bit
word that followed the source of %eax, but because %eax was
overwritten by the first instruction, the source of %edx was
basically random garbage.
The fixes are trivial: remove the extraneous STAC/CLAC entries, and mark
the 64-bit output as early-clobber to let gcc know that no inputs should
alias with the output register.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v4.8+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-05-22 09:26:54 +08:00
|
|
|
"3:\n" \
|
2016-03-10 04:05:56 +08:00
|
|
|
".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \
|
|
|
|
"4: mov %4,%0\n" \
|
|
|
|
" xorl %%eax,%%eax\n" \
|
|
|
|
" xorl %%edx,%%edx\n" \
|
|
|
|
" jmp 3b\n" \
|
|
|
|
".previous\n" \
|
2018-08-29 04:14:18 +08:00
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, 4b) \
|
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(2b, 4b) \
|
x86: fix 32-bit case of __get_user_asm_u64()
The code to fetch a 64-bit value from user space was entirely buggered,
and has been since the code was merged in early 2016 in commit
b2f680380ddf ("x86/mm/32: Add support for 64-bit __get_user() on 32-bit
kernels").
Happily the buggered routine is almost certainly entirely unused, since
the normal way to access user space memory is just with the non-inlined
"get_user()", and the inlined version didn't even historically exist.
The normal "get_user()" case is handled by external hand-written asm in
arch/x86/lib/getuser.S that doesn't have either of these issues.
There were two independent bugs in __get_user_asm_u64():
- it still did the STAC/CLAC user space access marking, even though
that is now done by the wrapper macros, see commit 11f1a4b9755f
("x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses").
This didn't result in a semantic error, it just means that the
inlined optimized version was hugely less efficient than the
allegedly slower standard version, since the CLAC/STAC overhead is
quite high on modern Intel CPU's.
- the double register %eax/%edx was marked as an output, but the %eax
part of it was touched early in the asm, and could thus clobber other
inputs to the asm that gcc didn't expect it to touch.
In particular, that meant that the generated code could look like
this:
mov (%eax),%eax
mov 0x4(%eax),%edx
where the load of %edx obviously was _supposed_ to be from the 32-bit
word that followed the source of %eax, but because %eax was
overwritten by the first instruction, the source of %edx was
basically random garbage.
The fixes are trivial: remove the extraneous STAC/CLAC entries, and mark
the 64-bit output as early-clobber to let gcc know that no inputs should
alias with the output register.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v4.8+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-05-22 09:26:54 +08:00
|
|
|
: "=r" (retval), "=&A"(x) \
|
2017-09-13 00:40:00 +08:00
|
|
|
: "m" (__m(__ptr)), "m" __m(((u32 __user *)(__ptr)) + 1), \
|
2016-03-10 04:05:56 +08:00
|
|
|
"i" (errret), "0" (retval)); \
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __get_user_asm_ex_u64(x, ptr) (x) = __get_user_bad()
|
2008-06-25 23:48:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
#define __get_user_asm_u64(x, ptr, retval, errret) \
|
|
|
|
__get_user_asm(x, ptr, retval, "q", "", "=r", errret)
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __get_user_asm_ex_u64(x, ptr) \
|
|
|
|
__get_user_asm_ex(x, ptr, "q", "", "=r")
|
2008-06-25 23:48:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define __get_user_size(x, ptr, size, retval, errret) \
|
|
|
|
do { \
|
|
|
|
retval = 0; \
|
|
|
|
__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
|
|
|
|
switch (size) { \
|
|
|
|
case 1: \
|
|
|
|
__get_user_asm(x, ptr, retval, "b", "b", "=q", errret); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
case 2: \
|
|
|
|
__get_user_asm(x, ptr, retval, "w", "w", "=r", errret); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
case 4: \
|
|
|
|
__get_user_asm(x, ptr, retval, "l", "k", "=r", errret); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
case 8: \
|
|
|
|
__get_user_asm_u64(x, ptr, retval, errret); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
default: \
|
|
|
|
(x) = __get_user_bad(); \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
|
|
|
} while (0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define __get_user_asm(x, addr, err, itype, rtype, ltype, errret) \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
asm volatile("\n" \
|
2012-09-22 03:43:12 +08:00
|
|
|
"1: mov"itype" %2,%"rtype"1\n" \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
"2:\n" \
|
2008-06-25 23:48:47 +08:00
|
|
|
".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \
|
|
|
|
"3: mov %3,%0\n" \
|
|
|
|
" xor"itype" %"rtype"1,%"rtype"1\n" \
|
|
|
|
" jmp 2b\n" \
|
|
|
|
".previous\n" \
|
2018-08-29 04:14:18 +08:00
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, 3b) \
|
2008-06-25 23:48:47 +08:00
|
|
|
: "=r" (err), ltype(x) \
|
|
|
|
: "m" (__m(addr)), "i" (errret), "0" (err))
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-26 06:36:22 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __get_user_asm_nozero(x, addr, err, itype, rtype, ltype, errret) \
|
|
|
|
asm volatile("\n" \
|
|
|
|
"1: mov"itype" %2,%"rtype"1\n" \
|
|
|
|
"2:\n" \
|
|
|
|
".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \
|
|
|
|
"3: mov %3,%0\n" \
|
|
|
|
" jmp 2b\n" \
|
|
|
|
".previous\n" \
|
2018-08-29 04:14:18 +08:00
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, 3b) \
|
2017-03-26 06:36:22 +08:00
|
|
|
: "=r" (err), ltype(x) \
|
|
|
|
: "m" (__m(addr)), "i" (errret), "0" (err))
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This doesn't do __uaccess_begin/end - the exception handling
|
|
|
|
* around it must do that.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __get_user_size_ex(x, ptr, size) \
|
|
|
|
do { \
|
|
|
|
__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
|
|
|
|
switch (size) { \
|
|
|
|
case 1: \
|
|
|
|
__get_user_asm_ex(x, ptr, "b", "b", "=q"); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
case 2: \
|
|
|
|
__get_user_asm_ex(x, ptr, "w", "w", "=r"); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
case 4: \
|
|
|
|
__get_user_asm_ex(x, ptr, "l", "k", "=r"); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
case 8: \
|
|
|
|
__get_user_asm_ex_u64(x, ptr); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
default: \
|
|
|
|
(x) = __get_user_bad(); \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
|
|
|
} while (0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define __get_user_asm_ex(x, addr, itype, rtype, ltype) \
|
2012-09-22 03:43:15 +08:00
|
|
|
asm volatile("1: mov"itype" %1,%"rtype"0\n" \
|
|
|
|
"2:\n" \
|
2016-09-15 09:35:29 +08:00
|
|
|
".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \
|
|
|
|
"3:xor"itype" %"rtype"0,%"rtype"0\n" \
|
|
|
|
" jmp 2b\n" \
|
|
|
|
".previous\n" \
|
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_EX(1b, 3b) \
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
: ltype(x) : "m" (__m(addr)))
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-25 22:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __put_user_nocheck(x, ptr, size) \
|
|
|
|
({ \
|
Use __put_user_goto in __put_user_size() and unsafe_put_user()
This actually enables the __put_user_goto() functionality in
unsafe_put_user().
For an example of the effect of this, this is the code generated for the
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
in the waitid() system call:
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_2]
It's just one single store instruction, along with generating an
exception table entry pointing to the Efault label case in case that
instruction faults.
Before, we would generate this:
xorl %edx, %edx
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_3]
testl %edx, %edx
jne .L309
with the exception table generated for that 'mov' instruction causing us
to jump to a stub that set %edx to -EFAULT and then jumped back to the
'testl' instruction.
So not only do we now get rid of the extra code in the normal sequence,
we also avoid unnecessarily keeping that extra error register live
across it all.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-22 12:55:19 +08:00
|
|
|
__label__ __pu_label; \
|
|
|
|
int __pu_err = -EFAULT; \
|
2019-04-24 15:19:24 +08:00
|
|
|
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __pu_val = (x); \
|
|
|
|
__typeof__(ptr) __pu_ptr = (ptr); \
|
|
|
|
__typeof__(size) __pu_size = (size); \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
__uaccess_begin(); \
|
2019-04-24 15:19:24 +08:00
|
|
|
__put_user_size(__pu_val, __pu_ptr, __pu_size, __pu_label); \
|
Use __put_user_goto in __put_user_size() and unsafe_put_user()
This actually enables the __put_user_goto() functionality in
unsafe_put_user().
For an example of the effect of this, this is the code generated for the
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
in the waitid() system call:
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_2]
It's just one single store instruction, along with generating an
exception table entry pointing to the Efault label case in case that
instruction faults.
Before, we would generate this:
xorl %edx, %edx
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_3]
testl %edx, %edx
jne .L309
with the exception table generated for that 'mov' instruction causing us
to jump to a stub that set %edx to -EFAULT and then jumped back to the
'testl' instruction.
So not only do we now get rid of the extra code in the normal sequence,
we also avoid unnecessarily keeping that extra error register live
across it all.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-22 12:55:19 +08:00
|
|
|
__pu_err = 0; \
|
|
|
|
__pu_label: \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
__uaccess_end(); \
|
2015-10-06 08:47:49 +08:00
|
|
|
__builtin_expect(__pu_err, 0); \
|
2008-06-25 22:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-25 23:48:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __get_user_nocheck(x, ptr, size) \
|
|
|
|
({ \
|
2008-12-09 11:18:38 +08:00
|
|
|
int __gu_err; \
|
2016-03-10 04:05:56 +08:00
|
|
|
__inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \
|
2019-08-29 16:24:45 +08:00
|
|
|
__typeof__(ptr) __gu_ptr = (ptr); \
|
|
|
|
__typeof__(size) __gu_size = (size); \
|
2018-01-30 09:02:49 +08:00
|
|
|
__uaccess_begin_nospec(); \
|
2019-08-29 16:24:45 +08:00
|
|
|
__get_user_size(__gu_val, __gu_ptr, __gu_size, __gu_err, -EFAULT); \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
__uaccess_end(); \
|
2008-06-25 23:48:47 +08:00
|
|
|
(x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \
|
2015-10-06 08:47:49 +08:00
|
|
|
__builtin_expect(__gu_err, 0); \
|
2008-06-25 23:48:47 +08:00
|
|
|
})
|
2008-06-25 22:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: this hack is definitely wrong -AK */
|
|
|
|
struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; };
|
|
|
|
#define __m(x) (*(struct __large_struct __user *)(x))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Tell gcc we read from memory instead of writing: this is because
|
|
|
|
* we do not write to any memory gcc knows about, so there are no
|
|
|
|
* aliasing issues.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-05-22 12:44:51 +08:00
|
|
|
#define __put_user_goto(x, addr, itype, rtype, ltype, label) \
|
|
|
|
asm_volatile_goto("\n" \
|
|
|
|
"1: mov"itype" %"rtype"0,%1\n" \
|
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, %l2) \
|
|
|
|
: : ltype(x), "m" (__m(addr)) \
|
|
|
|
: : label)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define __put_user_failed(x, addr, itype, rtype, ltype, errret) \
|
|
|
|
({ __label__ __puflab; \
|
|
|
|
int __pufret = errret; \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_goto(x,addr,itype,rtype,ltype,__puflab); \
|
|
|
|
__pufret = 0; \
|
|
|
|
__puflab: __pufret; })
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define __put_user_asm(x, addr, retval, itype, rtype, ltype, errret) do { \
|
|
|
|
retval = __put_user_failed(x, addr, itype, rtype, ltype, errret); \
|
|
|
|
} while (0)
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define __put_user_asm_ex(x, addr, itype, rtype, ltype) \
|
2012-09-22 03:43:15 +08:00
|
|
|
asm volatile("1: mov"itype" %"rtype"0,%1\n" \
|
|
|
|
"2:\n" \
|
2012-04-21 07:57:35 +08:00
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_EX(1b, 2b) \
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
: : ltype(x), "m" (__m(addr)))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* uaccess_try and catch
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define uaccess_try do { \
|
2016-07-15 04:22:56 +08:00
|
|
|
current->thread.uaccess_err = 0; \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
__uaccess_begin(); \
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
barrier();
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-30 09:02:39 +08:00
|
|
|
#define uaccess_try_nospec do { \
|
|
|
|
current->thread.uaccess_err = 0; \
|
|
|
|
__uaccess_begin_nospec(); \
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
#define uaccess_catch(err) \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
__uaccess_end(); \
|
2016-07-15 04:22:56 +08:00
|
|
|
(err) |= (current->thread.uaccess_err ? -EFAULT : 0); \
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
} while (0)
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-26 01:43:30 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2019-03-06 07:48:39 +08:00
|
|
|
* __get_user - Get a simple variable from user space, with less checking.
|
2008-06-26 01:43:30 +08:00
|
|
|
* @x: Variable to store result.
|
|
|
|
* @ptr: Source address, in user space.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2015-05-11 23:52:08 +08:00
|
|
|
* Context: User context only. This function may sleep if pagefaults are
|
|
|
|
* enabled.
|
2008-06-26 01:43:30 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This macro copies a single simple variable from user space to kernel
|
|
|
|
* space. It supports simple types like char and int, but not larger
|
|
|
|
* data types like structures or arrays.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @ptr must have pointer-to-simple-variable type, and the result of
|
|
|
|
* dereferencing @ptr must be assignable to @x without a cast.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Caller must check the pointer with access_ok() before calling this
|
|
|
|
* function.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2019-03-06 07:48:39 +08:00
|
|
|
* Return: zero on success, or -EFAULT on error.
|
2008-06-26 01:43:30 +08:00
|
|
|
* On error, the variable @x is set to zero.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define __get_user(x, ptr) \
|
|
|
|
__get_user_nocheck((x), (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)))
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-06-26 01:43:30 +08:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2019-03-06 07:48:39 +08:00
|
|
|
* __put_user - Write a simple value into user space, with less checking.
|
2008-06-26 01:43:30 +08:00
|
|
|
* @x: Value to copy to user space.
|
|
|
|
* @ptr: Destination address, in user space.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2015-05-11 23:52:08 +08:00
|
|
|
* Context: User context only. This function may sleep if pagefaults are
|
|
|
|
* enabled.
|
2008-06-26 01:43:30 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This macro copies a single simple value from kernel space to user
|
|
|
|
* space. It supports simple types like char and int, but not larger
|
|
|
|
* data types like structures or arrays.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @ptr must have pointer-to-simple-variable type, and @x must be assignable
|
|
|
|
* to the result of dereferencing @ptr.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Caller must check the pointer with access_ok() before calling this
|
|
|
|
* function.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2019-03-06 07:48:39 +08:00
|
|
|
* Return: zero on success, or -EFAULT on error.
|
2008-06-26 01:43:30 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define __put_user(x, ptr) \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_nocheck((__typeof__(*(ptr)))(x), (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)))
|
2008-06-25 22:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* {get|put}_user_try and catch
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* get_user_try {
|
|
|
|
* get_user_ex(...);
|
|
|
|
* } get_user_catch(err)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-01-30 09:02:49 +08:00
|
|
|
#define get_user_try uaccess_try_nospec
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
#define get_user_catch(err) uaccess_catch(err)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define get_user_ex(x, ptr) do { \
|
|
|
|
unsigned long __gue_val; \
|
|
|
|
__get_user_size_ex((__gue_val), (ptr), (sizeof(*(ptr)))); \
|
|
|
|
(x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gue_val; \
|
|
|
|
} while (0)
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-30 03:49:18 +08:00
|
|
|
#define put_user_try uaccess_try
|
|
|
|
#define put_user_catch(err) uaccess_catch(err)
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-24 07:49:41 +08:00
|
|
|
#define put_user_ex(x, ptr) \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_size_ex((__typeof__(*(ptr)))(x), (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)))
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-07 17:49:55 +08:00
|
|
|
extern unsigned long
|
|
|
|
copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
|
2012-04-07 05:32:32 +08:00
|
|
|
extern __must_check long
|
|
|
|
strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count);
|
2011-06-07 17:49:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-27 02:09:53 +08:00
|
|
|
extern __must_check long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long n);
|
|
|
|
|
2012-09-22 03:43:11 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long __must_check clear_user(void __user *mem, unsigned long len);
|
|
|
|
unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *mem, unsigned long len);
|
|
|
|
|
2013-12-14 14:25:02 +08:00
|
|
|
extern void __cmpxchg_wrong_size(void)
|
|
|
|
__compiletime_error("Bad argument size for cmpxchg");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define __user_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(uval, ptr, old, new, size) \
|
|
|
|
({ \
|
|
|
|
int __ret = 0; \
|
|
|
|
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __old = (old); \
|
|
|
|
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __new = (new); \
|
2018-01-30 09:02:49 +08:00
|
|
|
__uaccess_begin_nospec(); \
|
2013-12-14 14:25:02 +08:00
|
|
|
switch (size) { \
|
|
|
|
case 1: \
|
|
|
|
{ \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
asm volatile("\n" \
|
2013-12-14 14:25:02 +08:00
|
|
|
"1:\t" LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchgb %4, %2\n" \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
"2:\n" \
|
2013-12-14 14:25:02 +08:00
|
|
|
"\t.section .fixup, \"ax\"\n" \
|
|
|
|
"3:\tmov %3, %0\n" \
|
|
|
|
"\tjmp 2b\n" \
|
|
|
|
"\t.previous\n" \
|
2018-08-29 04:14:18 +08:00
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, 3b) \
|
2013-12-14 14:25:02 +08:00
|
|
|
: "+r" (__ret), "=a" (__old), "+m" (*(ptr)) \
|
|
|
|
: "i" (-EFAULT), "q" (__new), "1" (__old) \
|
|
|
|
: "memory" \
|
|
|
|
); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
|
|
|
case 2: \
|
|
|
|
{ \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
asm volatile("\n" \
|
2013-12-14 14:25:02 +08:00
|
|
|
"1:\t" LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchgw %4, %2\n" \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
"2:\n" \
|
2013-12-14 14:25:02 +08:00
|
|
|
"\t.section .fixup, \"ax\"\n" \
|
|
|
|
"3:\tmov %3, %0\n" \
|
|
|
|
"\tjmp 2b\n" \
|
|
|
|
"\t.previous\n" \
|
2018-08-29 04:14:18 +08:00
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, 3b) \
|
2013-12-14 14:25:02 +08:00
|
|
|
: "+r" (__ret), "=a" (__old), "+m" (*(ptr)) \
|
|
|
|
: "i" (-EFAULT), "r" (__new), "1" (__old) \
|
|
|
|
: "memory" \
|
|
|
|
); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
|
|
|
case 4: \
|
|
|
|
{ \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
asm volatile("\n" \
|
2013-12-14 14:25:02 +08:00
|
|
|
"1:\t" LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchgl %4, %2\n" \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
"2:\n" \
|
2013-12-14 14:25:02 +08:00
|
|
|
"\t.section .fixup, \"ax\"\n" \
|
|
|
|
"3:\tmov %3, %0\n" \
|
|
|
|
"\tjmp 2b\n" \
|
|
|
|
"\t.previous\n" \
|
2018-08-29 04:14:18 +08:00
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, 3b) \
|
2013-12-14 14:25:02 +08:00
|
|
|
: "+r" (__ret), "=a" (__old), "+m" (*(ptr)) \
|
|
|
|
: "i" (-EFAULT), "r" (__new), "1" (__old) \
|
|
|
|
: "memory" \
|
|
|
|
); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
|
|
|
case 8: \
|
|
|
|
{ \
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) \
|
|
|
|
__cmpxchg_wrong_size(); \
|
|
|
|
\
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
asm volatile("\n" \
|
2013-12-14 14:25:02 +08:00
|
|
|
"1:\t" LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchgq %4, %2\n" \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
"2:\n" \
|
2013-12-14 14:25:02 +08:00
|
|
|
"\t.section .fixup, \"ax\"\n" \
|
|
|
|
"3:\tmov %3, %0\n" \
|
|
|
|
"\tjmp 2b\n" \
|
|
|
|
"\t.previous\n" \
|
2018-08-29 04:14:18 +08:00
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, 3b) \
|
2013-12-14 14:25:02 +08:00
|
|
|
: "+r" (__ret), "=a" (__old), "+m" (*(ptr)) \
|
|
|
|
: "i" (-EFAULT), "r" (__new), "1" (__old) \
|
|
|
|
: "memory" \
|
|
|
|
); \
|
|
|
|
break; \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
|
|
|
default: \
|
|
|
|
__cmpxchg_wrong_size(); \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
2015-12-18 01:45:09 +08:00
|
|
|
__uaccess_end(); \
|
2019-03-30 05:46:52 +08:00
|
|
|
*(uval) = __old; \
|
2013-12-14 14:25:02 +08:00
|
|
|
__ret; \
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define user_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(uval, ptr, old, new) \
|
|
|
|
({ \
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
access_ok((ptr), sizeof(*(ptr))) ? \
|
2013-12-14 14:25:02 +08:00
|
|
|
__user_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic((uval), (ptr), \
|
|
|
|
(old), (new), sizeof(*(ptr))) : \
|
|
|
|
-EFAULT; \
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-26 01:53:41 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* movsl can be slow when source and dest are not both 8-byte aligned
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY
|
|
|
|
extern struct movsl_mask {
|
|
|
|
int mask;
|
|
|
|
} ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp movsl_mask;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-26 01:56:53 +08:00
|
|
|
#define ARCH_HAS_NOCACHE_UACCESS 1
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-11 17:20:03 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
|
2012-10-03 01:01:25 +08:00
|
|
|
# include <asm/uaccess_32.h>
|
2007-10-11 17:20:03 +08:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2012-10-03 01:01:25 +08:00
|
|
|
# include <asm/uaccess_64.h>
|
2007-10-11 17:20:03 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2008-06-14 01:39:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-10-23 06:07:20 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We rely on the nested NMI work to allow atomic faults from the NMI path; the
|
|
|
|
* nested NMI paths are careful to preserve CR2.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Caller must use pagefault_enable/disable, or run in interrupt context,
|
|
|
|
* and also do a uaccess_ok() check
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define __copy_from_user_nmi __copy_from_user_inatomic
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-18 01:57:27 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The "unsafe" user accesses aren't really "unsafe", but the naming
|
|
|
|
* is a big fat warning: you have to not only do the access_ok()
|
|
|
|
* checking before using them, but you have to surround them with the
|
|
|
|
* user_access_begin/end() pair.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-04-03 15:39:47 +08:00
|
|
|
static __must_check __always_inline bool user_access_begin(const void __user *ptr, size_t len)
|
2019-01-05 04:56:09 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!access_ok(ptr,len)))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2019-01-20 05:56:05 +08:00
|
|
|
__uaccess_begin_nospec();
|
2019-01-05 04:56:09 +08:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define user_access_begin(a,b) user_access_begin(a,b)
|
2015-12-18 01:57:27 +08:00
|
|
|
#define user_access_end() __uaccess_end()
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-03 15:39:48 +08:00
|
|
|
#define user_access_save() smap_save()
|
|
|
|
#define user_access_restore(x) smap_restore(x)
|
|
|
|
|
Use __put_user_goto in __put_user_size() and unsafe_put_user()
This actually enables the __put_user_goto() functionality in
unsafe_put_user().
For an example of the effect of this, this is the code generated for the
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
in the waitid() system call:
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_2]
It's just one single store instruction, along with generating an
exception table entry pointing to the Efault label case in case that
instruction faults.
Before, we would generate this:
xorl %edx, %edx
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_3]
testl %edx, %edx
jne .L309
with the exception table generated for that 'mov' instruction causing us
to jump to a stub that set %edx to -EFAULT and then jumped back to the
'testl' instruction.
So not only do we now get rid of the extra code in the normal sequence,
we also avoid unnecessarily keeping that extra error register live
across it all.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-22 12:55:19 +08:00
|
|
|
#define unsafe_put_user(x, ptr, label) \
|
|
|
|
__put_user_size((__typeof__(*(ptr)))(x), (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)), label)
|
2015-12-18 01:57:27 +08:00
|
|
|
|
unsafe_[get|put]_user: change interface to use a error target label
When I initially added the unsafe_[get|put]_user() helpers in commit
5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched
accesses"), I made the mistake of modeling the interface on our
traditional __[get|put]_user() functions, which return zero on success,
or -EFAULT on failure.
That interface is fairly easy to use, but it's actually fairly nasty for
good code generation, since it essentially forces the caller to check
the error value for each access.
In particular, since the error handling is already internally
implemented with an exception handler, and we already use "asm goto" for
various other things, we could fairly easily make the error cases just
jump directly to an error label instead, and avoid the need for explicit
checking after each operation.
So switch the interface to pass in an error label, rather than checking
the error value in the caller. Best do it now before we start growing
more users (the signal handling code in particular would be a good place
to use the new interface).
So rather than
if (unsafe_get_user(x, ptr))
... handle error ..
the interface is now
unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label);
where an error during the user mode fetch will now just cause a jump to
'label' in the caller.
Right now the actual _implementation_ of this all still ends up being a
"if (err) goto label", and does not take advantage of any exception
label tricks, but for "unsafe_put_user()" in particular it should be
fairly straightforward to convert to using the exception table model.
Note that "unsafe_get_user()" is much harder to convert to a clever
exception table model, because current versions of gcc do not allow the
use of "asm goto" (for the exception) with output values (for the actual
value to be fetched). But that is hopefully not a limitation in the
long term.
[ Also note that it might be a good idea to switch unsafe_get_user() to
actually _return_ the value it fetches from user space, but this
commit only changes the error handling semantics ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-09 04:02:01 +08:00
|
|
|
#define unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, err_label) \
|
|
|
|
do { \
|
2015-12-18 01:57:27 +08:00
|
|
|
int __gu_err; \
|
2017-05-22 06:25:46 +08:00
|
|
|
__inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \
|
2015-12-18 01:57:27 +08:00
|
|
|
__get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)), __gu_err, -EFAULT); \
|
|
|
|
(x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \
|
unsafe_[get|put]_user: change interface to use a error target label
When I initially added the unsafe_[get|put]_user() helpers in commit
5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched
accesses"), I made the mistake of modeling the interface on our
traditional __[get|put]_user() functions, which return zero on success,
or -EFAULT on failure.
That interface is fairly easy to use, but it's actually fairly nasty for
good code generation, since it essentially forces the caller to check
the error value for each access.
In particular, since the error handling is already internally
implemented with an exception handler, and we already use "asm goto" for
various other things, we could fairly easily make the error cases just
jump directly to an error label instead, and avoid the need for explicit
checking after each operation.
So switch the interface to pass in an error label, rather than checking
the error value in the caller. Best do it now before we start growing
more users (the signal handling code in particular would be a good place
to use the new interface).
So rather than
if (unsafe_get_user(x, ptr))
... handle error ..
the interface is now
unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label);
where an error during the user mode fetch will now just cause a jump to
'label' in the caller.
Right now the actual _implementation_ of this all still ends up being a
"if (err) goto label", and does not take advantage of any exception
label tricks, but for "unsafe_put_user()" in particular it should be
fairly straightforward to convert to using the exception table model.
Note that "unsafe_get_user()" is much harder to convert to a clever
exception table model, because current versions of gcc do not allow the
use of "asm goto" (for the exception) with output values (for the actual
value to be fetched). But that is hopefully not a limitation in the
long term.
[ Also note that it might be a good idea to switch unsafe_get_user() to
actually _return_ the value it fetches from user space, but this
commit only changes the error handling semantics ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-09 04:02:01 +08:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(__gu_err)) goto err_label; \
|
|
|
|
} while (0)
|
2015-12-18 01:57:27 +08:00
|
|
|
|
uaccess: implement a proper unsafe_copy_to_user() and switch filldir over to it
In commit 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to
unsafe_put_user()") I made filldir() use unsafe_put_user(), which
improves code generation on x86 enormously.
But because we didn't have a "unsafe_copy_to_user()", the dirent name
copy was also done by hand with unsafe_put_user() in a loop, and it
turns out that a lot of other architectures didn't like that, because
unlike x86, they have various alignment issues.
Most non-x86 architectures trap and fix it up, and some (like xtensa)
will just fail unaligned put_user() accesses unconditionally. Which
makes that "copy using put_user() in a loop" not work for them at all.
I could make that code do explicit alignment etc, but the architectures
that don't like unaligned accesses also don't really use the fancy
"user_access_begin/end()" model, so they might just use the regular old
__copy_to_user() interface.
So this commit takes that looping implementation, turns it into the x86
version of "unsafe_copy_to_user()", and makes other architectures
implement the unsafe copy version as __copy_to_user() (the same way they
do for the other unsafe_xyz() accessor functions).
Note that it only does this for the copying _to_ user space, and we
still don't have a unsafe version of copy_from_user().
That's partly because we have no current users of it, but also partly
because the copy_from_user() case is slightly different and cannot
efficiently be implemented in terms of a unsafe_get_user() loop (because
gcc can't do asm goto with outputs).
It would be trivial to do this using "rep movsb", which would work
really nicely on newer x86 cores, but really badly on some older ones.
Al Viro is looking at cleaning up all our user copy routines to make
this all a non-issue, but for now we have this simple-but-stupid version
for x86 that works fine for the dirent name copy case because those
names are short strings and we simply don't need anything fancier.
Fixes: 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-08 03:56:48 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We want the unsafe accessors to always be inlined and use
|
|
|
|
* the error labels - thus the macro games.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define unsafe_copy_loop(dst, src, len, type, label) \
|
|
|
|
while (len >= sizeof(type)) { \
|
|
|
|
unsafe_put_user(*(type *)src,(type __user *)dst,label); \
|
|
|
|
dst += sizeof(type); \
|
|
|
|
src += sizeof(type); \
|
|
|
|
len -= sizeof(type); \
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define unsafe_copy_to_user(_dst,_src,_len,label) \
|
|
|
|
do { \
|
|
|
|
char __user *__ucu_dst = (_dst); \
|
|
|
|
const char *__ucu_src = (_src); \
|
|
|
|
size_t __ucu_len = (_len); \
|
|
|
|
unsafe_copy_loop(__ucu_dst, __ucu_src, __ucu_len, u64, label); \
|
|
|
|
unsafe_copy_loop(__ucu_dst, __ucu_src, __ucu_len, u32, label); \
|
|
|
|
unsafe_copy_loop(__ucu_dst, __ucu_src, __ucu_len, u16, label); \
|
|
|
|
unsafe_copy_loop(__ucu_dst, __ucu_src, __ucu_len, u8, label); \
|
|
|
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} while (0)
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2008-10-23 13:26:29 +08:00
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#endif /* _ASM_X86_UACCESS_H */
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x86: lockless get_user_pages_fast()
Implement get_user_pages_fast without locking in the fastpath on x86.
Do an optimistic lockless pagetable walk, without taking mmap_sem or any
page table locks or even mmap_sem. Page table existence is guaranteed by
turning interrupts off (combined with the fact that we're always looking
up the current mm, means we can do the lockless page table walk within the
constraints of the TLB shootdown design). Basically we can do this
lockless pagetable walk in a similar manner to the way the CPU's pagetable
walker does not have to take any locks to find present ptes.
This patch (combined with the subsequent ones to convert direct IO to use
it) was found to give about 10% performance improvement on a 2 socket 8
core Intel Xeon system running an OLTP workload on DB2 v9.5
"To test the effects of the patch, an OLTP workload was run on an IBM
x3850 M2 server with 2 processors (quad-core Intel Xeon processors at
2.93 GHz) using IBM DB2 v9.5 running Linux 2.6.24rc7 kernel. Comparing
runs with and without the patch resulted in an overall performance
benefit of ~9.8%. Correspondingly, oprofiles showed that samples from
__up_read and __down_read routines that is seen during thread contention
for system resources was reduced from 2.8% down to .05%. Monitoring the
/proc/vmstat output from the patched run showed that the counter for
fast_gup contained a very high number while the fast_gup_slow value was
zero."
(fast_gup is the old name for get_user_pages_fast, fast_gup_slow is a
counter we had for the number of times the slowpath was invoked).
The main reason for the improvement is that DB2 has multiple threads each
issuing direct-IO. Direct-IO uses get_user_pages, and thus the threads
contend the mmap_sem cacheline, and can also contend on page table locks.
I would anticipate larger performance gains on larger systems, however I
think DB2 uses an adaptive mix of threads and processes, so it could be
that thread contention remains pretty constant as machine size increases.
In which case, we stuck with "only" a 10% gain.
The downside of using get_user_pages_fast is that if there is not a pte
with the correct permissions for the access, we end up falling back to
get_user_pages and so the get_user_pages_fast is a bit of extra work.
However this should not be the common case in most performance critical
code.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: Kconfig fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: Makefile fix/cleanup]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: warning fix]
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Cc: Andy Whitcroft <apw@shadowen.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Cc: Badari Pulavarty <pbadari@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Zach Brown <zach.brown@oracle.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-26 10:45:24 +08:00
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