2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
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/*
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BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
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Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
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This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
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published by the Free Software Foundation;
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THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
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OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
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IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
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WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
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ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
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OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
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ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
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COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
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SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
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*/
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2015-01-01 06:43:16 +08:00
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#include <linux/debugfs.h>
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2012-05-23 15:04:22 +08:00
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#include <linux/crypto.h>
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#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
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#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
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2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
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#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
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#include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
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#include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
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2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
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#include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
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2013-10-11 05:54:16 +08:00
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2014-06-06 15:50:15 +08:00
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#include "ecc.h"
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2013-10-11 05:54:16 +08:00
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#include "smp.h"
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2011-06-10 05:50:44 +08:00
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2015-06-11 18:52:26 +08:00
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#define SMP_DEV(hdev) \
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((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data)
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2014-12-02 04:03:16 +08:00
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/* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want
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* accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys
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* and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions.
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*/
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#ifdef DEBUG
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#define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
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##__VA_ARGS__)
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#else
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#define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
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##__VA_ARGS__)
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#endif
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2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
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#define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
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2014-06-06 15:50:15 +08:00
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/* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
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#define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY);
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2012-03-02 06:32:37 +08:00
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#define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
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2011-06-15 00:37:41 +08:00
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2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
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#define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \
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2014-05-26 18:29:28 +08:00
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0x1f : 0x07)
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#define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07
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2012-10-11 22:26:06 +08:00
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2014-06-06 16:30:08 +08:00
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/* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
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#define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80
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2014-06-17 00:25:18 +08:00
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enum {
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SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,
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SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING,
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SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH,
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SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE,
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SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
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2014-05-16 16:03:34 +08:00
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SMP_FLAG_SC,
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2014-06-06 16:09:28 +08:00
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SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK,
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2014-05-31 23:52:28 +08:00
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SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY,
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2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
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SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER,
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2014-06-04 16:07:40 +08:00
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SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
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2015-03-16 17:45:44 +08:00
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SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB,
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SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB,
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2014-06-17 00:25:18 +08:00
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};
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2014-05-20 14:45:47 +08:00
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2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
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struct smp_dev {
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2015-03-16 16:10:22 +08:00
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/* Secure Connections OOB data */
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u8 local_pk[64];
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u8 local_sk[32];
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2015-03-17 03:34:57 +08:00
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u8 local_rand[16];
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2015-03-16 16:10:22 +08:00
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bool debug_key;
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2015-06-11 18:52:27 +08:00
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u8 min_key_size;
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2015-06-11 18:52:26 +08:00
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u8 max_key_size;
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2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
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struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
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2015-03-16 16:10:21 +08:00
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struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac;
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2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
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};
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2014-05-20 14:45:47 +08:00
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struct smp_chan {
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2014-08-12 03:06:40 +08:00
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struct l2cap_conn *conn;
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struct delayed_work security_timer;
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2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
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unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */
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2014-08-12 03:06:40 +08:00
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2014-05-20 14:45:47 +08:00
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u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
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u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
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u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
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u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
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u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
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u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
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2015-03-16 17:45:43 +08:00
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u8 rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */
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u8 lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */
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2014-05-20 14:45:47 +08:00
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u8 enc_key_size;
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u8 remote_key_dist;
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bdaddr_t id_addr;
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u8 id_addr_type;
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u8 irk[16];
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struct smp_csrk *csrk;
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struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk;
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struct smp_ltk *ltk;
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struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk;
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struct smp_irk *remote_irk;
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2014-06-06 16:54:04 +08:00
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u8 *link_key;
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2014-05-20 14:45:50 +08:00
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unsigned long flags;
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2014-05-31 23:48:26 +08:00
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u8 method;
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2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
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u8 passkey_round;
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2014-06-27 19:23:03 +08:00
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2014-06-06 15:50:15 +08:00
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/* Secure Connections variables */
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u8 local_pk[64];
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u8 local_sk[32];
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2014-06-06 16:09:28 +08:00
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u8 remote_pk[64];
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u8 dhkey[32];
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2014-06-06 16:44:05 +08:00
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u8 mackey[16];
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2014-06-06 15:50:15 +08:00
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2014-06-27 19:23:03 +08:00
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struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
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2014-05-02 19:19:47 +08:00
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struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac;
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2014-05-20 14:45:47 +08:00
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};
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2014-05-31 23:52:28 +08:00
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/* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core
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* specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the
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* private debug key.
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*/
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static const u8 debug_pk[64] = {
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0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
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0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
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0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
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0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20,
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0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74,
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0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76,
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0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63,
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0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc,
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};
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static const u8 debug_sk[32] = {
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0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58,
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0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a,
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0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74,
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0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f,
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};
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2014-06-17 00:25:19 +08:00
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static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
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2011-06-10 05:50:44 +08:00
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{
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2014-06-17 00:25:19 +08:00
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size_t i;
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2011-06-10 05:50:44 +08:00
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2014-06-17 00:25:19 +08:00
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for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
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dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
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2011-06-10 05:50:44 +08:00
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}
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2014-12-02 19:39:23 +08:00
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/* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions
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* AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6.
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*/
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2014-06-06 16:30:08 +08:00
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static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_hash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
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size_t len, u8 mac[16])
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{
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uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
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struct hash_desc desc;
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struct scatterlist sg;
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int err;
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if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
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return -EFBIG;
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if (!tfm) {
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BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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desc.tfm = tfm;
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desc.flags = 0;
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crypto_hash_init(&desc);
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/* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */
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swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
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swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len);
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2014-12-02 04:03:16 +08:00
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SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
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SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k);
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2014-06-06 16:30:08 +08:00
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err = crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
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if (err) {
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BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
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return err;
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}
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sg_init_one(&sg, msg_msb, len);
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err = crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, len);
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if (err) {
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BT_ERR("Hash update error %d", err);
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return err;
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}
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err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, mac_msb);
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if (err) {
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BT_ERR("Hash final error %d", err);
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return err;
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}
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swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16);
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2014-12-02 04:03:16 +08:00
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SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
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2014-06-06 16:30:08 +08:00
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return 0;
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}
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static int smp_f4(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
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const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16])
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{
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u8 m[65];
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int err;
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2014-12-02 04:03:16 +08:00
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SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
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SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
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SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
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2014-06-06 16:30:08 +08:00
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m[0] = z;
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memcpy(m + 1, v, 32);
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memcpy(m + 33, u, 32);
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err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res);
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if (err)
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return err;
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2014-12-02 04:03:16 +08:00
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SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
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2014-06-06 16:30:08 +08:00
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return err;
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}
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2014-12-29 18:04:10 +08:00
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static int smp_f5(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32],
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const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7],
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const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
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2014-06-06 16:44:05 +08:00
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{
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/* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in
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* the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII
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* the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a
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* random number whereas length is the value 256 in little
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* endian format.
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*/
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const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 };
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const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60,
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0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c };
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const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
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u8 m[53], t[16];
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int err;
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2014-12-02 04:03:16 +08:00
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SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w);
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SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
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SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
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2014-06-06 16:44:05 +08:00
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err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t);
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if (err)
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return err;
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2014-12-02 04:03:16 +08:00
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SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t);
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2014-06-06 16:44:05 +08:00
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memcpy(m, length, 2);
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memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7);
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memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7);
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memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16);
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memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16);
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memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4);
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m[52] = 0; /* Counter */
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err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey);
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if (err)
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return err;
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2014-12-02 04:03:16 +08:00
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SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
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2014-06-06 16:44:05 +08:00
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m[52] = 1; /* Counter */
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err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk);
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if (err)
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return err;
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2014-12-02 04:03:16 +08:00
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SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
|
2014-06-06 16:44:05 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int smp_f6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
|
2014-12-29 18:04:10 +08:00
|
|
|
const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
|
2014-06-06 16:44:05 +08:00
|
|
|
const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7],
|
|
|
|
u8 res[16])
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u8 m[65];
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-02 04:03:16 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w);
|
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
|
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
|
2014-06-06 16:44:05 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(m, a2, 7);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(m + 17, r, 16);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-01 12:01:22 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
|
2014-06-06 16:44:05 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:39:49 +08:00
|
|
|
static int smp_g2(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
|
|
|
|
const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u8 m[80], tmp[16];
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-02 04:03:16 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
|
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
|
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
|
2014-06-06 16:39:49 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(m, y, 16);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(m + 16, v, 32);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(m + 48, u, 32);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp);
|
|
|
|
*val %= 1000000;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-02 04:03:16 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val);
|
2014-06-06 16:39:49 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-02 19:39:23 +08:00
|
|
|
static int smp_h6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
|
|
|
|
const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1,
|
|
|
|
* s1 and ah.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:44 +08:00
|
|
|
static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct blkcipher_desc desc;
|
|
|
|
struct scatterlist sg;
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
|
2013-12-02 16:49:04 +08:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:44 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-20 02:06:04 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-03 22:07:13 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!tfm) {
|
2011-06-10 05:50:44 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
desc.tfm = tfm;
|
|
|
|
desc.flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
/* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
|
2014-06-17 00:25:19 +08:00
|
|
|
swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
|
2011-06-10 05:50:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
|
2014-06-17 00:25:19 +08:00
|
|
|
swap_buf(r, data, 16);
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sg_init_one(&sg, data, 16);
|
2011-06-10 05:50:44 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg, &sg, 16);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
|
2014-06-17 00:25:19 +08:00
|
|
|
swap_buf(data, r, 16);
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-20 02:06:04 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r);
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:44 +08:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-02 19:39:23 +08:00
|
|
|
static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
|
|
|
|
const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
|
|
|
|
const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
|
2014-06-06 16:54:04 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-12-02 19:39:23 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 p1[16], p2[16];
|
2014-06-06 16:54:04 +08:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-20 02:06:04 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
|
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("iat %u ia %6phN rat %u ra %6phN", _iat, ia, _rat, ra);
|
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("preq %7phN pres %7phN", preq, pres);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-02 19:39:23 +08:00
|
|
|
memset(p1, 0, 16);
|
2014-06-06 16:54:04 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-02 19:39:23 +08:00
|
|
|
/* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
|
|
|
|
p1[0] = _iat;
|
|
|
|
p1[1] = _rat;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-20 02:06:04 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("p1 %16phN", p1);
|
2014-12-02 19:39:23 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* res = r XOR p1 */
|
|
|
|
u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* res = e(k, res) */
|
|
|
|
err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
|
2014-06-06 16:54:04 +08:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
2014-12-02 19:39:23 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-06 16:54:04 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-20 02:06:04 +08:00
|
|
|
/* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p2, ra, 6);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6);
|
|
|
|
memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("p2 %16phN", p2);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-02 19:39:23 +08:00
|
|
|
/* res = res XOR p2 */
|
|
|
|
u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* res = e(k, res) */
|
|
|
|
err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
|
|
|
|
const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(_r, r2, 8);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, _r);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
|
2014-06-06 16:54:04 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-02 19:37:41 +08:00
|
|
|
static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 irk[16],
|
|
|
|
const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
|
2014-02-18 16:19:31 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 _res[16];
|
2014-02-18 16:19:31 +08:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* r' = padding || r */
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(_res, r, 3);
|
|
|
|
memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
|
2014-02-18 16:19:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res);
|
2014-02-18 16:19:31 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The output of the random address function ah is:
|
2015-09-04 23:08:18 +08:00
|
|
|
* ah(k, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
|
2014-02-18 16:19:31 +08:00
|
|
|
* The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
|
|
|
|
* by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
|
|
|
|
* result of ah.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(res, _res, 3);
|
2014-02-18 16:19:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-02 19:37:41 +08:00
|
|
|
bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
|
|
|
|
const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
|
2014-02-18 16:19:31 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-08-08 14:37:17 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_dev *smp;
|
2014-02-18 16:19:31 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 hash[3];
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:17 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!chan || !chan->data)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
smp = chan->data;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-02-18 16:19:31 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
|
2014-02-18 16:19:31 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-02 19:37:41 +08:00
|
|
|
int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
|
2014-02-24 01:42:19 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-08-08 14:37:17 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_dev *smp;
|
2014-02-24 01:42:19 +08:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:17 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!chan || !chan->data)
|
|
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
smp = chan->data;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-02-24 01:42:19 +08:00
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
|
|
|
|
rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
|
2014-02-24 01:42:19 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err < 0)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 16:10:22 +08:00
|
|
|
int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_dev *smp;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!chan || !chan->data)
|
|
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp = chan->data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
|
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
|
|
|
|
smp->debug_key = true;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
|
|
/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
|
|
|
|
if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
|
|
|
|
return -EIO;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
|
|
|
|
* we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
smp->debug_key = false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
|
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
|
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("OOB Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-17 03:34:57 +08:00
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
|
2015-03-16 16:10:22 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk,
|
2015-03-17 03:34:57 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->local_rand, 0, hash);
|
2015-03-16 16:10:22 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err < 0)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-17 03:34:57 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16);
|
2015-03-16 16:10:22 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
2014-08-12 03:06:40 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct kvec iv[2];
|
|
|
|
struct msghdr msg;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!chan)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
iv[0].iov_base = &code;
|
|
|
|
iv[0].iov_len = 1;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
iv[1].iov_base = data;
|
|
|
|
iv[1].iov_len = len;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-25 06:07:38 +08:00
|
|
|
iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, iv, 2, 1 + len);
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
|
2011-08-20 08:06:50 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:40 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!chan->data)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp = chan->data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
|
2014-09-06 03:19:48 +08:00
|
|
|
schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-16 15:59:06 +08:00
|
|
|
static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq)
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-05-16 15:59:06 +08:00
|
|
|
if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) {
|
|
|
|
if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)
|
|
|
|
return BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
|
2014-05-16 15:59:06 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (sec_level) {
|
2014-05-16 15:59:06 +08:00
|
|
|
case BT_SECURITY_FIPS:
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
|
|
|
|
return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
|
|
|
|
case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
|
|
|
|
return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:52 +08:00
|
|
|
static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
|
2013-10-13 20:43:25 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq)
|
2011-06-10 05:50:52 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
|
2014-10-27 04:19:10 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
|
2011-07-08 05:59:38 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
|
2014-03-10 03:19:17 +08:00
|
|
|
local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
|
|
|
|
remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
|
2011-07-08 05:59:38 +08:00
|
|
|
authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
|
2011-07-08 05:59:38 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
|
2014-02-23 01:06:32 +08:00
|
|
|
local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) &&
|
2014-10-27 04:19:10 +08:00
|
|
|
(authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
|
|
|
|
struct oob_data *oob_data;
|
|
|
|
u8 bdaddr_type;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) {
|
2014-06-06 15:39:56 +08:00
|
|
|
local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
|
|
|
|
remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-10-27 04:19:10 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
|
|
|
|
bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
|
|
|
|
bdaddr_type);
|
2015-01-31 16:15:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if (oob_data && oob_data->present) {
|
2015-03-16 17:45:44 +08:00
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags);
|
2014-10-27 04:19:10 +08:00
|
|
|
oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
|
2014-10-28 22:17:05 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
|
2014-10-27 04:19:10 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
|
2015-03-17 03:34:56 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf);
|
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr);
|
2014-10-27 04:19:10 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 15:39:56 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-07-08 05:59:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (rsp == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
|
2014-10-27 04:19:10 +08:00
|
|
|
req->oob_flag = oob_flag;
|
2015-06-11 18:52:26 +08:00
|
|
|
req->max_key_size = SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size;
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
|
|
|
|
req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
|
2014-05-26 18:29:28 +08:00
|
|
|
req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
|
2011-07-08 05:59:38 +08:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
|
2014-10-27 04:19:10 +08:00
|
|
|
rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag;
|
2015-06-11 18:52:26 +08:00
|
|
|
rsp->max_key_size = SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size;
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
|
|
|
|
rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
|
2014-05-26 18:29:28 +08:00
|
|
|
rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:52 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-15 00:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
2015-06-11 18:52:26 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
2011-09-06 01:31:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-11 18:52:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (max_key_size > SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size ||
|
|
|
|
max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
|
2011-06-15 00:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-01-31 06:29:12 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
|
2011-06-15 00:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:44 +08:00
|
|
|
static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
2014-12-03 18:43:39 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
2014-08-12 03:06:44 +08:00
|
|
|
bool complete;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(!smp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
|
2014-12-03 18:43:39 +08:00
|
|
|
mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
|
2014-08-12 03:06:44 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 16:10:18 +08:00
|
|
|
kzfree(smp->csrk);
|
|
|
|
kzfree(smp->slave_csrk);
|
|
|
|
kzfree(smp->link_key);
|
2014-08-12 03:06:44 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
|
2014-05-02 19:19:47 +08:00
|
|
|
crypto_free_hash(smp->tfm_cmac);
|
2014-08-12 03:06:44 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-03 18:43:39 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key
|
|
|
|
* support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
|
2014-12-03 18:43:39 +08:00
|
|
|
list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
|
|
|
|
kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
|
|
|
|
smp->ltk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:44 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
|
|
|
|
if (!complete) {
|
|
|
|
if (smp->ltk) {
|
2014-11-13 20:37:47 +08:00
|
|
|
list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
|
|
|
|
kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
|
2014-08-12 03:06:44 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp->slave_ltk) {
|
2014-11-13 20:37:47 +08:00
|
|
|
list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
|
|
|
|
kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu);
|
2014-08-12 03:06:44 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp->remote_irk) {
|
2014-11-13 20:37:48 +08:00
|
|
|
list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
|
|
|
|
kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
|
2014-08-12 03:06:44 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
chan->data = NULL;
|
2015-03-16 16:10:18 +08:00
|
|
|
kzfree(smp);
|
2014-12-03 18:43:39 +08:00
|
|
|
hci_conn_drop(hcon);
|
2014-08-12 03:06:44 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-11-06 17:24:57 +08:00
|
|
|
static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
|
2011-11-24 00:28:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-02-09 22:07:29 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
2014-08-12 03:06:40 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
2012-02-09 22:07:29 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2013-11-06 17:24:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if (reason)
|
2011-11-24 00:28:36 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
|
2013-10-13 20:43:25 +08:00
|
|
|
&reason);
|
2011-11-24 00:28:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-09 08:09:49 +08:00
|
|
|
mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
|
2012-02-02 05:27:56 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if (chan->data)
|
2012-02-02 05:27:56 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_chan_destroy(conn);
|
2011-11-24 00:28:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
#define JUST_WORKS 0x00
|
|
|
|
#define JUST_CFM 0x01
|
|
|
|
#define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02
|
|
|
|
#define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03
|
|
|
|
#define REQ_OOB 0x04
|
2014-05-31 23:51:02 +08:00
|
|
|
#define DSP_PASSKEY 0x05
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
#define OVERLAP 0xFF
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
|
|
|
|
{ JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
|
|
|
|
{ JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
|
|
|
|
{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
|
|
|
|
{ JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
|
|
|
|
{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP },
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-31 23:51:02 +08:00
|
|
|
static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = {
|
|
|
|
{ JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
|
|
|
|
{ JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
|
|
|
|
{ DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY },
|
|
|
|
{ JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
|
|
|
|
{ DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-17 18:07:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-07-10 00:18:09 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
|
|
|
|
* converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-06-17 18:07:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
|
|
|
|
remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
|
2014-07-10 00:18:09 +08:00
|
|
|
return JUST_CFM;
|
2014-06-17 18:07:38 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-05-31 23:51:02 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
|
|
|
|
return sc_method[remote_io][local_io];
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-17 18:07:38 +08:00
|
|
|
return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
|
|
|
|
u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
u32 passkey = 0;
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
|
|
|
|
memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
|
2014-05-20 14:45:50 +08:00
|
|
|
clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-10 00:18:09 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming
|
|
|
|
* request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM
|
|
|
|
* will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this
|
|
|
|
* function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the
|
|
|
|
* table.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-06-17 18:07:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
|
2014-05-31 23:48:26 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->method = JUST_CFM;
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
2014-05-31 23:48:26 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-03-24 20:39:07 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
|
2014-05-31 23:48:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
|
|
|
|
&smp->flags))
|
|
|
|
smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
|
2014-03-24 20:39:07 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-16 20:09:13 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
|
2014-05-31 23:48:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->method == JUST_CFM &&
|
|
|
|
hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
|
|
|
|
smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
|
2014-07-16 20:09:13 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
|
2014-05-31 23:48:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
|
2014-05-20 14:45:50 +08:00
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Bluetooth: Add workaround for broken OS X legacy SMP pairing
OS X version 10.10.2 (and possibly older versions) doesn't support LE
Secure Connections but incorrectly copies all authentication request
bits from a Security Request to its Pairing Request. The result is that
an SC capable initiator (such as BlueZ) will think OS X intends to do SC
when in fact it's incapable of it:
< ACL Data TX: Handle 3585 flags 0x00 dlen 6
SMP: Security Request (0x0b) len 1
Authentication requirement: Bonding, No MITM, SC, No Keypresses (0x09)
> ACL Data RX: Handle 3585 flags 0x02 dlen 11
SMP: Pairing Request (0x01) len 6
IO capability: KeyboardDisplay (0x04)
OOB data: Authentication data not present (0x00)
Authentication requirement: Bonding, No MITM, SC, No Keypresses (0x09)
Max encryption key size: 16
Initiator key distribution: EncKey (0x01)
Responder key distribution: EncKey IdKey Sign (0x07)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 3585 flags 0x00 dlen 11
SMP: Pairing Response (0x02) len 6
IO capability: NoInputNoOutput (0x03)
OOB data: Authentication data not present (0x00)
Authentication requirement: Bonding, No MITM, SC, No Keypresses (0x09)
Max encryption key size: 16
Initiator key distribution: EncKey (0x01)
Responder key distribution: EncKey Sign (0x05)
The pairing eventually fails when we get an unexpected Pairing Confirm
PDU instead of a Public Key PDU:
> ACL Data RX: Handle 3585 flags 0x02 dlen 21
SMP: Pairing Confirm (0x03) len 16
Confim value: bcc3bed31b8f313a78ec3cce32685faf
It is only at this point that we can speculate that the remote doesn't
really support SC. This patch creates a workaround for the just-works
model, however the MITM case is unsolvable because the OS X user has
already been requested to enter a PIN which we're now expected to
randomly generate and show the user (i.e. a chicken-and-egg problem).
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2015-03-16 01:34:04 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we
|
|
|
|
* can only recover the just-works case.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
|
2014-05-31 23:48:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
|
2014-05-20 14:45:50 +08:00
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
|
2014-09-18 16:26:32 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
|
|
|
|
hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
|
|
|
|
* Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-05-31 23:48:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
|
2014-07-16 16:42:27 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
|
2014-05-31 23:48:26 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
2014-05-31 23:48:26 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-19 20:14:53 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Generate random passkey. */
|
2014-05-31 23:48:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
|
|
|
|
passkey %= 1000000;
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk);
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
|
2014-05-20 14:45:50 +08:00
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-31 23:48:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY)
|
2013-10-13 17:23:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
|
2012-02-09 21:26:12 +08:00
|
|
|
hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
|
2014-05-31 23:48:26 +08:00
|
|
|
else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM)
|
2014-03-24 20:39:05 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
|
|
|
|
hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
|
|
|
|
passkey, 1);
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
2014-03-19 20:14:53 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
|
2012-02-09 21:26:12 +08:00
|
|
|
hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
|
2014-03-20 14:18:14 +08:00
|
|
|
passkey, 0);
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-20 14:45:52 +08:00
|
|
|
static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-26 03:15:37 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
|
2014-02-28 18:54:17 +08:00
|
|
|
conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
|
|
|
|
cp.confirm_val);
|
2014-05-20 14:45:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-05-20 14:45:50 +08:00
|
|
|
clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->out)
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-20 14:45:52 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-20 14:45:51 +08:00
|
|
|
static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
2014-05-20 14:45:51 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 confirm[16];
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-27 19:23:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(smp->tfm_aes))
|
2014-05-20 14:45:51 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-26 03:15:37 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
|
2014-02-28 18:54:17 +08:00
|
|
|
hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
|
2014-05-20 14:45:51 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)");
|
2014-05-20 14:45:51 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) {
|
2014-02-28 08:00:28 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 stk[16];
|
|
|
|
__le64 rand = 0;
|
|
|
|
__le16 ediv = 0;
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-10-26 03:15:37 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-05-20 14:45:51 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-08 23:14:39 +08:00
|
|
|
hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk, smp->enc_key_size);
|
2012-01-31 06:29:12 +08:00
|
|
|
hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
|
2014-07-02 00:14:12 +08:00
|
|
|
set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2014-06-10 20:19:50 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 stk[16], auth;
|
2014-02-28 08:00:28 +08:00
|
|
|
__le64 rand = 0;
|
|
|
|
__le16 ediv = 0;
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
|
|
|
|
smp->prnd);
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-10-26 03:15:37 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-10 20:19:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
|
|
|
|
auth = 1;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
auth = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-17 00:25:15 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the
|
|
|
|
* slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master
|
|
|
|
* STK never needs to be stored).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-10-13 17:23:39 +08:00
|
|
|
hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
|
2014-06-17 00:25:16 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-20 14:45:51 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
|
|
|
|
bool persistent;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-12 19:36:19 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
|
|
|
|
if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
|
|
|
|
persistent = false;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY,
|
|
|
|
&hcon->flags);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* The LTKs, IRKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if
|
|
|
|
* both sides had the bonding bit set in their
|
|
|
|
* authentication requests.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) &
|
|
|
|
SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->remote_irk) {
|
2015-10-12 19:36:19 +08:00
|
|
|
mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk, persistent);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Now that user space can be considered to know the
|
|
|
|
* identity address track the connection based on it
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
* from now on (assuming this is an LE link).
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
|
|
|
|
bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
|
|
|
|
hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
|
|
|
|
queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* When receiving an indentity resolving key for
|
|
|
|
* a remote device that does not use a resolvable
|
|
|
|
* private address, just remove the key so that
|
|
|
|
* it is possible to use the controller white
|
|
|
|
* list for scanning.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Userspace will have been told to not store
|
|
|
|
* this key at this point. So it is safe to
|
|
|
|
* just remove it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) {
|
2014-11-13 20:37:48 +08:00
|
|
|
list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
|
|
|
|
kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->remote_irk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp->csrk) {
|
|
|
|
smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
|
|
|
|
bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
|
|
|
|
mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp->slave_csrk) {
|
|
|
|
smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
|
|
|
|
bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
|
|
|
|
mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp->ltk) {
|
|
|
|
smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
|
|
|
|
bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
|
|
|
|
mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp->slave_ltk) {
|
|
|
|
smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
|
|
|
|
bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
|
|
|
|
mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-06 16:54:04 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp->link_key) {
|
2014-06-01 21:33:39 +08:00
|
|
|
struct link_key *key;
|
|
|
|
u8 type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
|
|
|
|
type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION;
|
|
|
|
else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
|
|
|
|
type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
|
|
|
|
smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent);
|
|
|
|
if (key) {
|
|
|
|
mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
|
|
|
|
* flag is not set.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) &&
|
2014-06-01 21:33:39 +08:00
|
|
|
key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
|
|
|
|
list_del_rcu(&key->list);
|
|
|
|
kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-06 16:54:04 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-04 16:07:40 +08:00
|
|
|
static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
u8 key_type, auth;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
|
|
|
|
key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
|
|
|
|
auth = 1;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
auth = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
|
|
|
|
key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
|
|
|
|
0, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:54:04 +08:00
|
|
|
static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* These constants are as specified in the core specification.
|
|
|
|
* In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp1' and 'lebr'.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!smp->link_key)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
|
2015-03-16 16:10:18 +08:00
|
|
|
kzfree(smp->link_key);
|
2014-06-06 16:54:04 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->link_key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
|
2015-03-16 16:10:18 +08:00
|
|
|
kzfree(smp->link_key);
|
2014-06-06 16:54:04 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->link_key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs
|
|
|
|
* will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive
|
|
|
|
* them in the correct order.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);
|
|
|
|
else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
|
|
|
|
else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* These constants are as specified in the core specification.
|
|
|
|
* In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp2' and 'brle'.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 };
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
|
|
|
|
struct link_key *key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst);
|
|
|
|
if (!key) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("%s No Link Key found to generate LTK", hdev->name);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
|
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sc_add_ltk(smp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:51 +08:00
|
|
|
static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
|
2014-08-12 03:06:43 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
|
|
|
|
__u8 *keydist;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The responder sends its keys first */
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
|
|
|
|
smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
|
2014-08-12 03:06:43 +08:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) {
|
|
|
|
keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
|
|
|
|
*keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
|
|
|
|
*keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:54:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY))
|
2014-06-06 16:54:04 +08:00
|
|
|
sc_generate_link_key(smp);
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
|
|
|
|
sc_generate_ltk(smp);
|
2014-06-06 16:54:04 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */
|
|
|
|
*keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_ltk *ltk;
|
|
|
|
u8 authenticated;
|
|
|
|
__le16 ediv;
|
|
|
|
__le64 rand;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-10 16:11:20 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of
|
|
|
|
* bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest
|
|
|
|
* of the value to zeroes.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size);
|
|
|
|
memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
|
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
|
|
|
|
ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
|
|
|
|
SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
|
|
|
|
smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
|
|
|
|
smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ident.ediv = ediv;
|
|
|
|
ident.rand = rand;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
|
|
|
|
* after the connection has been established.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This is true even when the connection has been
|
|
|
|
* established using a resolvable random address.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
|
|
|
|
addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
|
|
|
|
&addrinfo);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_csrk *csrk;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Generate a new random key */
|
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (csrk) {
|
2015-02-27 16:11:13 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
|
|
|
|
csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) {
|
|
|
|
smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
|
2014-08-12 03:06:43 +08:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
smp_notify_keys(conn);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp_chan_destroy(conn);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:40 +08:00
|
|
|
static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
|
|
|
|
security_timer.work);
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-19 01:33:29 +08:00
|
|
|
hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
|
2014-08-12 03:06:40 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-10-13 20:43:25 +08:00
|
|
|
smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!smp)
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-27 19:23:03 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
|
2015-03-16 16:10:18 +08:00
|
|
|
kzfree(smp);
|
2014-06-27 19:23:03 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-02 19:19:47 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_hash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
|
2015-03-16 16:10:18 +08:00
|
|
|
kzfree(smp);
|
2014-05-02 19:19:47 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->conn = conn;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
chan->data = smp;
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:40 +08:00
|
|
|
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return smp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:44:05 +08:00
|
|
|
static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) {
|
|
|
|
na = smp->prnd;
|
|
|
|
nb = smp->rrnd;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
na = smp->rrnd;
|
|
|
|
nb = smp->prnd;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
|
|
|
|
a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
|
|
|
|
b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
|
|
|
static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
|
2014-06-06 16:44:05 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
|
|
|
|
u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
|
|
|
|
u8 io_cap[3], r[16];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
|
|
|
|
a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
|
|
|
|
b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) {
|
|
|
|
local_addr = a;
|
|
|
|
remote_addr = b;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
local_addr = b;
|
|
|
|
remote_addr = a;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-01 20:38:09 +08:00
|
|
|
memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
|
2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
|
|
|
put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
|
2014-06-06 16:44:05 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-10-28 22:17:05 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
|
|
|
|
memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:44:05 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
|
|
|
|
local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
|
2014-06-01 20:38:09 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
|
|
|
static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
|
|
|
|
u8 r;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
|
|
|
|
r |= 0x80;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r,
|
|
|
|
cfm.confirm_val))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
|
|
|
|
u8 cfm[16], r;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */
|
|
|
|
if (smp->passkey_round >= 20)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (smp_op) {
|
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
|
|
|
|
r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
|
|
|
|
r |= 0x80;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
|
|
|
|
smp->rrnd, r, cfm))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp->passkey_round++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
|
|
|
|
/* Generate MacKey and LTK */
|
|
|
|
if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The round is only complete when the initiator
|
|
|
|
* receives pairing random.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!hcon->out) {
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
|
2014-06-04 16:07:40 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
|
2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
|
2014-06-04 16:07:40 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Start the next round */
|
|
|
|
if (smp->passkey_round != 20)
|
|
|
|
return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */
|
|
|
|
sc_dhkey_check(smp);
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
|
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) {
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* Initiating device starts the round */
|
|
|
|
if (!hcon->out)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("%s Starting passkey round %u", hdev->name,
|
|
|
|
smp->passkey_round + 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-01 20:38:09 +08:00
|
|
|
static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
u8 smp_op;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-01 20:38:09 +08:00
|
|
|
switch (mgmt_op) {
|
|
|
|
case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
|
|
|
|
smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
|
|
|
|
smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
|
|
|
case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
|
|
|
|
hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
|
|
|
|
smp->passkey_round = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags))
|
|
|
|
smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
smp_op = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op))
|
|
|
|
return -EIO;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2014-06-01 20:38:09 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-04 16:07:40 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
|
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) {
|
|
|
|
sc_dhkey_check(smp);
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
|
|
|
|
} else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
|
|
|
|
sc_dhkey_check(smp);
|
|
|
|
sc_add_ltk(smp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-06 16:44:05 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-06-27 19:23:07 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan;
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp;
|
|
|
|
u32 value;
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("");
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!conn)
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
return -ENOTCONN;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
if (!chan)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOTCONN;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
|
|
|
|
if (!chan->data) {
|
|
|
|
err = -ENOTCONN;
|
|
|
|
goto unlock;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
smp = chan->data;
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:44:05 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
|
|
|
|
err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey);
|
|
|
|
goto unlock;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
switch (mgmt_op) {
|
|
|
|
case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
|
|
|
|
value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Fall Through */
|
|
|
|
case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
|
2014-05-20 14:45:50 +08:00
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
|
|
|
|
case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
|
2013-11-06 17:24:57 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
|
|
goto unlock;
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2013-11-06 17:24:57 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
goto unlock;
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
|
2014-05-20 14:45:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
|
|
|
|
u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp);
|
|
|
|
if (rsp)
|
|
|
|
smp_failure(conn, rsp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
unlock:
|
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
|
|
|
|
u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
|
|
|
|
remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!rsp) {
|
|
|
|
memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
|
|
|
|
req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
|
2015-06-11 18:52:30 +08:00
|
|
|
req->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-11 18:52:30 +08:00
|
|
|
rsp->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
|
|
|
|
rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-06-15 00:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
2014-07-10 16:02:07 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp;
|
2014-06-17 18:07:37 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-02-18 16:19:29 +08:00
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
|
2014-05-08 19:19:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
|
2014-02-18 16:19:29 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-16 16:42:27 +08:00
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!chan->data)
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
smp = chan->data;
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2012-07-19 22:03:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!smp)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
2011-08-20 08:06:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-11 08:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
|
2014-05-26 18:29:28 +08:00
|
|
|
auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
|
2014-09-11 08:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
|
2014-09-11 08:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
|
2014-07-10 16:02:07 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
|
2014-09-09 07:59:18 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-06 01:31:30 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
|
2011-06-15 00:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-17 03:12:34 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
|
|
|
|
* successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
|
|
|
|
* flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-03-16 17:45:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT)
|
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
/* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
|
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
|
|
|
|
/* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
|
2014-12-07 23:19:12 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) &&
|
2015-03-14 01:20:35 +08:00
|
|
|
!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
|
|
|
|
if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
|
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp_distribute_keys(smp);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-31 23:51:02 +08:00
|
|
|
build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC)
|
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-11 08:58:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
|
2014-09-11 08:37:44 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-17 18:07:37 +08:00
|
|
|
if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
|
|
|
|
conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
|
2012-03-06 02:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-10-28 12:12:20 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
|
2014-06-17 18:07:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
|
|
|
|
u8 method;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability,
|
|
|
|
req->io_capability);
|
|
|
|
if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-15 00:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
|
|
|
|
if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2013-12-02 16:49:03 +08:00
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-09-06 01:31:30 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
|
2011-06-10 05:50:45 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-15 00:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
|
2014-06-06 15:50:15 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
Bluetooth: Add workaround for broken OS X legacy SMP pairing
OS X version 10.10.2 (and possibly older versions) doesn't support LE
Secure Connections but incorrectly copies all authentication request
bits from a Security Request to its Pairing Request. The result is that
an SC capable initiator (such as BlueZ) will think OS X intends to do SC
when in fact it's incapable of it:
< ACL Data TX: Handle 3585 flags 0x00 dlen 6
SMP: Security Request (0x0b) len 1
Authentication requirement: Bonding, No MITM, SC, No Keypresses (0x09)
> ACL Data RX: Handle 3585 flags 0x02 dlen 11
SMP: Pairing Request (0x01) len 6
IO capability: KeyboardDisplay (0x04)
OOB data: Authentication data not present (0x00)
Authentication requirement: Bonding, No MITM, SC, No Keypresses (0x09)
Max encryption key size: 16
Initiator key distribution: EncKey (0x01)
Responder key distribution: EncKey IdKey Sign (0x07)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 3585 flags 0x00 dlen 11
SMP: Pairing Response (0x02) len 6
IO capability: NoInputNoOutput (0x03)
OOB data: Authentication data not present (0x00)
Authentication requirement: Bonding, No MITM, SC, No Keypresses (0x09)
Max encryption key size: 16
Initiator key distribution: EncKey (0x01)
Responder key distribution: EncKey Sign (0x05)
The pairing eventually fails when we get an unexpected Pairing Confirm
PDU instead of a Public Key PDU:
> ACL Data RX: Handle 3585 flags 0x02 dlen 21
SMP: Pairing Confirm (0x03) len 16
Confim value: bcc3bed31b8f313a78ec3cce32685faf
It is only at this point that we can speculate that the remote doesn't
really support SC. This patch creates a workaround for the just-works
model, however the MITM case is unsolvable because the OS X user has
already been requested to enter a PIN which we're now expected to
randomly generate and show the user (i.e. a chicken-and-egg problem).
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2015-03-16 01:34:04 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the
|
|
|
|
* SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth
|
|
|
|
* req bits from our security request, which may create a false
|
|
|
|
* positive SC enablement.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 15:50:15 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
|
|
|
|
/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
|
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
|
|
|
|
/* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Request setup of TK */
|
|
|
|
ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 15:50:15 +08:00
|
|
|
static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-06-24 20:22:59 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 15:50:15 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_DBG("");
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 17:45:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
|
2015-03-16 16:10:24 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!chan || !chan->data)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp_dev = chan->data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->local_sk, smp_dev->local_sk, 32);
|
2015-03-17 03:34:57 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
|
2015-03-16 16:10:24 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp_dev->debug_key)
|
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
|
2014-06-24 20:22:59 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
|
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
|
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
|
|
/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
|
|
|
|
if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
2014-06-06 20:33:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-24 20:22:59 +08:00
|
|
|
/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
|
|
|
|
* we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-06 20:33:30 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-06 15:50:15 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 16:10:24 +08:00
|
|
|
done:
|
2014-12-02 04:03:16 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
|
2015-03-16 16:10:25 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
|
2014-12-02 04:03:16 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("Local Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk);
|
2014-06-06 15:50:15 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-06-15 00:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
2014-05-26 18:29:28 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
|
2014-09-11 08:37:41 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 key_size, auth;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:46 +08:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-02-18 16:19:29 +08:00
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
|
2014-05-08 19:19:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
|
2014-02-18 16:19:29 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-16 16:42:27 +08:00
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-15 00:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-06 01:31:30 +08:00
|
|
|
req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-15 00:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
|
|
|
|
if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-26 18:29:28 +08:00
|
|
|
auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
|
2014-09-11 08:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
|
2014-09-09 07:59:18 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-17 03:12:34 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
|
|
|
|
* successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
|
|
|
|
* flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-03-16 17:45:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT)
|
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
|
|
|
|
* some bits that we had enabled in our request.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */
|
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
|
|
|
|
/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
|
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
|
|
|
|
smp_distribute_keys(smp);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-16 16:03:34 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
|
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
|
2014-05-16 15:59:06 +08:00
|
|
|
else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
|
|
|
|
conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
|
2014-05-16 16:03:34 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-10-28 12:12:20 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
|
2014-06-17 18:07:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
|
|
|
|
u8 method;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability,
|
|
|
|
rsp->io_capability);
|
|
|
|
if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-12-02 16:49:03 +08:00
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
|
2011-06-10 05:50:46 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-03-14 16:53:50 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
|
|
|
|
* some bits that we had enabled in our request.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 15:50:15 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
|
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
|
|
|
|
return sc_send_public_key(smp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-11 08:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
auth |= req->auth_req;
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2012-06-06 18:54:15 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-20 14:45:50 +08:00
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
|
2014-05-20 14:45:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
|
2014-05-20 14:45:52 +08:00
|
|
|
return smp_confirm(smp);
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:36:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("");
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
|
|
|
|
return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:36:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->out) {
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
|
|
|
|
smp->prnd);
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Bluetooth: Add workaround for broken OS X legacy SMP pairing
OS X version 10.10.2 (and possibly older versions) doesn't support LE
Secure Connections but incorrectly copies all authentication request
bits from a Security Request to its Pairing Request. The result is that
an SC capable initiator (such as BlueZ) will think OS X intends to do SC
when in fact it's incapable of it:
< ACL Data TX: Handle 3585 flags 0x00 dlen 6
SMP: Security Request (0x0b) len 1
Authentication requirement: Bonding, No MITM, SC, No Keypresses (0x09)
> ACL Data RX: Handle 3585 flags 0x02 dlen 11
SMP: Pairing Request (0x01) len 6
IO capability: KeyboardDisplay (0x04)
OOB data: Authentication data not present (0x00)
Authentication requirement: Bonding, No MITM, SC, No Keypresses (0x09)
Max encryption key size: 16
Initiator key distribution: EncKey (0x01)
Responder key distribution: EncKey IdKey Sign (0x07)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 3585 flags 0x00 dlen 11
SMP: Pairing Response (0x02) len 6
IO capability: NoInputNoOutput (0x03)
OOB data: Authentication data not present (0x00)
Authentication requirement: Bonding, No MITM, SC, No Keypresses (0x09)
Max encryption key size: 16
Initiator key distribution: EncKey (0x01)
Responder key distribution: EncKey Sign (0x05)
The pairing eventually fails when we get an unexpected Pairing Confirm
PDU instead of a Public Key PDU:
> ACL Data RX: Handle 3585 flags 0x02 dlen 21
SMP: Pairing Confirm (0x03) len 16
Confim value: bcc3bed31b8f313a78ec3cce32685faf
It is only at this point that we can speculate that the remote doesn't
really support SC. This patch creates a workaround for the just-works
model, however the MITM case is unsolvable because the OS X user has
already been requested to enter a PIN which we're now expected to
randomly generate and show the user (i.e. a chicken-and-egg problem).
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2015-03-16 01:34:04 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits
|
|
|
|
* from our security request and thereby create the impression that
|
|
|
|
* we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
|
|
|
|
u8 auth;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */
|
|
|
|
if (hcon->out)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Refusing SMP SC -> legacy fallback in SC-only mode");
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Trying to fall back to legacy SMP");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
|
|
|
|
rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */
|
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Failed to fall back to legacy SMP");
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:46 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
|
|
|
|
|
2014-02-18 16:19:29 +08:00
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
|
2014-05-08 19:19:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
|
2014-02-18 16:19:29 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-09-06 01:31:30 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
|
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
Bluetooth: Add workaround for broken OS X legacy SMP pairing
OS X version 10.10.2 (and possibly older versions) doesn't support LE
Secure Connections but incorrectly copies all authentication request
bits from a Security Request to its Pairing Request. The result is that
an SC capable initiator (such as BlueZ) will think OS X intends to do SC
when in fact it's incapable of it:
< ACL Data TX: Handle 3585 flags 0x00 dlen 6
SMP: Security Request (0x0b) len 1
Authentication requirement: Bonding, No MITM, SC, No Keypresses (0x09)
> ACL Data RX: Handle 3585 flags 0x02 dlen 11
SMP: Pairing Request (0x01) len 6
IO capability: KeyboardDisplay (0x04)
OOB data: Authentication data not present (0x00)
Authentication requirement: Bonding, No MITM, SC, No Keypresses (0x09)
Max encryption key size: 16
Initiator key distribution: EncKey (0x01)
Responder key distribution: EncKey IdKey Sign (0x07)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 3585 flags 0x00 dlen 11
SMP: Pairing Response (0x02) len 6
IO capability: NoInputNoOutput (0x03)
OOB data: Authentication data not present (0x00)
Authentication requirement: Bonding, No MITM, SC, No Keypresses (0x09)
Max encryption key size: 16
Initiator key distribution: EncKey (0x01)
Responder key distribution: EncKey Sign (0x05)
The pairing eventually fails when we get an unexpected Pairing Confirm
PDU instead of a Public Key PDU:
> ACL Data RX: Handle 3585 flags 0x02 dlen 21
SMP: Pairing Confirm (0x03) len 16
Confim value: bcc3bed31b8f313a78ec3cce32685faf
It is only at this point that we can speculate that the remote doesn't
really support SC. This patch creates a workaround for the just-works
model, however the MITM case is unsolvable because the OS X user has
already been requested to enter a PIN which we're now expected to
randomly generate and show the user (i.e. a chicken-and-egg problem).
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2015-03-16 01:34:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
|
|
|
|
return sc_check_confirm(smp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-06 16:36:38 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->out) {
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
|
|
|
|
smp->prnd);
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
|
2014-05-20 14:45:52 +08:00
|
|
|
return smp_confirm(smp);
|
2015-03-12 08:47:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
2014-06-06 16:39:49 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb;
|
|
|
|
u32 passkey;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:46 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
|
2011-06-15 00:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-02-18 16:19:29 +08:00
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
|
2014-05-08 19:19:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
|
2014-02-18 16:19:29 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-03-18 18:58:24 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
|
2011-07-08 05:59:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:39:49 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
|
|
|
|
return smp_random(smp);
|
|
|
|
|
Bluetooth: Fix false-positive "uninitialized" compiler warning
Some gcc versions don't seem to be able to properly track the flow of
the smp_cmd_pairing_random() function and end up causing the following
types of (false-positive) warnings:
smp.c:1995:6: warning: ‘nb’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
smp.c:1995:6: warning: ‘na’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
^
smp.c:1995:6: warning: ‘pkbx’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
^
smp.c:1995:6: warning: ‘pkax’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
This patch fixes the issue by moving the pkax/pkbx and na/nb
initialization earlier in the function.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2014-12-03 22:26:37 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) {
|
|
|
|
pkax = smp->local_pk;
|
|
|
|
pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
|
|
|
|
na = smp->prnd;
|
|
|
|
nb = smp->rrnd;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
pkax = smp->remote_pk;
|
|
|
|
pkbx = smp->local_pk;
|
|
|
|
na = smp->rrnd;
|
|
|
|
nb = smp->prnd;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-28 22:17:05 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
|
|
|
|
if (!hcon->out)
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
|
|
|
|
goto mackey_and_ltk;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Passkey entry has special treatment */
|
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
|
|
|
|
return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:39:49 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) {
|
|
|
|
u8 cfm[16];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
|
|
|
|
smp->rrnd, 0, cfm);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
|
|
|
|
smp->prnd);
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-28 22:17:05 +08:00
|
|
|
mackey_and_ltk:
|
2014-06-06 16:44:05 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Generate MacKey and LTK */
|
|
|
|
err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-28 22:17:05 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
|
2014-06-01 20:38:09 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) {
|
2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
|
|
|
sc_dhkey_check(smp);
|
2014-06-01 20:38:09 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
|
|
|
err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
|
|
|
|
hcon->dst_type, passkey, 0);
|
2014-06-06 16:39:49 +08:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:39:49 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-01 16:59:24 +08:00
|
|
|
static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
|
2011-08-26 07:02:28 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-02-03 08:08:01 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_ltk *key;
|
2011-08-26 07:02:28 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-29 20:02:59 +08:00
|
|
|
key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role);
|
2011-08-26 07:02:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!key)
|
2014-07-01 16:59:24 +08:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2011-08-26 07:02:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-11 08:37:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level)
|
2014-07-01 16:59:24 +08:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2012-06-07 14:58:37 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2012-01-16 12:10:31 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
|
2014-07-01 16:59:24 +08:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
2011-08-26 07:02:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-08 23:14:39 +08:00
|
|
|
hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size);
|
2012-02-03 08:08:01 +08:00
|
|
|
hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
|
2011-08-26 07:02:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-02 00:14:12 +08:00
|
|
|
/* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */
|
|
|
|
clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-01 16:59:24 +08:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
2011-08-26 07:02:28 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-10-13 20:43:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 16:55:18 +08:00
|
|
|
bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
|
|
|
|
enum smp_key_pref key_pref)
|
2014-07-01 23:40:20 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 16:55:18 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using
|
|
|
|
* LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the
|
|
|
|
* connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK
|
|
|
|
* provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we
|
|
|
|
* don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits).
|
2014-07-02 00:14:13 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-11-13 16:55:18 +08:00
|
|
|
if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
|
|
|
|
test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
|
2014-05-29 20:02:59 +08:00
|
|
|
hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role))
|
2014-07-02 00:14:13 +08:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-01 23:40:20 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
|
2011-01-27 08:42:57 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
2014-05-26 18:29:28 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp;
|
2014-09-11 08:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 sec_level, auth;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-02-18 16:19:29 +08:00
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
|
2014-05-08 19:19:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
|
2014-02-18 16:19:29 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-16 16:42:27 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
|
2013-11-05 17:30:39 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-26 18:29:28 +08:00
|
|
|
auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
|
2014-09-11 08:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
|
2014-09-09 07:59:18 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-11 08:58:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
|
2014-09-11 08:37:44 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 16:55:18 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
|
2014-07-01 23:40:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-17 18:07:37 +08:00
|
|
|
if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
|
|
|
|
hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
|
2011-08-26 07:02:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2012-06-07 14:58:37 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
|
2011-08-26 07:02:28 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
|
2014-06-17 00:25:14 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!smp)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
2011-08-20 08:06:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
|
2014-09-11 08:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
|
2014-07-29 19:18:48 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
|
2014-09-11 08:37:42 +08:00
|
|
|
build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-09-06 01:31:30 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
|
2011-06-10 05:50:45 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
|
2011-01-27 08:42:57 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-08-24 08:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-08-24 08:32:43 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
|
2014-09-06 11:59:10 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan;
|
2014-03-24 20:39:03 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp;
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
__u8 authreq;
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:43 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-24 20:39:03 +08:00
|
|
|
/* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */
|
|
|
|
if (!conn)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
|
2011-07-01 06:20:56 +08:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 16:55:18 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2011-01-27 08:42:57 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-17 18:07:37 +08:00
|
|
|
if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
|
|
|
|
hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-16 16:42:27 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
|
2014-06-17 18:07:37 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2011-08-20 08:06:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-09-04 17:22:46 +08:00
|
|
|
chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
if (!chan) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("SMP security requested but not available");
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */
|
|
|
|
if (chan->data) {
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
goto unlock;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-08-20 08:06:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-09-06 01:31:31 +08:00
|
|
|
smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!smp) {
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
goto unlock;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
|
2011-08-20 08:06:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
|
2014-05-16 15:59:06 +08:00
|
|
|
authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-01 14:45:24 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
|
|
|
|
* requires it.
|
2014-03-18 21:42:30 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-06-01 14:45:24 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
|
2014-06-17 18:07:37 +08:00
|
|
|
hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
|
2014-03-18 21:42:30 +08:00
|
|
|
authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-16 16:42:27 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
|
2011-08-20 08:06:51 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:45 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
|
2011-09-06 01:31:30 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
|
2011-06-10 05:50:45 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
|
2011-12-22 08:12:12 +08:00
|
|
|
cp.auth_req = authreq;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-20 14:45:50 +08:00
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
2014-03-24 21:54:11 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
unlock:
|
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-22 14:38:35 +08:00
|
|
|
void smp_cancel_pairing(struct hci_conn *hcon)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!conn)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
if (!chan)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp = chan->data;
|
|
|
|
if (smp) {
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags))
|
|
|
|
smp_failure(conn, 0);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
smp_failure(conn, SMP_UNSPECIFIED);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-07-08 05:59:34 +08:00
|
|
|
static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2011-07-08 05:59:39 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
2011-07-08 05:59:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-02-18 16:19:29 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
|
2014-05-08 19:19:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
|
2014-02-18 16:19:29 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);
|
2014-02-18 16:19:37 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-07-08 05:59:39 +08:00
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-06 01:31:30 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk));
|
2011-07-08 05:59:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-07-08 05:59:34 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2011-07-08 05:59:39 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
2012-02-03 08:08:01 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
2014-02-19 20:57:46 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_ltk *ltk;
|
2012-02-03 08:08:01 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 authenticated;
|
2011-07-08 05:59:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-02-18 16:19:29 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
|
2014-05-08 19:19:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
|
2014-02-18 16:19:29 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-02-27 05:33:43 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Mark the information as received */
|
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
|
2014-09-10 07:21:46 +08:00
|
|
|
else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-07-08 05:59:39 +08:00
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
|
2011-07-08 05:59:34 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2013-10-13 17:23:39 +08:00
|
|
|
authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
|
2014-06-17 00:25:16 +08:00
|
|
|
ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK,
|
2014-02-19 20:57:46 +08:00
|
|
|
authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
|
|
|
|
rp->ediv, rp->rand);
|
|
|
|
smp->ltk = ltk;
|
2014-09-06 03:19:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
|
2014-09-06 03:19:51 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_distribute_keys(smp);
|
2011-07-08 05:59:34 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
|
2014-05-08 19:19:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
|
2014-02-18 16:19:37 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
|
|
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
bdaddr_t rpa;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
|
2014-05-08 19:19:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-02-27 05:33:43 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Mark the information as received */
|
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
|
|
|
|
|
2014-02-26 04:24:37 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending
|
|
|
|
* an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK
|
|
|
|
* as "identity information". However, since such
|
|
|
|
* implementations are not known of and in order to not over
|
|
|
|
* complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never
|
|
|
|
* received an IRK for such a device.
|
2015-01-15 02:51:37 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public
|
|
|
|
* Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for.
|
2014-02-26 04:24:37 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-01-15 02:51:37 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) ||
|
|
|
|
!hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) {
|
2014-02-26 04:24:37 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Ignoring IRK with no identity address");
|
2014-06-27 19:23:02 +08:00
|
|
|
goto distribute;
|
2014-02-26 04:24:37 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr);
|
|
|
|
smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type))
|
|
|
|
bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-02-19 20:57:46 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr,
|
|
|
|
smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-27 19:23:02 +08:00
|
|
|
distribute:
|
2014-09-06 03:19:54 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
|
|
|
|
smp_distribute_keys(smp);
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-10 03:19:17 +08:00
|
|
|
static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
2014-03-10 03:19:17 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_csrk *csrk;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
|
2014-05-08 19:19:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
|
2014-03-10 03:19:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Mark the information as received */
|
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (csrk) {
|
2015-02-27 16:11:13 +08:00
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
|
|
|
|
csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED;
|
2014-03-10 03:19:17 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
smp->csrk = csrk;
|
2014-09-06 03:19:51 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_distribute_keys(smp);
|
2014-03-10 03:19:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-31 23:51:02 +08:00
|
|
|
static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
|
|
|
|
u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 17:45:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) ||
|
|
|
|
test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags))
|
2014-10-28 22:17:05 +08:00
|
|
|
return REQ_OOB;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-31 23:51:02 +08:00
|
|
|
/* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
|
|
|
|
* which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get
|
|
|
|
* the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
|
|
|
|
* first byte which contains the opcode.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) {
|
|
|
|
local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
|
|
|
|
remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
|
|
|
|
remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
local_io = local->io_capability;
|
|
|
|
remote_io = remote->io_capability;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
|
|
|
|
remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table,
|
|
|
|
* otherwise use JUST WORKS.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (local_mitm || remote_mitm)
|
|
|
|
method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
method = JUST_WORKS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
|
|
|
|
if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
|
|
|
|
method = JUST_WORKS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return method;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:09:28 +08:00
|
|
|
static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
2014-05-31 23:51:02 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
|
2014-06-06 16:30:08 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
|
2014-06-06 16:09:28 +08:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-17 00:12:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
|
|
|
|
err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
|
|
|
|
smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:09:28 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
|
|
|
|
* the key from the initiating device.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!hcon->out) {
|
|
|
|
err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-02 04:03:16 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
|
2015-03-17 03:34:55 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
|
2014-06-06 16:09:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ecdh_shared_secret(smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk, smp->dhkey))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-02 04:03:16 +08:00
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
|
2014-06-06 16:09:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-31 23:51:02 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->method = sc_select_method(smp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("%s selected method 0x%02x", hdev->name, smp->method);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */
|
|
|
|
if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM)
|
|
|
|
hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-31 23:52:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!memcmp(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
|
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) {
|
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify));
|
|
|
|
hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000;
|
|
|
|
hcon->passkey_entered = 0;
|
|
|
|
smp->passkey_round = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
|
|
|
|
hcon->dst_type,
|
|
|
|
hcon->passkey_notify,
|
|
|
|
hcon->passkey_entered))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
|
|
|
|
return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 17:45:46 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
|
2014-10-28 22:17:05 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->out)
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->out)
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
|
|
|
|
if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
|
|
|
|
hcon->dst_type))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
|
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:30:08 +08:00
|
|
|
/* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
|
|
|
|
* send the confirm value.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->out)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
|
|
|
|
0, cfm.confirm_val);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:09:28 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:47:30 +08:00
|
|
|
static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data;
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
|
|
|
u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
|
|
|
|
u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
|
|
|
|
a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
|
|
|
|
b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) {
|
|
|
|
local_addr = a;
|
|
|
|
remote_addr = b;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
local_addr = b;
|
|
|
|
remote_addr = a;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
|
|
|
|
put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
|
2015-03-16 17:45:43 +08:00
|
|
|
else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
|
|
|
|
memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16);
|
2014-06-25 16:10:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:47:30 +08:00
|
|
|
err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
|
|
|
|
io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(check->e, e, 16))
|
|
|
|
return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-04 16:07:40 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!hcon->out) {
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
|
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-05-31 23:53:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-04 16:07:40 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */
|
|
|
|
sc_dhkey_check(smp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-05-31 23:53:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-04 16:07:40 +08:00
|
|
|
sc_add_ltk(smp);
|
2014-06-06 16:47:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) {
|
2015-06-08 23:14:39 +08:00
|
|
|
hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size);
|
2014-06-06 16:47:30 +08:00
|
|
|
hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-05 03:45:57 +08:00
|
|
|
static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
|
|
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("value 0x%02x", kp->value);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
|
2013-10-03 15:00:57 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp;
|
2013-10-03 16:23:08 +08:00
|
|
|
__u8 code, reason;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (skb->len < 1)
|
2013-10-03 16:23:08 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EILSEQ;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) {
|
2011-07-01 06:20:56 +08:00
|
|
|
reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-10-03 16:23:08 +08:00
|
|
|
code = skb->data[0];
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
smp = chan->data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)
|
|
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-11 08:37:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are
|
|
|
|
* pairing request and security request.
|
2013-01-30 00:44:23 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ)
|
|
|
|
goto drop;
|
2013-01-30 00:44:23 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
switch (code) {
|
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
|
2013-11-06 17:24:57 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_failure(conn, 0);
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
err = -EPERM;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
|
2011-06-10 05:50:53 +08:00
|
|
|
reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
|
2011-06-10 05:50:42 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
|
2011-07-08 05:59:34 +08:00
|
|
|
reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
|
2011-07-08 05:59:34 +08:00
|
|
|
reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
|
2014-02-18 16:19:36 +08:00
|
|
|
reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
|
2014-03-10 03:19:17 +08:00
|
|
|
reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
|
2011-07-08 05:59:34 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:09:28 +08:00
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
|
|
|
|
reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 16:47:30 +08:00
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK:
|
|
|
|
reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-05 03:45:57 +08:00
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY:
|
|
|
|
reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
|
|
|
|
reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:43 +08:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:43 +08:00
|
|
|
done:
|
2014-08-19 01:33:31 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!err) {
|
|
|
|
if (reason)
|
|
|
|
smp_failure(conn, reason);
|
2014-08-12 03:06:39 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree_skb(skb);
|
2014-08-19 01:33:31 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
2014-09-06 03:19:55 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
drop:
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("%s unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR", hcon->hdev->name,
|
|
|
|
code, &hcon->dst);
|
|
|
|
kfree_skb(skb);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2011-06-10 05:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-07-08 05:59:34 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if (chan->data)
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_chan_destroy(conn);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
conn->smp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_put(chan);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
|
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Only new pairings are interesting */
|
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */
|
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Only master may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
|
|
|
|
if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
|
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
|
2015-03-14 01:20:35 +08:00
|
|
|
!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
|
2015-03-13 17:11:00 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
|
|
|
|
if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */
|
|
|
|
if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */
|
|
|
|
if (chan->data)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
|
|
|
|
if (!smp) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("%s unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR",
|
|
|
|
hdev->name);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("%s starting SMP over BR/EDR", hdev->name);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
|
|
|
|
build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
|
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-08-12 03:06:40 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
|
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
|
|
|
|
bredr_pairing(chan);
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!smp)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2014-08-12 03:06:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:49 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:43 +08:00
|
|
|
cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-06 03:19:51 +08:00
|
|
|
smp_distribute_keys(smp);
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
conn->smp = chan;
|
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
|
2014-08-14 17:34:26 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
|
|
|
|
bredr_pairing(chan);
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
2014-08-12 03:06:40 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
|
2014-08-12 03:06:38 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 03:06:40 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp)
|
|
|
|
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
|
2014-08-12 03:06:38 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-19 01:33:29 +08:00
|
|
|
hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
|
2014-08-12 03:06:38 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long hdr_len,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long len, int nb)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!skb)
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
|
2015-03-31 04:21:01 +08:00
|
|
|
bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return skb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
|
|
|
|
.name = "Security Manager",
|
|
|
|
.ready = smp_ready_cb,
|
2014-08-08 14:37:18 +08:00
|
|
|
.recv = smp_recv_cb,
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
.alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb,
|
|
|
|
.teardown = smp_teardown_cb,
|
2014-08-12 03:06:36 +08:00
|
|
|
.resume = smp_resume_cb,
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,
|
|
|
|
.state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
|
|
|
|
.close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
|
|
|
|
.defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
|
|
|
|
.suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
|
|
|
|
.set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
|
|
|
|
.get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
chan = l2cap_chan_create();
|
|
|
|
if (!chan)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type;
|
|
|
|
chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops;
|
|
|
|
chan->scid = pchan->scid;
|
|
|
|
chan->dcid = chan->scid;
|
|
|
|
chan->imtu = pchan->imtu;
|
|
|
|
chan->omtu = pchan->omtu;
|
|
|
|
chan->mode = pchan->mode;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 04:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to
|
|
|
|
* change the security level. This means that the SMP channel
|
|
|
|
* lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep
|
|
|
|
* warnings.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return chan;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
|
|
|
|
.name = "Security Manager Root",
|
|
|
|
.new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* None of these are implemented for the root channel */
|
|
|
|
.close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
|
|
|
|
.alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb,
|
|
|
|
.recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv,
|
|
|
|
.state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
|
|
|
|
.teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown,
|
|
|
|
.ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready,
|
|
|
|
.defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
|
|
|
|
.suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
|
|
|
|
.resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume,
|
|
|
|
.set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
|
|
|
|
.get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
|
2014-08-08 14:32:52 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan;
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_dev *smp;
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
|
2015-03-16 16:10:21 +08:00
|
|
|
struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
smp = NULL;
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
goto create_chan;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-08 14:32:52 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!smp)
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
|
2014-08-08 14:37:17 +08:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
|
|
|
|
kzfree(smp);
|
2014-12-08 03:04:38 +08:00
|
|
|
return ERR_CAST(tfm_aes);
|
2014-08-08 14:32:52 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 16:10:21 +08:00
|
|
|
tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_hash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
|
|
|
|
kzfree(smp);
|
|
|
|
return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->tfm_aes = tfm_aes;
|
2015-03-16 16:10:21 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
|
2015-06-11 18:52:27 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->min_key_size = SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
|
2015-06-11 18:52:26 +08:00
|
|
|
smp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
create_chan:
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
chan = l2cap_chan_create();
|
|
|
|
if (!chan) {
|
2015-03-18 02:38:24 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp) {
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_hash(smp->tfm_cmac);
|
|
|
|
kzfree(smp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
chan->data = smp;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:17 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-15 07:43:09 +08:00
|
|
|
if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) {
|
2015-02-20 19:48:24 +08:00
|
|
|
u8 bdaddr_type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
|
2015-01-15 07:43:09 +08:00
|
|
|
chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
|
2015-02-20 19:48:24 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
|
2015-01-15 07:43:09 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
|
2015-01-15 07:43:09 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
|
|
|
|
chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
|
|
|
|
chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
|
|
|
|
chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-13 04:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
|
|
|
|
atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
return chan;
|
2014-08-08 14:32:52 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
|
2014-08-08 14:32:52 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
struct smp_dev *smp;
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
|
2014-08-08 14:32:52 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
smp = chan->data;
|
|
|
|
if (smp) {
|
2014-08-08 14:37:17 +08:00
|
|
|
chan->data = NULL;
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->tfm_aes)
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
|
2015-03-16 16:10:21 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smp->tfm_cmac)
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_hash(smp->tfm_cmac);
|
2015-03-16 16:10:19 +08:00
|
|
|
kzfree(smp);
|
2014-08-08 14:32:52 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-08 14:37:16 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_put(chan);
|
2014-08-08 14:32:52 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-01 06:43:16 +08:00
|
|
|
static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_read(struct file *file,
|
|
|
|
char __user *user_buf,
|
|
|
|
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
|
|
|
|
char buf[3];
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-14 01:20:35 +08:00
|
|
|
buf[0] = hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP) ? 'Y': 'N';
|
2015-01-01 06:43:16 +08:00
|
|
|
buf[1] = '\n';
|
|
|
|
buf[2] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, 2);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_write(struct file *file,
|
|
|
|
const char __user *user_buf,
|
|
|
|
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
|
|
|
|
char buf[32];
|
|
|
|
size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf)-1));
|
|
|
|
bool enable;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buf[buf_size] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
if (strtobool(buf, &enable))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-14 01:20:35 +08:00
|
|
|
if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
|
2015-01-01 06:43:16 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EALREADY;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (enable) {
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(chan))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(chan);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
|
|
|
|
hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
smp_del_chan(chan);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-14 01:20:35 +08:00
|
|
|
hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP);
|
2015-01-01 06:43:16 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return count;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct file_operations force_bredr_smp_fops = {
|
|
|
|
.open = simple_open,
|
|
|
|
.read = force_bredr_smp_read,
|
|
|
|
.write = force_bredr_smp_write,
|
|
|
|
.llseek = default_llseek,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-11 18:52:27 +08:00
|
|
|
static ssize_t le_min_key_size_read(struct file *file,
|
|
|
|
char __user *user_buf,
|
|
|
|
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
|
|
|
|
char buf[4];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t le_min_key_size_write(struct file *file,
|
|
|
|
const char __user *user_buf,
|
|
|
|
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
|
|
|
|
char buf[32];
|
|
|
|
size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
|
|
|
|
u8 key_size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buf[buf_size] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (key_size > SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size ||
|
|
|
|
key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size = key_size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return count;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct file_operations le_min_key_size_fops = {
|
|
|
|
.open = simple_open,
|
|
|
|
.read = le_min_key_size_read,
|
|
|
|
.write = le_min_key_size_write,
|
|
|
|
.llseek = default_llseek,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-11 18:52:26 +08:00
|
|
|
static ssize_t le_max_key_size_read(struct file *file,
|
|
|
|
char __user *user_buf,
|
|
|
|
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
|
|
|
|
char buf[4];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t le_max_key_size_write(struct file *file,
|
|
|
|
const char __user *user_buf,
|
|
|
|
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
|
|
|
|
char buf[32];
|
|
|
|
size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
|
|
|
|
u8 key_size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buf[buf_size] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-11 18:52:27 +08:00
|
|
|
if (key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE ||
|
|
|
|
key_size < SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size)
|
2015-06-11 18:52:26 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size = key_size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return count;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct file_operations le_max_key_size_fops = {
|
|
|
|
.open = simple_open,
|
|
|
|
.read = le_max_key_size_read,
|
|
|
|
.write = le_max_key_size_write,
|
|
|
|
.llseek = default_llseek,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-15 07:43:10 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then
|
|
|
|
* there is also no need to register any SMP channel.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-16 00:04:21 +08:00
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) {
|
|
|
|
chan = hdev->smp_data;
|
|
|
|
hdev->smp_data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
smp_del_chan(chan);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(chan))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(chan);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hdev->smp_data = chan;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-11 18:52:27 +08:00
|
|
|
debugfs_create_file("le_min_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
|
|
|
|
&le_min_key_size_fops);
|
2015-06-11 18:52:26 +08:00
|
|
|
debugfs_create_file("le_max_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
|
|
|
|
&le_max_key_size_fops);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-01 06:43:16 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If the controller does not support BR/EDR Secure Connections
|
|
|
|
* feature, then the BR/EDR SMP channel shall not be present.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* To test this with Bluetooth 4.0 controllers, create a debugfs
|
|
|
|
* switch that allows forcing BR/EDR SMP support and accepting
|
|
|
|
* cross-transport pairing on non-AES encrypted connections.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) {
|
|
|
|
debugfs_create_file("force_bredr_smp", 0644, hdev->debugfs,
|
|
|
|
hdev, &force_bredr_smp_fops);
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-01-01 06:43:16 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-16 00:04:21 +08:00
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) {
|
|
|
|
chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
|
|
|
|
hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
smp_del_chan(chan);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-13 20:12:32 +08:00
|
|
|
chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(chan)) {
|
|
|
|
int err = PTR_ERR(chan);
|
|
|
|
chan = hdev->smp_data;
|
|
|
|
hdev->smp_data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
smp_del_chan(chan);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) {
|
|
|
|
chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
|
|
|
|
hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
smp_del_chan(chan);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hdev->smp_data) {
|
|
|
|
chan = hdev->smp_data;
|
|
|
|
hdev->smp_data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
smp_del_chan(chan);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-30 15:50:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP)
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-30 15:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
static int __init test_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const u8 irk[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
|
|
|
|
0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
|
|
|
|
const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d };
|
|
|
|
u8 res[3];
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = smp_ah(tfm_aes, irk, r, res);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(res, exp, 3))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init test_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const u8 k[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 r[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63,
|
|
|
|
0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 _iat = 0x01;
|
|
|
|
const u8 _rat = 0x00;
|
|
|
|
const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } };
|
|
|
|
const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } };
|
|
|
|
const u8 exp[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2,
|
|
|
|
0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e };
|
|
|
|
u8 res[16];
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = smp_c1(tfm_aes, k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init test_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const u8 k[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 r1[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 r2[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 exp[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b,
|
|
|
|
0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a };
|
|
|
|
u8 res[16];
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = smp_s1(tfm_aes, k, r1, r2, res);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-30 15:50:41 +08:00
|
|
|
static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const u8 u[32] = {
|
|
|
|
0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
|
|
|
|
0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
|
|
|
|
0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
|
|
|
|
0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 v[32] = {
|
|
|
|
0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
|
|
|
|
0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
|
|
|
|
0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
|
|
|
|
0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 x[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
|
|
|
|
0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 z = 0x00;
|
|
|
|
const u8 exp[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1,
|
|
|
|
0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 };
|
|
|
|
u8 res[16];
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const u8 w[32] = {
|
|
|
|
0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86,
|
|
|
|
0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99,
|
|
|
|
0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
|
|
|
|
0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
|
|
|
|
const u8 n1[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
|
|
|
|
0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 n2[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
|
|
|
|
0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 exp_ltk[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98,
|
|
|
|
0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 exp_mackey[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
|
|
|
|
0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
|
|
|
|
u8 mackey[16], ltk[16];
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(mackey, exp_mackey, 16))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(ltk, exp_ltk, 16))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const u8 w[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
|
|
|
|
0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 n1[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
|
|
|
|
0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 n2[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
|
|
|
|
0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 r[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08,
|
|
|
|
0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 exp[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2,
|
|
|
|
0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 };
|
|
|
|
u8 res[16];
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const u8 u[32] = {
|
|
|
|
0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
|
|
|
|
0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
|
|
|
|
0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
|
|
|
|
0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 v[32] = {
|
|
|
|
0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
|
|
|
|
0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
|
|
|
|
0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
|
|
|
|
0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 x[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
|
|
|
|
0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
|
|
|
|
const u8 y[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
|
|
|
|
0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
|
|
|
|
const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000;
|
|
|
|
u32 val;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (val != exp_val)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const u8 w[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
|
|
|
|
0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
|
|
|
|
const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
|
|
|
|
const u8 exp[16] = {
|
|
|
|
0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8,
|
|
|
|
0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d };
|
|
|
|
u8 res[16];
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-02 03:52:13 +08:00
|
|
|
static char test_smp_buffer[32];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
|
|
|
|
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer,
|
|
|
|
strlen(test_smp_buffer));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = {
|
|
|
|
.open = simple_open,
|
|
|
|
.read = test_smp_read,
|
|
|
|
.llseek = default_llseek,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-30 15:50:39 +08:00
|
|
|
static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes,
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-12-30 16:11:20 +08:00
|
|
|
ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long long duration;
|
2014-12-30 15:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-30 16:11:20 +08:00
|
|
|
calltime = ktime_get();
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-30 15:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
err = test_ah(tfm_aes);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
|
2015-04-02 03:52:13 +08:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2014-12-30 15:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = test_c1(tfm_aes);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
|
2015-04-02 03:52:13 +08:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2014-12-30 15:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = test_s1(tfm_aes);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
|
2015-04-02 03:52:13 +08:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2014-12-30 15:50:40 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-30 15:50:41 +08:00
|
|
|
err = test_f4(tfm_cmac);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed");
|
2015-04-02 03:52:13 +08:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2014-12-30 15:50:41 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = test_f5(tfm_cmac);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed");
|
2015-04-02 03:52:13 +08:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2014-12-30 15:50:41 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = test_f6(tfm_cmac);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed");
|
2015-04-02 03:52:13 +08:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2014-12-30 15:50:41 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = test_g2(tfm_cmac);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed");
|
2015-04-02 03:52:13 +08:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2014-12-30 15:50:41 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = test_h6(tfm_cmac);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed");
|
2015-04-02 03:52:13 +08:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2014-12-30 15:50:41 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-30 16:11:20 +08:00
|
|
|
rettime = ktime_get();
|
|
|
|
delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime);
|
|
|
|
duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-13 15:09:48 +08:00
|
|
|
BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration);
|
2014-12-30 15:50:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-02 03:52:13 +08:00
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
|
|
snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer),
|
|
|
|
"PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL,
|
|
|
|
&test_smp_fops);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
2014-12-30 15:50:39 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_hash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
|
|
|
|
BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = run_selftests(tfm_aes, tfm_cmac);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_hash(tfm_cmac);
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|