mirror of https://gitee.com/openkylin/linux.git
netfilter: conntrack: Make global sysctls readonly in non-init netns
These sysctls point to global variables: - NF_SYSCTL_CT_MAX (&nf_conntrack_max) - NF_SYSCTL_CT_EXPECT_MAX (&nf_ct_expect_max) - NF_SYSCTL_CT_BUCKETS (&nf_conntrack_htable_size_user) Because their data pointers are not updated to point to per-netns structures, they must be marked read-only in a non-init_net ns. Otherwise, changes in any net namespace are reflected in (leaked into) all other net namespaces. This problem has existed since the introduction of net namespaces. The current logic marks them read-only only if the net namespace is owned by an unprivileged user (other than init_user_ns). Commitd0febd81ae
("netfilter: conntrack: re-visit sysctls in unprivileged namespaces") "exposes all sysctls even if the namespace is unpriviliged." Since we need to mark them readonly in any case, we can forego the unprivileged user check altogether. Fixes:d0febd81ae
("netfilter: conntrack: re-visit sysctls in unprivileged namespaces") Signed-off-by: Jonathon Reinhart <Jonathon.Reinhart@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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@ -1060,16 +1060,10 @@ static int nf_conntrack_standalone_init_sysctl(struct net *net)
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nf_conntrack_standalone_init_dccp_sysctl(net, table);
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nf_conntrack_standalone_init_gre_sysctl(net, table);
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/* Don't allow unprivileged users to alter certain sysctls */
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if (net->user_ns != &init_user_ns) {
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/* Don't allow non-init_net ns to alter global sysctls */
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if (!net_eq(&init_net, net)) {
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table[NF_SYSCTL_CT_MAX].mode = 0444;
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table[NF_SYSCTL_CT_EXPECT_MAX].mode = 0444;
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table[NF_SYSCTL_CT_HELPER].mode = 0444;
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#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS
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table[NF_SYSCTL_CT_EVENTS].mode = 0444;
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#endif
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table[NF_SYSCTL_CT_BUCKETS].mode = 0444;
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} else if (!net_eq(&init_net, net)) {
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table[NF_SYSCTL_CT_BUCKETS].mode = 0444;
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}
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