mirror of https://gitee.com/openkylin/linux.git
userns: security: make capabilities relative to the user namespace
- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default user namespace. - Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default user namespace. The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with only potential uid confusion issues left. I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals. Changelog: 11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor 12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether he was the creator. Reverse those checks. 12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case 01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper 01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion 02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to it! Fix the check in cap_capable(). 02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable, fixing a compile failure. 02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use kernel-doc format. 02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable(). 02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable. (Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version acked by him) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs] [serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Serge E. Hallyn
Linus Torvalds
parent
59607db367
commit
3486740a4f
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@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ pci_read_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
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u8 *data = (u8*) buf;
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/* Several chips lock up trying to read undefined config space */
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if (security_capable(filp->f_cred, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) {
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if (security_capable(&init_user_ns, filp->f_cred, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) {
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size = dev->cfg_size;
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} else if (dev->hdr_type == PCI_HEADER_TYPE_CARDBUS) {
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size = 128;
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@ -368,6 +368,17 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
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#ifdef __KERNEL__
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struct dentry;
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struct user_namespace;
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extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
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struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
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extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
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extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set;
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extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
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/*
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* Internal kernel functions only
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*/
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@ -530,10 +541,6 @@ static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
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cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
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}
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extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
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extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set;
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extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
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/**
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* has_capability - Determine if a task has a superior capability available
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* @t: The task in question
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@ -544,7 +551,7 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
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*
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* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
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*/
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#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), (cap)) == 0)
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#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), &init_user_ns, (cap)) == 0)
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/**
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* has_capability_noaudit - Determine if a task has a superior capability available (unaudited)
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@ -558,12 +565,25 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
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* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
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*/
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#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) \
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(security_real_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)
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(security_real_capable_noaudit((t), &init_user_ns, (cap)) == 0)
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extern int capable(int cap);
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extern bool capable(int cap);
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extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
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extern bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
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/**
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* nsown_capable - Check superior capability to one's own user_ns
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* @cap: The capability in question
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*
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* Return true if the current task has the given superior capability
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* targeted at its own user namespace.
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*/
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static inline bool nsown_capable(int cap)
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{
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return ns_capable(current_user_ns(), cap);
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}
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/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
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struct dentry;
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extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
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#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
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@ -354,9 +354,11 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred)
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#define current_fsgid() (current_cred_xxx(fsgid))
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#define current_cap() (current_cred_xxx(cap_effective))
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#define current_user() (current_cred_xxx(user))
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#define current_user_ns() (current_cred_xxx(user)->user_ns)
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#define _current_user_ns() (current_cred_xxx(user)->user_ns)
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#define current_security() (current_cred_xxx(security))
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extern struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
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#define current_uid_gid(_uid, _gid) \
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do { \
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const struct cred *__cred; \
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@ -47,13 +47,14 @@
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struct ctl_table;
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struct audit_krule;
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struct user_namespace;
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/*
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* These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
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* as the default capabilities functions
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*/
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extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
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int cap, int audit);
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struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit);
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extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
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extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
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extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
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@ -1262,6 +1263,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
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* credentials.
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* @tsk contains the task_struct for the process.
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* @cred contains the credentials to use.
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* @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in
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* @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
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* @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
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* Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
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@ -1384,7 +1386,7 @@ struct security_operations {
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const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
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const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
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int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
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int cap, int audit);
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struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit);
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int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
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int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry);
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int (*syslog) (int type);
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@ -1665,9 +1667,12 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
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const kernel_cap_t *effective,
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const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
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const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
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int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, int cap);
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int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
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int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
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int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
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int cap);
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int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
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int cap);
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int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk,
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struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
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int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
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int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry);
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int security_syslog(int type);
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@ -1860,28 +1865,29 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new,
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return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted);
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}
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static inline int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, int cap)
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static inline int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns,
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const struct cred *cred, int cap)
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{
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return cap_capable(current, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
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return cap_capable(current, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
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}
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static inline int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
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static inline int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
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{
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int ret;
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rcu_read_lock();
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ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
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ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return ret;
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}
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static inline
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int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
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int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
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{
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int ret;
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rcu_read_lock();
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ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), cap,
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ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), ns, cap,
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SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return ret;
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@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
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/*
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@ -299,17 +300,48 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data)
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* This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
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* assumption that it's about to be used.
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*/
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int capable(int cap)
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bool capable(int cap)
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{
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return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
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/**
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* ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
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* @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
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* @cap: The capability to be tested for
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*
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* Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
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* available for use, false if not.
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*
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* This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
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* assumption that it's about to be used.
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*/
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bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
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{
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if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
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printk(KERN_CRIT "capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
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BUG();
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}
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if (security_capable(current_cred(), cap) == 0) {
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if (security_capable(ns, current_cred(), cap) == 0) {
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current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
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return 1;
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return true;
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}
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return 0;
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return false;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
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/**
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* task_ns_capable - Determine whether current task has a superior
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* capability targeted at a specific task's user namespace.
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* @t: The task whose user namespace is targeted.
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* @cap: The capability in question.
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*
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* Return true if it does, false otherwise.
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*/
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bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
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{
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return ns_capable(task_cred_xxx(t, user)->user_ns, cap);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(task_ns_capable);
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@ -741,6 +741,12 @@ int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as);
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struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void)
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{
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return _current_user_ns();
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(current_user_ns);
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#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
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bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
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@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
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#include <linux/ctype.h>
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#include <linux/sysctl.h>
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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#include <net/sock.h>
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#include "include/apparmor.h"
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@ -136,11 +137,11 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
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}
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static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
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int cap, int audit)
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struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
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{
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struct aa_profile *profile;
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/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
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int error = cap_capable(task, cred, cap, audit);
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int error = cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, audit);
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if (!error) {
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profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
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if (!unconfined(profile))
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@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/prctl.h>
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#include <linux/securebits.h>
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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/*
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* If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
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@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
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* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
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* @tsk: The task to query
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* @cred: The credentials to use
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* @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability
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* @cap: The capability to check for
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* @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
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*
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@ -78,10 +80,30 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
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* cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
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* kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
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*/
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int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, int cap,
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int audit)
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int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
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struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit)
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{
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return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
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for (;;) {
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/* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
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if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && targ_ns->creator == cred->user)
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return 0;
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/* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
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if (targ_ns == cred->user->user_ns)
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return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
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/* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */
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if (targ_ns == &init_user_ns)
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return -EPERM;
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/*
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*If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have
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* it over all children user namespaces as well.
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*/
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targ_ns = targ_ns->creator->user_ns;
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}
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/* We never get here */
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}
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/**
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@ -176,7 +198,8 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
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/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
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* capability
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*/
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if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
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if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
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current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
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SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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@ -828,7 +851,8 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
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& (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
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|| ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
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|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
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|| (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
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|| (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
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current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
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SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
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/*
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* [1] no changing of bits that are locked
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@ -893,7 +917,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
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{
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int cap_sys_admin = 0;
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if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
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if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
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SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
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cap_sys_admin = 1;
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return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
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@ -920,7 +944,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
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int ret = 0;
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if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
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ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
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ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
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SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
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/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
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if (ret == 0)
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@ -154,29 +154,33 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
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effective, inheritable, permitted);
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}
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int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, int cap)
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||||
int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
|
||||
int cap)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return security_ops->capable(current, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
|
||||
return security_ops->capable(current, cred, ns, cap,
|
||||
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
|
||||
int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
|
||||
int cap)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const struct cred *cred;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
|
||||
ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
|
||||
ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
|
||||
put_cred(cred);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
|
||||
int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk,
|
||||
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const struct cred *cred;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
|
||||
ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
|
||||
ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
|
||||
put_cred(cred);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -79,6 +79,7 @@
|
|||
#include <linux/mutex.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/syslog.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "avc.h"
|
||||
#include "objsec.h"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1846,11 +1847,11 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
|
|||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
|
||||
int cap, int audit)
|
||||
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
|
||||
rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
|
||||
rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
|
||||
if (rc)
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1931,7 +1932,8 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
|
|||
{
|
||||
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
|
||||
rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
|
||||
&init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
|
||||
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
|
||||
if (rc == 0)
|
||||
cap_sys_admin = 1;
|
||||
|
|
@ -2834,7 +2836,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
|
|||
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
|
||||
* in-core context value, not a denial.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
|
||||
error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
|
||||
&init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
|
||||
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
|
||||
if (!error)
|
||||
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
|
||||
|
|
@ -2968,7 +2971,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
|
|||
case KDSKBENT:
|
||||
case KDSKBSENT:
|
||||
error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
|
||||
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
|
||||
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
/* default case assumes that the command will go
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue