Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (25 commits)
  security: remove register_security hook
  security: remove dummy module fix
  security: remove dummy module
  security: remove unused sb_get_mnt_opts hook
  LSM/SELinux: show LSM mount options in /proc/mounts
  SELinux: allow fstype unknown to policy to use xattrs if present
  security: fix return of void-valued expressions
  SELinux: use do_each_thread as a proper do/while block
  SELinux: remove unused and shadowed addrlen variable
  SELinux: more user friendly unknown handling printk
  selinux: change handling of invalid classes (Was: Re: 2.6.26-rc5-mm1 selinux whine)
  SELinux: drop load_mutex in security_load_policy
  SELinux: fix off by 1 reference of class_to_string in context_struct_compute_av
  SELinux: open code sidtab lock
  SELinux: open code load_mutex
  SELinux: open code policy_rwlock
  selinux: fix endianness bug in network node address handling
  selinux: simplify ioctl checking
  SELinux: enable processes with mac_admin to get the raw inode contexts
  Security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attach
  ...

fs/namespace.c

@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ struct proc_fs_info {
 	const char *str;
 };
 
-static void show_sb_opts(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
+static int show_sb_opts(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	static const struct proc_fs_info fs_info[] = {
 		{ MS_SYNCHRONOUS, ",sync" },
@@ -764,6 +764,8 @@ static void show_sb_opts(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
 		if (sb->s_flags & fs_infop->flag)
 			seq_puts(m, fs_infop->str);
 	}
+
+	return security_sb_show_options(m, sb);
 }
 
 static void show_mnt_opts(struct seq_file *m, struct vfsmount *mnt)
@@ -806,11 +808,14 @@ static int show_vfsmnt(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	seq_putc(m, ' ');
 	show_type(m, mnt->mnt_sb);
 	seq_puts(m, __mnt_is_readonly(mnt) ? " ro" : " rw");
-	show_sb_opts(m, mnt->mnt_sb);
+	err = show_sb_opts(m, mnt->mnt_sb);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
 	show_mnt_opts(m, mnt);
 	if (mnt->mnt_sb->s_op->show_options)
 		err = mnt->mnt_sb->s_op->show_options(m, mnt);
 	seq_puts(m, " 0 0\n");
+out:
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -865,10 +870,13 @@ static int show_mountinfo(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	seq_putc(m, ' ');
 	mangle(m, mnt->mnt_devname ? mnt->mnt_devname : "none");
 	seq_puts(m, sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY ? " ro" : " rw");
-	show_sb_opts(m, sb);
+	err = show_sb_opts(m, sb);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
 	if (sb->s_op->show_options)
 		err = sb->s_op->show_options(m, mnt);
 	seq_putc(m, '\n');
+out:
 	return err;
 }
 

fs/proc/base.c

@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
 	 */
 	if (task->parent == current && (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) &&
 	    task_is_stopped_or_traced(task) &&
-	    ptrace_may_attach(task))
+	    ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH))
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -251,7 +251,8 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
 	task_lock(task);
 	if (task->mm != mm)
 		goto out;
-	if (task->mm != current->mm && __ptrace_may_attach(task) < 0)
+	if (task->mm != current->mm &&
+	    __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) < 0)
 		goto out;
 	task_unlock(task);
 	return mm;
@@ -518,7 +519,7 @@ static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode)
 	 */
 	task = get_proc_task(inode);
 	if (task) {
-		allowed = ptrace_may_attach(task);
+		allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
 		put_task_struct(task);
 	}
 	return allowed;
@@ -904,7 +905,7 @@ static ssize_t environ_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	if (!task)
 		goto out_no_task;
 
-	if (!ptrace_may_attach(task))
+	if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
 		goto out;
 
 	ret = -ENOMEM;

fs/proc/task_mmu.c

@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static int show_map(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	dev_t dev = 0;
 	int len;
 
-	if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_attach(task))
+	if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	if (file) {
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static ssize_t pagemap_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 		goto out;
 
 	ret = -EACCES;
-	if (!ptrace_may_attach(task))
+	if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
 		goto out_task;
 
 	ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ static int show_numa_map_checked(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
 	struct task_struct *task = priv->task;
 
-	if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_attach(task))
+	if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	return show_numa_map(m, v);

fs/proc/task_nommu.c

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int show_map(struct seq_file *m, void *_vml)
 	struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
 	struct task_struct *task = priv->task;
 
-	if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_attach(task))
+	if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	return nommu_vma_show(m, vml->vma);

include/linux/ptrace.h

@@ -95,8 +95,12 @@ extern void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child,
 			  struct task_struct *new_parent);
 extern void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child);
 extern void ptrace_untrace(struct task_struct *child);
-extern int ptrace_may_attach(struct task_struct *task);
+#define PTRACE_MODE_READ   1
-extern int __ptrace_may_attach(struct task_struct *task);
+#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 2
+/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
+extern int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
+/* Returns true on success, false on denial. */
+extern bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
 
 static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child)
 {

include/linux/security.h

@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ struct audit_krule;
  */
 extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
 extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
-extern int cap_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child);
+extern int cap_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child,
+		      unsigned int mode);
 extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
 extern int cap_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
 extern void cap_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ struct xfrm_selector;
 struct xfrm_policy;
 struct xfrm_state;
 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx;
+struct seq_file;
 
 extern int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 extern int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
@@ -289,10 +291,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	Update module state after a successful pivot.
  *	@old_path contains the path for the old root.
  *	@new_path contains the path for the new root.
- * @sb_get_mnt_opts:
- *	Get the security relevant mount options used for a superblock
- *	@sb the superblock to get security mount options from
- *	@opts binary data structure containing all lsm mount data
  * @sb_set_mnt_opts:
  *	Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock
  *	@sb the superblock to set security mount options for
@@ -1170,6 +1168,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	attributes would be changed by the execve.
  *	@parent contains the task_struct structure for parent process.
  *	@child contains the task_struct structure for child process.
+ *	@mode contains the PTRACE_MODE flags indicating the form of access.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @capget:
  *	Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for
@@ -1240,11 +1239,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@pages contains the number of pages.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  *
- * @register_security:
- *	allow module stacking.
- *	@name contains the name of the security module being stacked.
- *	@ops contains a pointer to the struct security_operations of the module to stack.
- *
  * @secid_to_secctx:
  *	Convert secid to security context.
  *	@secid contains the security ID.
@@ -1295,7 +1289,8 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 struct security_operations {
 	char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
 
-	int (*ptrace) (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child);
+	int (*ptrace) (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child,
+		       unsigned int mode);
 	int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
 		       kernel_cap_t *effective,
 		       kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
@@ -1328,6 +1323,7 @@ struct security_operations {
 	void (*sb_free_security) (struct super_block *sb);
 	int (*sb_copy_data) (char *orig, char *copy);
 	int (*sb_kern_mount) (struct super_block *sb, void *data);
+	int (*sb_show_options) (struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
 	int (*sb_statfs) (struct dentry *dentry);
 	int (*sb_mount) (char *dev_name, struct path *path,
 			 char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data);
@@ -1343,8 +1339,6 @@ struct security_operations {
 			     struct path *new_path);
 	void (*sb_post_pivotroot) (struct path *old_path,
 				   struct path *new_path);
-	int (*sb_get_mnt_opts) (const struct super_block *sb,
-				struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
 	int (*sb_set_mnt_opts) (struct super_block *sb,
 				struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
 	void (*sb_clone_mnt_opts) (const struct super_block *oldsb,
@@ -1472,10 +1466,6 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*netlink_send) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 	int (*netlink_recv) (struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
 
-	/* allow module stacking */
-	int (*register_security) (const char *name,
-				  struct security_operations *ops);
-
 	void (*d_instantiate) (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
 
 	int (*getprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
@@ -1565,7 +1555,6 @@ struct security_operations {
 extern int security_init(void);
 extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops);
 extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops);
-extern int mod_reg_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops);
 extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, mode_t mode,
 					     struct dentry *parent, void *data,
 					     const struct file_operations *fops);
@@ -1573,7 +1562,8 @@ extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *par
 extern void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry);
 
 /* Security operations */
-int security_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child);
+int security_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child,
+		    unsigned int mode);
 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
 		    kernel_cap_t *effective,
 		    kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
@@ -1606,6 +1596,7 @@ int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb);
 void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb);
 int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy);
 int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data);
+int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry);
 int security_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
 		      char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data);
@@ -1617,8 +1608,6 @@ void security_sb_post_remount(struct vfsmount *mnt, unsigned long flags, void *d
 void security_sb_post_addmount(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *mountpoint);
 int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path);
 void security_sb_post_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path);
-int security_sb_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
-				struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
 void security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 				struct super_block *newsb);
@@ -1755,9 +1744,11 @@ static inline int security_init(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
+static inline int security_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent,
+				  struct task_struct *child,
+				  unsigned int mode)
 {
-	return cap_ptrace(parent, child);
+	return cap_ptrace(parent, child, mode);
 }
 
 static inline int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
@@ -1881,6 +1872,12 @@ static inline int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m,
+					   struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -1927,12 +1924,6 @@ static inline int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path,
 static inline void security_sb_post_pivotroot(struct path *old_path,
 					      struct path *new_path)
 { }
-static inline int security_sb_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
-					   struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
-{
-	security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
-	return 0;
-}
 
 static inline int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 					   struct security_mnt_opts *opts)

kernel/ptrace.c

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, int kill)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int __ptrace_may_attach(struct task_struct *task)
+int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	/* May we inspect the given task?
 	 * This check is used both for attaching with ptrace
@@ -148,16 +148,16 @@ int __ptrace_may_attach(struct task_struct *task)
 	if (!dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	return security_ptrace(current, task);
+	return security_ptrace(current, task, mode);
 }
 
-int ptrace_may_attach(struct task_struct *task)
+bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int err;
 	task_lock(task);
-	err = __ptrace_may_attach(task);
+	err = __ptrace_may_access(task, mode);
 	task_unlock(task);
-	return !err;
+	return (!err ? true : false);
 }
 
 int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
 	/* the same process cannot be attached many times */
 	if (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 		goto bad;
-	retval = __ptrace_may_attach(task);
+	retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
 	if (retval)
 		goto bad;
 
@@ -494,7 +494,8 @@ int ptrace_traceme(void)
 	 */
 	task_lock(current);
 	if (!(current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) {
-		ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current);
+		ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current,
+				      PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
 		/*
 		 * Set the ptrace bit in the process ptrace flags.
 		 */

security/Kconfig

@@ -73,17 +73,9 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 	  IPSec.
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
-config SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
-	bool "Default Linux Capabilities"
-	depends on SECURITY
-	default y
-	help
-	  This enables the "default" Linux capabilities functionality.
-	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y.
-
 config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 	bool "File POSIX Capabilities (EXPERIMENTAL)"
-	depends on (SECURITY=n || SECURITY_CAPABILITIES!=n) && EXPERIMENTAL
+	depends on EXPERIMENTAL
 	default n
 	help
 	  This enables filesystem capabilities, allowing you to give

security/Makefile

@@ -6,16 +6,13 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS)			+= keys/
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)	+= selinux
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack
 
-# if we don't select a security model, use the default capabilities
+# always enable default capabilities
-ifneq ($(CONFIG_SECURITY),y)
 obj-y		+= commoncap.o
-endif
 
 # Object file lists
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o dummy.o inode.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o capability.o inode.o
 # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= commoncap.o smack/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/built-in.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES)	+= commoncap.o capability.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)		+= root_plug.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)		+= commoncap.o root_plug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o

security/commoncap.c

@@ -63,7 +63,8 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
+int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child,
+		unsigned int mode)
 {
 	/* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
 	if (!cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted) &&

security/root_plug.c

@@ -28,9 +28,6 @@
 #include <linux/usb.h>
 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
 
-/* flag to keep track of how we were registered */
-static int secondary;
-
 /* default is a generic type of usb to serial converter */
 static int vendor_id = 0x0557;
 static int product_id = 0x2008;
@@ -97,13 +94,7 @@ static int __init rootplug_init (void)
 	if (register_security (&rootplug_security_ops)) {
 		printk (KERN_INFO 
 			"Failure registering Root Plug module with the kernel\n");
-		/* try registering with primary module */
-		if (mod_reg_security (MY_NAME, &rootplug_security_ops)) {
-			printk (KERN_INFO "Failure registering Root Plug "
-				" module with primary security module.\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
-		}
-		secondary = 1;
 	}
 	printk (KERN_INFO "Root Plug module initialized, "
 		"vendor_id = %4.4x, product id = %4.4x\n", vendor_id, product_id);

security/security.c

@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@
 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
 static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
 
-/* things that live in dummy.c */
+/* things that live in capability.c */
-extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
+extern struct security_operations default_security_ops;
 extern void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);
 
 struct security_operations *security_ops;	/* Initialized to NULL */
@@ -57,13 +57,8 @@ int __init security_init(void)
 {
 	printk(KERN_INFO "Security Framework initialized\n");
 
-	if (verify(&dummy_security_ops)) {
+	security_fixup_ops(&default_security_ops);
-		printk(KERN_ERR "%s could not verify "
+	security_ops = &default_security_ops;
-		       "dummy_security_ops structure.\n", __func__);
-		return -EIO;
-	}
-
-	security_ops = &dummy_security_ops;
 	do_security_initcalls();
 
 	return 0;
@@ -122,7 +117,7 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (security_ops != &dummy_security_ops)
+	if (security_ops != &default_security_ops)
 		return -EAGAIN;
 
 	security_ops = ops;
@@ -130,40 +125,12 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/**
- * mod_reg_security - allows security modules to be "stacked"
- * @name: a pointer to a string with the name of the security_options to be registered
- * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_options that is to be registered
- *
- * This function allows security modules to be stacked if the currently loaded
- * security module allows this to happen.  It passes the @name and @ops to the
- * register_security function of the currently loaded security module.
- *
- * The return value depends on the currently loaded security module, with 0 as
- * success.
- */
-int mod_reg_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
-{
-	if (verify(ops)) {
-		printk(KERN_INFO "%s could not verify "
-		       "security operations.\n", __func__);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	if (ops == security_ops) {
-		printk(KERN_INFO "%s security operations "
-		       "already registered.\n", __func__);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	return security_ops->register_security(name, ops);
-}
-
 /* Security operations */
 
-int security_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
+int security_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child,
+		    unsigned int mode)
 {
-	return security_ops->ptrace(parent, child);
+	return security_ops->ptrace(parent, child, mode);
 }
 
 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
@@ -291,6 +258,11 @@ int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 	return security_ops->sb_kern_mount(sb, data);
 }
 
+int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	return security_ops->sb_show_options(m, sb);
+}
+
 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	return security_ops->sb_statfs(dentry);
@@ -342,12 +314,6 @@ void security_sb_post_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
 	security_ops->sb_post_pivotroot(old_path, new_path);
 }
 
-int security_sb_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
-				struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
-{
-	return security_ops->sb_get_mnt_opts(sb, opts);
-}
-
 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 				struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 {
@@ -894,7 +860,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
 
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
-	return security_ops->release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+	security_ops->release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
 
@@ -1011,12 +977,12 @@ int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 
 void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	return security_ops->sk_free_security(sk);
+	security_ops->sk_free_security(sk);
 }
 
 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	return security_ops->sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
+	security_ops->sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
 }
 
 void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl)

security/selinux/hooks.c

@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@
  *	      James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  *
  *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
- *  Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *					   Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  *			    <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
  *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
@@ -42,9 +43,7 @@
 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
-#include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
-#include <linux/kd.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
 #include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -53,7 +52,7 @@
 #include <net/tcp.h>		/* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
-#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
 #include <asm/atomic.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
@@ -104,7 +103,9 @@ int selinux_enforcing;
 
 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
 {
-	selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
+	unsigned long enforcing;
+	if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
+		selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
@@ -115,7 +116,9 @@ int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
 
 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 {
-	selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
+	unsigned long enabled;
+	if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
+		selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
@@ -123,13 +126,11 @@ __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 int selinux_enabled = 1;
 #endif
 
-/* Original (dummy) security module. */
-static struct security_operations *original_ops;
 
-/* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
+/*
-   just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
+ * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
-   The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
+ * just to allow the use of the capability module.
-   module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
+ */
 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
 
 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
@@ -554,13 +555,15 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 	const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
-	struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
+	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
-	struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
+	struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
+	struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = root_inode->i_security;
 	u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
 	u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
 	char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
 	int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
 	int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
+	bool can_xattr = false;
 
 	mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 
@@ -594,7 +597,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	 */
 	if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
 	    && (num_opts == 0))
-	        goto out;
+		goto out;
 
 	/*
 	 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
@@ -664,14 +667,24 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
+	if (strcmp(name, "proc") == 0)
 		sbsec->proc = 1;
 
+	/*
+	 * test if the fs supports xattrs, fs_use might make use of this if the
+	 * fs has no definition in policy.
+	 */
+	if (root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
+		rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+		if (rc >= 0 || rc == -ENODATA)
+			can_xattr = true;
+	}
+
 	/* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
-	rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
+	rc = security_fs_use(name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid, can_xattr);
 	if (rc) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
-		       __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+		       __func__, name, rc);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -956,6 +969,57 @@ static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 	return rc;
 }
 
+void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
+{
+	int i;
+	char *prefix;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
+		char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
+
+		switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
+		case CONTEXT_MNT:
+			prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
+			break;
+		case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
+			prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
+			break;
+		case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
+			prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
+			break;
+		case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
+			prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
+			break;
+		default:
+			BUG();
+		};
+		/* we need a comma before each option */
+		seq_putc(m, ',');
+		seq_puts(m, prefix);
+		if (has_comma)
+			seq_putc(m, '\"');
+		seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
+		if (has_comma)
+			seq_putc(m, '\"');
+	}
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct security_mnt_opts opts;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
+
+	security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
 {
 	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
@@ -1682,14 +1746,23 @@ static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
 
 /* Hook functions begin here. */
 
-static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
+static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent,
+			  struct task_struct *child,
+			  unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent, child);
+	rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent, child, mode);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
+	if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
+		struct task_security_struct *tsec = parent->security;
+		struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
+		return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
+				    SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
+	}
+
 	return task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
 }
 
@@ -2495,7 +2568,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	}
 
 	if (value && len) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
 		if (rc) {
 			kfree(namep);
 			return rc;
@@ -2669,6 +2742,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		return rc;
 
 	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
+	if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+			return rc;
+		rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
+	}
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2690,7 +2768,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 }
 
 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
-                                        const void *value, size_t size,
+					const void *value, size_t size,
 					int flags)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -2703,10 +2781,11 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		return;
 	}
 
-	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
 	if (rc) {
-		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  unable to obtain SID for context "
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to map context to SID"
-		       "%s, rc=%d\n", __func__, (char *)value, -rc);
+		       "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
+		       inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -2735,9 +2814,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 }
 
 /*
- * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user.  If the
+ * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
- * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
- * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
  *
  * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
  */
@@ -2746,12 +2823,33 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
 	u32 size;
 	int error;
 	char *context = NULL;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
+	/*
+	 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
+	 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
+	 * use the in-core value under current policy.
+	 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
+	 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
+	 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
+	 * in-core context value, not a denial.
+	 */
+	error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
+	if (!error)
+		error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+					     SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
+					     CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
+					     0,
+					     NULL);
+	if (!error)
+		error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
+						      &size);
+	else
+		error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 	error = size;
@@ -2865,46 +2963,16 @@ static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			      unsigned long arg)
 {
-	int error = 0;
+	u32 av = 0;
 
-	switch (cmd) {
+	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
-	case FIONREAD:
+		av |= FILE__WRITE;
-	/* fall through */
+	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
-	case FIBMAP:
+		av |= FILE__READ;
-	/* fall through */
+	if (!av)
-	case FIGETBSZ:
+		av = FILE__IOCTL;
-	/* fall through */
-	case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
-	/* fall through */
-	case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
-		error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
-		break;
 
-	case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
+	return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
-	/* fall through */
-	case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
-		error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
-		break;
-
-	/* sys_ioctl() checks */
-	case FIONBIO:
-	/* fall through */
-	case FIOASYNC:
-		error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
-		break;
-
-	case KDSKBENT:
-	case KDSKBSENT:
-		error = task_has_capability(current, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
-		break;
-
-	/* default case assumes that the command will go
-	 * to the file's ioctl() function.
-	 */
-	default:
-		error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
-	}
-	return error;
 }
 
 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
@@ -3663,7 +3731,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
 		unsigned short snum;
 		struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-		u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
+		u32 sid, node_perm;
 
 		tsec = current->security;
 		isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
@@ -3671,12 +3739,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		if (family == PF_INET) {
 			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
 			snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
-			addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
 			addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
 		} else {
 			addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
 			snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
-			addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
 			addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
 		}
 
@@ -5047,24 +5113,6 @@ static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = isec->sid;
 }
 
-/* module stacking operations */
-static int selinux_register_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
-{
-	if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  There is already a secondary security "
-		       "module registered.\n", __func__);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	secondary_ops = ops;
-
-	printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  Registering secondary module %s\n",
-	       __func__,
-	       name);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
 {
 	if (inode)
@@ -5153,6 +5201,12 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 			size--;
 		}
 		error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
+		if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
+			if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+				return error;
+			error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
+							      &sid);
+		}
 		if (error)
 			return error;
 	}
@@ -5186,12 +5240,12 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 			struct task_struct *g, *t;
 			struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
 			read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
-			do_each_thread(g, t)
+			do_each_thread(g, t) {
 				if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
 					read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
 					return -EPERM;
 				}
-			while_each_thread(g, t);
+			} while_each_thread(g, t);
 			read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
 		}
 
@@ -5343,10 +5397,10 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.sb_free_security =		selinux_sb_free_security,
 	.sb_copy_data =			selinux_sb_copy_data,
 	.sb_kern_mount =		selinux_sb_kern_mount,
+	.sb_show_options =		selinux_sb_show_options,
 	.sb_statfs =			selinux_sb_statfs,
 	.sb_mount =			selinux_mount,
 	.sb_umount =			selinux_umount,
-	.sb_get_mnt_opts =		selinux_get_mnt_opts,
 	.sb_set_mnt_opts =		selinux_set_mnt_opts,
 	.sb_clone_mnt_opts =		selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
 	.sb_parse_opts_str = 		selinux_parse_opts_str,
@@ -5378,7 +5432,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.inode_listsecurity =		selinux_inode_listsecurity,
 	.inode_need_killpriv =		selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
 	.inode_killpriv =		selinux_inode_killpriv,
-	.inode_getsecid =               selinux_inode_getsecid,
+	.inode_getsecid =		selinux_inode_getsecid,
 
 	.file_permission =		selinux_file_permission,
 	.file_alloc_security =		selinux_file_alloc_security,
@@ -5419,7 +5473,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.task_to_inode =		selinux_task_to_inode,
 
 	.ipc_permission =		selinux_ipc_permission,
-	.ipc_getsecid =                 selinux_ipc_getsecid,
+	.ipc_getsecid =			selinux_ipc_getsecid,
 
 	.msg_msg_alloc_security =	selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
 	.msg_msg_free_security =	selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
@@ -5443,8 +5497,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.sem_semctl =			selinux_sem_semctl,
 	.sem_semop =			selinux_sem_semop,
 
-	.register_security =		selinux_register_security,
-
 	.d_instantiate =		selinux_d_instantiate,
 
 	.getprocattr =			selinux_getprocattr,
@@ -5538,7 +5590,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
 					    0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 	avc_init();
 
-	original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
+	secondary_ops = security_ops;
 	if (!secondary_ops)
 		panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
 	if (register_security(&selinux_ops))

security/selinux/include/audit.h

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * SELinux support for the Audit LSM hooks
  *
- * Most of below header was moved from include/linux/selinux.h which 
+ * Most of below header was moved from include/linux/selinux.h which
  * is released under below copyrights:
  *
  * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
  *	-errno on failure.
  */
 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule,
-                             struct audit_context *actx);
+			     struct audit_context *actx);
 
 /**
  *	selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.

security/selinux/include/avc.h

@@ -75,13 +75,12 @@ struct avc_audit_data {
 
 /* Initialize an AVC audit data structure. */
 #define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d,_t) \
-        { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct avc_audit_data)); (_d)->type = AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; }
+	{ memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct avc_audit_data)); (_d)->type = AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; }
 
 /*
  * AVC statistics
  */
-struct avc_cache_stats
+struct avc_cache_stats {
-{
 	unsigned int lookups;
 	unsigned int hits;
 	unsigned int misses;
@@ -97,8 +96,8 @@ struct avc_cache_stats
 void __init avc_init(void);
 
 void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-               u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+	       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-               struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
+	       struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
 
 #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
 int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
@@ -107,8 +106,8 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			 struct av_decision *avd);
 
 int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-                 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+		 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-                 struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
+		 struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
 
 u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
 
@@ -122,7 +121,7 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE	128
 
 int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-                                     u16 tclass, u32 perms,
+				     u16 tclass, u32 perms,
 				     u32 *out_retained),
 		     u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		     u16 tclass, u32 perms);

security/selinux/include/objsec.h

@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ struct inode_security_struct {
 	u16 sclass;		/* security class of this object */
 	unsigned char initialized;	/* initialization flag */
 	struct mutex lock;
-	unsigned char inherit;	/* inherit SID from parent entry */
 };
 
 struct file_security_struct {

security/selinux/include/security.h

@@ -93,12 +93,17 @@ int security_change_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext,
 	u32 *scontext_len);
 
+int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
+
 int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 	u32 *out_sid);
 
 int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 				    u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags);
 
+int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+				  u32 *sid);
+
 int security_get_user_sids(u32 callsid, char *username,
 			   u32 **sids, u32 *nel);
 
@@ -131,7 +136,7 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT	6 /* use mountpoint labeling */
 
 int security_fs_use(const char *fstype, unsigned int *behavior,
-	u32 *sid);
+	u32 *sid, bool can_xattr);
 
 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass,
 	u32 *sid);

security/selinux/netnode.c

@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@
 #include <linux/ipv6.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
-#include <asm/bug.h>
 
 #include "netnode.h"
 #include "objsec.h"

security/selinux/netport.c

@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@
 #include <linux/ipv6.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
-#include <asm/bug.h>
 
 #include "netport.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
@@ -272,7 +271,7 @@ static __init int sel_netport_init(void)
 	}
 
 	ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netport_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
-	                       SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
+			       SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
 	if (ret != 0)
 		panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret);
 

security/selinux/selinuxfs.c

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
-#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
 
 /* selinuxfs pseudo filesystem for exporting the security policy API.
    Based on the proc code and the fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c code. */
@@ -57,14 +57,18 @@ int selinux_compat_net = SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE;
 
 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
 {
-	selinux_checkreqprot = simple_strtoul(str, NULL, 0) ? 1 : 0;
+	unsigned long checkreqprot;
+	if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
+		selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
 
 static int __init selinux_compat_net_setup(char *str)
 {
-	selinux_compat_net = simple_strtoul(str, NULL, 0) ? 1 : 0;
+	unsigned long compat_net;
+	if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &compat_net))
+		selinux_compat_net = compat_net ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("selinux_compat_net=", selinux_compat_net_setup);
@@ -352,11 +356,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		length = count;
 
 out1:
-
-	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: policy loaded with handle_unknown=%s\n",
-	       (security_get_reject_unknown() ? "reject" :
-		(security_get_allow_unknown() ? "allow" : "deny")));
-
 	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
 		"policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u",
 		audit_get_loginuid(current),

security/selinux/ss/avtab.c

@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag)
 	}
 
 	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
-	       "longest chain length %d sum of chain length^2 %Lu\n",
+	       "longest chain length %d sum of chain length^2 %llu\n",
 	       tag, h->nel, slots_used, h->nslot, max_chain_len,
 	       chain2_len_sum);
 }

security/selinux/ss/context.h

@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ struct context {
 	u32 role;
 	u32 type;
 	struct mls_range range;
+	char *str;	/* string representation if context cannot be mapped. */
+	u32 len;        /* length of string in bytes */
 };
 
 static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)
@@ -106,20 +108,43 @@ static inline void context_init(struct context *c)
 
 static inline int context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
 {
+	int rc;
+
 	dst->user = src->user;
 	dst->role = src->role;
 	dst->type = src->type;
-	return mls_context_cpy(dst, src);
+	if (src->str) {
+		dst->str = kstrdup(src->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!dst->str)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		dst->len = src->len;
+	} else {
+		dst->str = NULL;
+		dst->len = 0;
+	}
+	rc = mls_context_cpy(dst, src);
+	if (rc) {
+		kfree(dst->str);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline void context_destroy(struct context *c)
 {
 	c->user = c->role = c->type = 0;
+	kfree(c->str);
+	c->str = NULL;
+	c->len = 0;
 	mls_context_destroy(c);
 }
 
 static inline int context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
 {
+	if (c1->len && c2->len)
+		return (c1->len == c2->len && !strcmp(c1->str, c2->str));
+	if (c1->len || c2->len)
+		return 0;
 	return ((c1->user == c2->user) &&
 		(c1->role == c2->role) &&
 		(c1->type == c2->type) &&

security/selinux/ss/mls.c

@@ -239,7 +239,8 @@ int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
  * Policy read-lock must be held for sidtab lookup.
  *
  */
-int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc,
+int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
+		       char oldc,
 		       char **scontext,
 		       struct context *context,
 		       struct sidtab *s,
@@ -286,7 +287,7 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc,
 		*p++ = 0;
 
 	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
-		levdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_levels.table, scontextp);
+		levdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_levels.table, scontextp);
 		if (!levdatum) {
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 			goto out;
@@ -311,7 +312,7 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc,
 					*rngptr++ = 0;
 				}
 
-				catdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_cats.table,
+				catdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table,
 							  scontextp);
 				if (!catdatum) {
 					rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -327,7 +328,7 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc,
 				if (rngptr) {
 					int i;
 
-					rngdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_cats.table, rngptr);
+					rngdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table, rngptr);
 					if (!rngdatum) {
 						rc = -EINVAL;
 						goto out;
@@ -395,7 +396,7 @@ int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 	if (!tmpstr) {
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 	} else {
-		rc = mls_context_to_sid(':', &tmpstr, context,
+		rc = mls_context_to_sid(&policydb, ':', &tmpstr, context,
 					NULL, SECSID_NULL);
 		kfree(freestr);
 	}
@@ -436,13 +437,13 @@ int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
 		struct mls_level *usercon_clr = &(usercon->range.level[1]);
 
 		/* Honor the user's default level if we can */
-		if (mls_level_between(user_def, fromcon_sen, fromcon_clr)) {
+		if (mls_level_between(user_def, fromcon_sen, fromcon_clr))
 			*usercon_sen = *user_def;
-		} else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_sen, user_def, user_clr)) {
+		else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_sen, user_def, user_clr))
 			*usercon_sen = *fromcon_sen;
-		} else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_clr, user_low, user_def)) {
+		else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_clr, user_low, user_def))
 			*usercon_sen = *user_low;
-		} else
+		else
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		/* Lower the clearance of available contexts

security/selinux/ss/mls.h

@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
 int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r);
 int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l);
 
-int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc,
+int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *p,
+		       char oldc,
 		       char **scontext,
 		       struct context *context,
 		       struct sidtab *s,

security/selinux/ss/policydb.c

@@ -1478,7 +1478,8 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	struct ocontext *l, *c, *newc;
 	struct genfs *genfs_p, *genfs, *newgenfs;
 	int i, j, rc;
-	__le32 buf[8];
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	u32 nodebuf[8];
 	u32 len, len2, config, nprim, nel, nel2;
 	char *policydb_str;
 	struct policydb_compat_info *info;
@@ -1749,11 +1750,11 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 					goto bad;
 				break;
 			case OCON_NODE:
-				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+				rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
 				if (rc < 0)
 					goto bad;
-				c->u.node.addr = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				c->u.node.addr = nodebuf[0]; /* network order */
-				c->u.node.mask = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+				c->u.node.mask = nodebuf[1]; /* network order */
 				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
 				if (rc)
 					goto bad;
@@ -1782,13 +1783,13 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 			case OCON_NODE6: {
 				int k;
 
-				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8);
+				rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8);
 				if (rc < 0)
 					goto bad;
 				for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
-					c->u.node6.addr[k] = le32_to_cpu(buf[k]);
+					c->u.node6.addr[k] = nodebuf[k];
 				for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
-					c->u.node6.mask[k] = le32_to_cpu(buf[k+4]);
+					c->u.node6.mask[k] = nodebuf[k+4];
 				if (context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp))
 					goto bad;
 				break;

security/selinux/ss/services.c

@@ -71,14 +71,6 @@ int selinux_policycap_openperm;
 extern const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm;
 
 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
-#define POLICY_RDLOCK read_lock(&policy_rwlock)
-#define POLICY_WRLOCK write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
-#define POLICY_RDUNLOCK read_unlock(&policy_rwlock)
-#define POLICY_WRUNLOCK write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
-
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(load_mutex);
-#define LOAD_LOCK mutex_lock(&load_mutex)
-#define LOAD_UNLOCK mutex_unlock(&load_mutex)
 
 static struct sidtab sidtab;
 struct policydb policydb;
@@ -332,7 +324,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 		goto inval_class;
 	if (unlikely(tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim))
 		if (tclass > kdefs->cts_len ||
-		    !kdefs->class_to_string[tclass - 1] ||
+		    !kdefs->class_to_string[tclass] ||
 		    !policydb.allow_unknown)
 			goto inval_class;
 
@@ -415,9 +407,19 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	return 0;
 
 inval_class:
-	printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized class %d\n", __func__,
+	if (!tclass || tclass > kdefs->cts_len ||
-		tclass);
+	    !kdefs->class_to_string[tclass]) {
-	return -EINVAL;
+		if (printk_ratelimit())
+			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized class %d\n",
+			       __func__, tclass);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Known to the kernel, but not to the policy.
+	 * Handle as a denial (allowed is 0).
+	 */
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -429,7 +431,7 @@ int security_permissive_sid(u32 sid)
 	u32 type;
 	int rc;
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
 	BUG_ON(!context);
@@ -441,7 +443,7 @@ int security_permissive_sid(u32 sid)
 	 */
 	rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, type);
 
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -486,7 +488,7 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 	if (!ss_initialized)
 		return 0;
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	/*
 	 * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions.
@@ -543,7 +545,7 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 	}
 
 out:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -578,7 +580,7 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
@@ -598,7 +600,7 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
 	rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass,
 				       requested, avd);
 out:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -616,6 +618,14 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3
 	*scontext = NULL;
 	*scontext_len = 0;
 
+	if (context->len) {
+		*scontext_len = context->len;
+		*scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!(*scontext))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	/* Compute the size of the context. */
 	*scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) + 1;
 	*scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) + 1;
@@ -655,17 +665,8 @@ const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
 	return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
 }
 
-/**
+static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
- * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
+					u32 *scontext_len, int force)
- * @sid: security identifier, SID
- * @scontext: security context
- * @scontext_len: length in bytes
- *
- * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
- * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size.  Set @scontext
- * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
- */
-int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
 {
 	struct context *context;
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -692,8 +693,11 @@ int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	if (force)
+		context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
+	else
+		context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
 	if (!context) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, sid);
@@ -702,59 +706,54 @@ int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
 	}
 	rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
 out_unlock:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 out:
 	return rc;
 
 }
 
-static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+/**
-					u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
+ * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size.  Set @scontext
+ * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0);
+}
+
+int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Caveat:  Mutates scontext.
+ */
+static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
+				    struct sidtab *sidtabp,
+				    char *scontext,
+				    u32 scontext_len,
+				    struct context *ctx,
+				    u32 def_sid)
 {
-	char *scontext2;
-	struct context context;
 	struct role_datum *role;
 	struct type_datum *typdatum;
 	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
 	char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
+	context_init(ctx);
-		int i;
-
-		for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
-			if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
-				*sid = i;
-				goto out;
-			}
-		}
-		*sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
-
-	/* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it.
-	   The string should already by null terminated, but we append a
-	   null suffix to the copy to avoid problems with the existing
-	   attr package, which doesn't view the null terminator as part
-	   of the attribute value. */
-	scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1, gfp_flags);
-	if (!scontext2) {
-		rc = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
-	scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
-
-	context_init(&context);
-	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
-
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
 
 	/* Parse the security context. */
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	scontextp = (char *) scontext2;
+	scontextp = (char *) scontext;
 
 	/* Extract the user. */
 	p = scontextp;
@@ -762,15 +761,15 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 		p++;
 
 	if (*p == 0)
-		goto out_unlock;
+		goto out;
 
 	*p++ = 0;
 
-	usrdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, scontextp);
+	usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
 	if (!usrdatum)
-		goto out_unlock;
+		goto out;
 
-	context.user = usrdatum->value;
+	ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
 
 	/* Extract role. */
 	scontextp = p;
@@ -778,14 +777,14 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 		p++;
 
 	if (*p == 0)
-		goto out_unlock;
+		goto out;
 
 	*p++ = 0;
 
-	role = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, scontextp);
+	role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
 	if (!role)
-		goto out_unlock;
+		goto out;
-	context.role = role->value;
+	ctx->role = role->value;
 
 	/* Extract type. */
 	scontextp = p;
@@ -794,36 +793,90 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 	oldc = *p;
 	*p++ = 0;
 
-	typdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, scontextp);
+	typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
 	if (!typdatum)
-		goto out_unlock;
+		goto out;
 
-	context.type = typdatum->value;
+	ctx->type = typdatum->value;
 
-	rc = mls_context_to_sid(oldc, &p, &context, &sidtab, def_sid);
+	rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
 	if (rc)
-		goto out_unlock;
+		goto out;
 
-	if ((p - scontext2) < scontext_len) {
+	if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len) {
 		rc = -EINVAL;
-		goto out_unlock;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
-	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &context)) {
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx)) {
 		rc = -EINVAL;
-		goto out_unlock;
+		context_destroy(ctx);
+		goto out;
 	}
-	/* Obtain the new sid. */
+	rc = 0;
-	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
-out_unlock:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
-	context_destroy(&context);
-	kfree(scontext2);
 out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+					u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
+					int force)
+{
+	char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
+	struct context context;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		int i;
+
+		for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+			if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
+				*sid = i;
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+		*sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	/* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
+	scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1, gfp_flags);
+	if (!scontext2)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
+	scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
+
+	if (force) {
+		/* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
+		str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
+		if (!str) {
+			kfree(scontext2);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab,
+				      scontext2, scontext_len,
+				      &context, def_sid);
+	if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
+		context.str = str;
+		context.len = scontext_len;
+		str = NULL;
+	} else if (rc)
+		goto out;
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
+	if (rc)
+		context_destroy(&context);
+out:
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	kfree(scontext2);
+	kfree(str);
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /**
  * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
  * @scontext: security context
@@ -838,7 +891,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
 {
 	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
-					    sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
+					    sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -855,6 +908,7 @@ int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
  * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
  * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
  * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
+ * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
  * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
  * memory is available, or 0 on success.
  */
@@ -862,7 +916,14 @@ int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 				    u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 {
 	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
-					    sid, def_sid, gfp_flags);
+					    sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
+}
+
+int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+				  u32 *sid)
+{
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+					    sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
 }
 
 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
@@ -922,7 +983,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 
 	context_init(&newcontext);
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
@@ -1027,7 +1088,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	/* Obtain the sid for the context. */
 	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
 out_unlock:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	context_destroy(&newcontext);
 out:
 	return rc;
@@ -1110,6 +1171,7 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
 	const struct selinux_class_perm *kdefs = &selinux_class_perm;
 	const char *def_class, *def_perm, *pol_class;
 	struct symtab *perms;
+	bool print_unknown_handle = 0;
 
 	if (p->allow_unknown) {
 		u32 num_classes = kdefs->cts_len;
@@ -1130,6 +1192,7 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
 				return -EINVAL;
 			if (p->allow_unknown)
 				p->undefined_perms[i-1] = ~0U;
+			print_unknown_handle = 1;
 			continue;
 		}
 		pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[i-1];
@@ -1159,6 +1222,7 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
 				return -EINVAL;
 			if (p->allow_unknown)
 				p->undefined_perms[class_val-1] |= perm_val;
+			print_unknown_handle = 1;
 			continue;
 		}
 		perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm);
@@ -1206,6 +1270,7 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
 					return -EINVAL;
 				if (p->allow_unknown)
 					p->undefined_perms[class_val-1] |= (1 << j);
+				print_unknown_handle = 1;
 				continue;
 			}
 			perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm);
@@ -1223,6 +1288,9 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
 			}
 		}
 	}
+	if (print_unknown_handle)
+		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
+			(security_get_allow_unknown() ? "allowed" : "denied"));
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1246,9 +1314,12 @@ static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context
 		char *s;
 		u32 len;
 
-		context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len);
+		if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  context %s is invalid\n", s);
+			printk(KERN_WARNING
-		kfree(s);
+		       "SELinux:  Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n",
+			       s);
+			kfree(s);
+		}
 	}
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -1280,6 +1351,37 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
 
 	args = p;
 
+	if (c->str) {
+		struct context ctx;
+		s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!s) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
+					      c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
+		kfree(s);
+		if (!rc) {
+			printk(KERN_INFO
+		       "SELinux:  Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
+			       c->str);
+			/* Replace string with mapped representation. */
+			kfree(c->str);
+			memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
+			goto out;
+		} else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+			/* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
+			rc = 0;
+			goto out;
+		} else {
+			/* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
+			printk(KERN_ERR
+		       "SELinux:   Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
+			       c->str, -rc);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
 	rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
@@ -1319,13 +1421,21 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
 	}
 
 	context_destroy(&oldc);
+	rc = 0;
 out:
 	return rc;
 bad:
-	context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
+	/* Map old representation to string and save it. */
+	if (context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len))
+		return -ENOMEM;
 	context_destroy(&oldc);
-	printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  invalidating context %s\n", s);
+	context_destroy(c);
-	kfree(s);
+	c->str = s;
+	c->len = len;
+	printk(KERN_INFO
+	       "SELinux:  Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
+	       c->str);
+	rc = 0;
 	goto out;
 }
 
@@ -1359,17 +1469,13 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
 
-	LOAD_LOCK;
-
 	if (!ss_initialized) {
 		avtab_cache_init();
 		if (policydb_read(&policydb, fp)) {
-			LOAD_UNLOCK;
 			avtab_cache_destroy();
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) {
-			LOAD_UNLOCK;
 			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
 			avtab_cache_destroy();
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -1378,7 +1484,6 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 		if (validate_classes(&policydb)) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR
 			       "SELinux:  the definition of a class is incorrect\n");
-			LOAD_UNLOCK;
 			sidtab_destroy(&sidtab);
 			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
 			avtab_cache_destroy();
@@ -1388,7 +1493,6 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 		policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
 		ss_initialized = 1;
 		seqno = ++latest_granting;
-		LOAD_UNLOCK;
 		selinux_complete_init();
 		avc_ss_reset(seqno);
 		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
@@ -1401,12 +1505,13 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
 #endif
 
-	if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp)) {
+	if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp))
-		LOAD_UNLOCK;
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
-	sidtab_init(&newsidtab);
+	if (sidtab_init(&newsidtab)) {
+		policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
 	/* Verify that the kernel defined classes are correct. */
 	if (validate_classes(&newpolicydb)) {
@@ -1429,25 +1534,28 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 		goto err;
 	}
 
-	/* Convert the internal representations of contexts
+	/*
-	   in the new SID table and remove invalid SIDs. */
+	 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
+	 * in the new SID table.
+	 */
 	args.oldp = &policydb;
 	args.newp = &newpolicydb;
-	sidtab_map_remove_on_error(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
+	rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
 
 	/* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
 	memcpy(&oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb);
 	sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
 
 	/* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
-	POLICY_WRLOCK;
+	write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
 	memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
 	sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
 	security_load_policycaps();
 	seqno = ++latest_granting;
 	policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
-	POLICY_WRUNLOCK;
+	write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
-	LOAD_UNLOCK;
 
 	/* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
 	policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb);
@@ -1461,7 +1569,6 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	return 0;
 
 err:
-	LOAD_UNLOCK;
 	sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
 	policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
 	return rc;
@@ -1479,7 +1586,7 @@ int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
 	while (c) {
@@ -1504,7 +1611,7 @@ int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
 	}
 
 out:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1518,7 +1625,7 @@ int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
 	while (c) {
@@ -1545,7 +1652,7 @@ int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
 		*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
 
 out:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1577,7 +1684,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	switch (domain) {
 	case AF_INET: {
@@ -1632,7 +1739,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
 	}
 
 out:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1671,7 +1778,9 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
 	if (!ss_initialized)
 		goto out;
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+	context_init(&usercon);
 
 	fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
 	if (!fromcon) {
@@ -1722,7 +1831,7 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
 	}
 
 out_unlock:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	if (rc || !mynel) {
 		kfree(mysids);
 		goto out;
@@ -1775,7 +1884,7 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
 	while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
 		path++;
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
 		cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
@@ -1812,7 +1921,7 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
 
 	*sid = c->sid[0];
 out:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1825,12 +1934,13 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
 int security_fs_use(
 	const char *fstype,
 	unsigned int *behavior,
-	u32 *sid)
+	u32 *sid,
+	bool can_xattr)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
 	while (c) {
@@ -1839,6 +1949,7 @@ int security_fs_use(
 		c = c->next;
 	}
 
+	/* look for labeling behavior defined in policy */
 	if (c) {
 		*behavior = c->v.behavior;
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
@@ -1849,18 +1960,27 @@ int security_fs_use(
 				goto out;
 		}
 		*sid = c->sid[0];
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* labeling behavior not in policy, use xattrs if possible */
+	if (can_xattr) {
+		*behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR;
+		*sid = SECINITSID_FS;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* no behavior in policy and can't use xattrs, try GENFS */
+	rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid);
+	if (rc) {
+		*behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+		rc = 0;
 	} else {
-		rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid);
+		*behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
-		if (rc) {
-			*behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
-			rc = 0;
-		} else {
-			*behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
-		}
 	}
 
 out:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1868,7 +1988,7 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
 {
 	int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 	*names = NULL;
 	*values = NULL;
 
@@ -1898,7 +2018,7 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
 	}
 	rc = 0;
 out:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 err:
 	if (*names) {
@@ -1916,7 +2036,7 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
 	int lenp, seqno = 0;
 	struct cond_node *cur;
 
-	POLICY_WRLOCK;
+	write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
 	if (len != lenp) {
@@ -1950,7 +2070,7 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
 	seqno = ++latest_granting;
 
 out:
-	POLICY_WRUNLOCK;
+	write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
 	if (!rc) {
 		avc_ss_reset(seqno);
 		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
@@ -1964,7 +2084,7 @@ int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
 	int rc = 0;
 	int len;
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
 	if (bool >= len) {
@@ -1974,7 +2094,7 @@ int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
 
 	rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
 out:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2029,7 +2149,7 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
 
 	context_init(&newcon);
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 	context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
 	if (!context1) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
@@ -2071,7 +2191,7 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
 	}
 
 out_unlock:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	context_destroy(&newcon);
 out:
 	return rc;
@@ -2128,7 +2248,7 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
 	if (!nlbl_ctx) {
@@ -2147,7 +2267,7 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
 	rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
 
 out_slowpath:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		/* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
 		 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
@@ -2177,7 +2297,7 @@ int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
 {
 	int rc = -ENOMEM;
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	*nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
 	*classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(*classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -2194,7 +2314,7 @@ int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
 	}
 
 out:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2216,7 +2336,7 @@ int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
 	int rc = -ENOMEM, i;
 	struct class_datum *match;
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
 	if (!match) {
@@ -2244,11 +2364,11 @@ int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
 		goto err;
 
 out:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 
 err:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
 		kfree((*perms)[i]);
 	kfree(*perms);
@@ -2279,9 +2399,9 @@ int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 	rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -2345,7 +2465,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 
 	context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
 
@@ -2382,7 +2502,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 		break;
 	}
 
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (rc) {
 		selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
@@ -2420,7 +2540,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
 }
 
 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
-                             struct audit_context *actx)
+			     struct audit_context *actx)
 {
 	struct context *ctxt;
 	struct mls_level *level;
@@ -2433,7 +2553,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 		return -ENOENT;
 	}
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
 		audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
@@ -2527,14 +2647,14 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 	}
 
 out:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return match;
 }
 
 static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
 
 static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-                               u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
+			       u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 
@@ -2615,7 +2735,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) {
 		*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
@@ -2660,7 +2780,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 	}
 
 netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup:
 	ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
@@ -2685,7 +2805,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 	if (!ss_initialized)
 		return 0;
 
-	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 	ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
 	if (ctx == NULL)
 		goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
@@ -2696,12 +2816,12 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 	rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	return 0;
 
 netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure:
-	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */

security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c

@@ -14,10 +14,6 @@
 #define SIDTAB_HASH(sid) \
 (sid & SIDTAB_HASH_MASK)
 
-#define INIT_SIDTAB_LOCK(s) spin_lock_init(&s->lock)
-#define SIDTAB_LOCK(s, x) spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, x)
-#define SIDTAB_UNLOCK(s, x) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, x)
-
 int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -30,7 +26,7 @@ int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
 	s->nel = 0;
 	s->next_sid = 1;
 	s->shutdown = 0;
-	INIT_SIDTAB_LOCK(s);
+	spin_lock_init(&s->lock);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -86,7 +82,7 @@ int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
 	return rc;
 }
 
-struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+static struct context *sidtab_search_core(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, int force)
 {
 	int hvalue;
 	struct sidtab_node *cur;
@@ -99,7 +95,10 @@ struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
 	while (cur != NULL && sid > cur->sid)
 		cur = cur->next;
 
-	if (cur == NULL || sid != cur->sid) {
+	if (force && cur && sid == cur->sid && cur->context.len)
+		return &cur->context;
+
+	if (cur == NULL || sid != cur->sid || cur->context.len) {
 		/* Remap invalid SIDs to the unlabeled SID. */
 		sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 		hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
@@ -113,6 +112,16 @@ struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
 	return &cur->context;
 }
 
+struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+	return sidtab_search_core(s, sid, 0);
+}
+
+struct context *sidtab_search_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+	return sidtab_search_core(s, sid, 1);
+}
+
 int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s,
 	       int (*apply) (u32 sid,
 			     struct context *context,
@@ -138,43 +147,6 @@ int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-void sidtab_map_remove_on_error(struct sidtab *s,
-				int (*apply) (u32 sid,
-					      struct context *context,
-					      void *args),
-				void *args)
-{
-	int i, ret;
-	struct sidtab_node *last, *cur, *temp;
-
-	if (!s)
-		return;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
-		last = NULL;
-		cur = s->htable[i];
-		while (cur != NULL) {
-			ret = apply(cur->sid, &cur->context, args);
-			if (ret) {
-				if (last)
-					last->next = cur->next;
-				else
-					s->htable[i] = cur->next;
-				temp = cur;
-				cur = cur->next;
-				context_destroy(&temp->context);
-				kfree(temp);
-				s->nel--;
-			} else {
-				last = cur;
-				cur = cur->next;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	return;
-}
-
 static inline u32 sidtab_search_context(struct sidtab *s,
 						  struct context *context)
 {
@@ -204,7 +176,7 @@ int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
 
 	sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context);
 	if (!sid) {
-		SIDTAB_LOCK(s, flags);
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
 		/* Rescan now that we hold the lock. */
 		sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context);
 		if (sid)
@@ -215,11 +187,15 @@ int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
 			goto unlock_out;
 		}
 		sid = s->next_sid++;
+		if (context->len)
+			printk(KERN_INFO
+		       "SELinux:  Context %s is not valid (left unmapped).\n",
+			       context->str);
 		ret = sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
 		if (ret)
 			s->next_sid--;
 unlock_out:
-		SIDTAB_UNLOCK(s, flags);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
 	}
 
 	if (ret)
@@ -284,19 +260,19 @@ void sidtab_set(struct sidtab *dst, struct sidtab *src)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	SIDTAB_LOCK(src, flags);
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&src->lock, flags);
 	dst->htable = src->htable;
 	dst->nel = src->nel;
 	dst->next_sid = src->next_sid;
 	dst->shutdown = 0;
-	SIDTAB_UNLOCK(src, flags);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&src->lock, flags);
 }
 
 void sidtab_shutdown(struct sidtab *s)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	SIDTAB_LOCK(s, flags);
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
 	s->shutdown = 1;
-	SIDTAB_UNLOCK(s, flags);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
 }

security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ struct sidtab {
 int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s);
 int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context);
 struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid);
+struct context *sidtab_search_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid);
 
 int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s,
 	       int (*apply) (u32 sid,
@@ -39,12 +40,6 @@ int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s,
 			     void *args),
 	       void *args);
 
-void sidtab_map_remove_on_error(struct sidtab *s,
-				int (*apply) (u32 sid,
-					      struct context *context,
-					      void *args),
-				void *args);
-
 int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
 			  struct context *context,
 			  u32 *sid);

security/smack/smack_lsm.c

@@ -95,11 +95,12 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
  *
  * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
  */
-static int smack_ptrace(struct task_struct *ptp, struct task_struct *ctp)
+static int smack_ptrace(struct task_struct *ptp, struct task_struct *ctp,
+			unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = cap_ptrace(ptp, ctp);
+	rc = cap_ptrace(ptp, ctp, mode);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1821,27 +1822,6 @@ static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = smack_to_secid(smack);
 }
 
-/* module stacking operations */
-
-/**
- * smack_register_security - stack capability module
- * @name: module name
- * @ops: module operations - ignored
- *
- * Allow the capability module to register.
- */
-static int smack_register_security(const char *name,
-				   struct security_operations *ops)
-{
-	if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  Registering secondary module %s\n",
-	       __func__, name);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /**
  * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
  * @opt_dentry: unused
@@ -2672,8 +2652,6 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.netlink_send =			cap_netlink_send,
 	.netlink_recv = 		cap_netlink_recv,
 
-	.register_security = 		smack_register_security,
-
 	.d_instantiate = 		smack_d_instantiate,
 
 	.getprocattr = 			smack_getprocattr,