send_sigio_to_task: sanitize the usage of fown->signum

send_sigio_to_task() reads fown->signum several times, we can race with
F_SETSIG which changes ->signum lockless.  In theory, this can fool
security checks or we can call group_send_sig_info() with the wrong
->si_signo which does not match "int sig".

Change the code to cache ->signum.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Oleg Nesterov 2009-06-17 00:27:10 +02:00 committed by Linus Torvalds
parent f83b1e616f
commit 8eeee4e2f0
1 changed files with 11 additions and 5 deletions

View File

@ -428,14 +428,20 @@ static inline int sigio_perm(struct task_struct *p,
}
static void send_sigio_to_task(struct task_struct *p,
struct fown_struct *fown,
struct fown_struct *fown,
int fd,
int reason)
{
if (!sigio_perm(p, fown, fown->signum))
/*
* F_SETSIG can change ->signum lockless in parallel, make
* sure we read it once and use the same value throughout.
*/
int signum = ACCESS_ONCE(fown->signum);
if (!sigio_perm(p, fown, signum))
return;
switch (fown->signum) {
switch (signum) {
siginfo_t si;
default:
/* Queue a rt signal with the appropriate fd as its
@ -444,7 +450,7 @@ static void send_sigio_to_task(struct task_struct *p,
delivered even if we can't queue. Failure to
queue in this case _should_ be reported; we fall
back to SIGIO in that case. --sct */
si.si_signo = fown->signum;
si.si_signo = signum;
si.si_errno = 0;
si.si_code = reason;
/* Make sure we are called with one of the POLL_*
@ -456,7 +462,7 @@ static void send_sigio_to_task(struct task_struct *p,
else
si.si_band = band_table[reason - POLL_IN];
si.si_fd = fd;
if (!group_send_sig_info(fown->signum, &si, p))
if (!group_send_sig_info(signum, &si, p))
break;
/* fall-through: fall back on the old plain SIGIO signal */
case 0: