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ipmi: msghandler: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities 

channel and addr->channel are indirectly controlled by user-space,
hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1
vulnerability.

These issues were detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1381 ipmi_set_my_address() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [w] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1401 ipmi_get_my_address() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1421 ipmi_set_my_LUN() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [w] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1441 ipmi_get_my_LUN() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:2260 check_addr() warn: potential spectre issue 'intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing channel and addr->channel before using them to
index user->intf->addrinfo and intf->addrinfo, correspondingly.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
This commit is contained in:
Gustavo A. R. Silva 2019-01-09 17:39:06 -06:00 committed by Corey Minyard
parent 7d6380cd40
commit a7102c7461
1 changed files with 18 additions and 8 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

26
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c
View File

@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/uuid.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#define IPMI_DRIVER_VERSION "39.2"
@ -1298,10 +1299,12 @@ int ipmi_set_my_address(struct ipmi_user *user,
if (!user)
return -ENODEV;
if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS)
if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS) {
rv = -EINVAL;
else
} else {
channel = array_index_nospec(channel, IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS);
user->intf->addrinfo[channel].address = address;
}
release_ipmi_user(user, index);
return rv;
@ -1318,10 +1321,12 @@ int ipmi_get_my_address(struct ipmi_user *user,
if (!user)
return -ENODEV;
if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS)
if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS) {
rv = -EINVAL;
else
} else {
channel = array_index_nospec(channel, IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS);
*address = user->intf->addrinfo[channel].address;
}
release_ipmi_user(user, index);
return rv;
@ -1338,10 +1343,12 @@ int ipmi_set_my_LUN(struct ipmi_user *user,
if (!user)
return -ENODEV;
if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS)
if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS) {
rv = -EINVAL;
else
} else {
channel = array_index_nospec(channel, IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS);
user->intf->addrinfo[channel].lun = LUN & 0x3;
}
release_ipmi_user(user, index);
return rv;
@ -1358,10 +1365,12 @@ int ipmi_get_my_LUN(struct ipmi_user *user,
if (!user)
return -ENODEV;
if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS)
if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS) {
rv = -EINVAL;
else
} else {
channel = array_index_nospec(channel, IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS);
*address = user->intf->addrinfo[channel].lun;
}
release_ipmi_user(user, index);
return rv;
@ -2184,6 +2193,7 @@ static int check_addr(struct ipmi_smi *intf,
{
if (addr->channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS)
return -EINVAL;
addr->channel = array_index_nospec(addr->channel, IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS);
*lun = intf->addrinfo[addr->channel].lun;
*saddr = intf->addrinfo[addr->channel].address;
return 0;