mirror of https://gitee.com/openkylin/linux.git
sctp: validate chunk len before actually using it
Andrey Konovalov reported that KASAN detected that SCTP was using a slab beyond the boundaries. It was caused because when handling out of the blue packets in function sctp_sf_ootb() it was checking the chunk len only after already processing the first chunk, validating only for the 2nd and subsequent ones. The fix is to just move the check upwards so it's also validated for the 1st chunk. Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
parent
c2e169be8c
commit
bf911e985d
|
@ -3422,6 +3422,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
|
|||
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
|
||||
commands);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Report violation if chunk len overflows */
|
||||
ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length));
|
||||
if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
|
||||
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
|
||||
commands);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Now that we know we at least have a chunk header,
|
||||
* do things that are type appropriate.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -3453,12 +3459,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
|
|||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Report violation if chunk len overflows */
|
||||
ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length));
|
||||
if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
|
||||
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
|
||||
commands);
|
||||
|
||||
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end;
|
||||
} while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb));
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue