mirror of https://gitee.com/openkylin/linux.git
crypto: arm64/aes-ce-gcm - implement 2-way aggregation
Implement a faster version of the GHASH transform which amortizes the reduction modulo the characteristic polynomial across two input blocks at a time. On a Cortex-A53, the gcm(aes) performance increases 24%, from 3.0 cycles per byte to 2.4 cpb for large input sizes. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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@ -290,6 +290,10 @@ ENDPROC(pmull_ghash_update_p8)
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KS1 .req v9
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KS1 .req v9
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INP0 .req v10
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INP0 .req v10
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INP1 .req v11
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INP1 .req v11
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HH .req v12
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XL2 .req v13
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XM2 .req v14
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XH2 .req v15
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.macro load_round_keys, rounds, rk
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.macro load_round_keys, rounds, rk
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cmp \rounds, #12
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cmp \rounds, #12
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@ -323,6 +327,7 @@ ENDPROC(pmull_ghash_update_p8)
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.endm
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.endm
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.macro pmull_gcm_do_crypt, enc
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.macro pmull_gcm_do_crypt, enc
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ld1 {HH.2d}, [x4], #16
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ld1 {SHASH.2d}, [x4]
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ld1 {SHASH.2d}, [x4]
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ld1 {XL.2d}, [x1]
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ld1 {XL.2d}, [x1]
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ldr x8, [x5, #8] // load lower counter
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ldr x8, [x5, #8] // load lower counter
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@ -330,10 +335,11 @@ ENDPROC(pmull_ghash_update_p8)
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load_round_keys w7, x6
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load_round_keys w7, x6
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movi MASK.16b, #0xe1
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movi MASK.16b, #0xe1
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ext SHASH2.16b, SHASH.16b, SHASH.16b, #8
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trn1 SHASH2.2d, SHASH.2d, HH.2d
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trn2 T1.2d, SHASH.2d, HH.2d
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CPU_LE( rev x8, x8 )
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CPU_LE( rev x8, x8 )
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shl MASK.2d, MASK.2d, #57
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shl MASK.2d, MASK.2d, #57
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eor SHASH2.16b, SHASH2.16b, SHASH.16b
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eor SHASH2.16b, SHASH2.16b, T1.16b
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.if \enc == 1
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.if \enc == 1
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ldr x10, [sp]
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ldr x10, [sp]
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@ -358,116 +364,82 @@ CPU_LE( rev x8, x8 )
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ins KS0.d[1], x9 // set lower counter
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ins KS0.d[1], x9 // set lower counter
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ins KS1.d[1], x11
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ins KS1.d[1], x11
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rev64 T1.16b, INP0.16b
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rev64 T1.16b, INP1.16b
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cmp w7, #12
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cmp w7, #12
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b.ge 2f // AES-192/256?
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b.ge 2f // AES-192/256?
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1: enc_round KS0, v21
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1: enc_round KS0, v21
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ext T2.16b, XL.16b, XL.16b, #8
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ext IN1.16b, T1.16b, T1.16b, #8
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ext IN1.16b, T1.16b, T1.16b, #8
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enc_round KS1, v21
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enc_round KS1, v21
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pmull2 XH2.1q, SHASH.2d, IN1.2d // a1 * b1
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eor T1.16b, T1.16b, T2.16b
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eor XL.16b, XL.16b, IN1.16b
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enc_round KS0, v22
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enc_round KS0, v22
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eor T1.16b, T1.16b, IN1.16b
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pmull2 XH.1q, SHASH.2d, XL.2d // a1 * b1
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eor T1.16b, T1.16b, XL.16b
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enc_round KS1, v22
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enc_round KS1, v22
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pmull XL2.1q, SHASH.1d, IN1.1d // a0 * b0
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pmull XL.1q, SHASH.1d, XL.1d // a0 * b0
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pmull XM.1q, SHASH2.1d, T1.1d // (a1 + a0)(b1 + b0)
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enc_round KS0, v23
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enc_round KS0, v23
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pmull XM2.1q, SHASH2.1d, T1.1d // (a1 + a0)(b1 + b0)
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ext T1.16b, XL.16b, XH.16b, #8
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eor T2.16b, XL.16b, XH.16b
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eor XM.16b, XM.16b, T1.16b
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enc_round KS1, v23
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enc_round KS1, v23
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rev64 T1.16b, INP0.16b
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eor XM.16b, XM.16b, T2.16b
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ext T2.16b, XL.16b, XL.16b, #8
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pmull T2.1q, XL.1d, MASK.1d
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enc_round KS0, v24
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enc_round KS0, v24
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ext IN1.16b, T1.16b, T1.16b, #8
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mov XH.d[0], XM.d[1]
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eor T1.16b, T1.16b, T2.16b
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mov XM.d[1], XL.d[0]
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enc_round KS1, v24
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enc_round KS1, v24
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eor XL.16b, XM.16b, T2.16b
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enc_round KS0, v25
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ext T2.16b, XL.16b, XL.16b, #8
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enc_round KS1, v25
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pmull XL.1q, XL.1d, MASK.1d
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eor T2.16b, T2.16b, XH.16b
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enc_round KS0, v26
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eor XL.16b, XL.16b, T2.16b
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rev64 T1.16b, INP1.16b
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enc_round KS1, v26
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ext T2.16b, XL.16b, XL.16b, #8
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ext IN1.16b, T1.16b, T1.16b, #8
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enc_round KS0, v27
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eor T1.16b, T1.16b, T2.16b
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eor XL.16b, XL.16b, IN1.16b
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eor XL.16b, XL.16b, IN1.16b
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enc_round KS1, v27
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enc_round KS0, v25
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pmull2 XH.1q, SHASH.2d, XL.2d // a1 * b1
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eor T1.16b, T1.16b, XL.16b
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eor T1.16b, T1.16b, XL.16b
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enc_round KS0, v28
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enc_round KS1, v25
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pmull2 XH.1q, HH.2d, XL.2d // a1 * b1
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pmull XL.1q, SHASH.1d, XL.1d // a0 * b0
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enc_round KS0, v26
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pmull XM.1q, SHASH2.1d, T1.1d // (a1 + a0)(b1 + b0)
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pmull XL.1q, HH.1d, XL.1d // a0 * b0
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enc_round KS1, v28
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enc_round KS1, v26
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pmull2 XM.1q, SHASH2.2d, T1.2d // (a1 + a0)(b1 + b0)
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enc_round KS0, v27
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eor XL.16b, XL.16b, XL2.16b
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eor XH.16b, XH.16b, XH2.16b
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enc_round KS1, v27
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eor XM.16b, XM.16b, XM2.16b
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ext T1.16b, XL.16b, XH.16b, #8
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ext T1.16b, XL.16b, XH.16b, #8
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enc_round KS0, v28
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eor T2.16b, XL.16b, XH.16b
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eor T2.16b, XL.16b, XH.16b
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eor XM.16b, XM.16b, T1.16b
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eor XM.16b, XM.16b, T1.16b
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enc_round KS0, v29
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enc_round KS1, v28
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eor XM.16b, XM.16b, T2.16b
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eor XM.16b, XM.16b, T2.16b
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enc_round KS0, v29
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pmull T2.1q, XL.1d, MASK.1d
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pmull T2.1q, XL.1d, MASK.1d
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enc_round KS1, v29
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enc_round KS1, v29
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mov XH.d[0], XM.d[1]
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mov XH.d[0], XM.d[1]
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mov XM.d[1], XL.d[0]
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mov XM.d[1], XL.d[0]
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aese KS0.16b, v30.16b
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aese KS0.16b, v30.16b
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eor XL.16b, XM.16b, T2.16b
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eor XL.16b, XM.16b, T2.16b
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aese KS1.16b, v30.16b
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aese KS1.16b, v30.16b
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ext T2.16b, XL.16b, XL.16b, #8
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ext T2.16b, XL.16b, XL.16b, #8
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eor KS0.16b, KS0.16b, v31.16b
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eor KS0.16b, KS0.16b, v31.16b
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pmull XL.1q, XL.1d, MASK.1d
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pmull XL.1q, XL.1d, MASK.1d
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eor T2.16b, T2.16b, XH.16b
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eor T2.16b, T2.16b, XH.16b
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eor KS1.16b, KS1.16b, v31.16b
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eor KS1.16b, KS1.16b, v31.16b
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eor XL.16b, XL.16b, T2.16b
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eor XL.16b, XL.16b, T2.16b
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.if \enc == 0
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.if \enc == 0
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@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ struct ghash_desc_ctx {
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struct gcm_aes_ctx {
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struct gcm_aes_ctx {
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struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_key;
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struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_key;
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u64 h2[2];
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struct ghash_key ghash_key;
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struct ghash_key ghash_key;
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};
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};
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@ -62,12 +63,11 @@ static void (*pmull_ghash_update)(int blocks, u64 dg[], const char *src,
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const char *head);
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const char *head);
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asmlinkage void pmull_gcm_encrypt(int blocks, u64 dg[], u8 dst[],
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asmlinkage void pmull_gcm_encrypt(int blocks, u64 dg[], u8 dst[],
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const u8 src[], struct ghash_key const *k,
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const u8 src[], u64 const *k, u8 ctr[],
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u8 ctr[], u32 const rk[], int rounds,
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u32 const rk[], int rounds, u8 ks[]);
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u8 ks[]);
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asmlinkage void pmull_gcm_decrypt(int blocks, u64 dg[], u8 dst[],
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asmlinkage void pmull_gcm_decrypt(int blocks, u64 dg[], u8 dst[],
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const u8 src[], struct ghash_key const *k,
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const u8 src[], u64 const *k,
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u8 ctr[], u32 const rk[], int rounds);
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u8 ctr[], u32 const rk[], int rounds);
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asmlinkage void pmull_gcm_encrypt_block(u8 dst[], u8 const src[],
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asmlinkage void pmull_gcm_encrypt_block(u8 dst[], u8 const src[],
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@ -232,7 +232,8 @@ static int gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *inkey,
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unsigned int keylen)
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unsigned int keylen)
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{
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{
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struct gcm_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
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struct gcm_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
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u8 key[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
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be128 h1, h2;
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u8 *key = (u8 *)&h1;
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int ret;
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int ret;
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ret = crypto_aes_expand_key(&ctx->aes_key, inkey, keylen);
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ret = crypto_aes_expand_key(&ctx->aes_key, inkey, keylen);
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@ -244,7 +245,19 @@ static int gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *inkey,
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__aes_arm64_encrypt(ctx->aes_key.key_enc, key, (u8[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]){},
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__aes_arm64_encrypt(ctx->aes_key.key_enc, key, (u8[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]){},
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num_rounds(&ctx->aes_key));
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num_rounds(&ctx->aes_key));
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return __ghash_setkey(&ctx->ghash_key, key, sizeof(key));
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__ghash_setkey(&ctx->ghash_key, key, sizeof(be128));
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/* calculate H^2 (used for 2-way aggregation) */
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h2 = h1;
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gf128mul_lle(&h2, &h1);
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ctx->h2[0] = (be64_to_cpu(h2.b) << 1) | (be64_to_cpu(h2.a) >> 63);
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ctx->h2[1] = (be64_to_cpu(h2.a) << 1) | (be64_to_cpu(h2.b) >> 63);
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if (be64_to_cpu(h2.a) >> 63)
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ctx->h2[1] ^= 0xc200000000000000UL;
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return 0;
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}
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}
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static int gcm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize)
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static int gcm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize)
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@ -378,9 +391,8 @@ static int gcm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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kernel_neon_begin();
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kernel_neon_begin();
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pmull_gcm_encrypt(blocks, dg, walk.dst.virt.addr,
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pmull_gcm_encrypt(blocks, dg, walk.dst.virt.addr,
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walk.src.virt.addr, &ctx->ghash_key,
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walk.src.virt.addr, ctx->h2, iv,
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iv, ctx->aes_key.key_enc, nrounds,
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ctx->aes_key.key_enc, nrounds, ks);
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ks);
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kernel_neon_end();
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kernel_neon_end();
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err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
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err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
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@ -486,8 +498,8 @@ static int gcm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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kernel_neon_begin();
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kernel_neon_begin();
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pmull_gcm_decrypt(blocks, dg, walk.dst.virt.addr,
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pmull_gcm_decrypt(blocks, dg, walk.dst.virt.addr,
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walk.src.virt.addr, &ctx->ghash_key,
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walk.src.virt.addr, ctx->h2, iv,
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iv, ctx->aes_key.key_enc, nrounds);
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ctx->aes_key.key_enc, nrounds);
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kernel_neon_end();
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kernel_neon_end();
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err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
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err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
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