Merge branch 'fixes' into next

Merge our fixes branch, which contains some fixes that didn't make it
into rc2 but which we'd like in next.
This commit is contained in:
Michael Ellerman 2021-07-26 20:37:53 +10:00
commit e1ab9a730b
5 changed files with 68 additions and 8 deletions

View File

@ -2697,8 +2697,10 @@ static int kvmppc_core_vcpu_create_hv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
HFSCR_DSCR | HFSCR_VECVSX | HFSCR_FP | HFSCR_PREFIX;
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE)) {
vcpu->arch.hfscr &= mfspr(SPRN_HFSCR);
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_P9_TM_HV_ASSIST))
vcpu->arch.hfscr |= HFSCR_TM;
#endif
}
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM_COMP))
vcpu->arch.hfscr |= HFSCR_TM;

View File

@ -302,6 +302,9 @@ long kvmhv_enter_nested_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (vcpu->kvm->arch.l1_ptcr == 0)
return H_NOT_AVAILABLE;
if (MSR_TM_TRANSACTIONAL(vcpu->arch.shregs.msr))
return H_BAD_MODE;
/* copy parameters in */
hv_ptr = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 4);
regs_ptr = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 5);
@ -322,6 +325,23 @@ long kvmhv_enter_nested_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (l2_hv.vcpu_token >= NR_CPUS)
return H_PARAMETER;
/*
* L1 must have set up a suspended state to enter the L2 in a
* transactional state, and only in that case. These have to be
* filtered out here to prevent causing a TM Bad Thing in the
* host HRFID. We could synthesize a TM Bad Thing back to the L1
* here but there doesn't seem like much point.
*/
if (MSR_TM_SUSPENDED(vcpu->arch.shregs.msr)) {
if (!MSR_TM_ACTIVE(l2_regs.msr))
return H_BAD_MODE;
} else {
if (l2_regs.msr & MSR_TS_MASK)
return H_BAD_MODE;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.shregs.msr & MSR_TS_MASK))
return H_BAD_MODE;
}
/* translate lpid */
l2 = kvmhv_get_nested(vcpu->kvm, l2_hv.lpid, true);
if (!l2)

View File

@ -317,6 +317,9 @@ int kvmhv_vcpu_entry_p9(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit, unsigned long lpc
*/
mtspr(SPRN_HDEC, hdec);
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
tm_return_to_guest:
#endif
mtspr(SPRN_DAR, vcpu->arch.shregs.dar);
mtspr(SPRN_DSISR, vcpu->arch.shregs.dsisr);
mtspr(SPRN_SRR0, vcpu->arch.shregs.srr0);
@ -415,11 +418,23 @@ int kvmhv_vcpu_entry_p9(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit, unsigned long lpc
* is in real suspend mode and is trying to transition to
* transactional mode.
*/
if (local_paca->kvm_hstate.fake_suspend &&
if (!local_paca->kvm_hstate.fake_suspend &&
(vcpu->arch.shregs.msr & MSR_TS_S)) {
if (kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation_early(vcpu)) {
/* Prevent it being handled again. */
trap = 0;
/*
* Go straight back into the guest with the
* new NIP/MSR as set by TM emulation.
*/
mtspr(SPRN_HSRR0, vcpu->arch.regs.nip);
mtspr(SPRN_HSRR1, vcpu->arch.shregs.msr);
/*
* tm_return_to_guest re-loads SRR0/1, DAR,
* DSISR after RI is cleared, in case they had
* been clobbered by a MCE.
*/
__mtmsrd(0, 1); /* clear RI */
goto tm_return_to_guest;
}
}
#endif
@ -499,6 +514,10 @@ int kvmhv_vcpu_entry_p9(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit, unsigned long lpc
* If we are in real mode, only switch MMU on after the MMU is
* switched to host, to avoid the P9_RADIX_PREFETCH_BUG.
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM) &&
vcpu->arch.shregs.msr & MSR_TS_MASK)
msr |= MSR_TS_S;
__mtmsrd(msr, 0);
end_timing(vcpu);

View File

@ -242,6 +242,17 @@ int kvmppc_rtas_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* value so we can restore it on the way out.
*/
orig_rets = args.rets;
if (be32_to_cpu(args.nargs) >= ARRAY_SIZE(args.args)) {
/*
* Don't overflow our args array: ensure there is room for
* at least rets[0] (even if the call specifies 0 nret).
*
* Each handler must then check for the correct nargs and nret
* values, but they may always return failure in rets[0].
*/
rc = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
args.rets = &args.args[be32_to_cpu(args.nargs)];
mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock);
@ -269,9 +280,17 @@ int kvmppc_rtas_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
fail:
/*
* We only get here if the guest has called RTAS with a bogus
* args pointer. That means we can't get to the args, and so we
* can't fail the RTAS call. So fail right out to userspace,
* which should kill the guest.
* args pointer or nargs/nret values that would overflow the
* array. That means we can't get to the args, and so we can't
* fail the RTAS call. So fail right out to userspace, which
* should kill the guest.
*
* SLOF should actually pass the hcall return value from the
* rtas handler call in r3, so enter_rtas could be modified to
* return a failure indication in r3 and we could return such
* errors to the guest rather than failing to host userspace.
* However old guests that don't test for failure could then
* continue silently after errors, so for now we won't do this.
*/
return rc;
}

View File

@ -2048,9 +2048,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
{
struct kvm_enable_cap cap;
r = -EFAULT;
vcpu_load(vcpu);
if (copy_from_user(&cap, argp, sizeof(cap)))
goto out;
vcpu_load(vcpu);
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_enable_cap(vcpu, &cap);
vcpu_put(vcpu);
break;
@ -2074,9 +2074,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
case KVM_DIRTY_TLB: {
struct kvm_dirty_tlb dirty;
r = -EFAULT;
vcpu_load(vcpu);
if (copy_from_user(&dirty, argp, sizeof(dirty)))
goto out;
vcpu_load(vcpu);
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_dirty_tlb(vcpu, &dirty);
vcpu_put(vcpu);
break;