bpf: fix off by one for range markings with L{T, E} patterns

During review I noticed that the current logic for direct packet
access marking in check_cond_jmp_op() has an off by one for the
upper right range border when marking in find_good_pkt_pointers()
with BPF_JLT and BPF_JLE. It's not really harmful given access
up to pkt_end is always safe, but we should nevertheless correct
the range marking before it becomes ABI. If pkt_data' denotes a
pkt_data derived pointer (pkt_data + X), then for pkt_data' < pkt_end
in the true branch as well as for pkt_end <= pkt_data' in the false
branch we mark the range with X although it should really be X - 1
in these cases. For example, X could be pkt_end - pkt_data, then
when testing for pkt_data' < pkt_end the verifier simulation cannot
deduce that a byte load of pkt_data' - 1 would succeed in this
branch.

Fixes: b4e432f100 ("bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
Daniel Borkmann 2017-10-21 02:34:21 +02:00 committed by David S. Miller
parent 8695a53956
commit fb2a311a31
1 changed files with 21 additions and 12 deletions

View File

@ -2430,12 +2430,15 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
} }
static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
bool range_right_open)
{ {
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
u16 new_range;
int i; int i;
if (dst_reg->off < 0) if (dst_reg->off < 0 ||
(dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open))
/* This doesn't give us any range */ /* This doesn't give us any range */
return; return;
@ -2446,9 +2449,13 @@ static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
*/ */
return; return;
/* LLVM can generate four kind of checks: new_range = dst_reg->off;
if (range_right_open)
new_range--;
/* Examples for register markings:
* *
* Type 1/2: * pkt_data in dst register:
* *
* r2 = r3; * r2 = r3;
* r2 += 8; * r2 += 8;
@ -2465,7 +2472,7 @@ static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
* r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
* r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
* *
* Type 3/4: * pkt_data in src register:
* *
* r2 = r3; * r2 = r3;
* r2 += 8; * r2 += 8;
@ -2483,7 +2490,9 @@ static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
* r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
* *
* Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8) * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8)
* so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) is safe to access. * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8)
* and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on
* the check.
*/ */
/* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we
@ -2494,14 +2503,14 @@ static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET && regs[i].id == dst_reg->id) if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET && regs[i].id == dst_reg->id)
/* keep the maximum range already checked */ /* keep the maximum range already checked */
regs[i].range = max_t(u16, regs[i].range, dst_reg->off); regs[i].range = max(regs[i].range, new_range);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) { for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
continue; continue;
reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE]; reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE];
if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && reg->id == dst_reg->id) if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
reg->range = max_t(u16, reg->range, dst_reg->off); reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range);
} }
} }
@ -2865,19 +2874,19 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGT && } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGT &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg); find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, false);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLT && } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLT &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg); find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, true);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGE && } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGE &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) { regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg]); find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg], false);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLE && } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLE &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) { regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg]); find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg], true);
} else if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { } else if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", insn->dst_reg); verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES; return -EACCES;