A lot of the registers are controlled by the Ultravisor and never
visible to KVM. Some fields in the sie control block are overlayed, like
gbea. As no known userspace uses the ONE_REG interface on s390 if sync
regs are available, no functionality is lost if it is disabled for
protected guests.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Save response to sidad and disable address checking for protected
guests.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
STHYI data has to go through the bounce buffer.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
The current code tries to first pin shared pages, if that fails (e.g.
because the page is not shared) it will export them. For shared pages
this means that we get a new intercept telling us that the guest is
unsharing that page. We will unpin the page at that point in time,
following the same rules as for making a page secure (i.e. waiting for
writeback, no elevated page references, etc.)
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
The SPX instruction is handled by the ultravisor. We do get a
notification intercept, though. Let us update our internal view.
In addition to that, when the guest prefix page is not secure, an
intercept 112 (0x70) is indicated. Let us make the prefix pages
secure again.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Now that we can't access guest memory anymore, we have a dedicated
satellite block that's a bounce buffer for instruction data.
We re-use the memop interface to copy the instruction data to / from
userspace. This lets us re-use a lot of QEMU code which used that
interface to make logical guest memory accesses which are not possible
anymore in protected mode anyway.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Guest registers for protected guests are stored at offset 0x380. We
will copy those to the usual places. Long term we could refactor this
or use register access functions.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
SIE intercept code 8 is used only on exception loops for protected
guests. That means we need to stop the guest when we see it. This is
done by userspace.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
The sclp interrupt is kind of special. The ultravisor polices that we
do not inject an sclp interrupt with payload if no sccb is outstanding.
On the other hand we have "asynchronous" event interrupts, e.g. for
console input.
We separate both variants into sclp interrupt and sclp event interrupt.
The sclp interrupt is masked until a previous servc instruction has
finished (sie exit 108).
[frankja@linux.ibm.com: factoring out write_sclp]
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
This defines the necessary data structures in the SIE control block to
inject machine checks,external and I/O interrupts. We first define the
the interrupt injection control, which defines the next interrupt to
inject. Then we define the fields that contain the payload for machine
checks,external and I/O interrupts.
This is then used to implement interruption injection for the following
list of interruption types:
- I/O (uses inject io interruption)
__deliver_io
- External (uses inject external interruption)
__deliver_cpu_timer
__deliver_ckc
__deliver_emergency_signal
__deliver_external_call
- cpu restart (uses inject restart interruption)
__deliver_restart
- machine checks (uses mcic, failing address and external damage)
__write_machine_check
Please note that posted interrupts (GISA) are not used for protected
guests as of today.
The service interrupt is handled in a followup patch.
Signed-off-by: Michael Mueller <mimu@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
We have two new SIE exit codes dealing with instructions.
104 (0x68) for a secure instruction interception, on which the SIE needs
hypervisor action to complete the instruction. We can piggy-back on the
existing instruction handlers.
108 which is merely a notification and provides data for tracking and
management. For example this is used to tell the host about a new value
for the prefix register. As there will be several special case handlers
in later patches, we handle this in a separate function.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Since there is no interception for load control and load psw
instruction in the protected mode, we need a new way to get notified
whenever we can inject an IRQ right after the guest has just enabled
the possibility for receiving them.
The new interception codes solve that problem by providing a
notification for changes to IRQ enablement relevant bits in CRs 0, 6
and 14, as well a the machine check mask bit in the PSW.
No special handling is needed for these interception codes, the KVM
pre-run code will consult all necessary CRs and PSW bits and inject
IRQs the guest is enabled for.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Before we destroy the secure configuration, we better make all
pages accessible again. This also happens during reboot, where we reboot
into a non-secure guest that then can go again into secure mode. As
this "new" secure guest will have a new ID we cannot reuse the old page
state.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
KSM will not work on secure pages, because when the kernel reads a
secure page, it will be encrypted and hence no two pages will look the
same.
Let's mark the guest pages as unmergeable when we transition to secure
mode.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
This contains 3 main changes:
1. changes in SIE control block handling for secure guests
2. helper functions for create/destroy/unpack secure guests
3. KVM_S390_PV_COMMAND ioctl to allow userspace dealing with secure
machines
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
This adds two new helper functions for doing UV CALLs.
The first variant handles UV CALLs that might have longer busy
conditions or just need longer when doing partial completion. We should
schedule when necessary.
The second variant handles UV CALLs that only need the handle but have
no payload (e.g. destroying a VM). We can provide a simple wrapper for
those.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Let's have some debug traces which stay around for longer than the
guest.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
The adapter interrupt page containing the indicator bits is currently
pinned. That means that a guest with many devices can pin a lot of
memory pages in the host. This also complicates the reference tracking
which is needed for memory management handling of protected virtual
machines. It might also have some strange side effects for madvise
MADV_DONTNEED and other things.
We can simply try to get the userspace page set the bits and free the
page. By storing the userspace address in the irq routing entry instead
of the guest address we can actually avoid many lookups and list walks
so that this variant is very likely not slower.
If userspace messes around with the memory slots the worst thing that
can happen is that we write to some other memory within that process.
As we get the the page with FOLL_WRITE this can also not be used to
write to shared read-only pages.
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch simplification]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
That information, e.g. the maximum number of guests or installed
Ultravisor facilities, is interesting for QEMU, Libvirt and
administrators.
Let's provide an easily parsable API to get that information.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
This provides the basic ultravisor calls and page table handling to cope
with secure guests:
- provide arch_make_page_accessible
- make pages accessible after unmapping of secure guests
- provide the ultravisor commands convert to/from secure
- provide the ultravisor commands pin/unpin shared
- provide callbacks to make pages secure (inacccessible)
- we check for the expected pin count to only make pages secure if the
host is not accessing them
- we fence hugetlbfs for secure pages
- add missing radix-tree include into gmap.h
The basic idea is that a page can have 3 states: secure, normal or
shared. The hypervisor can call into a firmware function called
ultravisor that allows to change the state of a page: convert from/to
secure. The convert from secure will encrypt the page and make it
available to the host and host I/O. The convert to secure will remove
the host capability to access this page.
The design is that on convert to secure we will wait until writeback and
page refs are indicating no host usage. At the same time the convert
from secure (export to host) will be called in common code when the
refcount or the writeback bit is already set. This avoids races between
convert from and to secure.
Then there is also the concept of shared pages. Those are kind of secure
where the host can still access those pages. We need to be notified when
the guest "unshares" such a page, basically doing a convert to secure by
then. There is a call "pin shared page" that we use instead of convert
from secure when possible.
We do use PG_arch_1 as an optimization to minimize the convert from
secure/pin shared.
Several comments have been added in the code to explain the logic in
the relevant places.
Co-developed-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Before being able to host protected virtual machines, donate some of
the memory to the ultravisor. Besides that the ultravisor might impose
addressing limitations for memory used to back protected VM storage. Treat
that limit as protected virtualization host's virtual memory limit.
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Add "prot_virt" command line option which controls if the kernel
protected VMs support is enabled at early boot time. This has to be
done early, because it needs large amounts of memory and will disable
some features like STP time sync for the lpar.
Extend ultravisor info definitions and expose it via uv_info struct
filled in during startup.
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
While userfaultfd, KVM's demand paging implementation, is not specific
to KVM, having a benchmark for its performance will be useful for
guiding performance improvements to KVM. As a first step towards creating
a userfaultfd demand paging test, create a simple memory access test,
based on dirty_log_test.
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Guests and hosts don't have to have the same page size. This means
calculations are necessary when selecting the number of guest pages
to allocate in order to ensure the number is compatible with the
host. Provide utilities to help with those calculations and apply
them where appropriate.
We also revert commit bffed38d4f ("kvm: selftests: aarch64:
dirty_log_test: fix unaligned memslot size") and then use
vm_adjust_num_guest_pages() there instead.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This array will allow us to easily translate modes to their parameter
values.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
We're going to want this name in the library code, so use a shorter
name in the tests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
BITS_PER_LONG and friends are provided by linux/bitops.h
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
I'm not sure how we ended up using printf instead of fprintf in
virt_dump(). Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
We also need to rstify the new ioctls that we added in parallel to the
rstification of the kvm docs.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Consult the 'unconditional IO exiting' and 'use IO bitmaps' VM-execution
controls when checking instruction interception. If the 'use IO bitmaps'
VM-execution control is 1, check the instruction access against the IO
bitmaps to determine if the instruction causes a VM-exit.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Checks against the IO bitmap are useful for both instruction emulation
and VM-exit reflection. Refactor the IO bitmap checks into a helper
function.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
vmx_check_intercept is not yet fully implemented. To avoid emulating
instructions disallowed by the L1 hypervisor, refuse to emulate
instructions by default.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[Made commit, added commit msg - Oliver]
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Since commit 5f3d45e7f2 ("kvm/x86: add support for
MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG"), KVM has allowed an L1 guest to use the monitor trap
flag processor-based execution control for its L2 guest. KVM simply
forwards any MTF VM-exits to the L1 guest, which works for normal
instruction execution.
However, when KVM needs to emulate an instruction on the behalf of an L2
guest, the monitor trap flag is not emulated. Add the necessary logic to
kvm_skip_emulated_instruction() to synthesize an MTF VM-exit to L1 upon
instruction emulation for L2.
Fixes: 5f3d45e7f2 ("kvm/x86: add support for MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
rename svm_hardware_unsetup as svm_hardware_teardown, move
it before svm_hardware_setup, and call it to free all memory
if fail to setup in svm_hardware_setup, otherwise memory will
be leaked
remove __exit attribute for it since it is called in __init
function
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When kmalloc memory for sd->sev_vmcbs failed, we forget to free the page
held by sd->save_area. Also get rid of the var r as '-ENOMEM' is actually
the only possible outcome here.
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When pv_eoi_get_user() fails, 'val' may remain uninitialized and the return
value of pv_eoi_get_pending() becomes random. Fix the issue by initializing
the variable.
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When apicv is disabled on a vCPU (e.g. by enabling KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC*),
nothing happens to VMX MSRs on the already existing vCPUs, however, all new
ones are created with PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR filtered out. This is very
confusing and results in the following picture inside the guest:
$ rdmsr -ax 0x48d
ff00000016
7f00000016
7f00000016
7f00000016
This is observed with QEMU and 4-vCPU guest: QEMU creates vCPU0, does
KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC2 and then creates the remaining three.
L1 hypervisor may only check CPU0's controls to find out what features
are available and it will be very confused later. Switch to setting
PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR control based on global 'enable_apicv' setting.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Even when APICv is disabled for L1 it can (and, actually, is) still
available for L2, this means we need to always call
vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt() when attempting an interrupt
delivery.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Launching VM w/ AVIC disabled together with pass-through device
results in NULL pointer dereference bug with the following call trace.
RIP: 0010:svm_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl+0x17e/0x1a0 [kvm_amd]
Call Trace:
kvm_vcpu_update_apicv+0x44/0x60 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3f4/0x1c80 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3d8/0x650 [kvm]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xaa/0x660
? tomoyo_file_ioctl+0x19/0x20
ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x57/0x190
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Investigation shows that this is due to the uninitialized usage of
struct vapu_svm.ir_list in the svm_set_pi_irte_mode(), which is
called from svm_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl().
The ir_list is initialized only if AVIC is enabled. So, fixes by
adding a check if AVIC is enabled in the svm_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl().
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206579
Fixes: 8937d76239 ("kvm: x86: svm: Add support to (de)activate posted interrupts.")
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Tested-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Commit 159348784f ("x86/vmx: Introduce VMX_FEATURES_*") missed
bit 26 (enable user wait and pause) of Secondary Processor-based
VM-Execution Controls.
Add VMX_FEATURE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE flag so that it shows up in /proc/cpuinfo,
and use it to define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE to make them
uniform.
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For the duration of mapping eVMCS, it derefences ->memslots without holding
->srcu or ->slots_lock when accessing hv assist page. This patch fixes it by
moving nested_sync_vmcs12_to_shadow to prepare_guest_switch, where the SRCU
is already taken.
It can be reproduced by running kvm's evmcs_test selftest.
=============================
warning: suspicious rcu usage
5.6.0-rc1+ #53 tainted: g w ioe
-----------------------------
./include/linux/kvm_host.h:623 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by evmcs_test/8507:
#0: ffff9ddd156d00d0 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}, at:
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x85/0x680 [kvm]
stack backtrace:
cpu: 6 pid: 8507 comm: evmcs_test tainted: g w ioe 5.6.0-rc1+ #53
hardware name: dell inc. optiplex 7040/0jctf8, bios 1.4.9 09/12/2016
call trace:
dump_stack+0x68/0x9b
kvm_read_guest_cached+0x11d/0x150 [kvm]
kvm_hv_get_assist_page+0x33/0x40 [kvm]
nested_enlightened_vmentry+0x2c/0x60 [kvm_intel]
nested_vmx_handle_enlightened_vmptrld.part.52+0x32/0x1c0 [kvm_intel]
nested_sync_vmcs12_to_shadow+0x439/0x680 [kvm_intel]
vmx_vcpu_run+0x67a/0xe60 [kvm_intel]
vcpu_enter_guest+0x35e/0x1bc0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x40b/0x670 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x370/0x680 [kvm]
ksys_ioctl+0x235/0x850
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x77/0x780
entry_syscall_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Commit 13db77347d ("KVM: x86: don't notify userspace IOAPIC on edge
EOI") said, edge-triggered interrupts don't set a bit in TMR, which means
that IOAPIC isn't notified on EOI. And var level indicates level-triggered
interrupt.
But commit 3159d36ad7 ("KVM: x86: use generic function for MSI parsing")
replace var level with irq.level by mistake. Fix it by changing irq.level
to irq.trig_mode.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3159d36ad7 ("KVM: x86: use generic function for MSI parsing")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c: In function 'x86_emulate_insn':
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5686:22: error: cast between incompatible
function types from 'int (*)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *)' to 'void
(*)(struct fastop *)' [-Werror=cast-function-type]
rc = fastop(ctxt, (fastop_t)ctxt->execute);
Fix it by using an unnamed union of a (*execute) function pointer and a
(*fastop) function pointer.
Fixes: 3009afc6e3 ("KVM: x86: Use a typedef for fastop functions")
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The "u" field in the event has three states, -1/0/1. Using u8 however means that
comparison with -1 will always fail, so change to signed char.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Fix wrong variable names and grammar error in comment.
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported with "make W=1" due to -Wmissing-prototypes.
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Janosch Frank