VCPU states have to be reported to the ultravisor for SIGP
interpretation, kdump, kexec and reboot.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Now that we can't access guest memory anymore, we have a dedicated
satellite block that's a bounce buffer for instruction data.
We re-use the memop interface to copy the instruction data to / from
userspace. This lets us re-use a lot of QEMU code which used that
interface to make logical guest memory accesses which are not possible
anymore in protected mode anyway.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Before we destroy the secure configuration, we better make all
pages accessible again. This also happens during reboot, where we reboot
into a non-secure guest that then can go again into secure mode. As
this "new" secure guest will have a new ID we cannot reuse the old page
state.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
This contains 3 main changes:
1. changes in SIE control block handling for secure guests
2. helper functions for create/destroy/unpack secure guests
3. KVM_S390_PV_COMMAND ioctl to allow userspace dealing with secure
machines
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Janosch Frank