Fix error handling in construct_key_and_link().
If construct_alloc_key() returns an error, it shouldn't pass out through
the normal path as the key_serial() called by the kleave() statement
will oops when it gets an error code in the pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffffffff84
IP: [<ffffffff8120b401>] request_key_and_link+0x4d7/0x52f
..
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8120b52c>] request_key+0x41/0x75
[<ffffffffa00ed6e8>] cifs_get_spnego_key+0x206/0x226 [cifs]
[<ffffffffa00eb0c9>] CIFS_SessSetup+0x511/0x1234 [cifs]
[<ffffffffa00d9799>] cifs_setup_session+0x90/0x1ae [cifs]
[<ffffffffa00d9c02>] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x34b/0x40f [cifs]
[<ffffffffa00d9e05>] cifs_mount+0x13f/0x504 [cifs]
[<ffffffffa00caabb>] cifs_do_mount+0xc4/0x672 [cifs]
[<ffffffff8113ae8c>] mount_fs+0x69/0x155
[<ffffffff8114ff0e>] vfs_kern_mount+0x63/0xa0
[<ffffffff81150be2>] do_kern_mount+0x4d/0xdf
[<ffffffff81152278>] do_mount+0x63c/0x69f
[<ffffffff8115255c>] sys_mount+0x88/0xc2
[<ffffffff814fbdc2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
____call_usermodehelper() now erases any credentials set by the
subprocess_inf::init() function. The problem is that commit
17f60a7da1 ("capabilites: allow the application of capability limits
to usermode helpers") creates and commits new credentials with
prepare_kernel_cred() after the call to the init() function. This wipes
all keyrings after umh_keys_init() is called.
The best way to deal with this is to put the init() call just prior to
the commit_creds() call, and pass the cred pointer to init(). That
means that umh_keys_init() and suchlike can modify the credentials
_before_ they are published and potentially in use by the rest of the
system.
This prevents request_key() from working as it is prevented from passing
the session keyring it set up with the authorisation token to
/sbin/request-key, and so the latter can't assume the authority to
instantiate the key. This causes the in-kernel DNS resolver to fail
with ENOKEY unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'docs-move' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdunlap/linux-docs:
Create Documentation/security/, move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/ to Documentation/security/, add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file> to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
Since this cred was not created with copy_creds(), it needs to get
initialized. Otherwise use of syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
can lead to a NULL deref. Thanks to Robert for finding this.
But introduced by commit 47a150edc2 ("Cache user_ns in struct cred").
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Robert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.39)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/
to Documentation/security/,
add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and
update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file>
to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
The rcu callback user_update_rcu_disposal() just calls a kfree(),
so we use kfree_rcu() instead of the call_rcu(user_update_rcu_disposal).
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Make request_key() and co. return an error for a negative or rejected key. If
the key was simply negated, then return ENOKEY, otherwise return the error
with which it was rejected.
Without this patch, the following command returns a key number (with the latest
keyutils):
[root@andromeda ~]# keyctl request2 user debug:foo rejected @s
586569904
Trying to print the key merely gets you a permission denied error:
[root@andromeda ~]# keyctl print 586569904
keyctl_read_alloc: Permission denied
Doing another request_key() call does get you the error, as long as it hasn't
expired yet:
[root@andromeda ~]# keyctl request user debug:foo
request_key: Key was rejected by service
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Improve /proc/keys by:
(1) Don't attempt to summarise the payload of a negated key. It won't have
one. To this end, a helper function - key_is_instantiated() has been
added that allows the caller to find out whether the key is positively
instantiated (as opposed to being uninstantiated or negatively
instantiated).
(2) Do show keys that are negative, expired or revoked rather than hiding
them. This requires an override flag (no_state_check) to be passed to
search_my_process_keyrings() and keyring_search_aux() to suppress this
check.
Without this, keys that are possessed by the caller, but only grant
permissions to the caller if possessed are skipped as the possession check
fails.
Keys that are visible due to user, group or other checks are visible with
or without this patch.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a keyctl op (KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV) that is like KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, but
takes an iovec array and concatenates the data in-kernel into one buffer.
Since the KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE copies the data anyway, this isn't too much of a
problem.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code. This works
much the same as negating a key, and so keyctl_negate_key() is made a special
case of keyctl_reject_key(). The difference is that keyctl_negate_key()
selects ENOKEY as the error to be reported.
Typically the key would be rejected with EKEYEXPIRED, EKEYREVOKED or
EKEYREJECTED, but this is not mandatory.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a key type operation to permit the key type to vet the description of a new
key that key_alloc() is about to allocate. The operation may reject the
description if it wishes with an error of its choosing. If it does this, the
key will not be allocated.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add an RCU payload dereference macro as this seems to be a common piece of code
amongst key types that use RCU referenced payloads.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix __key_link_end()'s attempt to fix up the quota if an error occurs.
There are two erroneous cases: Firstly, we always decrease the quota if
the preallocated replacement keyring needs cleaning up, irrespective of
whether or not we should (we may have replaced a pointer rather than
adding another pointer).
Secondly, we never clean up the quota if we added a pointer without the
keyring storage being extended (we allocate multiple pointers at a time,
even if we're not going to use them all immediately).
We handle this by setting the bottom bit of the preallocation pointer in
__key_link_begin() to indicate that the quota needs fixing up, which is
then passed to __key_link() (which clears the whole thing) and
__key_link_end().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
One failure path in security/keys/trusted.c::trusted_update() does
not free 'new_p' while the others do. This patch makes sure we also free
it in the remaining path (if datablob_parse() returns different from
Opt_update).
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Rename encrypted_defined.c and encrypted_defined.h files to encrypted.c and
encrypted.h, respectively. Based on request from David Howells.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Rename trusted_defined.c and trusted_defined.h files to trusted.c and
trusted.h, respectively. Based on request from David Howells.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix up comments in the key management code. No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Do a bit of a style clean up in the key management code. No functional
changes.
Done using:
perl -p -i -e 's!^/[*]*/\n!!' security/keys/*.c
perl -p -i -e 's!} /[*] end [a-z0-9_]*[(][)] [*]/\n!}\n!' security/keys/*.c
sed -i -s -e ": next" -e N -e 's/^\n[}]$/}/' -e t -e P -e 's/^.*\n//' -e "b next" security/keys/*.c
To remove /*****/ lines, remove comments on the closing brace of a
function to name the function and remove blank lines before the closing
brace of a function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We can avoid scattering va_end() within the
va_start();
for (;;) {
}
va_end();
loop, assuming that crypto_shash_init()/crypto_shash_update() return 0 on
success and negative value otherwise.
Make TSS_authhmac()/TSS_checkhmac1()/TSS_checkhmac2() similar to TSS_rawhmac()
by removing "va_end()/goto" from the loop.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
TSS_rawhmac() checks for data != NULL before using it.
We should do the same thing for TSS_authhmac().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
TSS_rawhmac() forgot to call va_end()/kfree() when data == NULL and
forgot to call va_end() when crypto_shash_update() < 0.
Fix these bugs by escaping from the loop using "break"
(rather than "return"/"goto") in order to make sure that
va_end()/kfree() are always called.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add missing kfree(td) in tpm_seal() before the return, freeing
td on error paths as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Conflicts:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
Verified and added fix by Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Ok'd by Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In construct_alloc_key(), up_write() is called in the error path if
__key_link_begin() fails, but this is incorrect as __key_link_begin() only
returns with the nominated keyring locked if it returns successfully.
Without this patch, you might see the following in dmesg:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
mount.cifs/5769 is trying to release lock (&key->sem) at:
[<ffffffff81201159>] request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
3 locks held by mount.cifs/5769:
#0: (&type->s_umount_key#41/1){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81131321>] sget+0x278/0x3e7
#1: (&ret_buf->session_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0258e59>] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x35a/0x443 [cifs]
#2: (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81201000>] request_key_and_link+0x10a/0x3fc
stack backtrace:
Pid: 5769, comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 2.6.37-rc6+ #1
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81201159>] ? request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
[<ffffffff81081601>] print_unlock_inbalance_bug+0xca/0xd5
[<ffffffff81083248>] lock_release_non_nested+0xc1/0x263
[<ffffffff81201159>] ? request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
[<ffffffff81201159>] ? request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
[<ffffffff81083567>] lock_release+0x17d/0x1a4
[<ffffffff81073f45>] up_write+0x23/0x3b
[<ffffffff81201159>] request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
[<ffffffffa026fe9e>] ? cifs_get_spnego_key+0x61/0x21f [cifs]
[<ffffffff812013c5>] request_key+0x41/0x74
[<ffffffffa027003d>] cifs_get_spnego_key+0x200/0x21f [cifs]
[<ffffffffa026e296>] CIFS_SessSetup+0x55d/0x1273 [cifs]
[<ffffffffa02589e1>] cifs_setup_session+0x90/0x1ae [cifs]
[<ffffffffa0258e7e>] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x37f/0x443 [cifs]
[<ffffffffa025a9e3>] cifs_mount+0x1aa1/0x23f3 [cifs]
[<ffffffff8111fd94>] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xdb/0x120
[<ffffffffa027002c>] ? cifs_get_spnego_key+0x1ef/0x21f [cifs]
[<ffffffffa024cc71>] cifs_do_mount+0x165/0x2b3 [cifs]
[<ffffffff81130e72>] vfs_kern_mount+0xaf/0x1dc
[<ffffffff81131007>] do_kern_mount+0x4d/0xef
[<ffffffff811483b9>] do_mount+0x6f4/0x733
[<ffffffff8114861f>] sys_mount+0x88/0xc2
[<ffffffff8100ac42>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-and-Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cleanup based on David Howells suggestions:
- use static const char arrays instead of #define
- rename init_sdesc to alloc_sdesc
- convert 'unsigned int' definitions to 'size_t'
- revert remaining 'const unsigned int' definitions to 'unsigned int'
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Verify the hex ascii datablob length is correct before converting the IV,
encrypted data, and HMAC to binary.
Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cleanup based on David Howells suggestions:
- replace kzalloc, where possible, with kmalloc
- revert 'const unsigned int' definitions to 'unsigned int'
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Previously not all TSS return codes were tested, as they were all eventually
caught by the TPM. Now all returns are tested and handled immediately.
This patch also fixes memory leaks in error and non-error paths.
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch fixes the linux-next powerpc build errors as reported by
Stephen Rothwell.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Define a new kernel key-type called 'encrypted'. Encrypted keys are kernel
generated random numbers, which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'trusted'
symmetric key. Encrypted keys are created/encrypted/decrypted in the kernel.
Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
Changelog:
- bug fix: replaced master-key rcu based locking with semaphore
(reported by David Howells)
- Removed memset of crypto_shash_digest() digest output
- Replaced verification of 'key-type:key-desc' using strcspn(), with
one based on string constants.
- Moved documentation to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- Replace hash with shash (based on comments by David Howells)
- Make lengths/counts size_t where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
Could not convert most lengths, as crypto expects 'unsigned int'
(size_t: on 32 bit is defined as unsigned int, but on 64 bit is unsigned long)
- Add 'const' where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
- allocate derived_buf dynamically to support arbitrary length master key
(fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- wait until late_initcall for crypto libraries to be registered
- cleanup security/Kconfig
- Add missing 'update' keyword (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Free epayload on failure to create key (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Increase the data size limit (requested by Roberto Sassu)
- Crypto return codes are always 0 on success and negative on failure,
remove unnecessary tests.
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc()
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Define a new kernel key-type called 'trusted'. Trusted keys are random
number symmetric keys, generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM
only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other criteria match.
Userspace can only ever see encrypted blobs.
Based on suggestions by Jason Gunthorpe, several new options have been
added to support additional usages.
The new options are:
migratable= designates that the key may/may not ever be updated
(resealed under a new key, new pcrinfo or new auth.)
pcrlock=n extends the designated PCR 'n' with a random value,
so that a key sealed to that PCR may not be unsealed
again until after a reboot.
keyhandle= specifies the sealing/unsealing key handle.
keyauth= specifies the sealing/unsealing key auth.
blobauth= specifies the sealed data auth.
Implementation of a kernel reserved locality for trusted keys will be
investigated for a possible future extension.
Changelog:
- Updated and added examples to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- Moved generic TPM constants to include/linux/tpm_command.h
(David Howell's suggestion.)
- trusted_defined.c: replaced kzalloc with kmalloc, added pcrlock failure
error handling, added const qualifiers where appropriate.
- moved to late_initcall
- updated from hash to shash (suggestion by David Howells)
- reduced worst stack usage (tpm_seal) from 530 to 312 bytes
- moved documentation to Documentation directory (suggestion by David Howells)
- all the other code cleanups suggested by David Howells
- Add pcrlock CAP_SYS_ADMIN dependency (based on comment by Jason Gunthorpe)
- New options: migratable, pcrlock, keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth (based on
discussions with Jason Gunthorpe)
- Free payload on failure to create key(reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Updated Kconfig and other descriptions (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion)
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() (reported by Serge Hallyn)
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix an incorrect error check that returns 1 for error instead of the
expected error code.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix a bug in keyctl_session_to_parent() whereby it tries to check the ownership
of the parent process's session keyring whether or not the parent has a session
keyring [CVE-2010-2960].
This results in the following oops:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000a0
IP: [<ffffffff811ae4dd>] keyctl_session_to_parent+0x251/0x443
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff811ae2f3>] ? keyctl_session_to_parent+0x67/0x443
[<ffffffff8109d286>] ? __do_fault+0x24b/0x3d0
[<ffffffff811af98c>] sys_keyctl+0xb4/0xb8
[<ffffffff81001eab>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
if the parent process has no session keyring.
If the system is using pam_keyinit then it mostly protected against this as all
processes derived from a login will have inherited the session keyring created
by pam_keyinit during the log in procedure.
To test this, pam_keyinit calls need to be commented out in /etc/pam.d/.
Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There's an protected access to the parent process's credentials in the middle
of keyctl_session_to_parent(). This results in the following RCU warning:
===================================================
[ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ]
---------------------------------------------------
security/keys/keyctl.c:1291 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by keyctl-session-/2137:
#0: (tasklist_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff811ae2ec>] keyctl_session_to_parent+0x60/0x236
stack backtrace:
Pid: 2137, comm: keyctl-session- Not tainted 2.6.36-rc2-cachefs+ #1
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8105606a>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xaa/0xb3
[<ffffffff811ae379>] keyctl_session_to_parent+0xed/0x236
[<ffffffff811af77e>] sys_keyctl+0xb4/0xb6
[<ffffffff81001eab>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
The code should take the RCU read lock to make sure the parents credentials
don't go away, even though it's holding a spinlock and has IRQ disabled.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add a dummy printk function for the maintenance of unused printks through gcc
format checking, and also so that side-effect checking is maintained too.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
request_key() should return -ENOKEY if the key it constructs has been
negatively instantiated.
Without this, request_key() can return an unusable key to its caller,
and if the caller then does key_validate() that won't catch the problem.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In commit bb952bb98a there was the accidental
deletion of a statement from call_sbin_request_key() to render the process
keyring ID to a text string so that it can be passed to /sbin/request-key.
With gcc 4.6.0 this causes the following warning:
CC security/keys/request_key.o
security/keys/request_key.c: In function 'call_sbin_request_key':
security/keys/request_key.c:102:15: warning: variable 'prkey' set but not used
This patch reinstates that statement.
Without this statement, /sbin/request-key will get some random rubbish from the
stack as that parameter.
Signed-off-by: Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
keyctl_describe_key() turns the key reference it gets into a usable key pointer
and assigns that to a variable called 'key', which it then ignores in favour of
recomputing the key pointer each time it needs it. Make it use the precomputed
pointer instead.
Without this patch, gcc 4.6 reports that the variable key is set but not used:
building with gcc 4.6 I'm getting a warning message:
CC security/keys/keyctl.o
security/keys/keyctl.c: In function 'keyctl_describe_key':
security/keys/keyctl.c:472:14: warning: variable 'key' set but not used
Reported-by: Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Make /proc/keys check to see if the calling process possesses each key before
performing the security check. The possession check can be skipped if the key
doesn't have the possessor-view permission bit set.
This causes the keys a process possesses to show up in /proc/keys, even if they
don't have matching user/group/other view permissions.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Authorise a process to perform keyctl_set_timeout() on an uninstantiated key if
that process has the authorisation key for it.
This allows the instantiator to set the timeout on a key it is instantiating -
provided it does it before instantiating the key.
For instance, the test upcall script provided with the keyutils package could
be modified to set the expiry to an hour hence before instantiating the key:
[/usr/share/keyutils/request-key-debug.sh]
if [ "$3" != "neg" ]
then
+ keyctl timeout $1 3600
keyctl instantiate $1 "Debug $3" $4 || exit 1
else
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This is from a Smatch check I'm writing.
strncpy_from_user() returns -EFAULT on error so the first change just
silences a warning but doesn't change how the code works.
The other change is a bug fix because install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
can return a variety of errors such as -EINVAL, -EEXIST, -ENOMEM or
-EKEYREVOKED.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
No functional changes.
keyctl_session_to_parent() is the only user of signal->count which needs
the correct value. Change it to use thread_group_empty() instead, this
must be strictly equivalent under tasklist, and imho looks better.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
call_usermodehelper_keys() uses call_usermodehelper_setkeys() to change
subprocess_info->cred in advance. Now that we have info->init() we can
change this code to set tgcred->session_keyring in context of execing
kernel thread.
Note: since currently call_usermodehelper_keys() is never called with
UMH_NO_WAIT, call_usermodehelper_keys()->key_get() and umh_keys_cleanup()
are not really needed, we could rely on install_session_keyring_to_cred()
which does key_get() on success.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- C99 knows about USHRT_MAX/SHRT_MAX/SHRT_MIN, not
USHORT_MAX/SHORT_MAX/SHORT_MIN.
- Make SHRT_MIN of type s16, not int, for consistency.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix drivers/dma/timb_dma.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix security/keys/keyring.c]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We were using the wrong variable here so the error codes weren't being returned
properly. The original code returns -ENOKEY.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Do preallocation for __key_link() so that the various callers in request_key.c
can deal with any errors from this source before attempting to construct a key.
This allows them to assume that the actual linkage step is guaranteed to be
successful.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Errors from construct_alloc_key() shouldn't just be ignored in the way they are
by construct_key_and_link(). The only error that can be ignored so is
EINPROGRESS as that is used to indicate that we've found a key and don't need
to construct one.
We don't, however, handle ENOMEM, EDQUOT or EACCES to indicate allocation
failures of one sort or another.
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
keyring_serialise_link_sem is only needed for keyring->keyring links as it's
used to prevent cycle detection from being avoided by parallel keyring
additions.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
David Howells