Restructure to keyword=value pairs without spaces. Drop superfluous words in
text. Make invalid_context a keyword. Change result= keyword to seresult=.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[Minor rewrite to the patch subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
With the introduction of fair queued rwlock, recursive read_lock()
may hang the offending process if there is a write_lock() somewhere
in between.
With recursive read_lock checking enabled, the following error was
reported:
=============================================
[ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
3.16.0-rc1 #2 Tainted: G E
---------------------------------------------
load_policy/708 is trying to acquire lock:
(policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b32a>]
security_genfs_sid+0x3a/0x170
but task is already holding lock:
(policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b48c>]
security_fs_use+0x2c/0x110
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(policy_rwlock);
lock(policy_rwlock);
This patch fixes the occurrence of recursive read_lock() of
policy_rwlock by adding a helper function __security_genfs_sid()
which requires caller to take the lock before calling it. The
security_fs_use() was then modified to call the new helper function.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)
Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.
CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull audit update from Eric Paris:
"Again we stayed pretty well contained inside the audit system.
Venturing out was fixing a couple of function prototypes which were
inconsistent (didn't hurt anything, but we used the same value as an
int, uint, u32, and I think even a long in a couple of places).
We also made a couple of minor changes to when a couple of LSMs called
the audit system. We hoped to add aarch64 audit support this go
round, but it wasn't ready.
I'm disappearing on vacation on Thursday. I should have internet
access, but it'll be spotty. If anything goes wrong please be sure to
cc rgb@redhat.com. He'll make fixing things his top priority"
* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (50 commits)
audit: whitespace fix in kernel-parameters.txt
audit: fix location of __net_initdata for audit_net_ops
audit: remove pr_info for every network namespace
audit: Modify a set of system calls in audit class definitions
audit: Convert int limit uses to u32
audit: Use more current logging style
audit: Use hex_byte_pack_upper
audit: correct a type mismatch in audit_syscall_exit()
audit: reorder AUDIT_TTY_SET arguments
audit: rework AUDIT_TTY_SET to only grab spin_lock once
audit: remove needless switch in AUDIT_SET
audit: use define's for audit version
audit: documentation of audit= kernel parameter
audit: wait_for_auditd rework for readability
audit: update MAINTAINERS
audit: log task info on feature change
audit: fix incorrect set of audit_sock
audit: print error message when fail to create audit socket
audit: fix dangling keywords in audit_log_set_loginuid() output
audit: log on errors from filter user rules
...
Two of the conditions in selinux_audit_rule_match() should never happen and
the third indicates a race that should be retried. Remove the calls to
audit_log() (which call audit_log_start()) and deal with the errors in the
caller, logging only once if the condition is met. Calling audit_log_start()
in this location makes buffer allocation and locking more complicated in the
calling tree (audit_filter_user()).
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies"
This reverts commit 102aefdda4.
Explanation from Eric Paris:
SELinux policy can specify if it should use a filesystem's
xattrs or not. In current policy we have a specification that
fuse should not use xattrs but fuse.glusterfs should use
xattrs. This patch has a bug in which non-glusterfs
filesystems would match the rule saying fuse.glusterfs should
use xattrs. If both fuse and the particular filesystem in
question are not written to handle xattr calls during the mount
command, they will deadlock.
I have fixed the bug to do proper matching, however I believe a
revert is still the correct solution. The reason I believe
that is because the code still does not work. The s_subtype is
not set until after the SELinux hook which attempts to match on
the ".gluster" portion of the rule. So we cannot match on the
rule in question. The code is useless.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Dynamically allocate a couple of the larger stack variables in order to
reduce the stack footprint below 1024. gcc-4.8
security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function 'security_load_policy':
security/selinux/ss/services.c:1964:1: warning: the frame size of 1104 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
}
Also silence a couple of checkpatch warnings at the same time.
WARNING: sizeof policydb should be sizeof(policydb)
+ memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb);
WARNING: sizeof policydb should be sizeof(policydb)
+ memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Not considering sub filesystem has the following limitation. Support
for SELinux in FUSE is dependent on the particular userspace
filesystem, which is identified by the subtype. For e.g, GlusterFS,
a FUSE based filesystem supports SELinux (by mounting and processing
FUSE requests in different threads, avoiding the mount time
deadlock), whereas other FUSE based filesystems (identified by a
different subtype) have the mount time deadlock.
By considering the subtype of the filesytem in the SELinux policies,
allows us to specify a filesystem subtype, in the following way:
fs_use_xattr fuse.glusterfs gen_context(system_u:object_r:fs_t,s0);
This way not all FUSE filesystems are put in the same bucket and
subjected to the limitations of the other subtypes.
Signed-off-by: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Currently the packet class in SELinux is not checked if there are no
SECMARK rules in the security or mangle netfilter tables. Some systems
prefer that packets are always checked, for example, to protect the system
should the netfilter rules fail to load or if the nefilter rules
were maliciously flushed.
Add the always_check_network policy capability which, when enabled, treats
SECMARK as enabled, even if there are no netfilter SECMARK rules and
treats peer labeling as enabled, even if there is no Netlabel or
labeled IPSEC configuration.
Includes definition of "redhat1" SELinux policy capability, which
exists in the SELinux userpace library, to keep ordering correct.
The SELinux userpace portion of this was merged last year, but this kernel
change fell on the floor.
Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Rather than passing pointers to memory locations, strings, and other
stuff just give up on the separation and give security_fs_use the
superblock. It just makes the code easier to read (even if not easier to
reuse on some other OS)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We only have 6 options, so char is good enough, but use a short as that
packs nicely. This shrinks the superblock_security_struct just a little
bit.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
avc_add_callback now just used for registering reset functions
in initcalls, and the callback functions just did reset operations.
So, reducing the arguments to only one event is enough now.
Signed-off-by: Wanlong Gao <gaowanlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It's possible that the caller passed a NULL for scontext. However if this
is a defered mapping we might still attempt to call *scontext=kstrdup().
This is bad. Instead just return the len.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Because Fedora shipped userspace based on my development tree we now
have policy version 27 in the wild defining only default user, role, and
range. Thus to add default_type we need a policy.28.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
When new objects are created we have great and flexible rules to
determine the type of the new object. We aren't quite as flexible or
mature when it comes to determining the user, role, and range. This
patch adds a new ability to specify the place a new objects user, role,
and range should come from. For users and roles it can come from either
the source or the target of the operation. aka for files the user can
either come from the source (the running process and todays default) or
it can come from the target (aka the parent directory of the new file)
examples always are done with
directory context: system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512
process context: unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
[no rule]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_none
[default user source]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_source
[default user target]
system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_target
[default role source]
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_source
[default role target]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_target
[default range source low]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_source_low
[default range source high]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_high
[default range source low-high]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_low-high
[default range target low]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_target_low
[default range target high]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_high
[default range target low-high]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_low-high
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
My @hp.com will no longer be valid starting August 5, 2011 so an update is
necessary. My new email address is employer independent so we don't have
to worry about doing this again any time soon.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Right now security_get_user_sids() will pass in a NULL avd pointer to
avc_has_perm_noaudit(), which then forces that function to have a dummy
entry for that case and just generally test it.
Don't do it. The normal callers all pass a real avd pointer, and this
helper function is incredibly hot. So don't make avc_has_perm_noaudit()
do conditional stuff that isn't needed for the common case.
This also avoids some duplicated stack space.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To shorten the list we need to run if filename trans rules exist for the type
of the given parent directory I put them in a hashtable. Given the policy we
are expecting to use in Fedora this takes the worst case list run from about
5,000 entries to 17.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Right now we walk to filename trans rule list for every inode that is
created. First passes at policy using this facility creates around 5000
filename trans rules. Running a list of 5000 entries every time is a bad
idea. This patch adds a new ebitmap to policy which has a bit set for each
ttype that has at least 1 filename trans rule. Thus when an inode is
created we can quickly determine if any rules exist for this parent
directory type and can skip the list if we know there is definitely no
relevant entry.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
filename_compute_type() takes as arguments the numeric value of the type of
the subject and target. It does not take a context. Thus the names are
misleading. Fix the argument names.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
filename_compute_type used to take a qstr, but it now takes just a name.
Fix the comments to indicate it is an objname, not a qstr.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The len should be an size_t but is a ssize_t. Easy enough fix to silence
build warnings. We have no need for signed-ness.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Commit 6f5317e730 introduced a bug in the
handling of userspace object classes that is causing breakage for Xorg
when XSELinux is enabled. Fix the bug by changing map_class() to return
SECCLASS_NULL when the class cannot be mapped to a kernel object class.
Reported-by: "Justin P. Mattock" <justinmattock@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The attached patch allows /selinux/create takes optional 4th argument
to support TYPE_TRANSITION with name extension for userspace object
managers.
If 4th argument is not supplied, it shall perform as existing kernel.
In fact, the regression test of SE-PostgreSQL works well on the patched
kernel.
Thanks,
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kohei.kaigai@eu.nec.com>
[manually verify fuzz was not an issue, and it wasn't: eparis]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Commit 6f5317e730 introduced a bug in the
handling of userspace object classes that is causing breakage for Xorg
when XSELinux is enabled. Fix the bug by changing map_class() to return
SECCLASS_NULL when the class cannot be mapped to a kernel object class.
Reported-by: "Justin P. Mattock" <justinmattock@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Apply role_transition rules for all kinds of classes.
Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The socket SID would be computed on creation and no longer inherit
its creator's SID by default. Socket may have a different type but
needs to retain the creator's role and MLS attribute in order not
to break labeled networking and network access control.
The kernel value for a class would be used to determine if the class
if one of socket classes. If security_compute_sid is called from
userspace the policy value for a class would be mapped to the relevant
kernel value first.
Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Currently SELinux has rules which label new objects according to 3 criteria.
The label of the process creating the object, the label of the parent
directory, and the type of object (reg, dir, char, block, etc.) This patch
adds a 4th criteria, the dentry name, thus we can distinguish between
creating a file in an etc_t directory called shadow and one called motd.
There is no file globbing, regex parsing, or anything mystical. Either the
policy exactly (strcmp) matches the dentry name of the object or it doesn't.
This patch has no changes from today if policy does not implement the new
rules.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The sym_val_to_name type array can be quite large as it grows linearly with
the number of types. With known policies having over 5k types these
allocations are growing large enough that they are likely to fail. Convert
those to flex_array so no allocation is larger than PAGE_SIZE
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In rawhide type_val_to_struct will allocate 26848 bytes, an order 3
allocations. While this hasn't been seen to fail it isn't outside the
realm of possibiliy on systems with severe memory fragmentation. Convert
to flex_array so no allocation will ever be bigger than PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid is difficult to follow, especially the
return codes. Try to make the function obvious.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
selinuxfs.c has lots of different standards on how to handle return paths on
error. For the most part transition to
rc=errno
if (failure)
goto out;
[...]
out:
cleanup()
return rc;
Instead of doing cleanup mid function, or having multiple returns or other
options. This doesn't do that for every function, but most of the complex
functions which have cleanup routines on error.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
/selinux/policy allows a user to copy the policy back out of the kernel.
This patch allows userspace to actually mmap that file and use it directly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
There is interest in being able to see what the actual policy is that was
loaded into the kernel. The patch creates a new selinuxfs file
/selinux/policy which can be read by userspace. The actual policy that is
loaded into the kernel will be written back out to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
With the (long ago) interface change to have the secid_to_secctx functions
do the string allocation instead of having the caller do the allocation we
lost the ability to query the security server for the length of the
upcoming string. The SECMARK code would like to allocate a netlink skb
with enough length to hold the string but it is just too unclean to do the
string allocation twice or to do the allocation the first time and hold
onto the string and slen. This patch adds the ability to call
security_secid_to_secctx() with a NULL data pointer and it will just set
the slen pointer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch provides a new /selinux/status entry which allows applications
read-only mmap(2).
This region reflects selinux_kernel_status structure in kernel space.
struct selinux_kernel_status
{
u32 length; /* length of this structure */
u32 sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */
u32 enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */
u32 policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */
u32 deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */
};
When userspace object manager caches access control decisions provided
by SELinux, it needs to invalidate the cache on policy reload and setenforce
to keep consistency.
However, the applications need to check the kernel state for each accesses
on userspace avc, or launch a background worker process.
In heuristic, frequency of invalidation is much less than frequency of
making access control decision, so it is annoying to invoke a system call
to check we don't need to invalidate the userspace cache.
If we can use a background worker thread, it allows to receive invalidation
messages from the kernel. But it requires us an invasive coding toward the
base application in some cases; E.g, when we provide a feature performing
with SELinux as a plugin module, it is unwelcome manner to launch its own
worker thread from the module.
If we could map /selinux/status to process memory space, application can
know updates of selinux status; policy reload or setenforce.
A typical application checks selinux_kernel_status::sequence when it tries
to reference userspace avc. If it was changed from the last time when it
checked userspace avc, it means something was updated in the kernel space.
Then, the application can reset userspace avc or update current enforcing
mode, without any system call invocations.
This sequence number is updated according to the seqlock logic, so we need
to wait for a while if it is odd number.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
--
security/selinux/include/security.h | 21 ++++++
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 56 +++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/Makefile | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +
security/selinux/ss/status.c | 129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Current selinux policy can have over 3000 types. The type_attr_map in
policy is an array sized by the number of types times sizeof(struct ebitmap)
(12 on x86_64). Basic math tells us the array is going to be of length
3000 x 12 = 36,000 bytes. The largest 'safe' allocation on a long running
system is 16k. Most of the time a 32k allocation will work. But on long
running systems a 64k allocation (what we need) can fail quite regularly.
In order to deal with this I am converting the type_attr_map to use
flex_arrays. Let the library code deal with breaking this into PAGE_SIZE
pieces.
-v2
rework some of the if(!obj) BUG() to be BUG_ON(!obj)
drop flex_array_put() calls and just use a _get() object directly
-v3
make apply to James' tree (drop the policydb_write changes)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
policy load failure always return EINVAL even if the failure was for some
other reason (usually ENOMEM). This patch passes error codes back up the
stack where they will make their way to userspace. This might help in
debugging future problems with policy load.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch revert the commit of 7d52a155e3
which removed a part of type_attribute_bounds_av as a dead code.
However, at that time, we didn't find out the target side boundary allows
to handle some of pseudo /proc/<pid>/* entries with its process's security
context well.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
--
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix a couple of sparse warnings for callers of
context_struct_to_string, which takes a *u32, not an *int.
These cases are harmless as the values are not used.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Allow runtime switching between different policy types (e.g. from a MLS/MCS
policy to a non-MLS/non-MCS policy or viceversa).
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Richard Guy Briggs