An invariant of cap_bprm_set_creds is that every field in the new cred
structure that cap_bprm_set_creds might set, needs to be set every
time to ensure the fields does not get a stale value.
The field cap_ambient is not set every time cap_bprm_set_creds is
called, which means that if there is a suid or sgid script with an
interpreter that has neither the suid nor the sgid bits set the
interpreter should be able to accept ambient credentials.
Unfortuantely because cap_ambient is not reset to it's original value
the interpreter can not accept ambient credentials.
Given that the ambient capability set is expected to be controlled by
the caller, I don't think this is particularly serious. But it is
definitely worth fixing so the code works correctly.
I have tested to verify my reading of the code is correct and the
interpreter of a sgid can receive ambient capabilities with this
change and cannot receive ambient capabilities without this change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Fixes: 58319057b7 ("capabilities: ambient capabilities")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The MSCC bug fix in 'net' had to be slightly adjusted because the
register accesses are done slightly differently in net-next.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
1) Fix RCU warnings in ipv6 multicast router code, from Madhuparna
Bhowmik.
2) Nexthop attributes aren't being checked properly because of
mis-initialized iterator, from David Ahern.
3) Revert iop_idents_reserve() change as it caused performance
regressions and was just working around what is really a UBSAN bug
in the compiler. From Yuqi Jin.
4) Read MAC address properly from ROM in bmac driver (double iteration
proceeds past end of address array), from Jeremy Kerr.
5) Add Microsoft Surface device IDs to r8152, from Marc Payne.
6) Prevent reference to freed SKB in __netif_receive_skb_core(), from
Boris Sukholitko.
7) Fix ACK discard behavior in rxrpc, from David Howells.
8) Preserve flow hash across packet scrubbing in wireguard, from Jason
A. Donenfeld.
9) Cap option length properly for SO_BINDTODEVICE in AX25, from Eric
Dumazet.
10) Fix encryption error checking in kTLS code, from Vadim Fedorenko.
11) Missing BPF prog ref release in flow dissector, from Jakub Sitnicki.
12) dst_cache must be used with BH disabled in tipc, from Eric Dumazet.
13) Fix use after free in mlxsw driver, from Jiri Pirko.
14) Order kTLS key destruction properly in mlx5 driver, from Tariq
Toukan.
15) Check devm_platform_ioremap_resource() return value properly in
several drivers, from Tiezhu Yang.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (71 commits)
net: smsc911x: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error
net/mlx4_core: fix a memory leak bug.
net: ethernet: ti: cpsw: fix ASSERT_RTNL() warning during suspend
net: phy: mscc: fix initialization of the MACsec protocol mode
net: stmmac: don't attach interface until resume finishes
net: Fix return value about devm_platform_ioremap_resource()
net/mlx5: Fix error flow in case of function_setup failure
net/mlx5e: CT: Correctly get flow rule
net/mlx5e: Update netdev txq on completions during closure
net/mlx5: Annotate mutex destroy for root ns
net/mlx5: Don't maintain a case of del_sw_func being null
net/mlx5: Fix cleaning unmanaged flow tables
net/mlx5: Fix memory leak in mlx5_events_init
net/mlx5e: Fix inner tirs handling
net/mlx5e: kTLS, Destroy key object after destroying the TIS
net/mlx5e: Fix allowed tc redirect merged eswitch offload cases
net/mlx5: Avoid processing commands before cmdif is ready
net/mlx5: Fix a race when moving command interface to events mode
net/mlx5: Add command entry handling completion
rxrpc: Fix a memory leak in rxkad_verify_response()
...
Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent
IMA's mmap appraise policy rules. Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore
would be taken prior to i_mutex), files can not be measured or appraised at
this point. Eliminate this integrity gap, by denying the mprotect
PROT_EXECUTE change, if an mmap appraise policy rule exists.
On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS.
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
In the implementation of aa_audit_rule_init(), when aa_label_parse()
fails the allocated memory for rule is released using
aa_audit_rule_free(). But after this release, the return statement
tries to access the label field of the rule which results in
use-after-free. Before releasing the rule, copy errNo and return it
after release.
Fixes: 52e8c38001 ("apparmor: Fix memory leak of rule on error exit path")
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
policy_update() invokes begin_current_label_crit_section(), which
returns a reference of the updated aa_label object to "label" with
increased refcount.
When policy_update() returns, "label" becomes invalid, so the refcount
should be decreased to keep refcount balanced.
The reference counting issue happens in one exception handling path of
policy_update(). When aa_may_manage_policy() returns not NULL, the
refcnt increased by begin_current_label_crit_section() is not decreased,
causing a refcnt leak.
Fix this issue by jumping to "end_section" label when
aa_may_manage_policy() returns not NULL.
Fixes: 5ac8c355ae ("apparmor: allow introspecting the loaded policy pre internal transform")
Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang <xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xin Tan <tanxin.ctf@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
aa_change_profile() invokes aa_get_current_label(), which returns
a reference of the current task's label.
According to the comment of aa_get_current_label(), the returned
reference must be put with aa_put_label().
However, when the original object pointed by "label" becomes
unreachable because aa_change_profile() returns or a new object
is assigned to "label", reference count increased by
aa_get_current_label() is not decreased, causing a refcnt leak.
Fix this by calling aa_put_label() before aa_change_profile() return
and dropping unnecessary aa_get_current_label().
Fixes: 9fcf78cca1 ("apparmor: update domain transitions that are subsets of confinement at nnp")
Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang <xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xin Tan <tanxin.ctf@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Rename bprm->cap_elevated to bprm->active_secureexec and initialize it
in prepare_binprm instead of in cap_bprm_set_creds. Initializing
bprm->active_secureexec in prepare_binprm allows multiple
implementations of security_bprm_repopulate_creds to play nicely with
each other.
Rename security_bprm_set_creds to security_bprm_reopulate_creds to
emphasize that this path recomputes part of bprm->cred. This
recomputation avoids the time of check vs time of use problems that
are inherent in unix #! interpreters.
In short two renames and a move in the location of initializing
bprm->active_secureexec.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87o8qkzrxp.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
secid_to_secctx is not stackable, and since the BPF LSM registers this
hook by default, the call_int_hook logic is not suitable which
"bails-on-fail" and casues issues when other LSMs register this hook and
eventually breaks Audit.
In order to fix this, directly iterate over the security hooks instead
of using call_int_hook as suggested in:
https: //lore.kernel.org/bpf/9d0eb6c6-803a-ff3a-5603-9ad6d9edfc00@schaufler-ca.com/#t
Fixes: 98e828a065 ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks")
Fixes: 625236ba38 ("security: Fix the default value of secid_to_secctx hook")
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200520125616.193765-1-kpsingh@chromium.org
Today security_bprm_set_creds has several implementations:
apparmor_bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds,
smack_bprm_set_creds, and tomoyo_bprm_set_creds.
Except for cap_bprm_set_creds they all test bprm->called_set_creds and
return immediately if it is true. The function cap_bprm_set_creds
ignores bprm->calld_sed_creds entirely.
Create a new LSM hook security_bprm_creds_for_exec that is called just
before prepare_binprm in __do_execve_file, resulting in a LSM hook
that is called exactly once for the entire of exec. Modify the bits
of security_bprm_set_creds that only want to be called once per exec
into security_bprm_creds_for_exec, leaving only cap_bprm_set_creds
behind.
Remove bprm->called_set_creds all of it's former users have been moved
to security_bprm_creds_for_exec.
Add or upate comments a appropriate to bring them up to date and
to reflect this change.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87v9kszrzh.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> # For the LSM and Smack bits
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Implement the watch_key security hook in Smack to make sure that a key
grants the caller Read permission in order to set a watch on a key.
Also implement the post_notification security hook to make sure that the
notification source is granted Write permission by the watch queue.
For the moment, the watch_devices security hook is left unimplemented as
it's not obvious what the object should be since the queue is global and
didn't previously exist.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Implement the watch_key security hook to make sure that a key grants the
caller View permission in order to set a watch on a key.
For the moment, the watch_devices security hook is left unimplemented as
it's not obvious what the object should be since the queue is global and
didn't previously exist.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Since the meaning of combining the KEY_NEED_* constants is undefined, make
it so that you can't do that by turning them into an enum.
The enum is also given some extra values to represent special
circumstances, such as:
(1) The '0' value is reserved and causes a warning to trap the parameter
being unset.
(2) The key is to be unlinked and we require no permissions on it, only
the keyring, (this replaces the KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK flag).
(3) An override due to CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
(4) An override due to an instantiation token being present.
(5) The permissions check is being deferred to later key_permission()
calls.
The extra values give the opportunity for LSMs to audit these situations.
[Note: This really needs overhauling so that lookup_user_key() tells
key_task_permission() and the LSM what operation is being done and leaves
it to those functions to decide how to map that onto the available
permits. However, I don't really want to make these change in the middle
of the notifications patchset.]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Add a key/keyring change notification facility whereby notifications about
changes in key and keyring content and attributes can be received.
Firstly, an event queue needs to be created:
pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, 256);
then a notification can be set up to report notifications via that queue:
struct watch_notification_filter filter = {
.nr_filters = 1,
.filters = {
[0] = {
.type = WATCH_TYPE_KEY_NOTIFY,
.subtype_filter[0] = UINT_MAX,
},
},
};
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter);
keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
After that, records will be placed into the queue when events occur in
which keys are changed in some way. Records are of the following format:
struct key_notification {
struct watch_notification watch;
__u32 key_id;
__u32 aux;
} *n;
Where:
n->watch.type will be WATCH_TYPE_KEY_NOTIFY.
n->watch.subtype will indicate the type of event, such as
NOTIFY_KEY_REVOKED.
n->watch.info & WATCH_INFO_LENGTH will indicate the length of the
record.
n->watch.info & WATCH_INFO_ID will be the second argument to
keyctl_watch_key(), shifted.
n->key will be the ID of the affected key.
n->aux will hold subtype-dependent information, such as the key
being linked into the keyring specified by n->key in the case of
NOTIFY_KEY_LINKED.
Note that it is permissible for event records to be of variable length -
or, at least, the length may be dependent on the subtype. Note also that
the queue can be shared between multiple notifications of various types.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Add security hooks that will allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a watch
may be set. More than one hook is required as the watches watch different
types of object.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Add a security hook that allows an LSM to rule on whether a notification
message is allowed to be inserted into a particular watch queue.
The hook is given the following information:
(1) The credentials of the triggerer (which may be init_cred for a system
notification, eg. a hardware error).
(2) The credentials of the whoever set the watch.
(3) The notification message.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
syzbot found that
touch /proc/testfile
causes NULL pointer dereference at tomoyo_get_local_path()
because inode of the dentry is NULL.
Before c59f415a7c, Tomoyo received pid_ns from proc's s_fs_info
directly. Since proc_pid_ns() can only work with inode, using it in
the tomoyo_get_local_path() was wrong.
To avoid creating more functions for getting proc_ns, change the
argument type of the proc_pid_ns() function. Then, Tomoyo can use
the existing super_block to get pid_ns.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0000000000002f0c7505a5b0e04c@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200518180738.2939611-1-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+c1af344512918c61362c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: c59f415a7c ("Use proc_pid_ns() to get pid_namespace from the proc superblock")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull integrity fixes from Mimi Zohar:
"A couple of miscellaneous bug fixes for the integrity subsystem:
IMA:
- Properly modify the open flags in order to calculate the file hash.
- On systems requiring the IMA policy to be signed, the policy is
loaded differently. Don't differentiate between "enforce" and
either "log" or "fix" modes how the policy is loaded.
EVM:
- Two patches to fix an EVM race condition, normally the result of
attempting to load an unsupported hash algorithm.
- Use the lockless RCU version for walking an append only list"
* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()
evm: Fix RCU list related warnings
ima: Fix return value of ima_write_policy()
evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()
ima: Set file->f_mode instead of file->f_flags in ima_calc_file_hash()
Fixes coccicheck warnings:
security/apparmor/file.c:162:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'is_deleted' with return type bool
security/apparmor/file.c:362:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'xindex_is_subset' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:246:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_X' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:292:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_nameX' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:646:8-9: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_rlimits' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:604:8-9: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_secmark' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:538:8-9: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_trans_table' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:327:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_u32' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:345:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_u64' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:309:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_u8' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:568:8-9: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_xattrs' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:1007:10-11: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'verify_dfa_xindex' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:997:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'verify_xindex' with return type bool
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zou Wei <zou_wei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Previously 'label->proxy->label' value checking
and conditional reassigning were done twice in the same function.
The second one is redundant and can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Nosek <mateusznosek0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The current codebase makes use of the zero-length array language
extension to the C90 standard, but the preferred mechanism to declare
variable-length types such as these ones is a flexible array member[1][2],
introduced in C99:
struct foo {
int stuff;
struct boo array[];
};
By making use of the mechanism above, we will get a compiler warning
in case the flexible array does not occur last in the structure, which
will help us prevent some kind of undefined behavior bugs from being
inadvertently introduced[3] to the codebase from now on.
Also, notice that, dynamic memory allocations won't be affected by
this change:
"Flexible array members have incomplete type, and so the sizeof operator
may not be applied. As a quirk of the original implementation of
zero-length arrays, sizeof evaluates to zero."[1]
sizeof(flexible-array-member) triggers a warning because flexible array
members have incomplete type[1]. There are some instances of code in
which the sizeof operator is being incorrectly/erroneously applied to
zero-length arrays and the result is zero. Such instances may be hiding
some bugs. So, this work (flexible-array member conversions) will also
help to get completely rid of those sorts of issues.
This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle.
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21
[3] commit 7649773293 ("cxgb3/l2t: Fix undefined behaviour")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Split BPF operations that are allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN into
combination of CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN.
For backward compatibility include them in CAP_SYS_ADMIN as well.
The end result provides simple safety model for applications that use BPF:
- to load tracing program types
BPF_PROG_TYPE_{KPROBE, TRACEPOINT, PERF_EVENT, RAW_TRACEPOINT, etc}
use CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON
- to load networking program types
BPF_PROG_TYPE_{SCHED_CLS, XDP, SK_SKB, etc}
use CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN
There are few exceptions from this rule:
- bpf_trace_printk() is allowed in networking programs, but it's using
tracing mechanism, hence this helper needs additional CAP_PERFMON
if networking program is using this helper.
- BPF_F_ZERO_SEED flag for hash/lru map is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only
to discourage production use.
- BPF HW offload is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
- bpf_probe_write_user() is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only.
CAPs are not checked at attach/detach time with two exceptions:
- loading BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB is allowed for unprivileged users,
hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at attach time.
- flow_dissector detach doesn't check prog FD at detach,
hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at detach time.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to iterate BPF objects (progs, maps, links) via get_next_id
command and convert them to file descriptor via GET_FD_BY_ID command.
This restriction guarantees that mutliple tasks with CAP_BPF are not able to
affect each other. That leads to clean isolation of tasks. For example:
task A with CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN loads and attaches a firewall via bpf_link.
task B with the same capabilities cannot detach that firewall unless
task A explicitly passed link FD to task B via scm_rights or bpffs.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN can still detach/unload everything.
Two networking user apps with CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_NET_ADMIN can
accidentely mess with each other programs and maps.
Two networking user apps with CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_BPF cannot affect each other.
CAP_NET_ADMIN + CAP_BPF allows networking programs access only packet data.
Such networking progs cannot access arbitrary kernel memory or leak pointers.
bpftool, bpftrace, bcc tools binaries should NOT be installed with
CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON, since unpriv users will be able to read kernel secrets.
But users with these two permissions will be able to use these tracing tools.
CAP_PERFMON is least secure, since it allows kprobes and kernel memory access.
CAP_NET_ADMIN can stop network traffic via iproute2.
CAP_BPF is the safest from security point of view and harmless on its own.
Having CAP_BPF and/or CAP_NET_ADMIN is not enough to write into arbitrary map
and if that map is used by firewall-like bpf prog.
CAP_BPF allows many bpf prog_load commands in parallel. The verifier
may consume large amount of memory and significantly slow down the system.
Existing unprivileged BPF operations are not affected.
In particular unprivileged users are allowed to load socket_filter and cg_skb
program types and to create array, hash, prog_array, map-in-map map types.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513230355.7858-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Alexei Starovoitov says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2020-05-14
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
The main changes are:
1) Merged tag 'perf-for-bpf-2020-05-06' from tip tree that includes CAP_PERFMON.
2) support for narrow loads in bpf_sock_addr progs and additional
helpers in cg-skb progs, from Andrey.
3) bpf benchmark runner, from Andrii.
4) arm and riscv JIT optimizations, from Luke.
5) bpf iterator infrastructure, from Yonghong.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The IS_ERR_OR_NULL() function has two conditions and if we got really
unlucky we could hit a race where "ptr" started as an error pointer and
then was set to NULL. Both conditions would be false even though the
pointer at the end was NULL.
This patch fixes the problem by ensuring that "*tfm" can only be NULL
or valid. I have introduced a "tmp_tfm" variable to make that work. I
also reversed a condition and pulled the code in one tab.
Reported-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Fixes: 53de3b080d ("evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
A number of userspace tools, such as systemtap, need a way to see the
current lockdown state so they can gracefully deal with the kernel being
locked down. The state is already exposed in
/sys/kernel/security/lockdown, but is only readable by root. Adjust the
permissions so unprivileged users can read the state.
Fixes: 000d388ed3 ("security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM")
Cc: Frank Ch. Eigler <fche@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
commit a269434d2f ("LSM: separate LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY from LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH")
left behind this, remove it.
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Instead of manually allocating a 'struct shash_desc' on the stack and
calling crypto_shash_digest(), switch to using the new helper function
crypto_shash_tfm_digest() which does this for us.
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Don't immediately return if the signature is portable and security.ima is
not present. Just set error so that memory allocated is freed before
returning from evm_calc_hmac_or_hash().
Fixes: 50b977481f ("EVM: Add support for portable signature format")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
After adding the new add_rule() function in commit c52657d93b
("ima: refactor ima_init_policy()"), all appraisal flags are added to the
temp_ima_appraise variable. Revert to the previous behavior instead of
removing build_ima_appraise, to benefit from the protection offered by
__ro_after_init.
The mentioned commit introduced a bug, as it makes all the flags
modifiable, while build_ima_appraise flags can be protected with
__ro_after_init.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0.x
Fixes: c52657d93b ("ima: refactor ima_init_policy()")
Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Function ima_appraise_flag() returns the flag to be set in
temp_ima_appraise depending on the hook identifier passed as an argument.
It is not necessary to set the flag again for the POLICY_CHECK hook.
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Function hash_long() accepts unsigned long, while currently only one byte
is passed from ima_hash_key(), which calculates a key for ima_htable.
Given that hashing the digest does not give clear benefits compared to
using the digest itself, remove hash_long() and return the modulus
calculated on the first two bytes of the digest with the number of slots.
Also reduce the depth of the hash table by doubling the number of slots.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3323eec921 ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Acked-by: David.Laight@aculab.com (big endian system concerns)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch fixes the following warning and few other instances of
traversal of evm_config_xattrnames list:
[ 32.848432] =============================
[ 32.848707] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[ 32.848966] 5.7.0-rc1-00006-ga8d5875ce5f0b #1 Not tainted
[ 32.849308] -----------------------------
[ 32.849567] security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:231 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
Since entries are only added to the list and never deleted, use
list_for_each_entry_lockless() instead of list_for_each_entry_rcu for
traversing the list. Also, add a relevant comment in evm_secfs.c to
indicate this fact.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik <madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> (RCU viewpoint)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch fixes the return value of ima_write_policy() when a new policy
is directly passed to IMA and the current policy requires appraisal of the
file containing the policy. Currently, if appraisal is not in ENFORCE mode,
ima_write_policy() returns 0 and leads user space applications to an
endless loop. Fix this issue by denying the operation regardless of the
appraisal mode.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.10.x
Fixes: 19f8a84713 ("ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch avoids a kernel panic due to accessing an error pointer set by
crypto_alloc_shash(). It occurs especially when there are many files that
require an unsupported algorithm, as it would increase the likelihood of
the following race condition:
Task A: *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash() <= error pointer
Task B: if (*tfm == NULL) <= *tfm is not NULL, use it
Task B: rc = crypto_shash_init(desc) <= panic
Task A: *tfm = NULL
This patch uses the IS_ERR_OR_NULL macro to determine whether or not a new
crypto context must be created.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d46eb36995 ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash")
Co-developed-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Commit a408e4a86b ("ima: open a new file instance if no read
permissions") tries to create a new file descriptor to calculate a file
digest if the file has not been opened with O_RDONLY flag. However, if a
new file descriptor cannot be obtained, it sets the FMODE_READ flag to
file->f_flags instead of file->f_mode.
This patch fixes this issue by replacing f_flags with f_mode as it was
before that commit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.20.x
Fixes: a408e4a86b ("ima: open a new file instance if no read permissions")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The inode_smack cache is no longer used.
Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
"smk_lock" mutex is used during inode instantiation in
smack_d_instantiate()function. It has been used to avoid
simultaneous access on same inode security structure.
Since smack related initialization is done only once i.e during
inode creation. If the inode has already been instantiated then
smack_d_instantiate() function just returns without doing
anything.
So it means mutex lock is required only during inode creation.
But since 2 processes can't create same inodes or files
simultaneously. Also linking or some other file operation can't
be done simultaneously when the file is getting created since
file lookup will fail before dentry inode linkup which is done
after smack initialization.
So no mutex lock is required in inode_smack structure.
It will save memory as well as improve some performance.
If 40000 inodes are created in system, it will save 1.5 MB on
32-bit systems & 2.8 MB on 64-bit systems.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The mix of IS_ENABLED() and #ifdef checks has left a combination
that causes a warning about an unused variable:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c: In function 'smack_socket_connect':
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:2838:24: error: unused variable 'sip' [-Werror=unused-variable]
2838 | struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
Change the code to use C-style checks consistently so the compiler
can handle it correctly.
Fixes: 87fbfffcc8 ("broken ping to ipv6 linklocal addresses on debian buster")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
It is simpler to allocate them statically in the corresponding
structure, avoiding unnecessary kmalloc() calls and pointer
dereferencing.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: manual merging required in policydb.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The value of rc is still zero from the last assignment when the error
path is taken. Fix it by setting it to -ENOMEM before the
hashtab_create() call.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: e67b2ec9f6 ("selinux: store role transitions in a hash table")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
No need to traverse the hashtab to count its elements, hashtab already
tracks it for us.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Fix to return negative error code -ENOMEM from the kvcalloc() error
handling case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.
Fixes: acdf52d97f ("selinux: convert to kvmalloc")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200430' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two more SELinux patches to fix problems in the v5.7-rcX releases.
Wei Yongjun's patch fixes a return code in an error path, and my patch
fixes a problem where we were not correctly applying access controls
to all of the netlink messages in the netlink_send LSM hook"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200430' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send()
selinux: fix error return code in cond_read_list()
Fix the SELinux netlink_send hook to properly handle multiple netlink
messages in a single sk_buff; each message is parsed and subject to
SELinux access control. Prior to this patch, SELinux only inspected
the first message in the sk_buff.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull in Christoph Hellwig's series that changes the sysctl's ->proc_handler
methods to take kernel pointers instead. It gets rid of the set_fs address
space overrides used by BPF. As per discussion, pull in the feature branch
into bpf-next as it relates to BPF sysctl progs.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200427071508.GV23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk/T/
Fix to return negative error code -ENOMEM from the error handling
case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.
Fixes: 60abd3181d ("selinux: convert cond_list to array")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Instead of having all the sysctl handlers deal with user pointers, which
is rather hairy in terms of the BPF interaction, copy the input to and
from userspace in common code. This also means that the strings are
always NUL-terminated by the common code, making the API a little bit
safer.
As most handler just pass through the data to one of the common handlers
a lot of the changes are mechnical.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
I thought I fixed the counting in filename_trans_read_helper() to count
the compat rule count correctly in the final version, but it's still
wrong. To really count the same thing as in the compat path, we'd need
to add up the cardinalities of stype bitmaps of all datums.
Since the kernel currently doesn't implement an ebitmap_cardinality()
function (and computing the proper count would just waste CPU cycles
anyway), just document that we use the field only in case of the old
format and stop updating it in filename_trans_read_helper().
Fixes: 4300590243 ("selinux: implement new format of filename transitions")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
kernel + tools/perf:
Alexey Budankov:
- Introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space.
callchains:
Adrian Hunter:
- Allow using Intel PT to synthesize callchains for regular events.
Kan Liang:
- Stitch LBR records from multiple samples to get deeper backtraces,
there are caveats, see the csets for details.
perf script:
Andreas Gerstmayr:
- Add flamegraph.py script
BPF:
Jiri Olsa:
- Synthesize bpf_trampoline/dispatcher ksymbol events.
perf stat:
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:
- Honour --timeout for forked workloads.
Stephane Eranian:
- Force error in fallback on :k events, to avoid counting nothing when
the user asks for kernel events but is not allowed to.
perf bench:
Ian Rogers:
- Add event synthesis benchmark.
tools api fs:
Stephane Eranian:
- Make xxx__mountpoint() more scalable
libtraceevent:
He Zhe:
- Handle return value of asprintf.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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Merge tag 'perf-core-for-mingo-5.8-20200420' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux into perf/core
Pull perf/core fixes and improvements from Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:
kernel + tools/perf:
Alexey Budankov:
- Introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space.
callchains:
Adrian Hunter:
- Allow using Intel PT to synthesize callchains for regular events.
Kan Liang:
- Stitch LBR records from multiple samples to get deeper backtraces,
there are caveats, see the csets for details.
perf script:
Andreas Gerstmayr:
- Add flamegraph.py script
BPF:
Jiri Olsa:
- Synthesize bpf_trampoline/dispatcher ksymbol events.
perf stat:
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:
- Honour --timeout for forked workloads.
Stephane Eranian:
- Force error in fallback on :k events, to avoid counting nothing when
the user asks for kernel events but is not allowed to.
perf bench:
Ian Rogers:
- Add event synthesis benchmark.
tools api fs:
Stephane Eranian:
- Make xxx__mountpoint() more scalable
libtraceevent:
He Zhe:
- Handle return value of asprintf.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Before calculating a digest for each PCR bank, collisions were detected
with a SHA1 digest. This patch includes ima_hash_algo among the algorithms
used to calculate the template digest and checks collisions on that digest.
The position in the measurement entry array of the template digest
calculated with the IMA default hash algorithm is stored in the
ima_hash_algo_idx global variable and is determined at IMA initialization
time.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch modifies ima_calc_field_array_hash() to calculate a template
digest for each allocated PCR bank and SHA1. It also passes the tpm_digest
array of the template entry to ima_pcr_extend() or in case of a violation,
the pre-initialized digests array filled with 0xff.
Padding with zeros is still done if the mapping between TPM algorithm ID
and crypto ID is unknown.
This patch calculates again the template digest when a measurement list is
restored. Copying only the SHA1 digest (due to the limitation of the
current measurement list format) is not sufficient, as hash collision
detection will be done on the digest calculated with the IMA default hash
algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch creates a crypto_shash structure for each allocated PCR bank and
for SHA1 if a bank with that algorithm is not currently allocated.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch dynamically allocates the array of tpm_digest structures in
ima_alloc_init_template() and ima_restore_template_data(). The size of the
array is equal to the number of PCR banks plus ima_extra_slots, to make
room for SHA1 and the IMA default hash algorithm, when PCR banks with those
algorithms are not allocated.
Calculating the SHA1 digest is mandatory, as SHA1 still remains the default
hash algorithm for the measurement list. When IMA will support the Crypto
Agile format, remaining digests will be also provided.
The position in the measurement entry array of the SHA1 digest is stored in
the ima_sha1_idx global variable and is determined at IMA initialization
time.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
In preparation for the patch that calculates a digest for each allocated
PCR bank, this patch passes to ima_calc_field_array_hash() the
ima_template_entry structure, so that digests can be directly stored in
that structure instead of ima_digest_data.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Evaluate error in init_ima() before register_blocking_lsm_notifier() and
return if not zero.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.3.x
Fixes: b169424551 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
boot_aggregate is the first entry of IMA measurement list. Its purpose is
to link pre-boot measurements to IMA measurements. As IMA was designed to
work with a TPM 1.2, the SHA1 PCR bank was always selected even if a
TPM 2.0 with support for stronger hash algorithms is available.
This patch first tries to find a PCR bank with the IMA default hash
algorithm. If it does not find it, it selects the SHA256 PCR bank for
TPM 2.0 and SHA1 for TPM 1.2. Ultimately, it selects SHA1 also for TPM 2.0
if the SHA256 PCR bank is not found.
If none of the PCR banks above can be found, boot_aggregate file digest is
filled with zeros, as for TPM bypass, making it impossible to perform a
remote attestation of the system.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1.x
Fixes: 879b589210 ("tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read")
Reported-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Implement a new, more space-efficient way of storing filename
transitions in the binary policy. The internal structures have already
been converted to this new representation; this patch just implements
reading/writing an equivalent represntation from/to the binary policy.
This new format reduces the size of Fedora policy from 7.6 MB to only
3.3 MB (with policy optimization enabled in both cases). With the
unconfined module disabled, the size is reduced from 3.3 MB to 2.4 MB.
The time to load policy into kernel is also shorter with the new format.
On Fedora Rawhide x86_64 it dropped from 157 ms to 106 ms; without the
unconfined module from 115 ms to 105 ms.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Now that context hash computation no longer depends on policydb, we can
simplify things by moving the context hashing completely under sidtab.
The hash is still cached in sidtab entries, but not for the in-flight
context structures.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Always hashing the string representation is inefficient. Just hash the
contents of the structure directly (using jhash). If the context is
invalid (str & len are set), then hash the string as before, otherwise
hash the structured data.
Since the context hashing function is now faster (about 10 times), this
patch decreases the overhead of security_transition_sid(), which is
called from many hooks.
The jhash function seemed as a good choice, since it is used as the
default hashing algorithm in rhashtable.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
[PM: fixed some spelling errors in the comments pointed out by JVS]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Currently, they are stored in a linked list, which adds significant
overhead to security_transition_sid(). On Fedora, with 428 role
transitions in policy, converting this list to a hash table cuts down
its run time by about 50%. This was measured by running 'stress-ng --msg
1 --msg-ops 100000' under perf with and without this patch.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200416' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One small SELinux fix to ensure we cleanup properly on an error
condition"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200416' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: free str on error in str_read()
If seq_file .next function does not change position index,
read after some lseek can generate unexpected output:
$ dd if=/proc/keys bs=1 # full usual output
0f6bfdf5 I--Q--- 2 perm 3f010000 1000 1000 user 4af2f79ab8848d0a: 740
1fb91b32 I--Q--- 3 perm 1f3f0000 1000 65534 keyring _uid.1000: 2
27589480 I--Q--- 1 perm 0b0b0000 0 0 user invocation_id: 16
2f33ab67 I--Q--- 152 perm 3f030000 0 0 keyring _ses: 2
33f1d8fa I--Q--- 4 perm 3f030000 1000 1000 keyring _ses: 1
3d427fda I--Q--- 2 perm 3f010000 1000 1000 user 69ec44aec7678e5a: 740
3ead4096 I--Q--- 1 perm 1f3f0000 1000 65534 keyring _uid_ses.1000: 1
521+0 records in
521+0 records out
521 bytes copied, 0,00123769 s, 421 kB/s
But a read after lseek in middle of last line results in the partial
last line and then a repeat of the final line:
$ dd if=/proc/keys bs=500 skip=1
dd: /proc/keys: cannot skip to specified offset
g _uid_ses.1000: 1
3ead4096 I--Q--- 1 perm 1f3f0000 1000 65534 keyring _uid_ses.1000: 1
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
97 bytes copied, 0,000135035 s, 718 kB/s
and a read after lseek beyond end of file results in the last line being
shown:
$ dd if=/proc/keys bs=1000 skip=1 # read after lseek beyond end of file
dd: /proc/keys: cannot skip to specified offset
3ead4096 I--Q--- 1 perm 1f3f0000 1000 65534 keyring _uid_ses.1000: 1
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
76 bytes copied, 0,000119981 s, 633 kB/s
See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283
Fixes: 1f4aace60b ("fs/seq_file.c: simplify seq_file iteration code ...")
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Introduce the CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system
performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON
can assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for
performance monitoring and observability subsystems.
CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance
monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that
is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access
to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON
capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure.
Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for
performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e:
2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that
states that a process or program be granted only those privileges
(e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function,
and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and
observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted,
multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute
environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to
mass users of a system, and securely unblocks applicability and scalability
of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root
and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases.
CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance
monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN
credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1]
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel
developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system
performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability
usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations
is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.
Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance
of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues
following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs
in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development
process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring
and observability operations.
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5590d543-82c6-490a-6544-08e6a5517db0@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
In commit 66f8e2f03c ("selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash table") the
corresponding load is moved under the spin lock, so there is no race
possible and we can read the count directly. The smp_store_release() is
still needed to avoid racing with the lock-free readers.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In [see "Fixes:"] I missed the fact that str_read() may give back an
allocated pointer even if it returns an error, causing a potential
memory leak in filename_trans_read_one(). Fix this by making the
function free the allocated string whenever it returns a non-zero value,
which also makes its behavior more obvious and prevents repeating the
same mistake in the future.
Reported-by: coverity-bot <keescook+coverity-bot@chromium.org>
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1461665 ("Resource leaks")
Fixes: c3a276111e ("selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
fix below warnings reported by coccicheck
security/selinux/ss/mls.c:539:39-43: WARNING: Comparison to bool
security/selinux/ss/services.c:1815:46-50: WARNING: Comparison to bool
security/selinux/ss/services.c:1827:46-50: WARNING: Comparison to bool
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zou Wei <zou_wei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Original cgroup v2 eBPF code for filtering device access made it
possible to compile with CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE=n and still use the eBPF
filtering. Change
commit 4b7d4d453f ("device_cgroup: Export devcgroup_check_permission")
reverted this, making it required to set it to y.
Since the device filtering (and all the docs) for cgroup v2 is no longer
a "device controller" like it was in v1, someone might compile their
kernel with CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE=n. Then (for linux 5.5+) the eBPF
filter will not be invoked, and all processes will be allowed access
to all devices, no matter what the eBPF filter says.
Signed-off-by: Odin Ugedal <odin@ugedal.com>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Currently it is possible to specify a state machine table with 0 length,
this is not valid as optional tables are specified by not defining
the table as present. Further this allows by-passing the base tables
range check against the next/check tables.
Fixes: d901d6a298 ("apparmor: dfa split verification of table headers")
Reported-by: Mike Salvatore <mike.salvatore@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Merge tag 'keys-fixes-20200329' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyrings fixes from David Howells:
"Here's a couple of patches that fix a circular dependency between
holding key->sem and mm->mmap_sem when reading data from a key.
One potential issue is that a filesystem looking to use a key inside,
say, ->readpages() could deadlock if the key being read is the key
that's required and the buffer the key is being read into is on a page
that needs to be fetched.
The case actually detected is a bit more involved - with a filesystem
calling request_key() and locking the target keyring for write - which
could be being read"
* tag 'keys-fixes-20200329' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read
KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore
Here are 3 SPDX patches for 5.7-rc1.
One fixes up the SPDX tag for a single driver, while the other two go
through the tree and add SPDX tags for all of the .gitignore files as
needed.
Nothing too complex, but you will get a merge conflict with your current
tree, that should be trivial to handle (one file modified by two things,
one file deleted.)
All 3 of these have been in linux-next for a while, with no reported
issues other than the merge conflict.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'spdx-5.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx
Pull SPDX updates from Greg KH:
"Here are three SPDX patches for 5.7-rc1.
One fixes up the SPDX tag for a single driver, while the other two go
through the tree and add SPDX tags for all of the .gitignore files as
needed.
Nothing too complex, but you will get a merge conflict with your
current tree, that should be trivial to handle (one file modified by
two things, one file deleted.)
All three of these have been in linux-next for a while, with no
reported issues other than the merge conflict"
* tag 'spdx-5.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx:
ASoC: MT6660: make spdxcheck.py happy
.gitignore: add SPDX License Identifier
.gitignore: remove too obvious comments
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Just a couple of updates for linux-5.7:
- A new Kconfig option to enable IMA architecture specific runtime
policy rules needed for secure and/or trusted boot, as requested.
- Some message cleanup (eg. pr_fmt, additional error messages)"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: add a new CONFIG for loading arch-specific policies
integrity: Remove duplicate pr_fmt definitions
IMA: Add log statements for failure conditions
IMA: Update KBUILD_MODNAME for IMA files to ima
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights:
1) Fix the iwlwifi regression, from Johannes Berg.
2) Support BSS coloring and 802.11 encapsulation offloading in
hardware, from John Crispin.
3) Fix some potential Spectre issues in qtnfmac, from Sergey
Matyukevich.
4) Add TTL decrement action to openvswitch, from Matteo Croce.
5) Allow paralleization through flow_action setup by not taking the
RTNL mutex, from Vlad Buslov.
6) A lot of zero-length array to flexible-array conversions, from
Gustavo A. R. Silva.
7) Align XDP statistics names across several drivers for consistency,
from Lorenzo Bianconi.
8) Add various pieces of infrastructure for offloading conntrack, and
make use of it in mlx5 driver, from Paul Blakey.
9) Allow using listening sockets in BPF sockmap, from Jakub Sitnicki.
10) Lots of parallelization improvements during configuration changes
in mlxsw driver, from Ido Schimmel.
11) Add support to devlink for generic packet traps, which report
packets dropped during ACL processing. And use them in mlxsw
driver. From Jiri Pirko.
12) Support bcmgenet on ACPI, from Jeremy Linton.
13) Make BPF compatible with RT, from Thomas Gleixnet, Alexei
Starovoitov, and your's truly.
14) Support XDP meta-data in virtio_net, from Yuya Kusakabe.
15) Fix sysfs permissions when network devices change namespaces, from
Christian Brauner.
16) Add a flags element to ethtool_ops so that drivers can more simply
indicate which coalescing parameters they actually support, and
therefore the generic layer can validate the user's ethtool
request. Use this in all drivers, from Jakub Kicinski.
17) Offload FIFO qdisc in mlxsw, from Petr Machata.
18) Support UDP sockets in sockmap, from Lorenz Bauer.
19) Fix stretch ACK bugs in several TCP congestion control modules,
from Pengcheng Yang.
20) Support virtual functiosn in octeontx2 driver, from Tomasz
Duszynski.
21) Add region operations for devlink and use it in ice driver to dump
NVM contents, from Jacob Keller.
22) Add support for hw offload of MACSEC, from Antoine Tenart.
23) Add support for BPF programs that can be attached to LSM hooks,
from KP Singh.
24) Support for multiple paths, path managers, and counters in MPTCP.
From Peter Krystad, Paolo Abeni, Florian Westphal, Davide Caratti,
and others.
25) More progress on adding the netlink interface to ethtool, from
Michal Kubecek"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2121 commits)
net: ipv6: rpl_iptunnel: Fix potential memory leak in rpl_do_srh_inline
cxgb4/chcr: nic-tls stats in ethtool
net: dsa: fix oops while probing Marvell DSA switches
net/bpfilter: remove superfluous testing message
net: macb: Fix handling of fixed-link node
net: dsa: ksz: Select KSZ protocol tag
netdevsim: dev: Fix memory leak in nsim_dev_take_snapshot_write
net: stmmac: add EHL 2.5Gbps PCI info and PCI ID
net: stmmac: add EHL PSE0 & PSE1 1Gbps PCI info and PCI ID
net: stmmac: create dwmac-intel.c to contain all Intel platform
net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Support specifying VLAN tag egress rule
net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Add support for matching VLAN TCI
net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Move writing of CFP_DATA(5) into slicing functions
net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Check earlier for FLOW_EXT and FLOW_MAC_EXT
net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Disable learning for ASP port
net: dsa: b53: Deny enslaving port 7 for 7278 into a bridge
net: dsa: b53: Prevent tagged VLAN on port 7 for 7278
net: dsa: b53: Restore VLAN entries upon (re)configuration
net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Fix overflow checks
hv_netvsc: Remove unnecessary round_up for recv_completion_cnt
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200330' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"We've got twenty SELinux patches for the v5.7 merge window, the
highlights are below:
- Deprecate setting /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot to 1.
This flag was originally created to deal with legacy userspace and
the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag. We changed the default from
1 to 0 back in Linux v4.4 and now we are taking the next step of
deprecating it, at some point in the future we will take the final
step of rejecting 1.
- Allow kernfs symlinks to inherit the SELinux label of the parent
directory. In order to preserve backwards compatibility this is
protected by the genfs_seclabel_symlinks SELinux policy capability.
- Optimize how we store filename transitions in the kernel, resulting
in some significant improvements to policy load times.
- Do a better job calculating our internal hash table sizes which
resulted in additional policy load improvements and likely general
SELinux performance improvements as well.
- Remove the unused initial SIDs (labels) and improve how we handle
initial SIDs.
- Enable per-file labeling for the bpf filesystem.
- Ensure that we properly label NFS v4.2 filesystems to avoid a
temporary unlabeled condition.
- Add some missing XFS quota command types to the SELinux quota
access controls.
- Fix a problem where we were not updating the seq_file position
index correctly in selinuxfs.
- We consolidate some duplicated code into helper functions.
- A number of list to array conversions.
- Update Stephen Smalley's email address in MAINTAINERS"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200330' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: clean up indentation issue with assignment statement
NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode
MAINTAINERS: Update my email address
selinux: avtab_init() and cond_policydb_init() return void
selinux: clean up error path in policydb_init()
selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling
selinux: reduce the use of hard-coded hash sizes
selinux: Add xfs quota command types
selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions
selinux: factor out loop body from filename_trans_read()
security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs
selinux: generalize evaluate_cond_node()
selinux: convert cond_expr to array
selinux: convert cond_av_list to array
selinux: convert cond_list to array
selinux: sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position index
selinux: allow kernfs symlinks to inherit parent directory context
selinux: simplify evaluate_cond_node()
Documentation,selinux: deprecate setting checkreqprot to 1
selinux: move status variables out of selinux_ss
The assignment of e->type_names is indented one level too deep,
clean this up by removing the extraneous tab.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull EFI updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The EFI changes in this cycle are much larger than usual, for two
(positive) reasons:
- The GRUB project is showing signs of life again, resulting in the
introduction of the generic Linux/UEFI boot protocol, instead of
x86 specific hacks which are increasingly difficult to maintain.
There's hope that all future extensions will now go through that
boot protocol.
- Preparatory work for RISC-V EFI support.
The main changes are:
- Boot time GDT handling changes
- Simplify handling of EFI properties table on arm64
- Generic EFI stub cleanups, to improve command line handling, file
I/O, memory allocation, etc.
- Introduce a generic initrd loading method based on calling back
into the firmware, instead of relying on the x86 EFI handover
protocol or device tree.
- Introduce a mixed mode boot method that does not rely on the x86
EFI handover protocol either, and could potentially be adopted by
other architectures (if another one ever surfaces where one
execution mode is a superset of another)
- Clean up the contents of 'struct efi', and move out everything that
doesn't need to be stored there.
- Incorporate support for UEFI spec v2.8A changes that permit
firmware implementations to return EFI_UNSUPPORTED from UEFI
runtime services at OS runtime, and expose a mask of which ones are
supported or unsupported via a configuration table.
- Partial fix for the lack of by-VA cache maintenance in the
decompressor on 32-bit ARM.
- Changes to load device firmware from EFI boot service memory
regions
- Various documentation updates and minor code cleanups and fixes"
* 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (114 commits)
efi/libstub/arm: Fix spurious message that an initrd was loaded
efi/libstub/arm64: Avoid image_base value from efi_loaded_image
partitions/efi: Fix partition name parsing in GUID partition entry
efi/x86: Fix cast of image argument
efi/libstub/x86: Use ULONG_MAX as upper bound for all allocations
efi: Fix a mistype in comments mentioning efivar_entry_iter_begin()
efi/libstub: Avoid linking libstub/lib-ksyms.o into vmlinux
efi/x86: Preserve %ebx correctly in efi_set_virtual_address_map()
efi/x86: Ignore the memory attributes table on i386
efi/x86: Don't relocate the kernel unless necessary
efi/x86: Remove extra headroom for setup block
efi/x86: Add kernel preferred address to PE header
efi/x86: Decompress at start of PE image load address
x86/boot/compressed/32: Save the output address instead of recalculating it
efi/libstub/x86: Deal with exit() boot service returning
x86/boot: Use unsigned comparison for addresses
efi/x86: Avoid using code32_start
efi/x86: Make efi32_pe_entry() more readable
efi/x86: Respect 32-bit ABI in efi32_pe_entry()
efi/x86: Annotate the LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID with SYM_DATA
...
* The hooks are initialized using the definitions in
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h.
* The LSM can be enabled / disabled with CONFIG_BPF_LSM.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-6-kpsingh@chromium.org
The information about the different types of LSM hooks is scattered
in two locations i.e. union security_list_options and
struct security_hook_heads. Rather than duplicating this information
even further for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, define all the hooks with the
LSM_HOOK macro in lsm_hook_defs.h which is then used to generate all
the data structures required by the LSM framework.
The LSM hooks are defined as:
LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <default_value>, <hook_name>, args...)
with <default_value> acccessible in security.c as:
LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>)
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-3-kpsingh@chromium.org
By allocating a kernel buffer with a user-supplied buffer length, it
is possible that a false positive ENOMEM error may be returned because
the user-supplied length is just too large even if the system do have
enough memory to hold the actual key data.
Moreover, if the buffer length is larger than the maximum amount of
memory that can be returned by kmalloc() (2^(MAX_ORDER-1) number of
pages), a warning message will also be printed.
To reduce this possibility, we set a threshold (PAGE_SIZE) over which we
do check the actual key length first before allocating a buffer of the
right size to hold it. The threshold is arbitrary, it is just used to
trigger a buffer length check. It does not limit the actual key length
as long as there is enough memory to satisfy the memory request.
To further avoid large buffer allocation failure due to page
fragmentation, kvmalloc() is used to allocate the buffer so that vmapped
pages can be used when there is not a large enough contiguous set of
pages available for allocation.
In the extremely unlikely scenario that the key keeps on being changed
and made longer (still <= buflen) in between 2 __keyctl_read_key()
calls, the __keyctl_read_key() calling loop in keyctl_read_key() may
have to be iterated a large number of times, but definitely not infinite.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Some .gitignore files have comments like "Generated files",
"Ignore generated files" at the header part, but they are
too obvious.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Currently, when we add a new user key, the calltrace as below:
add_key()
key_create_or_update()
key_alloc()
__key_instantiate_and_link
generic_key_instantiate
key_payload_reserve
......
Since commit a08bf91ce2 ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly"),
we can reach max bytes/keys in key_alloc, but we forget to remove this
limit when we reserver space for payload in key_payload_reserve. So we
can only reach max keys but not max bytes when having delta between plen
and type->def_datalen. Remove this limit when instantiating the key, so we
can keep consistent with key_alloc.
Also, fix the similar problem in keyctl_chown_key().
Fixes: 0b77f5bfb4 ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys")
Fixes: a08bf91ce2 ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0.x
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Every time a new architecture defines the IMA architecture specific
functions - arch_ima_get_secureboot() and arch_ima_get_policy(), the IMA
include file needs to be updated. To avoid this "noise", this patch
defines a new IMA Kconfig IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT option, allowing
the different architectures to select it.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.ibm.com> (s390)
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The avtab_init() and cond_policydb_init() functions always return
zero so mark them as returning void and update the callers not to
check for a return value.
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit e0ac568de1 ("selinux: reduce the use of hard-coded hash sizes")
moved symtab initialization out of policydb_init(), but left the cleanup
of symtabs from the error path. This patch fixes the oversight.
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The #define for formatting log messages, pr_fmt, is duplicated in the
files under security/integrity.
This change moves the definition to security/integrity/integrity.h and
removes the duplicate definitions in the other files under
security/integrity.
With this change, the messages in the following files will be prefixed
with 'integrity'.
security/integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
security/integrity/iint.c
e.g. "integrity: Error adding keys to platform keyring %s\n"
And the messages in the following file will be prefixed with 'ima'.
security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
e.g. "ima: Allocating IMA blacklist keyring.\n"
For the rest of the files under security/integrity, there will be no
change in the message format.
Suggested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
process_buffer_measurement() does not have log messages for failure
conditions.
This change adds a log statement in the above function.
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The kbuild Makefile specifies object files for vmlinux in the $(obj-y)
lists. These lists depend on the kernel configuration[1].
The kbuild Makefile for IMA combines the object files for IMA into a
single object file namely ima.o. All the object files for IMA should be
combined into ima.o. But certain object files are being added to their
own $(obj-y). This results in the log messages from those modules getting
prefixed with their respective base file name, instead of "ima". This is
inconsistent with the log messages from the IMA modules that are combined
into ima.o.
This change fixes the above issue.
[1] Documentation\kbuild\makefiles.rst
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Remove initial SIDs that have never been used or are no longer used by
the kernel from its string table, which is also used to generate the
SECINITSID_* symbols referenced in code. Update the code to
gracefully handle the fact that these can now be NULL. Stop treating
it as an error if a policy defines additional initial SIDs unknown to
the kernel. Do not load unused initial SID contexts into the sidtab.
Fix the incorrect usage of the name from the ocontext in error
messages when loading initial SIDs since these are not presently
written to the kernel policy and are therefore always NULL.
After this change, it is possible to safely reclaim and reuse some of
the unused initial SIDs without compatibility issues. Specifically,
unused initial SIDs that were being assigned the same context as the
unlabeled initial SID in policies can be reclaimed and reused for
another purpose, with existing policies still treating them as having
the unlabeled context and future policies having the option of mapping
them to a more specific context. For example, this could have been
used when the infiniband labeling support was introduced to define
initial SIDs for the default pkey and endport SIDs similar to the
handling of port/netif/node SIDs rather than always using
SECINITSID_UNLABELED as the default.
The set of safely reclaimable unused initial SIDs across all known
policies is igmp_packet (13), icmp_socket (14), tcp_socket (15), kmod
(24), policy (25), and scmp_packet (26); these initial SIDs were
assigned the same context as unlabeled in all known policies including
mls. If only considering non-mls policies (i.e. assuming that mls
users always upgrade policy with their kernels), the set of safely
reclaimable unused initial SIDs further includes file_labels (6), init
(7), sysctl_modprobe (16), and sysctl_fs (18) through sysctl_dev (23).
Adding new initial SIDs beyond SECINITSID_NUM to policy unfortunately
became a fatal error in commit 24ed7fdae6 ("selinux: use separate
table for initial SID lookup") and even before that it could cause
problems on a policy reload (collision between the new initial SID and
one allocated at runtime) ever since commit 42596eafdd ("selinux:
load the initial SIDs upon every policy load") so we cannot safely
start adding new initial SIDs to policies beyond SECINITSID_NUM (27)
until such a time as all such kernels do not need to be supported and
only those that include this commit are relevant. That is not a big
deal since we haven't added a new initial SID since 2004 (v2.6.7) and
we have plenty of unused ones we can reclaim if we truly need one.
If we want to avoid the wasted storage in initial_sid_to_string[]
and/or sidtab->isids[] for the unused initial SIDs, we could introduce
an indirection between the kernel initial SID values and the policy
initial SID values and just map the policy SID values in the ocontexts
to the kernel values during policy_load_isids(). Originally I thought
we'd do this by preserving the initial SID names in the kernel policy
and creating a mapping at load time like we do for the security
classes and permissions but that would require a new kernel policy
format version and associated changes to libsepol/checkpolicy and I'm
not sure it is justified. Simpler approach is just to create a fixed
mapping table in the kernel from the existing fixed policy values to
the kernel values. Less flexible but probably sufficient.
A separate selinux userspace change was applied in
8677ce5e8f
to enable removal of most of the unused initial SID contexts from
policies, but there is no dependency between that change and this one.
That change permits removing all of the unused initial SID contexts
from policy except for the fs and sysctl SID contexts. The initial
SID declarations themselves would remain in policy to preserve the
values of subsequent ones but the contexts can be dropped. If/when
the kernel decides to reuse one of them, future policies can change
the name and start assigning a context again without breaking
compatibility.
Here is how I would envision staging changes to the initial SIDs in a
compatible manner after this commit is applied:
1. At any time after this commit is applied, the kernel could choose
to reclaim one of the safely reclaimable unused initial SIDs listed
above for a new purpose (i.e. replace its NULL entry in the
initial_sid_to_string[] table with a new name and start using the
newly generated SECINITSID_name symbol in code), and refpolicy could
at that time rename its declaration of that initial SID to reflect its
new purpose and start assigning it a context going
forward. Existing/old policies would map the reclaimed initial SID to
the unlabeled context, so that would be the initial default behavior
until policies are updated. This doesn't depend on the selinux
userspace change; it will work with existing policies and userspace.
2. In 6 months or so we'll have another SELinux userspace release that
will include the libsepol/checkpolicy support for omitting unused
initial SID contexts.
3. At any time after that release, refpolicy can make that release its
minimum build requirement and drop the sid context statements (but not
the sid declarations) for all of the unused initial SIDs except for
fs and sysctl, which must remain for compatibility on policy
reload with old kernels and for compatibility with kernels that were
still using SECINITSID_SYSCTL (< 2.6.39). This doesn't depend on this
kernel commit; it will work with previous kernels as well.
4. After N years for some value of N, refpolicy decides that it no
longer cares about policy reload compatibility for kernels that
predate this kernel commit, and refpolicy drops the fs and sysctl
SID contexts from policy too (but retains the declarations).
5. After M years for some value of M, the kernel decides that it no
longer cares about compatibility with refpolicies that predate step 4
(dropping the fs and sysctl SIDs), and those two SIDs also become
safely reclaimable. This step is optional and need not ever occur unless
we decide that the need to reclaim those two SIDs outweighs the
compatibility cost.
6. After O years for some value of O, refpolicy decides that it no
longer cares about policy load (not just reload) compatibility for
kernels that predate this kernel commit, and both kernel and refpolicy
can then start adding and using new initial SIDs beyond 27. This does
not depend on the previous change (step 5) and can occur independent
of it.
Fixes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/12
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Instead allocate hash tables with just the right size based on the
actual number of elements (which is almost always known beforehand, we
just need to defer the hashtab allocation to the right time). The only
case when we don't know the size (with the current policy format) is the
new filename transitions hashtable. Here I just left the existing value.
After this patch, the time to load Fedora policy on x86_64 decreases
from 790 ms to 167 ms. If the unconfined module is removed, it decreases
from 750 ms to 122 ms. It is also likely that other operations are going
to be faster, mainly string_to_context_struct() or mls_compute_sid(),
but I didn't try to quantify that.
The memory usage of all hash table arrays increases from ~58 KB to
~163 KB (with Fedora policy on x86_64).
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This time, the set of changes for the EFI subsystem is much larger than
usual. The main reasons are:
- Get things cleaned up before EFI support for RISC-V arrives, which will
increase the size of the validation matrix, and therefore the threshold to
making drastic changes,
- After years of defunct maintainership, the GRUB project has finally started
to consider changes from the distros regarding UEFI boot, some of which are
highly specific to the way x86 does UEFI secure boot and measured boot,
based on knowledge of both shim internals and the layout of bootparams and
the x86 setup header. Having this maintenance burden on other architectures
(which don't need shim in the first place) is hard to justify, so instead,
we are introducing a generic Linux/UEFI boot protocol.
Summary of changes:
- Boot time GDT handling changes (Arvind)
- Simplify handling of EFI properties table on arm64
- Generic EFI stub cleanups, to improve command line handling, file I/O,
memory allocation, etc.
- Introduce a generic initrd loading method based on calling back into
the firmware, instead of relying on the x86 EFI handover protocol or
device tree.
- Introduce a mixed mode boot method that does not rely on the x86 EFI
handover protocol either, and could potentially be adopted by other
architectures (if another one ever surfaces where one execution mode
is a superset of another)
- Clean up the contents of struct efi, and move out everything that
doesn't need to be stored there.
- Incorporate support for UEFI spec v2.8A changes that permit firmware
implementations to return EFI_UNSUPPORTED from UEFI runtime services at
OS runtime, and expose a mask of which ones are supported or unsupported
via a configuration table.
- Various documentation updates and minor code cleanups (Heinrich)
- Partial fix for the lack of by-VA cache maintenance in the decompressor
on 32-bit ARM. Note that these patches were deliberately put at the
beginning so they can be used as a stable branch that will be shared with
a PR containing the complete fix, which I will send to the ARM tree.
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Merge tag 'efi-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi into efi/core
Pull EFI updates for v5.7 from Ard Biesheuvel:
This time, the set of changes for the EFI subsystem is much larger than
usual. The main reasons are:
- Get things cleaned up before EFI support for RISC-V arrives, which will
increase the size of the validation matrix, and therefore the threshold to
making drastic changes,
- After years of defunct maintainership, the GRUB project has finally started
to consider changes from the distros regarding UEFI boot, some of which are
highly specific to the way x86 does UEFI secure boot and measured boot,
based on knowledge of both shim internals and the layout of bootparams and
the x86 setup header. Having this maintenance burden on other architectures
(which don't need shim in the first place) is hard to justify, so instead,
we are introducing a generic Linux/UEFI boot protocol.
Summary of changes:
- Boot time GDT handling changes (Arvind)
- Simplify handling of EFI properties table on arm64
- Generic EFI stub cleanups, to improve command line handling, file I/O,
memory allocation, etc.
- Introduce a generic initrd loading method based on calling back into
the firmware, instead of relying on the x86 EFI handover protocol or
device tree.
- Introduce a mixed mode boot method that does not rely on the x86 EFI
handover protocol either, and could potentially be adopted by other
architectures (if another one ever surfaces where one execution mode
is a superset of another)
- Clean up the contents of struct efi, and move out everything that
doesn't need to be stored there.
- Incorporate support for UEFI spec v2.8A changes that permit firmware
implementations to return EFI_UNSUPPORTED from UEFI runtime services at
OS runtime, and expose a mask of which ones are supported or unsupported
via a configuration table.
- Various documentation updates and minor code cleanups (Heinrich)
- Partial fix for the lack of by-VA cache maintenance in the decompressor
on 32-bit ARM. Note that these patches were deliberately put at the
beginning so they can be used as a stable branch that will be shared with
a PR containing the complete fix, which I will send to the ARM tree.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Testing the value of the efi.get_variable function pointer is not
the right way to establish whether the platform supports EFI
variables at runtime. Instead, use the newly added granular check
that can test for the presence of each EFI runtime service
individually.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Add Q_XQUOTAOFF, Q_XQUOTAON and Q_XSETQLIM to trigger filesystem quotamod
permission check.
Add Q_XGETQUOTA, Q_XGETQSTAT, Q_XGETQSTATV and Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA to trigger
filesystem quotaget permission check.
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In these rules, each rule with the same (target type, target class,
filename) values is (in practice) always mapped to the same result type.
Therefore, it is much more efficient to group the rules by (ttype,
tclass, filename).
Thus, this patch drops the stype field from the key and changes the
datum to be a linked list of one or more structures that contain a
result type and an ebitmap of source types that map the given target to
the given result type under the given filename. The size of the hash
table is also incremented to 2048 to be more optimal for Fedora policy
(which currently has ~2500 unique (ttype, tclass, filename) tuples,
regardless of whether the 'unconfined' module is enabled).
Not only does this dramtically reduce memory usage when the policy
contains a lot of unconfined domains (ergo a lot of filename based
transitions), but it also slightly reduces memory usage of strongly
confined policies (modeled on Fedora policy with 'unconfined' module
disabled) and significantly reduces lookup times of these rules on
Fedora (roughly matches the performance of the rhashtable conversion
patch [1] posted recently to selinux@vger.kernel.org).
An obvious next step is to change binary policy format to match this
layout, so that disk space is also saved. However, since that requires
more work (including matching userspace changes) and this patch is
already beneficial on its own, I'm posting it separately.
Performance/memory usage comparison:
Kernel | Policy load | Policy load | Mem usage | Mem usage | openbench
| | (-unconfined) | | (-unconfined) | (createfiles)
-----------------|-------------|---------------|-----------|---------------|--------------
reference | 1,30s | 0,91s | 90MB | 77MB | 55 us/file
rhashtable patch | 0.98s | 0,85s | 85MB | 75MB | 38 us/file
this patch | 0,95s | 0,87s | 75MB | 75MB | 40 us/file
(Memory usage is measured after boot. With SELinux disabled the memory
usage was ~60MB on the same system.)
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20200116213937.77795-1-dev@lynxeye.de/T/
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull IMA fixes from Mimi Zohar:
"Two bug fixes and an associated change for each.
The one that adds SM3 to the IMA list of supported hash algorithms is
a simple change, but could be considered a new feature"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: add sm3 algorithm to hash algorithm configuration list
crypto: rename sm3-256 to sm3 in hash_algo_name
efi: Only print errors about failing to get certs if EFI vars are found
x86/ima: use correct identifier for SetupMode variable
sm3 has been supported by the ima hash algorithm, but it is not
yet in the Kconfig configuration list. After adding, both ima and tpm2
can support sm3 well.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
If CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, the kernel attempts to load the certs
from the db, dbx and MokListRT EFI variables into the appropriate keyrings.
But it just assumes that the variables will be present and prints an error
if the certs can't be loaded, even when is possible that the variables may
not exist. For example the MokListRT variable will only be present if shim
is used.
So only print an error message about failing to get the certs list from an
EFI variable if this is found. Otherwise these printed errors just pollute
the kernel log ring buffer with confusing messages like the following:
[ 5.427251] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
[ 5.427261] MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
[ 5.428012] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
[ 5.428023] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT
Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
It simplifies cleanup in the error path. This will be extra useful in
later patch.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add support for genfscon per-file labeling of bpffs files. This allows
for separate permissions for different pinned bpf objects, which may
be completely unrelated to each other.
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Moreland <smoreland@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Both callers iterate the cond_list and call it for each node - turn it
into evaluate_cond_nodes(), which does the iteration for them.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since it is fixed-size after allocation and we know the size beforehand,
using a plain old array is simpler and more efficient.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since it is fixed-size after allocation and we know the size beforehand,
using a plain old array is simpler and more efficient.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since it is fixed-size after allocation and we know the size beforehand,
using a plain old array is simpler and more efficient.
While there, also fix signedness of some related variables/parameters.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200210' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two small fixes: one fixes a locking problem in the recently merged
label translation code, the other fixes an embarrassing 'binderfs' /
'binder' filesystem name check"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200210' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix sidtab string cache locking
selinux: fix typo in filesystem name
If seq_file .next function does not change position index,
read after some lseek can generate unexpected output.
$ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats # usual output
lookups hits misses allocations reclaims frees
817223 810034 7189 7189 6992 7037
1934894 1926896 7998 7998 7632 7683
1322812 1317176 5636 5636 5456 5507
1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
189 bytes copied, 5,1564e-05 s, 3,7 MB/s
$# read after lseek to midle of last line
$ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats bs=180 skip=1
dd: /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats: cannot skip to specified offset
056 9115 <<<< end of last line
1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115 <<< whole last line once again
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
45 bytes copied, 8,7221e-05 s, 516 kB/s
$# read after lseek beyond end of of file
$ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats bs=1000 skip=1
dd: /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats: cannot skip to specified offset
1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115 <<<< generates whole last line
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
36 bytes copied, 9,0934e-05 s, 396 kB/s
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Currently symlinks on kernel filesystems, like sysfs, are labeled on
creation with the parent filesystem root sid.
Allow symlinks to inherit the parent directory context, so fine-grained
kernfs labeling can be applied to symlinks too and checking contexts
doesn't complain about them.
For backward-compatibility this behavior is contained in a new policy
capability: genfs_seclabel_symlinks
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
It never fails, so it can just return void.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Deprecate setting the SELinux checkreqprot tunable to 1 via kernel
parameter or /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot. Setting it to 0 is left
intact for compatibility since Android and some Linux distributions
do so for security and treat an inability to set it as a fatal error.
Eventually setting it to 0 will become a no-op and the kernel will
stop using checkreqprot's value internally altogether.
checkreqprot was originally introduced as a compatibility mechanism
for legacy userspace and the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag.
However, if set to 1, it weakens security by allowing mappings to be
made executable without authorization by policy. The default value
for the SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE config option was changed
from 1 to 0 in commit 2a35d196c1 ("selinux: change
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default") and both Android
and Linux distributions began explicitly setting
/sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot to 0 some time ago.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
It fits more naturally in selinux_state, since it reflects also global
state (the enforcing and policyload fields).
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull vfs file system parameter updates from Al Viro:
"Saner fs_parser.c guts and data structures. The system-wide registry
of syntax types (string/enum/int32/oct32/.../etc.) is gone and so is
the horror switch() in fs_parse() that would have to grow another case
every time something got added to that system-wide registry.
New syntax types can be added by filesystems easily now, and their
namespace is that of functions - not of system-wide enum members. IOW,
they can be shared or kept private and if some turn out to be widely
useful, we can make them common library helpers, etc., without having
to do anything whatsoever to fs_parse() itself.
And we already get that kind of requests - the thing that finally
pushed me into doing that was "oh, and let's add one for timeouts -
things like 15s or 2h". If some filesystem really wants that, let them
do it. Without somebody having to play gatekeeper for the variants
blessed by direct support in fs_parse(), TYVM.
Quite a bit of boilerplate is gone. And IMO the data structures make a
lot more sense now. -200LoC, while we are at it"
* 'merge.nfs-fs_parse.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (25 commits)
tmpfs: switch to use of invalfc()
cgroup1: switch to use of errorfc() et.al.
procfs: switch to use of invalfc()
hugetlbfs: switch to use of invalfc()
cramfs: switch to use of errofc() et.al.
gfs2: switch to use of errorfc() et.al.
fuse: switch to use errorfc() et.al.
ceph: use errorfc() and friends instead of spelling the prefix out
prefix-handling analogues of errorf() and friends
turn fs_param_is_... into functions
fs_parse: handle optional arguments sanely
fs_parse: fold fs_parameter_desc/fs_parameter_spec
fs_parser: remove fs_parameter_description name field
add prefix to fs_context->log
ceph_parse_param(), ceph_parse_mon_ips(): switch to passing fc_log
new primitive: __fs_parse()
switch rbd and libceph to p_log-based primitives
struct p_log, variants of warnf() et.al. taking that one instead
teach logfc() to handle prefices, give it saner calling conventions
get rid of cg_invalf()
...
Unused now.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.6' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next
Pull smack fix from Casey Schaufler:
"One fix for an obscure error found using an old version of ping(1)
that did not use IPv6 sockets in the documented way"
* tag 'Smack-for-5.6' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
broken ping to ipv6 linklocal addresses on debian buster
Avoiding taking a lock in an IRQ context is not enough to prevent
deadlocks, as discovered by syzbot:
===
WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
5.5.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
-----------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.0/8927 [HC0[0]:SC0[2]:HE1:SE0] is trying to acquire:
ffff888027c94098 (&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline]
ffff888027c94098 (&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: sidtab_sid2str_put.part.0+0x36/0x880 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c:533
and this task is already holding:
ffffffff898639b0 (&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline]
ffffffff898639b0 (&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.}, at: nf_conntrack_lock+0x17/0x70 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:91
which would create a new lock dependency:
(&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.} -> (&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock){+.+.}
but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock:
(&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.}
[...]
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock);
lock(&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
[...]
===
Fix this by simply locking with irqsave/irqrestore and stop giving up on
!in_task(). It makes the locking a bit slower, but it shouldn't make a
big difference in real workloads. Under the scenario from [1] (only
cache hits) it only increased the runtime overhead from the
security_secid_to_secctx() function from ~2% to ~3% (it was ~5-65%
before introducing the cache).
[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1733259
Fixes: d97bd23c2d ("selinux: cache the SID -> context string translation")
Reported-by: syzbot+61cba5033e2072d61806@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Correct the filesystem name to "binder" to enable genfscon per-file
labelling for binderfs.
Fixes: 7a4b519474 ("selinux: allow per-file labelling for binderfs")
Signed-off-by: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: slight style changes to the subj/description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
I am seeing ping failures to IPv6 linklocal addresses with Debian
buster. Easiest example to reproduce is:
$ ping -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1
connect: Invalid argument
$ ping -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1
PING ff02::01%eth1(ff02::1%eth1) 56 data bytes
64 bytes from fe80::e0:f9ff:fe0c:37%eth1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.059 ms
git bisect traced the failure to
commit b9ef5513c9 ("smack: Check address length before reading address family")
Arguably ping is being stupid since the buster version is not setting
the address family properly (ping on stretch for example does):
$ strace -e connect ping6 -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1
connect(5, {sa_family=AF_UNSPEC,
sa_data="\4\1\0\0\0\0\377\2\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\1\3\0\0\0"}, 28)
= -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)
but the command works fine on kernels prior to this commit, so this is
breakage which goes against the Linux paradigm of "don't break userspace"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
This kunit update for Linux 5.6-rc1 consists of:
-- Support for building kunit as a module from Alan Maguire
-- AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack from Mike Salvatore
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Merge tag 'linux-kselftest-5.6-rc1-kunit' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest
Pull Kselftest kunit updates from Shuah Khan:
"This kunit update consists of:
- Support for building kunit as a module from Alan Maguire
- AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack from Mike Salvatore"
* tag 'linux-kselftest-5.6-rc1-kunit' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest:
kunit: building kunit as a module breaks allmodconfig
kunit: update documentation to describe module-based build
kunit: allow kunit to be loaded as a module
kunit: remove timeout dependence on sysctl_hung_task_timeout_seconds
kunit: allow kunit tests to be loaded as a module
kunit: hide unexported try-catch interface in try-catch-impl.h
kunit: move string-stream.h to lib/kunit
apparmor: add AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack
Pull openat2 support from Al Viro:
"This is the openat2() series from Aleksa Sarai.
I'm afraid that the rest of namei stuff will have to wait - it got
zero review the last time I'd posted #work.namei, and there had been a
leak in the posted series I'd caught only last weekend. I was going to
repost it on Monday, but the window opened and the odds of getting any
review during that... Oh, well.
Anyway, openat2 part should be ready; that _did_ get sane amount of
review and public testing, so here it comes"
From Aleksa's description of the series:
"For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown
flags are present[1].
This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road
to being added to openat(2).
Furthermore, the need for some sort of control over VFS's path
resolution (to avoid malicious paths resulting in inadvertent
breakouts) has been a very long-standing desire of many userspace
applications.
This patchset is a revival of Al Viro's old AT_NO_JUMPS[3] patchset
(which was a variant of David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[4] which
was a spin-off of the Capsicum project[5]) with a few additions and
changes made based on the previous discussion within [6] as well as
others I felt were useful.
In line with the conclusions of the original discussion of
AT_NO_JUMPS, the flag has been split up into separate flags. However,
instead of being an openat(2) flag it is provided through a new
syscall openat2(2) which provides several other improvements to the
openat(2) interface (see the patch description for more details). The
following new LOOKUP_* flags are added:
LOOKUP_NO_XDEV:
Blocks all mountpoint crossings (upwards, downwards, or through
absolute links). Absolute pathnames alone in openat(2) do not
trigger this. Magic-link traversal which implies a vfsmount jump is
also blocked (though magic-link jumps on the same vfsmount are
permitted).
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS:
Blocks resolution through /proc/$pid/fd-style links. This is done
by blocking the usage of nd_jump_link() during resolution in a
filesystem. The term "magic-links" is used to match with the only
reference to these links in Documentation/, but I'm happy to change
the name.
It should be noted that this is different to the scope of
~LOOKUP_FOLLOW in that it applies to all path components. However,
you can do openat2(NO_FOLLOW|NO_MAGICLINKS) on a magic-link and it
will *not* fail (assuming that no parent component was a
magic-link), and you will have an fd for the magic-link.
In order to correctly detect magic-links, the introduction of a new
LOOKUP_MAGICLINK_JUMPED state flag was required.
LOOKUP_BENEATH:
Disallows escapes to outside the starting dirfd's
tree, using techniques such as ".." or absolute links. Absolute
paths in openat(2) are also disallowed.
Conceptually this flag is to ensure you "stay below" a certain
point in the filesystem tree -- but this requires some additional
to protect against various races that would allow escape using
"..".
Currently LOOKUP_BENEATH implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, because it
can trivially beam you around the filesystem (breaking the
protection). In future, there might be similar safety checks done
as in LOOKUP_IN_ROOT, but that requires more discussion.
In addition, two new flags are added that expand on the above ideas:
LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS:
Does what it says on the tin. No symlink resolution is allowed at
all, including magic-links. Just as with LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS this
can still be used with NOFOLLOW to open an fd for the symlink as
long as no parent path had a symlink component.
LOOKUP_IN_ROOT:
This is an extension of LOOKUP_BENEATH that, rather than blocking
attempts to move past the root, forces all such movements to be
scoped to the starting point. This provides chroot(2)-like
protection but without the cost of a chroot(2) for each filesystem
operation, as well as being safe against race attacks that
chroot(2) is not.
If a race is detected (as with LOOKUP_BENEATH) then an error is
generated, and similar to LOOKUP_BENEATH it is not permitted to
cross magic-links with LOOKUP_IN_ROOT.
The primary need for this is from container runtimes, which
currently need to do symlink scoping in userspace[7] when opening
paths in a potentially malicious container.
There is a long list of CVEs that could have bene mitigated by
having RESOLVE_THIS_ROOT (such as CVE-2017-1002101,
CVE-2017-1002102, CVE-2018-15664, and CVE-2019-5736, just to name a
few).
In order to make all of the above more usable, I'm working on
libpathrs[8] which is a C-friendly library for safe path resolution.
It features a userspace-emulated backend if the kernel doesn't support
openat2(2). Hopefully we can get userspace to switch to using it, and
thus get openat2(2) support for free once it's ready.
Future work would include implementing things like
RESOLVE_NO_AUTOMOUNT and possibly a RESOLVE_NO_REMOTE (to allow
programs to be sure they don't hit DoSes though stale NFS handles)"
* 'work.openat2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
Documentation: path-lookup: include new LOOKUP flags
selftests: add openat2(2) selftests
open: introduce openat2(2) syscall
namei: LOOKUP_{IN_ROOT,BENEATH}: permit limited ".." resolution
namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like scoped resolution
namei: LOOKUP_BENEATH: O_BENEATH-like scoped resolution
namei: LOOKUP_NO_XDEV: block mountpoint crossing
namei: LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: block magic-link resolution
namei: LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS: block symlink resolution
namei: allow set_root() to produce errors
namei: allow nd_jump_link() to produce errors
nsfs: clean-up ns_get_path() signature to return int
namei: only return -ECHILD from follow_dotdot_rcu()
Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
"Just one minor fix this time"
* 'for-v5.6' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: remove EARLY_LSM_COUNT which never used
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Two new features - measuring certificates and querying IMA for a file
hash - and three bug fixes:
- Measuring certificates is like the rest of IMA, based on policy,
but requires loading a custom policy. Certificates loaded onto a
keyring, for example during early boot, before a custom policy has
been loaded, are queued and only processed after loading the custom
policy.
- IMA calculates and caches files hashes. Other kernel subsystems,
and possibly kernel modules, are interested in accessing these
cached file hashes.
The bug fixes prevent classifying a file short read (e.g. shutdown) as
an invalid file signature, add a missing blank when displaying the
securityfs policy rules containing LSM labels, and, lastly, fix the
handling of the IMA policy information for unknown LSM labels"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
IMA: Defined delayed workqueue to free the queued keys
IMA: Call workqueue functions to measure queued keys
IMA: Define workqueue for early boot key measurements
IMA: pre-allocate buffer to hold keyrings string
ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes
ima: add the ability to query the cached hash of a given file
ima: Add a space after printing LSM rules for readability
IMA: fix measuring asymmetric keys Kconfig
IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy
IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys
KEYS: Call the IMA hook to measure keys
IMA: Define an IMA hook to measure keys
IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys
IMA: Check IMA policy flag
ima: avoid appraise error for hash calc interrupt
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Add WireGuard
2) Add HE and TWT support to ath11k driver, from John Crispin.
3) Add ESP in TCP encapsulation support, from Sabrina Dubroca.
4) Add variable window congestion control to TIPC, from Jon Maloy.
5) Add BCM84881 PHY driver, from Russell King.
6) Start adding netlink support for ethtool operations, from Michal
Kubecek.
7) Add XDP drop and TX action support to ena driver, from Sameeh
Jubran.
8) Add new ipv4 route notifications so that mlxsw driver does not have
to handle identical routes itself. From Ido Schimmel.
9) Add BPF dynamic program extensions, from Alexei Starovoitov.
10) Support RX and TX timestamping in igc, from Vinicius Costa Gomes.
11) Add support for macsec HW offloading, from Antoine Tenart.
12) Add initial support for MPTCP protocol, from Christoph Paasch,
Matthieu Baerts, Florian Westphal, Peter Krystad, and many others.
13) Add Octeontx2 PF support, from Sunil Goutham, Geetha sowjanya, Linu
Cherian, and others.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1469 commits)
net: phy: add default ARCH_BCM_IPROC for MDIO_BCM_IPROC
udp: segment looped gso packets correctly
netem: change mailing list
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 debug features
qed: rt init valid initialization changed
qed: Debug feature: ilt and mdump
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Add fw overlay feature
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 HSI changes
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 iscsi/fcoe changes
qed: Add abstraction for different hsi values per chip
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Additional ll2 type
qed: Use dmae to write to widebus registers in fw_funcs
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Parser offsets modified
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Queue Manager changes
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Expose new registers and change windows
qed: FW 8.42.2.0 Internal ram offsets modifications
MAINTAINERS: Add entry for Marvell OcteonTX2 Physical Function driver
Documentation: net: octeontx2: Add RVU HW and drivers overview
octeontx2-pf: ethtool RSS config support
octeontx2-pf: Add basic ethtool support
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200127' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux update from Paul Moore:
"This is one of the bigger SELinux pull requests in recent years with
28 patches. Everything is passing our test suite and the highlights
are below:
- Mark CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE as deprecated. We're some time
away from actually attempting to remove this in the kernel, but the
only distro we know that still uses it (Fedora) is working on
moving away from this so we want to at least let people know we are
planning to remove it.
- Reorder the SELinux hooks to help prevent bad things when SELinux
is disabled at runtime. The proper fix is to remove the
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE functionality (see above) and just
take care of it at boot time (e.g. "selinux=0").
- Add SELinux controls for the kernel lockdown functionality,
introducing a new SELinux class/permissions: "lockdown { integrity
confidentiality }".
- Add a SELinux control for move_mount(2) that reuses the "file {
mounton }" permission.
- Improvements to the SELinux security label data store lookup
functions to speed up translations between our internal label
representations and the visible string labels (both directions).
- Revisit a previous fix related to SELinux inode auditing and
permission caching and do it correctly this time.
- Fix the SELinux access decision cache to cleanup properly on error.
In some extreme cases this could limit the cache size and result in
a decrease in performance.
- Enable SELinux per-file labeling for binderfs.
- The SELinux initialized and disabled flags were wrapped with
accessors to ensure they are accessed correctly.
- Mark several key SELinux structures with __randomize_layout.
- Changes to the LSM build configuration to only build
security/lsm_audit.c when needed.
- Changes to the SELinux build configuration to only build the IB
object cache when CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND is enabled.
- Move a number of single-caller functions into their callers.
- Documentation fixes (/selinux -> /sys/fs/selinux).
- A handful of cleanup patches that aren't worth mentioning on their
own, the individual descriptions have plenty of detail"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200127' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: (28 commits)
selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscall
selinux: do not allocate ancillary buffer on first load
selinux: remove redundant allocation and helper functions
selinux: remove redundant selinux_nlmsg_perm
selinux: fix wrong buffer types in policydb.c
selinux: reorder hooks to make runtime disable less broken
selinux: treat atomic flags more carefully
selinux: make default_noexec read-only after init
selinux: move ibpkeys code under CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND.
selinux: remove redundant msg_msg_alloc_security
Documentation,selinux: fix references to old selinuxfs mount point
selinux: deprecate disabling SELinux and runtime
selinux: allow per-file labelling for binderfs
selinuxfs: use scnprintf to get real length for inode
selinux: remove set but not used variable 'sidtab'
selinux: ensure the policy has been loaded before reading the sidtab stats
selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_update()
selinux: randomize layout of key structures
selinux: clean up selinux_enabled/disabled/enforcing_boot
selinux: remove unnecessary selinux cred request
...
This macro is never used from it was introduced in commit e6b1db98cf
("security: Support early LSMs"), better to remove it.
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Keys queued for measurement should be freed if a custom IMA policy
was not loaded. Otherwise, the keys will remain queued forever
consuming kernel memory.
This patch defines a delayed workqueue to handle the above scenario.
The workqueue handler is setup to execute 5 minutes after IMA
initialization is completed.
If a custom IMA policy is loaded before the workqueue handler is
scheduled to execute, the workqueue task is cancelled and any queued keys
are processed for measurement. But if a custom policy was not loaded then
the queued keys are just freed when the delayed workqueue handler is run.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com> # sleeping
function called from invalid context
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> # redefinition of
ima_init_key_queue() function.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Measuring keys requires a custom IMA policy to be loaded. Keys should
be queued for measurement if a custom IMA policy is not yet loaded.
Keys queued for measurement, if any, should be processed when a custom
policy is loaded.
This patch updates the IMA hook function ima_post_key_create_or_update()
to queue the key if a custom IMA policy has not yet been loaded. And,
ima_update_policy() function, which is called when a custom IMA policy
is loaded, is updated to process queued keys.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Measuring keys requires a custom IMA policy to be loaded. Keys created
or updated before a custom IMA policy is loaded should be queued and
will be processed after a custom policy is loaded.
This patch defines a workqueue for queuing keys when a custom IMA policy
has not yet been loaded. An intermediate Kconfig boolean option namely
IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS is used to declare the workqueue functions.
A flag namely ima_process_keys is used to check if the key should be
queued or should be processed immediately.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
ima_match_keyring() is called while holding rcu read lock. Since this
function executes in atomic context, it should not call any function
that can sleep (such as kstrdup()).
This patch pre-allocates a buffer to hold the keyrings string read from
the IMA policy and uses that to match the given keyring.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: e9085e0ad3 ("IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Keep the ima policy rules around from the beginning even if they appear
invalid at the time of loading, as they may become active after an lsm
policy load. However, loading a custom IMA policy with unknown LSM
labels is only safe after we have transitioned from the "built-in"
policy rules to a custom IMA policy.
Patch also fixes the rule re-use during the lsm policy reload and makes
some prints a bit more human readable.
Changelog:
v4:
- Do not allow the initial policy load refer to non-existing lsm rules.
v3:
- Fix too wide policy rule matching for non-initialized LSMs
v2:
- Fix log prints
Fixes: b169424551 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Konsta Karsisto <konsta.karsisto@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This allows other parts of the kernel (perhaps a stacked LSM allowing
system monitoring, eg. the proposed KRSI LSM [1]) to retrieve the hash
of a given file from IMA if it's present in the iint cache.
It's true that the existence of the hash means that it's also in the
audit logs or in /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements,
but it can be difficult to pull that information out for every
subsequent exec. This is especially true if a given host has been up
for a long time and the file was first measured a long time ago.
It should be kept in mind that this function gives access to cached
entries which can be removed, for instance on security_inode_free().
This is based on Peter Moody's patch:
https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/mailman/message/33036180/
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/9/10/393
Signed-off-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
When reading ima_policy from securityfs, there is a missing
space between output string of LSM rules and the remaining
rules.
Signed-off-by: Clay Chang <clayc@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The second check to ensure the xattrs are present and checked is
unneeded as this is already done in the profile attachment xmatch.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
There are cases where the a special out of band transition that can
not be triggered by input is useful in separating match conditions
in the dfa encoding.
The null_transition is currently used as an out of band transition
for match conditions that can not contain a \0 in their input
but apparmor needs an out of band transition for cases where
the match condition is allowed to contain any input character.
Achieve this by allowing for an explicit transition out of input
range that can only be triggered by code.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The subset test is not taking into account the unconfined exception
which will cause profile transitions in the stacked confinement
case to fail when no_new_privs is applied.
This fixes a regression introduced in the fix for
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1839037
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1844186
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
commit 1180b4c757 ("apparmor: fix dangling symlinks to policy
rawdata after replacement") reworked how the rawdata symlink is
handled but failedto remove aafs_create_symlink which was reduced to a
useles stub.
Fixes: 1180b4c757 ("apparmor: fix dangling symlinks to policy rawdata after replacement")
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
commit 2db154b3ea ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around")
introduced a new move_mount(2) system call and a corresponding new LSM
security_move_mount hook but did not implement this hook for any existing
LSM. This creates a regression for SELinux with respect to consistent
checking of mounts; the existing selinux_mount hook checks mounton
permission to the mount point path. Provide a SELinux hook
implementation for move_mount that applies this same check for
consistency. In the future we may wish to add a new move_mount
filesystem permission and check as well, but this addresses
the immediate regression.
Fixes: 2db154b3ea ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Check that a states diff encode flag is only set if diff encode is
enabled in the dfa header.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Two strings which did not contain a data format specification should be put
into a sequence. Thus use the corresponding function “seq_puts”.
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
In security_load_policy(), we can defer allocating the newpolicydb
ancillary array to after checking state->initialized, thereby avoiding
the pointless allocation when loading policy the first time.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: merged portions by hand]
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch removes the inode, file, and superblock security blob
allocation functions and moves the associated code into the
respective LSM hooks. This patch also removes the inode_doinit()
function as it was a trivial wrapper around
inode_doinit_with_dentry() and called from one location in the code.
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Eric W. Biederman