prefixes are used for fns/data that are not static to apparmorfs.c
with the prefixes being
aafs - special magic apparmorfs for policy namespace data
aa_sfs - for fns/data that go into securityfs
aa_fs - for fns/data that may be used in the either of aafs or
securityfs
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
apparmor should be checking the SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT constant. Also
in complain mode make it so apparmor can elect to log a message,
informing of the check.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The aad macro can replace aad strings when it is not intended to. Switch
to a fn macro so it is only applied when intended.
Also at the same time cleanup audit_data initialization by putting
common boiler plate behind a macro, and dropping the gfp_t parameter
which will become useless.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Mediation is based off of the cred but auditing includes the current
task which may not be related to the actual request.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
It isn't needed. If you don't set the type of the data associated with
that type it is a pretty obvious programming bug. So why waste the cycles?
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
apparmor is the only LSM that uses the common_audit_data tsk field.
Instead of making all LSMs pay for the stack space move the aa usage into
the apparmor_audit_data.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big
perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop. This patch
requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than
doing it in a union. Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their
portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a
bigger space requirement.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
ipc:
AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation
and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip.
rlimits:
AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at
a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled
or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current
hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if
necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value.
AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile
is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the
parent even if they are not confined by the same profile.
Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities,
that will further restrict.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
John Johansen