The device model itself has no real usable reference counting at the
moment and this causes problems if parents are deleted before their
children. The device model itself handles the memory details of this
correctly, but the uevent order is not consistent. This causes various
problems for systems like HAL or even X.
So until device_put() does a proper cleanup, the device for Bluetooth
connection will be protected with an extra reference counting to ensure
the correct order of uevents when connections are terminated.
This is not an automatic feature. Higher Bluetooth layers like HIDP or
BNEP should grab this new reference to ensure that their uevents are
send before the ones from the parent device.
Based on a report by Brian Rogers <brian@xyzw.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
With the re-write of the RFKILL subsystem it is now possible to easily
integrate RFKILL soft-switch support into the Bluetooth subsystem. All
Bluetooth devices will now get automatically RFKILL support.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Due to a semantic changes in flush_workqueue() the current approach of
synchronizing the sysfs handling for connections doesn't work anymore. The
whole approach is actually fully broken and based on assumptions that are
no longer valid.
With the introduction of Simple Pairing support, the creation of low-level
ACL links got changed. This change invalidates the reason why in the past
two independent work queues have been used for adding/removing sysfs
devices. The adding of the actual sysfs device is now postponed until the
host controller successfully assigns an unique handle to that link. So
the real synchronization happens inside the controller and not the host.
The only left-over problem is that some internals of the sysfs device
handling are not initialized ahead of time. This leaves potential access
to invalid data and can cause various NULL pointer dereferences. To fix
this a new function makes sure that all sysfs details are initialized
when an connection attempt is made. The actual sysfs device is only
registered when the connection has been successfully established. To
avoid a race condition with the registration, the check if a device is
registered has been moved into the removal work.
As an extra protection two flush_work() calls are left in place to
make sure a previous add/del work has been completed first.
Based on a report by Marc Pignat <marc.pignat@hevs.ch>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Tested-by: Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Roger Quadros <ext-roger.quadros@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Marc Pignat <marc.pignat@hevs.ch>
The Bluetooth stack uses a reference counting for all established ACL
links and if no user (L2CAP connection) is present, the link will be
terminated to save power. The problem part is the dedicated pairing
when using Legacy Pairing (Bluetooth 2.0 and before). At that point
no user is present and pairing attempts will be disconnected within
10 seconds or less. In previous kernel version this was not a problem
since the disconnect timeout wasn't triggered on incoming connections
for the first time. However this caused issues with broken host stacks
that kept the connections around after dedicated pairing. When the
support for Simple Pairing got added, the link establishment procedure
needed to be changed and now causes issues when using Legacy Pairing
When using Simple Pairing it is possible to do a proper reference
counting of ACL link users. With Legacy Pairing this is not possible
since the specification is unclear in some areas and too many broken
Bluetooth devices have already been deployed. So instead of trying to
deal with all the broken devices, a special pairing timeout will be
introduced that increases the timeout to 60 seconds when pairing is
triggered.
If a broken devices now puts the stack into an unforeseen state, the
worst that happens is the disconnect timeout triggers after 120 seconds
instead of 4 seconds. This allows successful pairings with legacy and
broken devices now.
Based on a report by Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Some of the qualification tests demand that in case of failures in L2CAP
the HCI disconnect should indicate a reason why L2CAP fails. This is a
bluntly layer violation since multiple L2CAP connections could be using
the same ACL and thus forcing a disconnect reason is not a good idea.
To comply with the Bluetooth test specification, the disconnect reason
is now stored in the L2CAP connection structure and every time a new
L2CAP channel is added it will set back to its default. So only in the
case where the L2CAP channel with the disconnect reason is really the
last one, it will propagated to the HCI layer.
The HCI layer has been extended with a disconnect indication that allows
it to ask upper layers for a disconnect reason. The upper layer must not
support this callback and in that case it will nicely default to the
existing behavior. If an upper layer like L2CAP can provide a disconnect
reason that one will be used to disconnect the ACL or SCO link.
No modification to the ACL disconnect timeout have been made. So in case
of Linux to Linux connection the initiator will disconnect the ACL link
before the acceptor side can signal the specific disconnect reason. That
is perfectly fine since Linux doesn't make use of this value anyway. The
L2CAP layer has a perfect valid error code for rejecting connection due
to a security violation. It is unclear why the Bluetooth specification
insists on having specific HCI disconnect reason.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The recommendation for the L2CAP PSM 1 (SDP) is to not use any kind
of authentication or encryption. So don't trigger authentication
for incoming and outgoing SDP connections.
For L2CAP PSM 3 (RFCOMM) there is no clear requirement, but with
Bluetooth 2.1 the initiator is required to enable authentication
and encryption first and this gets enforced. So there is no need
to trigger an additional authentication step. The RFCOMM service
security will make sure that a secure enough link key is present.
When the encryption gets enabled after the SDP connection setup,
then switch the security level from SDP to low security.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
When receiving incoming connection to specific services, always use
general bonding. This ensures that the link key gets stored and can be
used for further authentications.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and
SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is
no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as
SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE.
Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this
actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends
on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your
existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of
course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place
is a security issue.
The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now
used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this
way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation
is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also
enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since
this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of
the authentication can't be guaranteed.
As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level
is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on
PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with
a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be
used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level
will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only
the HIGH security level will require this.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The Security Mode 4 of the Bluetooth 2.1 specification has strict
authentication and encryption requirements. It is the initiators job
to create a secure ACL link. However in case of malicious devices, the
acceptor has to make sure that the ACL is encrypted before allowing
any kind of L2CAP connection. The only exception here is the PSM 1 for
the service discovery protocol, because that is allowed to run on an
insecure ACL link.
Previously it was enough to reject a L2CAP connection during the
connection setup phase, but with Bluetooth 2.1 it is forbidden to
do any L2CAP protocol exchange on an insecure link (except SDP).
The new hci_conn_check_link_mode() function can be used to check the
integrity of an ACL link. This functions also takes care of the cases
where Security Mode 4 is disabled or one of the devices is based on
an older specification.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
With the introduction of Security Mode 4 and Simple Pairing from the
Bluetooth 2.1 specification it became mandatory that the initiator
requires authentication and encryption before any L2CAP channel can
be established. The only exception here is PSM 1 for the service
discovery protocol (SDP). It is meant to be used without any encryption
since it contains only public information. This is how Bluetooth 2.0
and before handle connections on PSM 1.
For Bluetooth 2.1 devices the pairing procedure differentiates between
no bonding, general bonding and dedicated bonding. The L2CAP layer
wrongly uses always general bonding when creating new connections, but it
should not do this for SDP connections. In this case the authentication
requirement should be no bonding and the just-works model should be used,
but in case of non-SDP connection it is required to use general bonding.
If the new connection requires man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection, it
also first wrongly creates an unauthenticated link key and then later on
requests an upgrade to an authenticated link key to provide full MITM
protection. With Simple Pairing the link key generation is an expensive
operation (compared to Bluetooth 2.0 and before) and doing this twice
during a connection setup causes a noticeable delay when establishing
a new connection. This should be avoided to not regress from the expected
Bluetooth 2.0 connection times. The authentication requirements are known
up-front and so enforce them.
To fulfill these requirements the hci_connect() function has been extended
with an authentication requirement parameter that will be stored inside
the connection information and can be retrieved by userspace at any
time. This allows the correct IO capabilities exchange and results in
the expected behavior.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
With the Simple Pairing support, the authentication requirements are
an explicit setting during the bonding process. Track and enforce the
requirements and allow higher layers like L2CAP and RFCOMM to increase
them if needed.
This patch introduces a new IOCTL that allows to query the current
authentication requirements. It is also possible to detect Simple
Pairing support in the kernel this way.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The Bluetooth technology introduces new features on a regular basis
and for some of them it is important that the hardware on both sides
support them. For features like Simple Pairing it is important that
the host stacks on both sides have switched this feature on. To make
valid decisions, a config stage during ACL link establishment has been
introduced that retrieves remote features and if needed also the remote
extended features (known as remote host features) before signalling
this link as connected.
This change introduces full reference counting of incoming and outgoing
ACL links and the Bluetooth core will disconnect both if no owner of it
is present. To better handle interoperability during the pairing phase
the disconnect timeout for incoming connections has been increased to
10 seconds. This is five times more than for outgoing connections.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The Simple Pairing process can only be used if both sides have the
support enabled in the host stack. The current Bluetooth specification
has three ways to detect this support.
If an Extended Inquiry Result has been sent during inquiry then it
is safe to assume that Simple Pairing is enabled. It is not allowed
to enable Extended Inquiry without Simple Pairing. During the remote
name request phase a notification with the remote host supported
features will be sent to indicate Simple Pairing support. Also the
second page of the remote extended features can indicate support for
Simple Pairing.
For all three cases the value of remote Simple Pairing mode is stored
in the inquiry cache for later use.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The Simple Pairing feature is optional and needs to be enabled by the
host stack first. The Linux kernel relies on the Bluetooth daemon to
either enable or disable it, but at any time it needs to know the
current state of the Simple Pairing mode. So track any changes made
by external entities and store the current mode in the HCI device
structure.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The connection packet type can be changed after the connection has been
established and thus needs to be properly tracked to ensure that the
host stack has always correct and valid information about it.
On incoming connections the Bluetooth core switches the supported packet
types to the configured list for this controller. However the usefulness
of this feature has been questioned a lot. The general consent is that
every Bluetooth host stack should enable as many packet types as the
hardware actually supports and leave the decision to the link manager
software running on the Bluetooth chip.
When running on Bluetooth 2.0 or later hardware, don't change the packet
type for incoming connections anymore. This hardware likely supports
Enhanced Data Rate and thus leave it completely up to the link manager
to pick the best packet type.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The Bluetooth specification allows to enable or disable the encryption
of an ACL link at any time by either the peer or the remote device. If
a L2CAP or RFCOMM connection requested an encrypted link, they will now
disconnect that link if the encryption gets disabled. Higher protocols
that don't care about encryption (like SDP) are not affected.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
With the Bluetooth 1.2 specification the Extended SCO feature for
better audio connections was introduced. So far the Bluetooth core
wasn't able to handle any eSCO connections correctly. This patch
adds simple eSCO support while keeping backward compatibility with
older devices.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The Bluetooth HCI commands are divided into logical OGF groups for
easier identification of their purposes. While this still makes sense
for the written specification, its makes the code only more complex
and harder to read. So instead of using separate OGF and OCF values
to identify the commands, use a common 16-bit opcode that combines
both values. As a side effect this also reduces the complexity of
OGF and OCF calculations during command header parsing.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
To better support and handle eSCO links in the future a bunch of
constants needs to be added and some basic routines need to be
updated. This is the initial step.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Most drivers must handle fragmented HCI data packets and events. This
patch adds a generic function for their reassembly to the Bluetooth
core layer and thus allows to shrink the complexity of the drivers.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Most Bluetooth chips don't support concurrent connect requests, because
this would involve a multiple baseband page with only one radio. In the
case an upper layer like L2CAP requests a concurrent connect these chips
return the error "Command Disallowed" for the second request. If this
happens it the responsibility of the Bluetooth core to queue the request
and try again after the previous connect attempt has been completed.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
In case of non-blocking connects it is possible that the last user
of an ACL link quits before the connection has been fully established.
This will lead to a race condition where the internal state of a
connection is closed, but the actual link has been established and is
active. In case of Bluetooth 1.2 and later devices it is possible to
call create connection cancel to abort the connect. For older devices
the disconnect timer will be used to trigger the needed disconnect.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The local version information are needed to identify certain feature
sets of devices. They must be read on device init and stored for later
use. It is also possible to access them through the device model.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
This patch integrates the low-level connections (ACL and SCO) into the
driver model. Every connection is presented as device with the parent
set to its host controller device.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
This patch converts the Bluetooth class devices into real devices. The
Bluetooth class is kept and the driver core provides the appropriate
symlinks for backward compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
This patch adds a generic Bluetooth platform device that can be used
as parent device by virtual and serial devices.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
This patch introduces the automatic sniff mode feature. This allows
the host to switch idle connections into sniff mode to safe power.
Signed-off-by: Ulisses Furquim <ulissesf@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
This patch removes all relics of the /proc usage from the Bluetooth
subsystem core and its upper layers. All the previous information are
now available via /sys/class/bluetooth through appropriate functions.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch adds the endian annotations to the Bluetooth core.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!