Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Eric Paris c727709092 security: shmem: implement kernel private shmem inodes
We have a problem where the big_key key storage implementation uses a
shmem backed inode to hold the key contents.  Because of this detail of
implementation LSM checks are being done between processes trying to
read the keys and the tmpfs backed inode.  The LSM checks are already
being handled on the key interface level and should not be enforced at
the inode level (since the inode is an implementation detail, not a
part of the security model)

This patch implements a new function shmem_kernel_file_setup() which
returns the equivalent to shmem_file_setup() only the underlying inode
has S_PRIVATE set.  This means that all LSM checks for the inode in
question are skipped.  It should only be used for kernel internal
operations where the inode is not exposed to userspace without proper
LSM checking.  It is possible that some other users of
shmem_file_setup() should use the new interface, but this has not been
explored.

Reproducing this bug is a little bit difficult.  The steps I used on
Fedora are:

 (1) Turn off selinux enforcing:

	setenforce 0

 (2) Create a huge key

	k=`dd if=/dev/zero bs=8192 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key test-key @s`

 (3) Access the key in another context:

	runcon system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 keyctl print $k >/dev/null

 (4) Examine the audit logs:

	ausearch -m AVC -i --subject httpd_t | audit2allow

If the last command's output includes a line that looks like:

	allow httpd_t user_tmpfs_t:file { open read };

There was an inode check between httpd and the tmpfs filesystem.  With
this patch no such denial will be seen.  (NOTE! you should clear your
audit log if you have tested for this previously)

(Please return you box to enforcing)

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
2013-12-02 11:24:19 +00:00
David Howells 97826c821e KEYS: Fix error handling in big_key instantiation
In the big_key_instantiate() function we return 0 if kernel_write() returns us
an error rather than returning an error.  This can potentially lead to
dentry_open() giving a BUG when called from big_key_read() with an unset
tmpfile path.

	------------[ cut here ]------------
	kernel BUG at fs/open.c:798!
	...
	RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8119bbd1>] dentry_open+0xd1/0xe0
	...
	Call Trace:
	 [<ffffffff812350c5>] big_key_read+0x55/0x100
	 [<ffffffff81231084>] keyctl_read_key+0xb4/0xe0
	 [<ffffffff81231e58>] SyS_keyctl+0xf8/0x1d0
	 [<ffffffff815bb799>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b


Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
2013-11-13 16:51:06 +00:00
Wei Yongjun d2b8697024 KEYS: fix error return code in big_key_instantiate()
Fix to return a negative error code from the error handling
case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2013-10-30 12:54:29 +00:00
David Howells ab3c3587f8 KEYS: Implement a big key type that can save to tmpfs
Implement a big key type that can save its contents to tmpfs and thus
swapspace when memory is tight.  This is useful for Kerberos ticket caches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
2013-09-24 10:35:18 +01:00