* RCU-delayed freeing of vfsmounts
* vfsmount_lock replaced with a seqlock (mount_lock)
* sequence number from mount_lock is stored in nameidata->m_seq and
used when we exit RCU mode
* new vfsmount flag - MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT. Set by umount_tree() when its
caller knows that vfsmount will have no surviving references.
* synchronize_rcu() done between unlocking namespace_sem in namespace_unlock()
and doing pending mntput().
* new helper: legitimize_mnt(mnt, seq). Checks the mount_lock sequence
number against seq, then grabs reference to mnt. Then it rechecks mount_lock
again to close the race and either returns success or drops the reference it
has acquired. The subtle point is that in case of MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT we can
simply decrement the refcount and sod off - aforementioned synchronize_rcu()
makes sure that final mntput() won't come until we leave RCU mode. We need
that, since we don't want to end up with some lazy pathwalk racing with
umount() and stealing the final mntput() from it - caller of umount() may
expect it to return only once the fs is shut down and we don't want to break
that. In other cases (i.e. with MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT absent) we have to do
full-blown mntput() in case of mount_lock sequence number mismatch happening
just as we'd grabbed the reference, but in those cases we won't be stealing
the final mntput() from anything that would care.
* mntput_no_expire() doesn't lock anything on the fast path now. Incidentally,
SMP and UP cases are handled the same way - no ifdefs there.
* normal pathname resolution does *not* do any writes to mount_lock. It does,
of course, bump the refcounts of vfsmount and dentry in the very end, but that's
it.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Instead of passing the direction as argument (and checking it on every
step through the hash chain), just have separate __lookup_mnt() and
__lookup_mnt_last(). And use the standard iterators...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
aka br_write_{lock,unlock} of vfsmount_lock. Inlines in fs/mount.h,
vfsmount_lock extern moved over there as well.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
When the rootfs code was a wrapper around ramfs, having them in the same
file made sense. Now that it can wrap another filesystem type, move it in
with the init code instead.
This also allows a subsequent patch to access rootfstype= command line
arg.
Signed-off-by: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Jim Cromie <jim.cromie@gmail.com>
Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull vfs pile 2 (of many) from Al Viro:
"Mostly Miklos' series this time"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
constify dcache.c inlined helpers where possible
fuse: drop dentry on failed revalidate
fuse: clean up return in fuse_dentry_revalidate()
fuse: use d_materialise_unique()
sysfs: use check_submounts_and_drop()
nfs: use check_submounts_and_drop()
gfs2: use check_submounts_and_drop()
afs: use check_submounts_and_drop()
vfs: check unlinked ancestors before mount
vfs: check submounts and drop atomically
vfs: add d_walk()
vfs: restructure d_genocide()
Pull namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
"This is an assorted mishmash of small cleanups, enhancements and bug
fixes.
The major theme is user namespace mount restrictions. nsown_capable
is killed as it encourages not thinking about details that need to be
considered. A very hard to hit pid namespace exiting bug was finally
tracked and fixed. A couple of cleanups to the basic namespace
infrastructure.
Finally there is an enhancement that makes per user namespace
capabilities usable as capabilities, and an enhancement that allows
the per userns root to nice other processes in the user namespace"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy
capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged
pidns: Don't have unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) imply CLONE_THREAD
userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace.
namespaces: Simplify copy_namespaces so it is clear what is going on.
pidns: Fix hang in zap_pid_ns_processes by sending a potentially extra wakeup
sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs
userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted
vfs: Don't copy mount bind mounts of /proc/<pid>/ns/mnt between namespaces
kernel/nsproxy.c: Improving a snippet of code.
proc: Restrict mounting the proc filesystem
vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users
We check submounts before doing d_drop() on a non-empty directory dentry in
NFS (have_submounts()), but we do not exclude a racing mount. Nor do we
prevent mounts to be added to the disconnected subtree using relative paths
after the d_drop().
This patch fixes these issues by checking for unlinked (unhashed, non-root)
ancestors before proceeding with the mount. This is done with rename
seqlock taken for write and with ->d_lock grabbed on each ancestor in turn,
including our dentry itself. This ensures that the only one of
check_submounts_and_drop() or has_unlinked_ancestor() can succeed.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Christopher reported a regression where he was unable to unmount a NFS
filesystem where the root had gone stale. The problem is that
d_revalidate handles the root of the filesystem differently from other
dentries, but d_weak_revalidate does not. We could simply fix this by
making d_weak_revalidate return success on IS_ROOT dentries, but there
are cases where we do want to revalidate the root of the fs.
A umount is really a special case. We generally aren't interested in
anything but the dentry and vfsmount that's attached at that point. If
the inode turns out to be stale we just don't care since the intent is
to stop using it anyway.
Try to handle this situation better by treating umount as a special
case in the lookup code. Have it resolve the parent using normal
means, and then do a lookup of the final dentry without revalidating
it. In most cases, the final lookup will come out of the dcache, but
the case where there's a trailing symlink or !LAST_NORM entry on the
end complicates things a bit.
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Reported-by: Christopher T Vogan <cvogan@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
nsown_capable is a special case of ns_capable essentially for just CAP_SETUID and
CAP_SETGID. For the existing users it doesn't noticably simplify things and
from the suggested patches I have seen it encourages people to do the wrong
thing. So remove nsown_capable.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Rely on the fact that another flavor of the filesystem is already
mounted and do not rely on state in the user namespace.
Verify that the mounted filesystem is not covered in any significant
way. I would love to verify that the previously mounted filesystem
has no mounts on top but there are at least the directories
/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc and /sys/fs/cgroup/ that exist explicitly
for other filesystems to mount on top of.
Refactor the test into a function named fs_fully_visible and call that
function from the mount routines of proc and sysfs. This makes this
test local to the filesystems involved and the results current of when
the mounts take place, removing a weird threading of the user
namespace, the mount namespace and the filesystems themselves.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Don't copy bind mounts of /proc/<pid>/ns/mnt between namespaces.
These files hold references to a mount namespace and copying them
between namespaces could result in a reference counting loop.
The current mnt_ns_loop test prevents loops on the assumption that
mounts don't cross between namespaces. Unfortunately unsharing a
mount namespace and shared substrees can both cause mounts to
propogate between mount namespaces.
Add two flags CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE and CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE are added to
control this behavior, and CL_COPY_ALL is redefined as both of them.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This should actually be returning an ERR_PTR on error instead of NULL.
That was how it was designed and all the callers expect it.
[AV: actually, that's what "VFS: Make clone_mnt()/copy_tree()/collect_mounts()
return errors" missed - originally collect_mounts() was expected to return
NULL on failure]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10+
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
When creating a less privileged mount namespace or propogating mounts
from a more privileged to a less privileged mount namespace lock the
submounts so they may not be unmounted individually in the child mount
namespace revealing what is under them.
This enforces the reasonable expectation that it is not possible to
see under a mount point. Most of the time mounts are on empty
directories and revealing that does not matter, however I have seen an
occassionaly sloppy configuration where there were interesting things
concealed under a mount point that probably should not be revealed.
Expirable submounts are not locked because they will eventually
unmount automatically so whatever is under them already needs
to be safe for unprivileged users to access.
From a practical standpoint these restrictions do not appear to be
significant for unprivileged users of the mount namespace. Recursive
bind mounts and pivot_root continues to work, and mounts that are
created in a mount namespace may be unmounted there. All of which
means that the common idiom of keeping a directory of interesting
files and using pivot_root to throw everything else away continues to
work just fine.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
while list_add(A, B) and list_add(B, A) are equivalent when both A and B
are guaranteed to be empty, the usual idiom is list_add(what, where),
not the other way round... Not a bug per se, but only by accident and
it makes RTFS harder for no good reason.
Spotted-by: Rajat Sharma <fs.rajat@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull VFS updates from Al Viro,
Misc cleanups all over the place, mainly wrt /proc interfaces (switch
create_proc_entry to proc_create(), get rid of the deprecated
create_proc_read_entry() in favor of using proc_create_data() and
seq_file etc).
7kloc removed.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (204 commits)
don't bother with deferred freeing of fdtables
proc: Move non-public stuff from linux/proc_fs.h to fs/proc/internal.h
proc: Make the PROC_I() and PDE() macros internal to procfs
proc: Supply a function to remove a proc entry by PDE
take cgroup_open() and cpuset_open() to fs/proc/base.c
ppc: Clean up scanlog
ppc: Clean up rtas_flash driver somewhat
hostap: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree()
drm: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree()
drm: proc: Use minor->index to label things, not PDE->name
drm: Constify drm_proc_list[]
zoran: Don't print proc_dir_entry data in debug
reiserfs: Don't access the proc_dir_entry in r_open(), r_start() r_show()
proc: Supply an accessor for getting the data from a PDE's parent
airo: Use remove_proc_subtree()
rtl8192u: Don't need to save device proc dir PDE
rtl8187se: Use a dir under /proc/net/r8180/
proc: Add proc_mkdir_data()
proc: Move some bits from linux/proc_fs.h to linux/{of.h,signal.h,tty.h}
proc: Move PDE_NET() to fs/proc/proc_net.c
...
Split the proc namespace stuff out into linux/proc_ns.h.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
"A nasty bug in fs/namespace.c caught by Andrey + a couple of less
serious unpleasantness - ecryptfs misc device playing hopeless games
with try_module_get() and palinfo procfs support being... not quite
correctly done, to be polite."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
mnt: release locks on error path in do_loopback
palinfo fixes
procfs: add proc_remove_subtree()
ecryptfs: close rmmod race
... and provide namespace_lock() as a trivial wrapper;
switch to those two consistently.
Result is patterned after rtnl_lock/rtnl_unlock pair.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
global list of release_mounts() fodder, protected by namespace_sem;
eventually, all umount_tree() callers will use it as kill list.
Helper picking the contents of that list, releasing namespace_sem
and doing release_mounts() on what it got.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
do_loopback calls lock_mount(path) and forget to unlock_mount
if clone_mnt or copy_mnt fails.
[ 77.661566] ================================================
[ 77.662939] [ BUG: lock held when returning to user space! ]
[ 77.664104] 3.9.0-rc5+ #17 Not tainted
[ 77.664982] ------------------------------------------------
[ 77.666488] mount/514 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
[ 77.668027] 2 locks held by mount/514:
[ 77.668817] #0: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811cca22>] lock_mount+0x32/0xe0
[ 77.671755] #1: (&namespace_sem){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffff811cca3a>] lock_mount+0x4a/0xe0
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already
mounted when the user namespace is created.
proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is
per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces
are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that
is shared between every instance.
Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs
by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time
the user namespace was created.
In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are
mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all
(some form of mount namespace jail).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
When a read-only bind mount is copied from mount namespace in a higher
privileged user namespace to a mount namespace in a lesser privileged
user namespace, it should not be possible to remove the the read-only
restriction.
Add a MNT_LOCK_READONLY mount flag to indicate that a mount must
remain read-only.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.
Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.
For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace. Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.
Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead. With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
It's safe only under namespace_sem or vfsmount_lock; all places
in fs/namespace.c that want mnt->mnt_ns->user_ns actually want to use
current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns (note the calls of check_mnt() in
there).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The compiler may optimize the while loop and make the check just be done once,
so we should use ACCESS_ONCE() to guard access to ->mnt_flags
Signed-off-by: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> found a nasty little bug in
the permissions of setns. With unprivileged user namespaces it
became possible to create new namespaces without privilege.
However the setns calls were relaxed to only require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
the user nameapce of the targed namespace.
Which made the following nasty sequence possible.
pid = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS);
if (pid == 0) { /* child */
system("mount --bind /home/me/passwd /etc/passwd");
}
else if (pid != 0) { /* parent */
char path[PATH_MAX];
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%u/ns/mnt");
fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
setns(fd, 0);
system("su -");
}
Prevent this possibility by requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in the current user namespace when joing all but the user namespace.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Assign a unique proc inode to each namespace, and use that
inode number to ensure we only allocate at most one proc
inode for every namespace in proc.
A single proc inode per namespace allows userspace to test
to see if two processes are in the same namespace.
This has been a long requested feature and only blocked because
a naive implementation would put the id in a global space and
would ultimately require having a namespace for the names of
namespaces, making migration and certain virtualization tricks
impossible.
We still don't have per superblock inode numbers for proc, which
appears necessary for application unaware checkpoint/restart and
migrations (if the application is using namespace file descriptors)
but that is now allowd by the design if it becomes important.
I have preallocated the ipc and uts initial proc inode numbers so
their structures can be statically initialized.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Change return value from -EINVAL to -EPERM when the permission check fails.
Signed-off-by: Zhao Hongjiang <zhaohongjiang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- Add a filesystem flag to mark filesystems that are safe to mount as
an unprivileged user.
- Add a filesystem flag to mark filesystems that don't need MNT_NODEV
when mounted by an unprivileged user.
- Relax the permission checks to allow unprivileged users that have
CAP_SYS_ADMIN permissions in the user namespace referred to by the
current mount namespace to be allowed to mount, unmount, and move
filesystems.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Sharing mount subtress with mount namespaces created by unprivileged
users allows unprivileged mounts created by unprivileged users to
propagate to mount namespaces controlled by privileged users.
Prevent nasty consequences by changing shared subtrees to slave
subtress when an unprivileged users creates a new mount namespace.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Al Viro