For any given lower inode, eCryptfs keeps only one lower file open and
multiplexes all eCryptfs file operations through that lower file. The
lower file was considered "persistent" and stayed open from the first
lookup through the lifetime of the inode.
This patch keeps the notion of a single, per-inode lower file, but adds
reference counting around the lower file so that it is closed when not
currently in use. If the reference count is at 0 when an operation (such
as open, create, etc.) needs to use the lower file, a new lower file is
opened. Since the file is no longer persistent, all references to the
term persistent file are changed to lower file.
Locking is added around the sections of code that opens the lower file
and assign the pointer in the inode info, as well as the code the fputs
the lower file when all eCryptfs users are done with it.
This patch is needed to fix issues, when mounted on top of the NFSv3
client, where the lower file is left silly renamed until the eCryptfs
inode is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
A requested key is write locked in order to prevent modifications on the
authentication token while it is being used.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Authentication tokens content may change if another requestor calls the
update() method of the corresponding key. The new function
ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key() retrieves the authentication token from
the provided key and verifies if it is still valid before being used to
encrypt or decrypt an eCryptfs file.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
[tyhicks: Minor formatting changes]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Change the write path to encrypt the data only when the page is written to
disk in ecryptfs_writepage. Previously, ecryptfs encrypts the page in
ecryptfs_write_end which means that if there are multiple write requests to
the same page, ecryptfs ends up re-encrypting that page over and over again.
This patch minimizes the number of encryptions needed.
Signed-off-by: Thieu Le <thieule@chromium.org>
[tyhicks: Changed NULL .drop_inode sop pointer to generic_drop_inode]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Add __attribute__((format... to __ecryptfs_printk
Make formats and arguments match.
Add casts to (unsigned long long) for %llu.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
[tyhicks: 80 columns cleanup and fixed typo]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch initializes the 'magic' field of ecryptfs filesystems to
ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
[tyhicks: merge with 66cb76666d]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Stephen Rothwell reports that the vfs merge broke the build of ecryptfs.
The breakage comes from commit 66cb76666d ("sanitize ecryptfs
->mount()") which was obviously not even build tested. Tssk, tssk, Al.
This is the minimal build fixup for the situation, although I don't have
a filesystem to actually test it with.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kill ecryptfs_read_super(), reorder code allowing to use
normal d_alloc_root() instead of opencoding it.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reduce some branches and memory accesses in dcache lookup by adding dentry
flags to indicate common d_ops are set, rather than having to check them.
This saves a pointer memory access (dentry->d_op) in common path lookup
situations, and saves another pointer load and branch in cases where we
have d_op but not the particular operation.
Patched with:
git grep -E '[.>]([[:space:]])*d_op([[:space:]])*=' | xargs sed -e 's/\([^\t ]*\)->d_op = \(.*\);/d_set_d_op(\1, \2);/' -e 's/\([^\t ]*\)\.d_op = \(.*\);/d_set_d_op(\&\1, \2);/' -i
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ecryptfs/ecryptfs-2.6:
eCryptfs: Print mount_auth_tok_only param in ecryptfs_show_options
ecryptfs: added ecryptfs_mount_auth_tok_only mount parameter
ecryptfs: checking return code of ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig()
ecryptfs: release keys loaded in ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig()
eCryptfs: Clear LOOKUP_OPEN flag when creating lower file
ecryptfs: call vfs_setxattr() in ecryptfs_setxattr()
This patch adds a new mount parameter 'ecryptfs_mount_auth_tok_only' to
force ecryptfs to use only authentication tokens which signature has
been specified at mount time with parameters 'ecryptfs_sig' and
'ecryptfs_fnek_sig'. In this way, after disabling the passthrough and
the encrypted view modes, it's possible to make available to users only
files encrypted with the specified authentication token.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
[Tyler: Clean up coding style errors found by checkpatch]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This is a seriously simplified patch from Eric Sandeen; copy of
rationale follows:
===
mounting stacked ecryptfs on ecryptfs has been shown to lead to bugs
in testing. For crypto info in xattr, there is no mechanism for handling
this at all, and for normal file headers, we run into other trouble:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008
IP: [<ffffffffa015b0b3>] ecryptfs_d_revalidate+0x43/0xa0 [ecryptfs]
...
There doesn't seem to be any good usecase for this, so I'd suggest just
disallowing the configuration.
Based on a patch originally, I believe, from Mike Halcrow.
===
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
First of all, get_sb_nodev() grabs anon dev minor and we
never free it in ecryptfs ->kill_sb(). Moreover, on one
of the failure exits in ecryptfs_get_sb() we leak things -
it happens before we set ->s_root and ->put_super() won't
be called in that case. Solution: kill ->put_super(), do
all that stuff in ->kill_sb(). And use kill_anon_sb() instead
of generic_shutdown_super() to deal with anon dev leak.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
This get_nlinks parameter was never used by the only mainline user,
ecryptfs; and it has never been used by unionfs or wrapfs either.
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* do ima_get_count() in __dentry_open()
* stop doing that in followups
* move ima_path_check() to right after nameidata_to_filp()
* don't bump counters on it
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The unencrypted files are being measured. Update the counters to get
rid of the ecryptfs imbalance message. (http://bugzilla.redhat.com/519737)
Reported-by: Sachin Garg
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
If the lower inode is read-only, don't attempt to open the lower file
read/write and don't hand off the open request to the privileged
eCryptfs kthread for opening it read/write. Instead, only try an
unprivileged, read-only open of the file and give up if that fails.
This patch fixes an oops when eCryptfs is mounted on top of a read-only
mount.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <esandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
A feature was added to the eCryptfs umount helper to automatically
unlink the keys used for an eCryptfs mount from the kernel keyring upon
umount. This patch keeps the unrecognized mount option warnings for
ecryptfs_unlink_sigs out of the logs.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Copies the lower inode attributes to the upper inode before passing the
upper inode to d_instantiate(). This is important for
security_d_instantiate().
The problem was discovered by a user seeing SELinux denials like so:
type=AVC msg=audit(1236812817.898:47): avc: denied { 0x100000 } for
pid=3584 comm="httpd" name="testdir" dev=ecryptfs ino=943872
scontext=root:system_r:httpd_t:s0
tcontext=root:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t:s0 tclass=file
Notice target class is file while testdir is really a directory,
confusing the permission translation (0x100000) due to the wrong i_mode.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption
keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is
encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the
encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the
FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than
their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the
FNEK.
This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from
being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK
from being encrypted with a FNEK.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Enable mount-wide filename encryption by providing the Filename Encryption
Key (FNEK) signature as a mount option. Note that the ecryptfs-utils
userspace package versions 61 or later support this option.
When mounting with ecryptfs-utils version 61 or later, the mount helper
will detect the availability of the passphrase-based filename encryption
in the kernel (via the eCryptfs sysfs handle) and query the user
interactively as to whether or not he wants to enable the feature for the
mount. If the user enables filename encryption, the mount helper will
then prompt for the FNEK signature that the user wishes to use, suggesting
by default the signature for the mount passphrase that the user has
already entered for encrypting the file contents.
When not using the mount helper, the user can specify the signature for
the passphrase key with the ecryptfs_fnek_sig= mount option. This key
must be available in the user's keyring. The mount helper usually takes
care of this step. If, however, the user is not mounting with the mount
helper, then he will need to enter the passphrase key into his keyring
with some other utility prior to mounting, such as ecryptfs-manager.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have
SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself
when it opens its null chardev.
The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the
dentry_open hook in struct security_operations.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The netlink transport code has not worked for a while and the miscdev
transport is a simpler solution. This patch removes the netlink code and
makes the miscdev transport the only eCryptfs kernel to userspace
transport.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is a much better version of a previous patch to make the parser
tables constant. Rather than changing the typedef, we put the "const" in
all the various places where its required, allowing the __initconst
exception for nfsroot which was the cause of the previous trouble.
This was posted for review some time ago and I believe its been in -mm
since then.
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <aviro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Kmem cache passed to constructor is only needed for constructors that are
themselves multiplexeres. Nobody uses this "feature", nor does anybody uses
passed kmem cache in non-trivial way, so pass only pointer to object.
Non-trivial places are:
arch/powerpc/mm/init_64.c
arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage.c
This is flag day, yes.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jon Tollefson <kniht@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mm/slab.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix ubifs]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There is no good reason to immediately open the lower file, and that can
cause problems with files that the user does not intend to immediately
open, such as device nodes.
This patch removes the persistent file open from the interpose step and
pushes that to the locations where eCryptfs really does need the lower
persistent file, such as just before reading or writing the metadata
stored in the lower file header.
Two functions are jumping to out_dput when they should just be jumping to
out on error paths. This patch also fixes these.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When creating device nodes, eCryptfs needs to delay actually opening the lower
persistent file until an application tries to open. Device handles may not be
backed by anything when they first come into existence.
[Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu}
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Clean up overcomplicated string copy, which also gets rid of this
bogus warning:
fs/ecryptfs/main.c: In function 'ecryptfs_parse_options':
include/asm/arch/string_32.h:75: warning: array subscript is above array bounds
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Mounting with invalid key signatures should probably fail, if they were
specifically requested but not available.
Also fix case checks in process_request_key_err() for the right sign of
the errnos, as spotted by Jan Tluka.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Tluka <jtluka@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
eCryptfs would really like to have read-write access to all files in the
lower filesystem. Right now, the persistent lower file may be opened
read-only if the attempt to open it read-write fails. One way to keep
from having to do that is to have a privileged kthread that can open the
lower persistent file on behalf of the user opening the eCryptfs file;
this patch implements this functionality.
This patch will properly allow a less-privileged user to open the eCryptfs
file, followed by a more-privileged user opening the eCryptfs file, with
the first user only being able to read and the second user being able to
both read and write. eCryptfs currently does this wrong; it will wind up
calling vfs_write() on a file that was opened read-only. This is fixed in
this patch.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
__FUNCTION__ is gcc-specific, use __func__
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Add path_put() functions for releasing a reference to the dentry and
vfsmount of a struct path in the right order
* Switch from path_release(nd) to path_put(&nd->path)
* Rename dput_path() to path_put_conditional()
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good
reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects
that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata.
Together with the other patches of this series
- it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on
<dentry,vfsmount> pairs
- it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a
struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed
- it reduces the overall code size:
without patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5321639 858418 715768 6895825 6938d1 vmlinux
with patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5320026 858418 715768 6894212 693284 vmlinux
This patch:
Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Jeff Moyer pointed out that a mount; umount loop of ecryptfs, with the same
cipher & other mount options, created a new ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache item
each time, and the cache could grow quite large this way.
Looking at this with mhalcrow, we saw that ecryptfs_parse_options()
unconditionally called ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(), which is what was adding
these items.
Refactor ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name() to create a new
helper function, ecryptfs_tfm_exists(), which checks for the cipher on the
cached key_tfm_list, and sets a pointer to it if it exists. This can then
be called from ecryptfs_parse_options(), and new key_tfm's can be added
only when a cached one is not found.
With list locking changes suggested by akpm.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
ecryptfs_debug really should not be a mount option; it is not per-mount,
but rather sets a global "ecryptfs_verbosity" variable which affects all
mounted filesysytems. It's already settable as a module load option,
I think we can leave it at that.
Also, if set, since secret values come out in debug messages, kick
things off with a stern warning.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove internal references to header extents; just keep track of header bytes
instead. Headers can easily span multiple pages with the recent persistent
file changes.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- make the following needlessly global code static:
- crypto.c:ecryptfs_lower_offset_for_extent()
- crypto.c:key_tfm_list
- crypto.c:key_tfm_list_mutex
- inode.c:ecryptfs_getxattr()
- main.c:ecryptfs_init_persistent_file()
- remove the no longer used mmap.c:ecryptfs_lower_page_cache
- #if 0 the unused read_write.c:ecryptfs_read()
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There is no need for kobject_unregister() anymore, thanks to Kay's
kobject cleanup changes, so replace all instances of it with
kobject_put().
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Using a kset for this trivial directory is an overkill.
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This file violates the one-value-per-file sysfs rule.
If you all want it added back, please do something like a per-feature
file to show what is present and what isn't.
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Switch all dynamically created ksets, that export simple attributes,
to kobj_attribute from subsys_attribute. Struct subsys_attribute will
be removed.
Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This also renames fs_subsys to fs_kobj to catch all current users with a
build error instead of a build warning which can easily be missed.
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Tyler Hicks